THE  CHRONICLES 
OF  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOi 


UC-NRLF 


WOOD  ROW  ' 

A  N  D 


T 


: 


WOODROW    WILSON   AND   THE    WORLD 
WAR 


TEXTBOOK   EDITION 

THE  CHRONICLES 

OF  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 

GERHARD  R.  LOMER 

CHARLES   W.   JEFFERYS 

ASSISTANT  EDITORS 


WOODROW  WILSON 
AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

A  CHRONICLE  OF  OUR  OWN   TIMES 
BY  CHARLES /SEYMOUR 


NEW  HAVEN:  YALE   UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

TORONTO:  GLASGOW.   BROOK  &  CO. 

LONDON:  HJJM.PHREY   M^LFORD 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY'- PRESS 


REPLACING 

^  -?  2 '  i  3  f  2- 

Copy right y  1981*  by  Yale  University  Press, 


E7U 


CONTENTS 

I.     WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  Page  1 

II.     NEUTRALITY  "  27 

III.  THE   SUBMARINE  "  47 

IV.  PLOTS   AND   PREPAREDNESS  -  71 
V.     AMERICA   DECIDES  -  94 

VI.     THE   NATION  IN   ARMS  «  11 6 

VII.     THE  HOME  FRONT  "  150 

VIII.    THE  FIGHTING   FRONT  -  192 

IX.    THE   PATH  TO   PEACE  "  228 

X.     WAYS  OF  THE   PEACE   CONFERENCE    u  254 

XI.     BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  OF 

NATIONS?  «  281 

XII.     THE   SETTLEMENT  "  310 

XIII.  THE   SENATE  AND   THE   TREATY  "  330 

XIV.  CONCLUSION  «  352 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  «  361 
INDEX  -  367 

255 


vii 


&?'•' 


WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WORLD 
WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

WILSON   THE   EXECUTIVE 

WHEN,  on  March  4, 1913,  Woodrow  Wilson  entered 
the  White  House,  the  first  Democratic  president 
elected  in  twenty  years,  no  one  could  have  guessed 
the  importance  of  the  role  which  he  was  destined  to 
play.  While  business  men  and  industrial  leaders 
bewailed  the  mischance  that  had  brought  into 
power  a  man  whose  attitude  towards  vested  inter 
ests  was  reputed  none  too  friendly,  they  looked  up 
on  him  as  a  temporary  inconvenience.  Nor  did  the 
increasingly  large  body  of  independent  voters,  dis 
gusted  by  the  "stand-pattism"  of  the  Republican 
machine,  regard  Wilson  much  more  seriously; 
rather  did  they  place  their  confidence  in  a  rein- 
vigoration  of  the  Grand  Old  Party  through  the 


S:      WGODiRiOW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

progressive  leadership  of  Roosevelt,  whose  enthusi 
asm  and  practical  vision  had  attracted  the  approval 
of  more  than  four  million  voters  in  the  preceding 
election,  despite  his  lack  of  an  adequate  political 
organization.  Even  those  who  supported  Wilson 
most  whole-heartedly  believed  that  his  work  would 
lie  entirely  within  the  field  of  domestic  reform; 
little  did  they  imagine  that  he  would  play  a  part  in 
world  affairs  larger  than  had  fallen  to  any  citizen 
of  the  United  States  since  the  birth  of  the  country. 
The  new  President  was  fifty-six  years  old.  His 
background  was  primarily  academic,  a  fact  which, 
together  with  his  Scotch-Irish  ancestry,  the  Pres 
byterian  tradition  of  his  family,  and  his  early  years 
spent  in  the  South,  explains  much  in  his  character 
at  the  time  when  he  entered  upon  the  general  politi 
cal  stage.  After  graduating  from  Princeton  in 
1879,  where  his  career  gave  little  indication  of  ex 
traordinary  promise,  he  studied  law,  and  for  a  time 
his  shingle  hung  out  in  Atlanta.  He  seemed  un 
fitted  by  nature,  however,  for  either  pleasure  or 
success  in  the  practice  of  the  law.  Reserved  and 
cold,  except  with  his  intimates,  he  was  incapable  of 
attracting  clients  in  a  profession  and  locality  where 
ability  to  "mix"  was  a  prime  qualification.  A 
certain  lack  of  tolerance  for  the  failings  of  his  fellow 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  3 

mortals  may  have  combined  with  his  Presbyterian 
conscience  to  disgust  him  with  the  hard  give-and- 
take  of  the  struggling  lawyer's  life.  He  sought  es 
cape  in  graduate  work  in  history  and  politics  at 
Johns  Hopkins,  where,  in  1886,  he  received  his 
Ph.D.  for  a  thesis  entitled  Congressional  Govern 
ment,  a  study  remarkable  for  clear  thinking  and 
felicitous  expression.  These  qualities  character 
ized  his  work  as  a  professor  at  Bryn  Mawr  and 
Wesleyan  and  paved  his  path  to  an  appointment 
on  the  Princeton  faculty  in  1890,  as  Professor  of 
Jurisprudence  and  Politics. 

Despite  his  early  distaste  to  the  career  of  prac 
ticing  lawyer,  Wilson  was  by  no  means  the  man  to 
bury  himself  in  academic  research.  He  lacked  the 
scrupulous  patience  and  the  willingness  to  sub 
merge  his  own  personality  which  are  characteristic 
of  the  scientific  scholar.  His  gift  was  for  general 
ization,  and  his  writings  were  marked  by  clarity  ol 
thought  and  wealth  of  phrase,  rather  than  by  pro* 
fundity.  But  such  qualities  brought  him  remark 
able  success  as  a  lecturer  and  essayist,  and  constant 
practice  gave  him  a  fluency,  a  vocal  control,  and  a 
power  of  verbal  expression  which  assured  distinc 
tion  at  the  frequent  public  meetings  and  dinners 
where  he  was  called  upon  to  speak.  Professional 


4       WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

interest  in  the  science  of  government  furnished  him 
with  topics  of  far  wider  import  than  the  ordinary 
pedagogue  cares  to  handle,  and  he  became,  even  as 
professor,  well  known  outside  of  Princeton.  His 
influence,  already  broad  in  the  educational  and  not 
without  some  recognition  in  the  political  world,  was 
extended  in  1902,  when  he  was  chosen  President  of 
the  University. 

During  the  succeeding  eight  years  Wilson  en 
joyed  his  first  taste  of  executive  power,  and  certain 
traits  which  he  then  displayed  deserve  brief  notice. 
Although  a  "conservative"  in  his  advocacy  of  the 
maintenance  of  the  old-time  curriculum,  based  up 
on  the  ancient  languages  and  mathematics,  and  in 
his  opposition  to  the  free  elective  system,  he  proved 
an  inflexible  reformer  as  regards  methods  of  in 
struction,  the  efficiency  of  which  he  was  determined 
to  establish.  He  showed  a  ruthless  resolution  to 
eliminate  what  he  looked  upon  as  undemocratic 
social  habits  among  the  undergraduates,  and  did 
not  hesitate  to  cut  loose  from  tradition,  regardless 
of  the  prejudice  thereby  aroused  against  him.  As 
an  executive  he  evoked  intense  admiration  and 
virulent  dislike;  the  Board  of  Trustees  and  the 
alumni  body  were  alike  divided  between  enthu 
siastic  support  and  bitter  anathematization  of  the 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  5 

measures  he  proposed.  What  seems  obvious  is  that 
many  graduates  sympathized  with  his  purposes  but 
were  alienated  by  his  methods.  His  strength  lay 
chiefly  in  the  force  of  his  appeal  to  democratic 
sentiment;  his  weakness  in  complete  inability  to 
conciliate  opponents. 

At  the  moment  when  the  issue  of  the  struggle  at 
Princeton  was  still  undecided,  opportunity  was 
given  Wilson  to  enter  political  life;  an  ambition  for 
such  a  career  had  evidently  stirred  him  in  early 
days  and  was  doubtless  resuscitated  by  his  success 
as  a  public  speaker.  While  President  of  Princeton 
he  had  frequently  touched  upon  public  issues,  and 
so  early  as  1906  Colonel  George  Harvey  had  men 
tioned  him  as  a  possible  President  of  the  United 
States.  From  that  time  he  was  often  considered  as 
available  for  political  office,  and  in  1910,  with  New 
Jersey  stirred  by  a  strong  popular  movement 
against  boss-rule,  he  was  tendered  the  nomination 
for  Governor  of  that  State.  He  accepted  and 
proved  an  ideal  candidate.  Though  supported  by 
the  Democratic  machine,  which  planned  to  elect  a 
reformer  and  then  control  him,  Wilson  won  the  ad 
herence  of  independents  and  progressive  Republi 
cans  by  his  promise  to  break  the  power  of  the  boss 
system,  and  by  the  clarity  of  his  plans  for  reform. 


£       WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

His  appeals  to  the  spirit  of  democracy  and  mo 
rality,  while  they  voiced  nothing  new  in  an  elec 
toral  campaign,  rang  with  unusual  strength  and 
sincerity.  The  State,  which  had  gone  Repub 
lican  by  eighty-two  thousand  two  years  before, 
now  elected  Wilson  its  Governor  by  a  plurality 
of  forty-nine  thousand. 

He  retained  office  in  New  Jersey  for  only  two 
years.  During  that  period  he  achieved  a  high  de 
gree  of  success.  Had  he  served  longer  it  is  impossi 
ble  to  say  what  might  have  been  his  ultimate  posi 
tion,  for  as  at  Princeton,  elements  of  opposition  had 
begun  to  coalesce  against  him  and  he  had  found  no 
means  to  disarm  them.  As  Governor,  he  at  once 
declared  himself  head  of  the  party  and  by  a  display 
of  firm  activity  dominated  the  machine.  The 
Democratic  boss,  Senator  James  Smith,  was  sternly 
enjoined  from  seeking  reelection  to  the  Senate,  and 
when,  in  defiance  of  promises  and  the  wish  of  the 
voters  as  expressed  at  the  primaries,  he  attempted 
to  run,  Wilson  entered  the  lists  and  so  influenced 
public  opinion  and  the  Legislature  that  the  head  of 
the  machine  received  only  four  votes.  Attempts  of 
the  Democratic  machine  to  combine  with  the  Re 
publicans,  in  order  to  nullify  the  reforms  which  Wil 
son  had  promised  in  his  campaign,  proved  equally 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  7 

futile.  With  strong  popular  support,  constantly  ex 
ercising  his  influence  both  in  party  conferences  and 
on  the  Legislature,  the  Governor  was  able  to  trans 
late  into  law  the  most  important  of  the  measures 
demanded  by  the  progressives.  He  himself  summed 
up  the  essence  of  the  situation  when  he  said:  "The 
moment  the  forces  in  New  Jersey  that  had  resisted 
reform  realized  that  the  people  were  backing  new 
men  who  meant  what  they  had  said,  they  realized 
that  they  dare  not  resist  them.  It  was  not  the  per 
sonal  force  of  the  new  officials;  it  was  the  moral 
strength  of  their  backing  that  accomplished  the 
extraordinary  result."  Supreme  confidence  in  the 
force  of  public  opinion  exerted  by  the  common  man 
characterizes  much  of  Wilson's  political  philosophy, 
and  the  position  in  the  world  which  he  was  to  enjoy 
for  some  months  towards  the  end  of  the  war  rested 
upon  the  same  basis. 

In  1912  came  the  presidential  election.  The 
split  in  the  Republican  forces  promised  if  it  did  not 
absolutely  guarantee  the  election  of  a  Democrat, 
and  when  the  party  convention  met  at  Baltimore 
in  June,  excitement  was  more  than  ordinarily  in 
tense.  The  conservative  elements  in  the  party  were 
divided.  The  radicals  looked  to  Bryan  for  leader 
ship,  although  his  nomination  seemed  out  of  the 


8       WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

question.  Wilson  had  stamped  himself  as  an  anti- 
machine  progressive,  and  if  the  machine  conserva 
tives  threatened  he  might  hope  for  support  from 
the  Nebraskan  orator.  From  the  first  the  real  con 
test  appeared  to  be  between  Wilson  and  Champ 
Clark,  who  although  hardly  a  conservative,  was 
backed  for  the  moment  by  the  machine  leaders. 
The  deciding  power  was  in  Bryan's  hand,  and  as 
the  strife  between  conservatives  and  radicals  waxed 
hot,  he  turned  to  the  support  of  Wilson.  On  the 
forty-sixth  ballot  Wilson  was  nominated.  With  di 
vision  in  the  Republican  ranks,  with  his  record  in 
New  Jersey  for  legislative  accomplishment,  and 
winning  many  independent  votes  through  a  suc 
cession  of  effective  campaign  speeches,  Wilson 
more  than  fulfilled  the  highest  of  Democratic  hopes. 
He  received  on  election  day  only  a  minority  of  all 
the  votes  cast,  but  his  majority  in  the  electoral 
college  was  overwhelming. 

The  personality  of  an  American  President  has 
seldom  undergone  so  much  analysis  with  such  un 
satisfactory  results;  almost  every  discussion  of  Wil 
son's  characteristics  leads  to  the  generation  of  heat 
rather  than  light.  Indeed  the  historian  of  the  fu 
ture  may  ask  whether  it  is  as  important,  in  this  age 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  9 

of  democracy,  to  know  exactly  what  sort  of  man  he 
was  as  to  know  what  the  people  thought  he  was. 
And  yet  in  the  case  of  a  statesman  who  was  to  play 
a  role  of  supreme  importance  in  the  affairs  of  the 
country  and  the  world,  it  is  perhaps  more  than  a 
matter  of  merely  personal  interest  to  underline  his 
salient  traits.  Let  it  be  premised  that  a  logical 
and  satisfactory  analysis  is  well-nigh  impossible, 
for  his  nature  is  self -contradictory,  subject  to  gusts 
of  temperament,  and  he  himself  has  pictured  the 
struggle  that  has  gone  on  between  the  impulsive  », 
Irish  and  the  cautious  Scotch  elements  in  him.J 
Thus  it  is  that  he  has  handled  similar  problems ~*# 
in  different  ways  at  different  times,  and  has  pro 
duced  upon  different  persons  diametrically  opposed 
impressions. 

As  an  executive,  perhaps  his  most  notable  char 
acteristic  is  the  will  to  dominate.  This  does  not 
mean  that  he  is  the  egocentric  autocrat  pictured  by 
his  opponents,  for  in  conference  he  is  apt  to  be  tol 
erant  of  the  opinions  of  others,  by  no  means  dicta 
torial  in  manner,  and  apparently  anxious  to  obtain 
facts  on  both  sides  of  the  argument.  An  unfriendly 
critic,  Mr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  has  said  of  him  at  Paris  that 
"he  was  a  very  good  listener,  an  intelligent  ques 
tioner,  and  amenable  to  argument  whenever  he  felt 


10     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

free  to  give  practical  effect  to  his  conclusions." 
Similar  evidence  has  been  offered  by  members  of 
his  Cabinet.  But  unquestionably,  in  reaching  a 
conclusion  he  resents  pressure  and  he  permits  no 
one  to  make  up  his  mind  for  him;  he  is,  said  the 
German  Ambassador,  "a  recluse  and  lonely  work 
er."  One  of  his  enthusiastic  admirers  has  written: 
"Once  in  possession  of  every  fact  in  the  case,  the 
President  withdraws,  commences  the  business  of 
consideration,  comparison,  and  assessment,  and 
then  emerges  with  a  decision."  From  such  a  deci 
sion  it  is  difficult  to  shake  him  and  continued  op 
position  serves  merely  to  stiffen  his  resolution. 
Wherever  the  responsibility  is  his,  he  insists  upon 
the  finality  of  his  judgment.  Those  who  have 
worked  with  him  have  remarked  upon  his  eager 
ness,  once  he  has  decided  a  course  of  action,  to 
carry  it  into  practical  effect.  The  President  of  the 
Czecho-Slovak  Republic,  Thomas  G.  Masaryk, 
said  that  of  all  the  men  he  had  met,  "your  vision 
ary,  idealistic  President  is  by  far  and  away  the 
most  intensely  practical."  One  of  the  Big  Four  at 
Paris  remarked:  "Wilson  works.  The  rest  of  us 
play,  comparatively  speaking.  We  Europeans 
can't  keep  up  with  a  man  who  travels  a  straight 
path  with  such  a  swift  stride,  never  looking  to  right 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  11 

or  left."  But  with  all  his  eagerness  for  practical 
effect  he  is  notably  less  efficient  in  the  execution 
than  in  the  formation  of  policies. 

Wilson  lacks,  furthermore,  the  power  of  quick 
decision  which  is  apt  to  characterize  the  masterful 
executive.  He  is  slow  to  make  up  his  mind,  a  trait 
that  results  partly,  perhaps,  from  his  Scotch  blood 
and  partly  from  his  academic  training.  Except  for 
his  steadfast  adherence  to  what  he  regards  as  basic 
principles,  he  might  rightly  be  termed  an  opportu 
nist.  For  he  is  prone  to  temporize,  anxious  to  pre 
vent  an  issue  from  approaching  a  crisis,  evidently 
in  the  hope  that  something  may  "turn  up"  to  im 
prove  the  situation  and  obviate  the  necessity  of 
conflict.  "Watchful  waiting"  in  the  Mexican 
crises  and  his  attitude  towards  the  belligerents  dur 
ing  the  first  two  years  of  the  European  war  are 
cases  in  point.  There  are  instances  of  impulsive 
action  on  his  part,  when  he  has  not  waited  for  ad 
vice  or  troubled  to  acquire  exact  knowledge  of  the 
facts  underlying  a  situation,  but  such  occasions 
have  been  infrequent. 

Wilson's  dislike  of  advice  has  been  widely  adver 
tized.  It  is  probably  closer  to  the  truth  to  say  that 
he  is  naturally  suspicious  of  advisers  unless  he  is 
certain  that  their  basic  point  of  view  is  the  same  as 


12     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

his  own.  This  is  quite  different  from  saying  that  he 
wants  only  opinions  that  coincide  with  his  own  and 
that  he  immediately  dispenses  with  advisers  who 
disagree  with  him.  Colonel  House,  for  example, 
who  for  five  years  exerted  constant  influence  on  his 
policy,  frequently  advanced  opinions  quite  at  vari 
ance  from  those  of  the  President,  but  such  differ 
ences  did  not  weaken  House's  influence  inasmuch  as 
Wilson  felt  that  they  were  both  starting  from  the 
same  angle  towards  the  same  point.  Prejudiced 
though  he  seemed  to  be  against  "financiers,"  Wil 
son  took  the  opinions  of  Thomas  W.  Lamont  at 
Paris,  because  the  underlying  object  of  both,  the 
acquisition  of  a  secure  peace,  was  identical.  It  is 
true,  however,  that  with  the  exception  of  Colonel 
House,  Wilson's  advisers  have  been  in  the  main 
purveyors  of  facts  rather  than  colleagues  in  the 
formation  of  policies.  Wilson  has  generally  been 
anxious  to  receive  facts  which  might  help  him  to 
build  his  policy,  as  will  be  attested  by  those  who 
worked  with  him  at  Paris.1  But  he  was  less  inter- 

1  Mr.  Lamont  says  of  the  President  at  Paris :  "  I  never  saw  a  man 
more  ready  and  anxious  to  consult  than  he.  .  .  .  President  Wil 
son  did  not  have  a  well-organized  secretarial  staff.  He  did  far  too 
much  of  the  work  himself,  studying  until  late  at  night  papers  and 
'iocuments  that  he  should  have  largely  delegated  to  some  discreet 
aides.  He  was  by  all  odds,  the  hardest  worked  man  at  the  Con 
ference;  but  the  failure  to  delegate  more  of  his  work  was  not  due 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  IS 

ested  in  the  opinions  of  his  advisers,  especially 
when  it  came  to  principles  and  not  details,  for  he 
decides  principles  for  himself.  In  this  sense  his 
Cabinet  was  composed  of  subordinates  rather  than 
counselors.  Such  an  attitude  is,  of  course,  charac 
teristic  of  most  modern  executives  and  has  been 
intensified  by  war  conditions.  The  summary  dis 
regard  of  Lansing,  shown  by  Wilson  at  Paris, 
was  less  striking  than  the  snubbing  of  Balfour  by 
Lloyd  George,  or  the  cold  brutality  with  which 
Clemenceau  treated  the  other  French  delegates. 

General  conviction  of  Wilson's  autocratic  nature 
has  been  intensified  by  his  choice  of  assistants,  who 
have  not  as  a  rule  enjoyed  public  confidence.  He 
debarred  himself  from  success  in  the  matter  of 
appointments,  in  the  first  place,  by  limiting  his 
range  of  choice  through  unwillingness  to  have 
about  him  those  who  did  not  share  his  point  of 
view.  It  is  more  epigrammatic  than  exact  to  say 
that  he  was  the  sole  unit  in  the  Government  giving 

to  any  inherent  distrust  that  he  had  of  men  —  and  certainly  not  to 
any  desire  to  'run  the  whole  show'  himself  —  but  simply  to  the  lack 
of  facility  in  knowing  how  to  delegate  work  on  a  large  scale.  In 
execution  we  all  have  a  blind  spot  in  some  part  of  our  eye.  Presi 
dent  Wilson's  was  in  his  inability  to  use  men;  an  inability,  mind 
you,  not  a  refusal.  On  the  contrary,  when  any  of  us  volunteered 
or  insisted  upon  taking  responsibility  off  his  shoulders  he  was 
delighted." 


14     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

value  to  a  row  of  ciphers,  for  his  Cabinet,  as  a 
whole,  was  not  composed  of  weak  men.  But  the 
fact  that  the  members  of  his  Cabinet  accepted  im 
plicitly  his  firm  creed  that  the  Cabinet  ought  to  be 
an  executive  and  not  a  political  council,  that  it  de 
pended  upon  the  President's  policy,  and  that  its 
main  function  should  be  merely  to  carry  that  policy 
into  effect,  gave  to  the  public  some  justification  for 
its  belief  that  Wilson's  was  a  "one-man"  Govern 
ment.  This  belief  was  further  intensified  by  the 
President's  extreme  sensitiveness  to  hostile  criti 
cism,  which  more  than  anything  else  hindered  frank 
interchange  of  opinion  between  himself  and  strong 
personalities.  On  more  than  one  occasion  he  seemed 
to  regard  opposition  as  tantamount  to  personal 
hostility,  an  attitude  which  at  times  was  not  en 
tirely  unjustified.  In  the  matter  of  minor  appoint 
ments  Wilson  failed  generally  of  success  because 
he  consistently  refused  to  take  a  personal  interest, 
leaving  them  to  subordinates  and  admitting  that 
political  necessities  must  go  far  to  determine  the 
choice.  Even  in  such  an  important  problem  as  the 
appointment  of  the  Peace  Commission  the  Presi 
dent  seems  to  have  made  his  selection  almost  at 
haphazard.  Many  of  his  war  appointments  proved 
ultimately  to  be  wise.  But  it  is  noteworthy  that 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  15 

such  men  as  Garfield,  Baruch,  and  McCormick, 
who  amply  justified  their  choice,  were  appointed 
because  Wilson  knew  personally  their  capacity  and 
not  because  of  previous  success  along  special  lines 
which  would  entitle  them  to  public  confidence. 

The  obstinacy  of  the  President  has  become  pro 
verbial.  The  square  chin,  unconsciously  protruded 
in  argument,  indicates  definitely  his  capacity,  as  a 
British  critic  has  put  it,  "to  dig  his  toes  in  and  hold 
on."  On  matters  of  method,  however,  where  a 
basic  principle  is  not  involved,  he  is  flexible.  Ac 
cording  as  you  approve  or  disapprove  of  him,  he  is 
"capable  of  development"  or  "inconsistent." 
Thus  he  completely  changed  front  on  the  question 
af  preparedness  from  1914  to  1916.  When  the 
question  of  the  initiative  and  referendum  arose  in 
Oregon,  his  attitude  was  the  reverse  of  what  it  had 
been  as  professor  of  politics.  When  matters  of 
detail  are  under  discussion,  he  has  displayed  much 
willingness  for  and  some  skill  in  compromise,  as 
was  abundantly  illustrated  at  Paris.  But  when  he 
thinks  that  a  principle  is  at  stake,  he  prefers  to 
accept  any  consequences,  no  matter  how  disastrous 
to  his  policy;  witness  his  refusal  to  accept  the 
Lodge  reservation  on  Article  X  of  the  League 
Covenant 


16     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

All  those  included  within  the  small  circle  of  Wil 
son's  intimates  attest  the  charm  and  magnetism  of 
his  personality.  The  breadth  of  his  reading  is  re 
flected  in  his  conversation,  which  is  enlivened  by 
anecdotes  that  illustrate  his  points  effectively  and 
illumined  by  a  sense  of  humor  which  some  of  his 
friends  regard  as  his  most  salient  trait.  His  man 
ner  is  marked  by  extreme  courtesy  and,  in  view  of 
the  fixity  of  his  opinions,  a  surprising  lack  of 
abruptness  or  dogmatism.  But  he  has  never  been 
able  to  capitalize  such  personal  advantages  in  his 
political  relations.  Apart  from  his  intimates  he  is 
shy  and  reserved.  The  antithesis  of  Roosevelt, 
who  loved  to  meet  new  individualities,  Wilson  has 
the  college  professor's  shrinking  from  social  con 
tacts,  and  is  not  at  ease  in  the  presence  of  those 
with  whom  he  is  not  familiar.  Naturally,  there 
fore,  he  lacks  completely  Roosevelt's  capacity  to 
make  friends,  and  there  is  in  him  no  trace  of  his 
predecessor's  power  to  find  exactly  the  right  com 
pliment  for  the  right  person.  Under  Roosevelt  the 
WTiite  House  opened  its  doors  to  every  one  who 
could  bring  the  President  anything  of  interest, 
whether  in  the  field  of  science,  literature,  politics, 
or  sport;  and  the  Chief  Magistrate,  no  matter  who 
his  guest,  instantly  found  a  common  ground  for 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  17 

discussion.  That  capacity  Wilson  did  not  possess. 
Furthermore  his  health  was  precarious  and  he  was 
physically  incapable  of  carrying  the  burden  of  the 
constant  interviews  that  characterized  the  life  of 
his  immediate  predecessors  in  the  presidential 
office.  He  lived  the  life  of  a  recluse  and  rarely  re 
ceived  any  one  but  friends  of  the  family  at  the 
White  House  dinner  table. 

WTiile  he  thus  saved  himself  from  the  social  inter 
course  which  for  Roosevelt  was  a  relaxation  but 
which  for  him  would  have  proved  a  nervous  and 
physical  drain,  Wilson  deprived  himself  of  the  po 
litical  advantages  that  might  have  been  derived 
from  more  extensive  hospitality.  He  was  unable 
to  influence  Congressmen  except  by  reason  of  his 
authority  as  head  of  the  party  or  nation.  He  lost 
many  a  chance  of  removing  political  opposition 
through  the  personal  appeal  which  is  so  flattering 
and  effective.  He  seems  to  have  thought  that  if 
his  policy  was  right  in  itself,  Congressmen  ought 
to  vote  for  it,  without  the  satisfaction  of  personal 
arguments,  a  singular  misappreciation  of  human 
nature.  The  same  was  true  of  his  relations  with 
the  Washington  correspondents;  he  was  never 
able  to  establish  a  man  to  man  basis  of  inter- 
course.  This  incapacity  in  the  vital  matter  of 


18     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

human  contacts  was,  perhaps,  his  greatest  politi 
cal  weakness.  If  he  had  been  able  to  arouse  warm 
personal  devotion  in  his  followers,  if  he  could 
have  inflamed  them  with  enthusiasm  such  as 
that  inspired  by  Hoosevelt,  rather  than  mere  ad 
miration,  Wilson  would  have  found  his  political 
task  immeasurably  lightened.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  his  mistakes  in  tactics  should  have  been  so 
numerous.  His  isolation  and  dependence  upon 
tactical  advisers,  such  as  Tumulty  and  Burleson, 
lacking  broad  vision,  led  him  into  serious  errors, 
most  of  which  —  such  as  his  appeal  for  a  Democra 
tic  Congress  in  1918,  his  selection  of  the  person 
nel  of  the  Peace  Commission,  his  refusal  to  compro 
mise  with  the  "mild  reservationist  Senators"  in 
the  summer  of  1919  —  were  committed,  significant 
ly,  when  he  was  not  in  immediate  contact  with 
Colonel  House. 

The  political  strength  of  Wilson  did  not  result 
primarily  from  intellectual  power.  His  mind  is 
neither  profound  nor  subtle.  His  serious  writings 
are  sound  but  not  characterized  by  originality,  nor 
in  his  policies  is  there  anything  to  indicate  creative 
genius.  He  thinks  straight  and  possesses  the  abil 
ity  to  concentrate  on  a  single  line  of  effort.  He  is 
skillful  in  catching  an  idea  and  adapting  it  to  his 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  19 

purposes.  Combined  with  his  power  of  expression 
and  his  talent  for  making  phrases,  such  qualities 
were  of  great  assistance  to  him.  But  the  real 
strength  of  the  President  lay  rather  in  his  gift  of 
sensing  what  the  common  people  wanted  and  his 
ability  to  put  it  into  words  for  them.  Few  of  his 
speeches  are  great;  many  of  them  are  marred  by 
tactless  phrases,  such  as  "too  proud  to  fight"  and 
"peace  without  victory."  But  nearly  all  of  them 
express  honestly  the  desires  of  the  masses.  His 
strength  in  New  Jersey  and  the  extraordinary  effect 
produced  in  Europe  by  his  war  speeches  might  be 
cited  as  evidence  of  this  peculiar  power.  He  sought 
above  everything  to  catch  the  trend  of  inarticulate 
rather  than  vociferous  opinion.  If  one  objects  that 
his  patience  under  German  outrages  was  not  truly 
representative,  we  must  remember  that  opinion 
was  slow  in  crystallizing,  that  his  policy  was  en 
dorsed  by  the  election  of  1916,  and  that  when  he 
finally  advocated  war  in  April,  1917,  the  country 
entered  the  struggle  practically  a  unit. 

But  it  is  obvious  that,  however  much  political 
strength  was  assured  the  President  by  his  instinc 
tive  appreciation  of  popular  feeling,  this  was 
largely  offset  by  the  gaucherie  of  his  political  tac 
tics.  He  had  a  genius  for  alienating  persons  who 


20     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

should  have  supported  him  and  who  agreed  in 
general  with  the  broad  lines  of  his  policies.  Few 
men  in  public  life  have  so  thoroughly  aroused  the 
dislike  of  "the  man  in  the  street."  Admitting  that 
much  of  Wilson's  unpopularity  resulted  from  mis^ 
understanding,  from  the  feeling  that  he  was  a  dif 
ferent  sort,  perhaps  a  "highbrow,"  the  degree  of 
dislike  felt  for  him  becomes  almost  inexplicable  in 
the  case  of  a  President  who,  from  all  the  evidence, 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  everything  for  what  he  con 
sidered  to  be  the  benefit  of  the  common  man.  He 
might  almost  repeat  Robespierre's  final  bitter  and 
puzzled  phrase:  "To  die  for  the  people  and  to  be 
abhorred  by  them."  So  keen  was  the  irritation 
aroused  by  Wilson's  methods  and  personality  that 
many  a  citizen  stated  frankly  that  he  preferred  to 
see  Wilsonian  policies  which  he  approved  meet  de 
feat,  rather  than  see  them  carried  to  success  by 
Wilson.  This  executive  failing  of  the  President  was 
destined  to  jeopardize  the  greatest  of  his  policies  and 
to  result  in  the  personal  tragedy  of  Wilson  himself. 
Certain  large  political  principles  stand  out  in 
Wilson's  writings  and  career  as  Governor  and  Presi 
dent.  Of  these  the  most  striking,  perhaps,  is  his 
conviction  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
must  be  something  more  than  a  mere  executive 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  21 

superintendent.  The  entire  responsibility  for  the 
administration  of  government,  he  believed,  should 
rest  upon  the  President,  and  in  order  to  meet  that 
responsibility,  he  must  keep  the  reins  of  control  in 
his  own  hands.  In  his  first  essays  and  in  his  later 
writings  Wilson  expressed  his  disgust  with  the  sys 
tem  of  congressional  committees  which  threw  enor 
mous  power  into  the  hands  of  irresponsible  profes 
sional  politicians,  and  called  for  a  Tresident  who 
would  break  that  system  and  exercise  greater  di 
rective  authority.  For  a  time  he  seemed,  under  the 
influence  of  Bagehot,  to  have  believed  in  the  feasi 
bility  of  introducing  something  like  the  parliamen 
tary  system  into  the  government  of  the  United 
States.  To  the  last  he  regarded  the  President  as  a 
sort  of  Prime  Minister,  at  the  head  of  his  party  in 
the  Legislature  and  able  to  count  absolutely  upon 
its  loyalty.  More  than  this,  he  believed  that  the 
President  should  take  a  large  share  of  responsibility 
for  the  legislative  programme  and  ought  to  push 
this  programme  through  by  all  means  at  his  dis 
posal.  Such  a  creed  appeared  in  his  early  writings 
and  was  largely  carried  into  operation  during  his 
administration.  We  find  him  bringing  all  possi 
ble  pressure  upon  the  New  Jersey  Legislature  in 
order  to  redeem  his  campaign  pledges.  When 


22     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

elected  President,  he  went  directly  to  Congress 
with  his  message,  instead  of  sending  it  to  be  read. 
Time  and  again  he  intervened  to  forward  his  special 
legislative  interests  by  direct  influence. 

Both  in  his  writings  and  in  his  actions  Wilson  has 

always  advocated  government  by  party.    Theoreti- 

t 

cally  and  in  practice  he  has  been  opposed  to  coali 
tion  government,  for,  in  his  belief,  it  divides  re 
sponsibility.  Although  by  no  means  an  advocate 
of  the  old-type  spoils  system,  rewards  for  party  ser 
vice  seem  to  him  essential.  Curiously  enough, 
while  insisting  that  the  President  is  the  leader  of 
his  party  like  a  Prime  Minister,  he  has  also  de 
scribed  him,  with  an  apparent  lack  of  logic,  as  the 
leader  of  the  country.  Because  Wilson  has  thus 
confused  party  and  people,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
why  he  has  at  times  claimed  to  represent  the  nation 
when,  in  reality,  he  was  merely  representing  parti 
san  views.  Such  an  attitude  is  naturally  irritating 
to  the  Opposition  and  explains  something  of  the 
virulence  that  characterized  the  attacks  made  upon 
him  in  1918  and  later. 

Wilson's  political  sentiments  are  tinged  by  a 
constant  and  intense  interest  in  the  common  man. 
More  than  once  he  has  insisted  that  it  was  more 
important  to  know  what  was  said  by  the  fireside 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  23 

than  what  was  said  in  the  council  chamber.  His 
strongest  political  weapon,  he  believes,  has  been 
the  appeal  over  the  heads  of  politicians  to  pub 
lic  opinion.  His  dislike  of  cliques  and  his  strong 
prejudice  against  anything  that  savors  of  special 
privilege  shone  clear  in  his  attack  upon  the  Prince 
ton  club  system,  and  the  same  light  has  not  infre 
quently  dazzled  his  vision  as  President.  Thus, 
while  by  no  means  a  radical,  he  instinctively  turned 
to  the  support  of  labor  in  its  struggles  with  capital 
because  of  the  abuse  of  its  privilege  by  capital  in 
the  past  and  regardless  of  more  recent  abuse  of  its 
power  by  labor.  Similarly  at  the  Peace  Conference 
his  sympathies  were  naturally  with  every  weak 
state  and  every  minority  group. 

Such  tendencies  may  have  been  strengthened  by 
the  intensity  of  his  religious  convictions.  There 
have  been  few  men  holding  high  office  in  recent 
times  so  deeply  and  constantly  affected  by  Chris 
tian  faith  as  Woodrow  Wilson.  The  son  of  a 
clergyman  and  subjected  during  his  early  years  to 
the  most  lively  and  devout  sort  of  Presbyterianism, 
he  preserved  in  his  own  family  circle,  in  later  years, 
a  similar  atmosphere.  Nor  was  his  conviction  of 
the  immanence  and  spiritual  guidance  of  the  Deity 
ever  divorced  from  his  professional  and  public  life. 


24     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

We  can  discover  in  his  presidential  speeches  many 
indications  of  his  belief  that  the  duties  he  had 
undertaken  were  laid  upon  him  by  God  and  that 
he  might  not  deviate  from  what  seemed  to  him  the 
straight  and  appointed  path.  There  is  something 
reminiscent  of  Calvin  in  the  stern  and  unswerving 
determination  not  to  compromise  for  the  sake  of 
ephemeral  advantage.  This  aspect  of  Wilson  has 
been  caught  by  a  British  critic,  J.  M.  Keynes,  who 
describes  the  President  as  a  Nonconformist  minis 
ter,  whose  thought  and  temperament  were  essen 
tially  theological,  not  intellectual,  "with  all  the 
strength  and  weakness  of  that  manner  of  thought, 
feeling,  and  expression."  The  observation  is  exact, 
although  it  does  not  in  itself  completely  explain 
Wilson.  Certainly  nothing  could  be  more  charac 
teristic  of  the  President  than  the  text  of  a  Bacca 
laureate  sermon  which  he  preached  £t  Princeton  in 
1907:  "And  be  ye  not  conformed  to  this  world." 
He  believed  with  intensity  that  each  individual 
must  set  up  for  himself  a  moral  standard,  which  he 
must  rigidly  maintain  regardless  of  the  opinions  of 
the  community. 

Entirely  natural,  therefore,  is  the  emphasis  v  hich 
he  has  placed,  whether  as  President  of  Princeton 
or  of  the  United  States,  upon  moral  rather  than 


WILSON  THE  EXECUTIVE  25 

material  virtues.  This,  indeed,  has  been  the  es 
sence  of  his  political  idealism.  Such  an  emphasis 
has  been  for  him  at  once  a  source  of  political 
strength  and  of  weakness.  The  moralist  unques 
tionably  secures  wide  popular  support;  but  he  also 
wearies  his  audience,  and  many  a  voter  has  turned 
from  Wilson  in  the  spirit  that  led  the  Athenian  to 
vote  for  the  ostracism  of  Aristides,  because  he  was 
tired  of  hearing  him  called  "the  Just."  Whatever 
the  immediate  political  effects,  the  country  owes 
to  Wilson  a  debt,  which  historians  will  doubtless 
acknowledge,  for  his  insistence  that  morality  must 
go  hand  in  hand  with  public  policy,  that  as  with 
individuals,  so  with  governments,  true  greatness 
is  won  by  service  rather  than  by  acquisition,  by 
sacrifice  rather  than  by  aggression.  Wilson  and 
Treitschke  are  at  opposite  poles. 

During  his  academic  career  Wilson  seems  to 
have  displayed  little  interest  in  foreign  affairs,  and 
his  knowledge  of  European  politics,  although  suffi 
cient  for  him  to  produce  an  admirable  handbook  on 
governments,  including  foreign  as  well  as  our  own, 
was  probably  not  profound.  During  his  first  year 
in  the  White  House,  he  was  typical  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party,  which  then  approved  the  political 
isolation  of  the  United  States,  abhorred  the  kind  of 


26     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

i  commercial  imperialism  summed  up  in  the  phrase 
"dollar  diplomacy,"  and  apparently  believed  that 
the  essence  of  foreign  policy  was  to  keep  one's  own 
hands  clean.  The  development  of  Wilson  from 
this  parochial  point  of  view  to  one  which  centers  his 
whole  being  upon  a  policy  of  unselfish  international 
service,  forms,  to  a  large  extent,  the  main  thread  of 
the  narrative  which  follows. 


CHAPTER  II 

NEUTRALITY 

DESPITE  the  wars  and  rumors  of  wars  in  Europe 
after  1910,  few  Americans  perceived  the  gathering 
of  the  clouds,  and  probably  not  one  in  ten  thousand 
felt  more  than  an  ordinary  thrill  of  interest  on  the 
morning  of  June  29, 1914,  when  they  read  that  the 
Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  of  Austria  had  been 
assassinated.  Nor,  a  month  later,  when  it  became 
obvious  that  the  resulting  crisis  was  to  precipitate 
another  war  in  the  Balkans,  did  most  Americans 
realize  that  the  world  was  hovering  on  the  brink  of 
momentous  events.  Not  even  when  the  most  dire 
forebodings  were  realized  and  the  great  powers  of 
Europe  were  drawn  into  the  quarrel,  could  America 
appreciate  its  significance.  Crowds  gazed  upon  the 
bulletin  boards  and  tried  to  picture  the  steady 
advance  of  German  field-gray  through  the  streets 
of  Liege,  asked  their  neighbors  what  were  these 
French  75's,  and  endeavored  to  locate  Mons  and 

27 


28     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Verdun  on  inadequate  maps.  Interest  could  not 
be  more  intense,  but  it  was  the  interest  of  the 
moving-picture  devotee.  Even  the  romantic  voy 
age  of  the  Kronprinzessin  Cecilie  with  her  cargo  of 
gold,  seeking  to  elude  the  roving  British  cruisers, 
seemed  merely  theatrical.  It  was  a  tremendous 
show  and  we  were  the  spectators.  Only  the  clos 
ing  of  the  Stock  Exchange  lent  an  air  of  reality  to 
the  crisis. 

It  was  true  that  the  Spanish  War  had  made  of 
the  United  States  a  world  power,  but  so  firmly 
rooted  in  American  minds  was  the  principle  of  com 
plete  political  isolation  from  European  affairs  that 
the  typical  citizen  could  not  imagine  any  cataclysm 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  so  engrossing  as 
to  engage  the  active  participation  of  his  country. 
The  whole  course  of  American  history  had  deep 
ened  the  general  feeling  of  aloofness  from  Europe 
and  heightened  the  effect  of  the  advice  given  by  the 
first  President  when  he  warned  the  country  to 
avoid  entangling  alliances.  In  the  early  nineteenth 
century  the  United  States  was  a  country  apart,  for 
in  the  days  when  there  was  neither  steamship  nor 
telegraph  the  Atlantic  in  truth  separated  the  New 
World  from  the  Old .  After  the  close  of  the ' '  second 
war  of  independence,"  in  1815,  the  possibility  of 


NEUTRALITY  29 

foreign  complications  seemed  remote.  The  atten 
tion  of  the  young  nation  was  directed  to  domestic 
concerns,  to  the  building  up  of  manufactures,  to  the 
extension  of  the  frontiers  westward.  The  Ameri 
can  nation  turned  its  back  to  the  Atlantic.  There 
was  a  steady  and  welcome  stream  of  immigrants 
from  Europe,  but  there  was  little  speculation  or 
interest  as  to  its  headwaters. 

Governmental  relations  with  European  states 
were  disturbed  at  times  by  crises  of  greater  or  less 
importance.  The  proximity  of  the  United  States 
to  and  interest  in  Cuba  compelled  the  Government 
to  recognize  the  political  existence  of  Spain;  a 
French  army  was  ordered  out  of  Mexico  when  it 
was  felt  to  be  a  menace;  the  presence  of  immigrant 
Irish  in  large  numbers  always  gave  a  note  of  un 
certainty  to  the  national  attitude  towards  Great 
Britain.  The  export  of  cotton  from  the  Southern 
States  created  industrial  relations  of  such  impor 
tance  with  Great  Britain  that,  during  the  Civil  War, 
after  the  establishment  of  the  blockade  on  the 
Confederate  coast,  wisdom  and  forbearance  were 
needed  on  both  sides  to  prevent  the  breaking  out 
of  armed  conflict.  But  during  the  last  third  of  the 
century,  which  was  marked  in  this  country  by  an 
extraordinary  industrial  evolution  and  an  increased 


SO     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

interest  in  domestic  administrative  issues,  the  atti 
tude  of  the  United  States  towards  Europe,  except 
during  the  brief  Venezuelan  crisis  and  the  war  with 
Spain,  was  generally  characterized  by  the  indiffer 
ence  which  is  the  natural  outcome  of  geographical 
separation. 

In  diplomatic  language  American  foreign  policy, 
so  far  as  Europe  was  concerned,  was  based  upon 
the  principle  of  "non-intervention."  The  right  to 
manage  their  affairs  in  their  own  way  without  in 
terference  was  conceded  to  European  Governments 
and  a  reciprocal  attitude  was  expected  of  them. 
The  American  Government  followed  strictly  the 
purpose  of  not  participating  in  any  political  ar 
rangements  made  between  European  states  regard 
ing  European  issues.  Early  in  the  life  of  the  nation 
Jefferson  had  correlated  the  double  aspect  of  this 
policy:  "Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim,"  he 
said,  "should  be  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the 
broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe 
to  intermeddle  with  cis- Atlantic  affairs."  The  influ 
ence  of  John  Quincy  Adams  crystallized  this  double 
policy  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which,  as  compen 
sation  for  denying  to  European  states  the  right  to 
intervene  in  American  politics,  sacrificed  the  gener 
ous  sympathies  of  many  Americans,  among  them 


NEUTRALITY  31 

President  Monroe  himself,  with  the  republican 
movements  across  the  Atlantic.  With  the  con 
tinued  and  increasing  importance  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  a  principle  of  national  policy,  the  natu 
ral  and  reciprocal  aspect  of  that  doctrine,  imply 
ing  political  isolation  from  Europe,  became  more 
deeply  imbedded  in  the  national  consciousness. 

There  was,  it  is  true,  another  aspect  to  American 
foreign  policy  besides  the  European,  namely,  that 
concerning  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,  which,  as 
diplomatic  historians  have  pointed  out,  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  affected  by  the  tradition  of  iso 
lation.  Since  the  day  when  the  western  frontier 
was  pushed  to  the  Golden  Gate,  the  United  States 
has  taken  an  active  interest  in  problems  of  the 
Pacific.  Alaska  was  purchased  from  Russia.  An 
American  seaman  was  the  first  to  open  the  trade  of 
Japan  to  the  outside  world  and  thus  precipitated 
the  great  revolution  which  has  touched  every  as 
pect  of  Far  Eastern  questions.  American  traders 
watched  carefully  the  commercial  development  of 
Oriental  ports,  in  which  Americans  have  played  an 
active  role.  In  China  and  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  open  door  especially,  has  America  taken  the 
keenest  interest.  It  is  a  matter  of  pride  that  Amer 
ican  policy,  always  of  a  purely  commerciai  and 


32     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

peaceful  nature,  showed  itself  less  aggressive  than 
that  of  some  European  states.  But  the  Govern 
ment  insisted  upon  the  recognition  of  American 
interest  in  every  Far  Eastern  issue  that  might  be 
raised,  and  was  ready  to  intervene  with  those  of 
Europe  in  moments  of  crisis  or  danger. 

A  fairly  clear-cut  distinction  might  thus  be  made 
between  American  pretensions  in  the  different 
parts  of  the  world.  In  the  Americas  the  nation 
claimed  that  sort  of  preeminence  which  was  implied 
by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  a  preeminence  which  as 
regards  the  Latin-American  states  north  of  the 
Orinoco  many  felt  must  be  actively  enforced,  in 
view  of  special  interests  in  the  Caribbean.  In  the 
Far  East  the  United  States  claimed  an  equality  of 
status  with  the  European  powers.  In  the  rest  of 
the  world,  Europe,  Africa,  the  Levant,  the  tradi 
tional  American  policy  of  abstention  held  good 
absolutely,  at  least  until  the  close  of  the  century. 

The  war  with  Spain  affected  American  foreign 
policy  vitally.  The  holding  of  the  Philippines, 
even  if  it  were  to  prove  merely  temporary,  created 
new  relations  with  all  the  great  powers,  of  Europe 
as  of  Asia;  American  Caribbean  interests  were 
strengthened;  and  the  victory  over  a  European 
power,  even  one  of  a  second  class  in  material 


NEUTRALITY  33 

strength,  necessarily  altered  the  traditional  atti 
tude  of  the  nation  towards  the  other  states  of  Eu 
rope  and  theirs  towards  it.  This  change  was  stimu 
lated  by  the  close  attention  which  American  mer 
chants  and  bankers  began  to  give  to  European 
combinations  and  policies,  particularly  to  the  ex 
ploitation  of  thinly  populated  districts  by  Eu 
ropean  states.  Even  before  the  Spanish  War  a 
keen-sighted  student  of  foreign  affairs,  Richard 
Olney,  had  declared  that  the  American  people 
could  not  assume  an  attitude  of  indifference  to 
wards  European  politics  and  that  the  hegemony  of  a 
single  continental  state  would  be  disastrous  to  their 
prosperity  if  not  to  their  safety.  Conversely  Eu 
ropeans  began  to  watch  America  with  greater  care. 
The  victory  over  Spain  was  resented  and  the  fear 
of  American  commercial  development  began  to 
spread.  The  Kaiser  had  even  talked  of  a  continen 
tal  customs  union  to  meet  American  competition. 
On  the  other  hand,  Great  Britain,  which  had  dis 
played  a  benevolent  attitude  during  the  Spanish 
War  and  whose  admiral  at  Manila  had  perhaps 
blocked  German  interference,  showed  an  increas 
ing  desire  for  a  close  understanding.  The  friend 
ship  of  the  United  States,  itself  once  a  British  de 
pendency,  for  the  British  colonies  was  natural  and 


84     WOODEOW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAE 

American  interests  in  the  Far  East  had  much  in 
common  with  those  of  Great  Britain. 

External  evidence  of  the  new  place  of  the  United 
States  in  the  world  might  be  found  in  the  position 
taken  by  Roosevelt  as  peacemaker  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  and,  more  significantly,  in  the  role 
played  by  the  American  representative,  Henry 
White,  at  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  in  1906.  Not 
merely  did  the  American  Government  consent  to 
discuss  matters  essentially  European  in  character, 
but  its  attitude  proved  almost  decisive  in  the  settle 
ment  then  drafted.  It  is  true  that  the  Senate,  in 
approving  that  settlement,  refused  to  assume  re 
sponsibility  for  its  maintenance  and  reiterated  its 
adherence  to  traditional  policy.  But  those  who 
watched  developments  with  intelligent  eyes  must 
have  agreed  with  Roosevelt  when  he  said:  "We 
have  no  choice,  we  people  of  the  United  States,  as 
to  whether  we  shall  play  a  great  part  in  the  affairs 
of  the  world.  That  has  been  decided  for  us  by  fate, 
by  the  march  of  events."  Yet  it  may  be  ques 
tioned  whether  the  average  American,  during  the 
first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  realized  the 
change  that  had  come  over  relations  with  Europe. 
The  majority  of  citizens  certainly  felt  that  any 
thing  happening  east  of  the  Atlantic  was  none  of 


NEUTRALITY  35 

their  business,  just  as  everything  that  occurred 
in  the  Americas  was  entirely  outside  the  scope  of 
European  interference. 

There  is  little  to  show  that  Woodrow  Wilson,  at 
the  time  when  he  entered  upon  his  duties  as  Presi 
dent,  was  one  of  the  few  Americans  who  fully  ap 
preciated  the  new  international  position  of  the 
United  States  and  its  consequences,  even  had  there 
been  no  war.  The  Democratic  platform  of  1912 
hardly  mentioned  foreign  policy,  and  Wilson's  In 
augural  contained  no  reference  to  anything  except 
domestic  matters.  Certain  problems  inherited 
from  the  previous  Administration  forced  upon  the 
President,  however,  the  formulation,  if  not  of  a 
policy,  at  least  of  an  attitude.  The  questions  of  the 
Panama  Canal  tolls  and  Japanese  immigration,  the 
Mexican  situation,  the  Philippines,  general  rela 
tions  with  Latin-America,  all  demanded  attention. 
In  each  case  Wilson  displayed  a  willingness  to  sac 
rifice,  a  desire  to  avoid  stressing  the  material 
strength  of  the  United  States,  an  anxiety  to  com 
promise,  which  matched  in  spirit  the  finest  tradi 
tions  of  American  foreign  policy,  which  has  gener 
ally  been  marked  by  high  ideals.  Many  of  his 
countrymen,  possibly  without  adequate  study  or 
command  of  the  facts,  supposed  that  Wilson  was 


36     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

inspired  less  by  positive  ideals  than  by  the  belief 
that  no  problem  of  a  foreign  nature  was  worth  a 
quarrel.  People  liked  the  principle  contained  in  the 
sentence:  "We  can  afford  to  exercise  the  self-re 
straint  of  a  really  great  nation  which  realizes  its  own 
strength  and  scorns  to  misuse  it."  But  they  also 
wondered  whether  the  passivity  of  the  Government 
did  not  in  part  proceed  from  the  fact  that  the  Presi 
dent  could  not  make  up  his  mind  what  he  wanted 
to  do.  They  looked  upon  his  handling  of  the  Mex 
ican  situation  as  clear  evidence  of  a  lack  of  policy. 
Nevertheless  the  country  as  a  whole,  without  ex 
pressing  enthusiasm  for  Wilson's  attitude,  was 
obviously  pleased  by  his  attempts  to  avoid  for 
eign  entanglements,  and  in  the  early  summer  of 
1914  the  eyes  of  the  nation  were  focused  upon 
domestic  issues. 

Then  came  the  war  in  Europe. 

Today,  after  the  long  years  of  stress  and 
struggle  in  which  the  crimes  of  Germany  have  re 
ceived  full  advertisement,  few  Americans  will  ad 
mit  that  they  did  not  perceive  during  that  first 
week  of  August,  1914,  the  complete  significance  of 
the  moral  issues  involved  in  the  European  war. 
They  read  back  into  their  thoughts  of  those  early 


NEUTRALITY  37 

days  the  realization  which,  in  truth,  came  only 
later,  that  Germany  was  the  brutal  aggressor  at 
tacking  those  aspects  of  modern  civilization  which 
are  dear  to  America.  In  fact  there  were  not  many 
then  who  grasped  the  essential  truth  that  the  cause 
defended  by  Great  Britain  and  France  was  indeed 
that  of  America  and  that  their  defeat  would  bring 
the  United  States  face  to  face  with  vital  danger, 
both  material  and  moral. 

Partisanship,  of  course,  was  not  lacking  and  fre 
quently  it  was  of  an  earnest  kind;  in  view  of  the 
large  number  of  European-born  who  enjoyed  citi 
zenship,  sympathy  with  one  side  or  the  other  was 
inevitably  warm.  West  of  the  Mississippi  it  was 
some  time  before  the  masses  were  stirred  from  their 
indifference  to  and  their  ignorance  of  the  strug 
gle.  But  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  and  in  the 
Middle  West  opinion  became  sharply  divided.  The 
middle-class  German-Americans  naturally  espoused 
with  some  vehemence  the  justice  of  the  Father 
land's  cause.  German  intellectuals  of  influence, 
such  as  Hugo  Miinsterberg,  inveighed  against  the 
hypocrisy  and  the  decadence  of  the  Entente 
powers.  Many  Americans  who  had  lived  or  had 
been  educated  in  Germany,  some  professors  who 
had  been  brought  into  contact  with  the  Kaiser, 


38     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

explained  the  "essentially  defensive  character"  of 
Germany's  struggle  against  the  threatening  Slav. 
Certain  of  the  politically  active  Irish  elements, 
anxious  to  discredit  the  British,  also  lent  their 
support  to  the  German  cause. 

On  the  Atlantic  coast,  however,  the  general  trend 
of  opinion  ran  strongly  in  favor  of  the  Entente. 
The  brave  defense  of  the  Belgians  at  Liege  against 
terrible  odds  evoked  warm  sympathy;  the  stories 
of  the  atrocities  committed  by  the  invading  Ger 
mans,  constantly  more  frequent  and  more  brutal 
in  character,  enhanced  that  feeling.  The  valorous 
retreat  of  the  French  and  their  last-ditch  stand  on 
the  Marne  compelled  admiration.  Moreover,  the 
school  histories  of  the  United  States  with  their  em 
phasis  upon  La  Fayette  and  the  aid  given  by  the 
French  in  the  first  fight  for  liberty  proved  to  be  of 
no  small  importance  in  the  molding  of  sympathy. 
Business  men  naturally  favored  Great  Britain, 
both  because  of  financial  relationships  and  because 
of  their  dislike  and  fear  of  German  commercial 
methods. 

But  in  all  this  partisanship  there  was  little  ap 
preciation  of  the  peril  that  might  result  from  Ger 
man  victory  and  no  articulate  demand  that  the 
United  States  intervene.  Warm  sympathy  might 


NEUTRALITY  39 

be  given  to  one  side  or  the  other,  but  the  almost 
universal  opinion  was  that  the  war  was  none  of  our 
business.  Even  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who  later  was 
to  be  one  of  the  most  determined  advocates  of 
American  intervention  on  the  side  of  the  Entente, 
writing  for  The  Outlook  in  September,  1914,  con 
gratulated  the  country  on  its  separation  from  Euro 
pean  quarrels,  which  made  possible  the  preservation 
of  our  peace. 

Whatever  the  trend  of  public  opinion,  Presi 
dent  Wilson  would  have  insisted  upon  neutrality. 
Everything  in  his  character  and  policy  demanded 
the  maintenance  of  peace.  He  had  entered  office 
with  a  broad  programme  of  social  reform  in  view, 
and  the  attainment  of  his  ideals  depended  upon  do 
mestic  tranquillity.  He  was,  furthermore,  a  real 
pacifist,  believing  that  war  is  debasing  morally 
and  disastrous  economically.  Finally,  he  was  con 
vinced  that  the  United  States  was  consecrated  to  a 
special  task,  namely,  the  inspiration  of  politics  by 
moral  factors;  if  the  nation  was  to  accomplish  this 
task  its  example  must  be  a  higher  example  than  one 
of  force.  Unquestionably  he  looked  forward  to 
acting  as  mediator  in  the  struggle  and  thus  secur 
ing  for  the  country  and  himself  new  prestige  such 
as  had  come  in  Roosevelt's  mediation  between 


40     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Russia  and  Japan.  But  the  main  thought  in  his 
mind  was,  first,  the  preservation  of  peace  for  the 
sake  of  peace;  and  next,  to  attain  the  supreme 
glory  of  showing  the  world  that  greatness  and 
peaceableness  are  complementary  in  national  char 
acter  and  not  antithetic.  "We  are  champions  of 
peace  and  of  concord,"  he  said,  "and  we  should 
be  very  jealous  of  this  distinction  which  we  have 
sought  to  earn." 

Wilson's  determination  was  strengthened  by  his 
obvious  failure  to  distinguish  between  the  war  aims 
of  the  two  sides.  He  did  not  at  first  see  the  moral 
issue  involved.  He  was  anxious  to  "reserve  judg 
ment  until  the  end  of  the  war,  when  all  its  events 
and  circumstances  can  be  seen  in  their  entirety 
and  in  their  true  relations."  When  appeals  and 
protests  were  sent  to  him  from  Germany,  Belgium, 
and  France  dealing  with  infractions  of  the  law  and 
practice  of  nations,  he  was  willing  to  return  a  re 
sponse  to  Germany,  which  had  confessedly  com 
mitted  an  international  wrong,  identical  with  that 
sent  to  Belgium  which  had  suffered  from  that 
wrong.  Wilson  has  himself  confessed  that  "Amer 
ica  did  not  at  first  see  the  full  meaning  of  the  war. 
It  looked  like  a  natural  raking  out  of  the  pent-up 
jealousies  and  rivalries  of  the  complicated  politics 


NEUTRALITY  41 

of  Europe.  .  .  .  We,  at  the  distance  of  America, 
looked  on  at  first  without  a  full  comprehension  of 
what  the  plot  was  getting  into."  x  That  the  aims 
of  the  belligerent  powers  might  affect  the  con 
science  or  the  fortunes  of  America  he  did  not  per 
ceive.  He  urged  us  not  to  be  "thrown  off  our  bal 
ance  by  a  war  with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do, 
whose  causes  cannot  touch  us,  whose  very  exist 
ence  affords  us  opportunities  of  friendship  and  dis 
interested  service  which  should  make  us  ashamed 
of  any  thought  of  hostility  or  fearful  preparation 
for  trouble."  Hence  his  proclamation  of  neutral 
ity,  which  was  universally  accepted  as  right. 
Hence,  also,  his  adjuration  to  be  "impartial  in 
thought  as  well  as  in  action,"  which  was  not  so 
universally  accepted  and  marks,  perhaps,  a  definite 
rift  between  Wilson  and  the  bulk  of  educated 
opinion  in  the  Northeast. 

During  the  early  days  of  August  Wilson  had  pro 
claimed  his  desire  to  act  as  mediator  between  the 
warring  forces,  although  he  must  have  realized 
that  the  suggestion  would  prove  fruitless  at  that 
moment.  Again,  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne, 
he  took  advantage  of  German  discouragement, 
apparently  receiving  a  hint  from  Johann  von 

'Speech  on  the  George  Washington,  July  4,  1919. 


42     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Bernstorff,  German  Ambassador  in  Washington,  to 
sound  the  belligerents  on  the  possibility  of  an  ar 
rangement.  Failing  a  second  time  to  elicit  serious 
consideration  of  peace,  he  withdrew  to  wait  for  a 
better  opportunity.  Thus  the  Germans,  beaten 
back  from  Paris,  vainly  pounded  the  allied  lines  on 
the  Yser;  the  Russians,  after  forcing  their  path 
through  Galicia,  defended  Warsaw  with  despera 
tion;  while  Wilson  kept  himself  and  his  country 
strictly  aloof  from  the  conflict. 

But  no  mere  desires  or  declarations  could  pre 
vent  the  war  from  touching  America,  and  each  day 
made  more  apparent  the  difficulties  and  the  dan 
gers  of  neutrality.  The  Atlantic  no  longer  sepa 
rated  the  two  worlds.  In  September  and  October 
the  British  Government,  taking  advantage  of  the 
naval  supremacy  assured  by  their  fleet,  issued  Or 
ders  in  Council  designed  to  provide  for  close  control 
of  neutral  commerce  and  to  prevent  the  importa 
tion  of  contraband  into  Germany.  British  super 
vision  of  war-time  trade  has  always  been  strict  and 
its  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  contraband 
broad;  the  present  instance  was  no  exception. 
American  ships  and  cargoes  were  seized  and  confis 
cated  to  an  extent  which,  while  it  doubtless  seemed 
justified  to  the  British,  who  were  fighting  for  their 


NEUTRALITY  43 

lives,  evoked  a  chorus  of  bitter  complaints  from 
American  producers  and  exporters.  Commerce 
with  neutral  countries  of  Europe  threatened  to 
become  completely  interrupted.  On  the  21st  of 
October  and  again  on  the  26th  of  December,  the 
State  Department  sent  notes  of  protest  to  the 
British  Government.  The  tone  of  the  discussion 
was  notably  sharpened  by  the  seizure  of  the  Wil- 
helmina,  supposedly  an  American  ship,  though,  as 
later  developed,  she  had  been  chartered  by  a  Ger 
man  agent  in  New  York,  Dr.  Heinrich  F.  Albert,  in 
order  to  bring  the  Anglo-American  dispute  to  a  head. 
How  far  the  interference  with  our  trade  by  the 
British  might  have  embittered  relations,  if  other 
issues  had  not  seemed  more  pressing,  no  one  can 
say.  Precisely  at  the  moment  when  business  men 
were  beginning  to  call  upon  Wilson  for  a  sturdier 
defense  of  American  commercial  rights,  a  contro 
versy  with  Germany  eclipsed,  at  least  from  the  eye 
of  the  general  public,  all  other  foreign  questions. 
From  the  moment  when  the  defeat  on  the  Marne 
showed  the  Germans  that  victory  was  not  likely 
to  come  quickly  to  their  arms,  the  Berlin  Govern 
ment  realized  the  importance  of  preventing  the  ex 
port  of  American  munitions.  Since  the  allies  held 
control  of  the  seas  an  embargo  on  such  export 


44     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

would  be  entirely  to  German  advantage,  and  the 
head  of  German  propaganda  in  this  country,  a 
former  Colonial  Secretary,  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg, 
attempted  to  mobilize  German-American  senti 
ment  and  to  bring  pressure  upon  Congressmen 
through  their  constituents  in  favor  of  such  an  em 
bargo.  It  was  easy  to  allege  that  the  export  of 
arms,  since  they  went  to  the  allied  camp  alone,  was 
on  its  face,  unneutral.  Several  Senators  approved 
the  embargo,  among  them  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  William  J. 
Stone  of  Missouri.  Against  the  proposed  embargo 
Wilson  set  his  face  steadfastly.  He  perceived  the 
fallacy  of  the  German  argument  and  insisted  that 
to  prevent  the  export  of  arms  would  be  itself  un 
neutral.  The  inability  of  the  Central  Powers  to 
import  arms  from  the  United  States  resulted  from 
their  inferiority  on  the  high  seas;  the  Government 
would  be  departing  from  its  position  of  impartial 
ity  if  it  failed  to  keep  American  markets  open  to 
zvery  nation  of  the  world,  belligerent  or  neutral. 
The  United  States  could  not  change  the  rules  in 
the  middle  of  the  game  for  the  advantage  of  one 
side.  The  perfect  legality  of  Wilson's  decision 
has  been  frankly  recognized  since  the  war  by  the 
German  Ambassador. 


NEUTRALITY  45 

But  the  execution  of  German  military  plans  de 
manded  that  the  allied  shortage  in  munitions,  upon 
which  the  Teutons  counted  for  success  in  the  spring 
campaigns,  should  not  be  replenished  from  Amer 
ican  sources.  Failing  to  budge  Wilson  on  the  pro 
posal  of  an  embargo,  they  launched  themselves 
upon  a  more  reckless  course.  On  February  4, 1915, 
the  German  Admiralty  issued  a  proclamation  to 
the  effect  that  after  the  18th  of  February,  German 
submarines  would  destroy  every  enemy  merchant 
vessel  found  in  the  waters  about  the  British  Isles, 
which  were  declared  a  "war  zone";  and  that  it 
might  not  be  possible  to  provide  for  the  safety  of 
crew  or  passengers  of  destroyed  vessels.  Neutral 
ships  were  warned  of  the  danger  of  destruction  if 
they  entered  the  zone.  The  excuse  alleged  for  this 
decided  departure  from  the  custom  of  nations  was 
the  British  blockade  upon  foodstuffs,  which  had 
been  declared  as  a  result  of  the  control  of  food  in 
Germany  by  the  Government.  Here  was  quite  a 
different  matter  from  British  interference  with 
American  trade-rights;  for  if  the  German  threat 
were  carried  into  effect  it  signified  not  merely  the 
destruction  or  loss  of  property,  for  which  restitu 
tion  might  be  made,  but  the  possible  drowning  of 
American  citizens,  perhaps  women  and  children, 


46     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

who  would  be  entirely  within  their  rights  in  travel 
ing  upon  merchant  vessels  and  to  whom  the 
Government  owed  protection. 

Wilson's  reply  was  prompt  and  definite.  "If  the 
commanders  of  German  vessels  of  war  should  .  .  . 
destroy  on  the  high  seas  an  American  vessel  or  the 
lives  of  American  citizens,  it  would  be  difficult  for 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  view  the 
act  in  any  other  light  than  as  an  indefensible  viola 
tion  of  neutral  rights.  .  .  .  The  Government  of 
the  United  States  would  be  constrained  to  hold  the 
Imperial  German  Government  to  a  strict  accounta 
bility  for  such  acts  of  their  naval  authorities  and  to 
take  any  steps  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to  safe 
guard  American  lives  and  property  and  to  secure  to 
American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their  ac 
knowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas."  It  was  the 
clearest  of  warnings.  Would  Germany  heed  it? 
And  if  she  did  not,  would  Wilson  surrender  his 
pacific  ideals  and  take  the  nation  into  war? 


CHAPTER  HI 

THE   SUBMARINE 

EARLY  in  the  winter  of  1914-1915  President  Wilson 
apparently  foresaw  something  of  the  complications 
likely  to  arise  from  the  measures  and  counter- 
measures  taken  by  the  belligerents  to  secure  con 
trol  of  overseas  commerce,  and  sent  his  personal 
adviser,  Colonel  House,  across  the  Atlantic  to 
study  the  possibilities  of  reaching  a  modus  vivendi. 
There  was  no  man  so  well  qualified  for  the  mission. 
Edward  Mandell  House  was  a  Texan  by  birth,  but 
a  cosmopolitan  by  nature.  His  hobby  was  prac 
tical  politics;  his  avocation  the  study  of  history  and 
government.  His  catholicity  of  taste  is  indicated 
by  the  nature  of  his  library,  which  includes  numer 
ous  volumes  not  merely  on  the  social  sciences  but 
also  on  philosophy  and  poetry.  His  intellectual 
background  was  thus  no  less  favorable  than  his 
political  for  the  post  which  he  assumed  as  Wilson's 
personal  adviser  Disqualified  by  physical  delicacy 

47 


48     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

from  entering  the  political  arena  himself  and  con 
sistently  refusing  office,  he  had  for  years  controlled 
the  political  stage  in  his  own  State;  in  1912,  exer 
cising  strong  influence  in  the  national  party  organ 
ization,  he  had  done  much  to  crystallize  sentiment 
in  favor  of  Wilson  as  presidential  candidate.  Slight 
in  stature,  quiet  in  manner  and  voice,  disliking  per 
sonal  publicity,  with  an  almost  uncanny  instinct 
for  divining  the  motives  that  actuate  men,  he  pos 
sessed  that  which  Wilson  lacked  —  the  capacity  to 
"mix,"  to  meet  his  fellow  mortals,  no  matter  what 
their  estate,  on  a  common  ground. 

Courteous  and  engaging,  Colonel  House  was  an 
unexcelled  negotiator:  he  had  a  genius  for  com 
promise,  as  perfect  a  control  of  his  emotions  as  of 
his  facial  expression,  and  a  pacific  magnetism  that 
soothed  into  reasonableness  the  most  heated  inter 
locutor.  His  range  of  acquaintance  in  the  United 
States  was  unparalleled.  Abroad,  previous  to  the 
war,  he  had  discussed  international  relations  with 
the  Kaiser  and  the  chief  statesmen  of  France  and 
England.  His  experience  of  American  politics  and 
knowledge  of  foreign  affairs,  whether  derived  from 
men  or  from  books,  were  matched  by  an  almost  un 
erring  penetration  in  the  analysis  of  a  political  situ 
ation,  domestic  or  European.  As  a  liberal  idealist 


THE  SUBMARINE  49 

and  pacifist,  he  saw  eye  to  eye  with  Wilson;  his 
sense  of  political  actualities,  however,  was  infinitely 
more  keen. 

But  even  the  skill  of  Colonel  House  was  not 
sufficient  to  induce  Germany  to  hold  her  hand,  and, 
as  spring  advanced,  it  became  increasingly  clear 
that  she  was  resolved  to  carry  her  threats  of  un 
restricted  submarine  warfare  into  effect.  The 
quality  of  Wilson's  pacifism  was  about  to  be  put  to 
the  test.  In  March  a  British  steamer,  the  Falaba, 
was  sunk  and  an  American  citizen  drowned;  some 
weeks  later  an  American  boat,  the  Gushing,  was 
attacked  by  a  German  airplane;  and  on  the  1st  of 
May,  another  American  steamer,  the  Gulflight,  was 
sunk  by  a  submarine  with  the  loss  of  two  American 
lives.  When  was  Wilson  going  to  translate  into 
action  his  summary  warning  of  "strict  accounta 
bility?  "  Even  as  the  question  was  asked,  we  heard 
that  the  Germans  had  sunk  the  Lusitania.  On  the 
7th  of  May,  1915,  at  two  in  the  afternoon,  the  pride 
of  the  British  merchant  marine  was  struck  by  two 
torpedoes  fired  from  a  German  submarine.  She 
sank  in  half  an  hour.  More  than  eleven  hundred 
of  her  passengers  and  crew  were  drowned,  among 
them  one  hundred  and  twenty-four  Americans, 
men,  women,  and  children. 


50     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  cry  that  went  up  from  America  was  one  of 
anguish,  but  still  more  one  of  rage.  This  attack 
upon  non-combatant  travelers,  citizens  of  a  neutral 
state,  had  been  callously  premeditated  and  ruth 
lessly  executed  in  cold  blood.  The  German  Gov 
ernment  had  given  frigid  warning,  in  a  newspaper 
advertisement,  of  its  intention  to  affront  the  cus 
tom  of  nations  and  the  laws  of  humanity.  A  wave 
of  the  bitterest  anti-German  feeling  swept  down 
the  Atlantic  coast  and  out  to  the  Mississippi;  for 
the  first  time  there  became  apparent  a  definite 
trend  of  opinion  demanding  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  En 
tente.  On  that  day  Wilson  might  have  won  a 
declaration  of  war,  so  strong  was  popular  senti 
ment;  and  despite  the  comparative  indifference  of 
the  Missouri  valley  and  the  Far  West,  he  might 
have  aroused  enthusiasm  if  not  unity. 

But  a  declaration  of  war  then  would,  in  all  prob 
ability,  have  been  a  mistake.  Entrance  into  the  war 
at  that  time  would  have  been  based  upon  neither 
judgment  nor  ideals,  but  merely  upon  emotion.  The 
American  people  were  in  no  way  prepared  to  bring 
material  aid  to  the  cause  of  justice,  nor  did  the  na 
tion  yet  appreciate  the  moral  issues  involved.  It 
would  have  been  a  war  of  revenge  for  American  lives 


THE  SUBMARINE  51 

lost.  The  President  was  by  temperament  disin 
clined  to  listen  to  the  passionate  demands  for  inter 
vention,  and,  as  historian,  he  must  have  had  in  mind 
the  error  committed  by  McKinley  when  he  permit 
ted  the  declaration  of  war  on  Spain,  after  the  sink 
ing  of  the  Maine  in  1898.  Sober  afterthought  has 
generally  agreed  that  Wilson  was  right.  But  he 
was  himself  led  into  a  serious  error  that  produced 
consequences  which  were  not  soon  to  be  dissipated. 
Speaking  three  days  after  the  event,  when  the 
world  looked  to  him  to  express  the  soul  of  America, 
and  dealing  with  the  spirit  of  Americanism,  he  per 
mitted  an  unfortunate  phrase  to  enter  his  address 
and  to  cloud  his  purpose.  "There  is  such  a  thing," 
he  said,  "as  a  man  being  too  proud  to  fight."  The 
phrase  was  by  no  means  essential  to  the  main 
points  of  his  address;  it  was  preceded  by  one  of 
greater  importance,  namely  that  "the  example  of 
America  must  be  a  special  example  ...  of  peace 
because  peace  is  the  healing  and  elevating  influence 
of  the  world  and  strife  is  not."  It  was  followed  by 
another  of  equal  importance,  that  a  nation  may 
be  so  much  in  the  right  "that  it  does  not  need  to 
convince  others  by  force  that  it  is  right."  These 
two  phrases  expressed  what  was  in  the  President's 
mind  clearly  and  definitely:  the  United  States  was 


52     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

consecrated  to  ideals  which  could  not  be  carried  into 
effect  through  force,  unless  every  other  method  dic 
tated  by  supreme  patience  had  failed.  But  the 
world  did  not  notice  them.  All  that  it  remembered 
was  that  the  United  States  was  "too  proud  to 
fight."  What  did  this  mean  to  the  average  man 
except  that  the  country  was  afraid  to  fight? 
The  peoples  of  the  Entente  powers  were  con 
temptuous;  Germans  were  reassured;  Americans 
were  humiliated. 

Wilson  the  phrase-maker  was  betrayed  by  a 
phrase,  and  it  was  to  pursue  him  like  a  Fury.  The 
chorus  of  indignation  and  shame  aroused  by  this 
phrase  covered  completely  the  determination  and 
skill  with  which  he  entered  upon  the  diplomatic 
struggle  with  Germany.  His  purpose  was  definite. 
He  had  gone  on  record  in  February  that  the  United 
States  Government  would  protect  the  rights  of 
American  citizens,  and  he  was  bound  to  secure  from 
Germany  a  promise  that  merchant  ships  should  not 
be  torpedoed  without  warning  or  assuring  the  lives 
of  crew  and  passengers.  And  yet  by  virtue  of  his 
pacific  principles  this  promise  could  not  be  forcibly 
extracted  until  every  other  possible  method  had 
been  attempted  in  vain.  Unquestionably  he  was 
supported  in  his  policy  by  many,  perhaps  most, 


THE  SUBMARINE  53 

thoughtful  people,  although  wherever  support  was 
given  him  in  the  East  it  was  generally  grudging. 
Such  a  representative  and  judicial  mind  as  that  of 
ex-President  Taft  favored  cool  consideration  and 
careful  action.  But  the  difficulties  encountered  by 
the  President  were  tremendous.  On  the  one  hand 
he  met  the  bitter  denunciations  of  the  group,  con 
stantly  increasing  hi  numbers,  which  demanded  our 
immediate  intervention  on  the  side  of  the  Entente. 
Led  by  Roosevelt,  who  no  longer  felt  as  in  the  pre 
vious  September,  that  the  United  States  had  no  im 
mediate  interest  in  the  war,  this  group  included  in 
fluential  men  of  business  and  many  writers.  They 
had  lost  patience  with  Wilson's  patience.  His  pol 
icy  was,  in  their  opinion,  that  of  a  coward.  On  the 
other  hand,  Wilson  was  assailed  by  pro-Germans 
and  die-hard  pacifists;  the  former  believed  that  the 
British  blockade  justified  Germany's  submarine 
warfare;  the  latter  were  afraid  even  of  strong  lan 
guage  in  diplomatic  notes,  lest  it  lead  to  war.  At  the 
very  outset  of  the  diplomatic  controversy  with  Ger 
many,  before  the  second  Lusitania  note  was  dis 
patched,  the  Secretary  of  State,  William  Jennings 
Bryan,  resigned,  in  the  belief  that  the  President's 
tone  was  too  peremptory.  For  Bryan  was  willing  to 
arbitrate  even  Germany's  right  to  drown  American 


54     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

citizens  on  the  high  seas.  The  defection  of  this 
influential  politician  a  year  previous  would  have 
weakened  Wilson  seriously,  but  by  now  the  Presi 
dent  had  won  secure  control  of  the  party.  He  was, 
indeed,  strengthened  diplomatically  by  Bryan's 
resignation,  as  the  latter,  in  a  conversation  with 
the  Austrian  Ambassador,  had  given  the  impres 
sion  that  American  protests  need  not  be  taken  over- 
seriously.  His  continuance  in  office  might  have 
encouraged  German  leaders  to  adopt  a  bolder  tone. 
From  the  very  beginning  of  his  attempts  to  ob 
tain  from  Germany  a  disavowal  for  the  sinking  of 
the  Lusitania  and  a  promise  not  to  sink  without 
warning,  the  President  took  his  stand  upon  high 
ground.  Not  merely  did  he  insist  upon  the  rights 
guaranteed  to  neutrals  by  the  law  of  nations;  he 
took  the  controversy  out  of  the  class  of  ordinary 
subjects  of  diplomatic  discussion  and  contended 
"for  nothing  less  high  and  sacred  than  the  rights  of 
humanity."  To  this  he  recurred  in  each  of  his 
notes.  Germany  avoided  the  issue.  At  first  she  in 
sisted  that  the  Lusitania  was  armed,  carrying  ex 
plosives  of  war,  transporting  troops  from  Canada, 
and  thus  virtually  acting  as  a  naval  auxiliary. 
After  the  falsity  of  this  assertion  was  shown,  she 
adduced  the  restrictions  placed  by  Great  Britain 


THE  SUBMARINE  55 

on  neutral  trade  as  excuse  for  submarine  opera 
tions,  and  contended  that  the  circumstances  of 
naval  warfare  in  the  twentieth  century  had  so 
changed  that  the  principles  of  international  law  no 
longer  held  good. 

Each  time  Wilson  returned  to  his  point  that  the 
"rights  of  neutrals  are  based  upon  principle,  not 
upon  expediency,  and  the  principles  are  immutable. 
Illegal  and  inhuman  acts  .  .  .  are  manifestly  in 
defensible  when  they  deprive  neutrals  of  their 
acknowledged  rights,  particularly  when  they  vio 
late  the  right  to  life  itself.  If  a  belligerent  cannot 
retaliate  against  an  enemy  without  injuring  the 
lives  of  neutrals,  as  well  as  their  property,  human 
ity,  as  well  as  justice  and  a  due  regard  for  the  dig 
nity  of  neutral  powers  should  dictate  that  the  prac 
tice  be  discontinued."  Wilson  terminated  his 
third  note  to  Germany  with  a  warning,  which  had 
the  tone,  if  not  the  form,  of  an  ultimatum:  there 
must  be  a  scrupulous  observance  of  neutral  rights 
in  this  critical  matter,  as  repetition  of  "acts  in  con 
travention  of  those  rights  must  be  regarded  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  when  they  affect 
American  citizens,  as  deliberately  unfriendly." 

The  exchange  of  notes  consumed  much  time  and 
proved  a  severe  test  for  American  patience.  The 


56     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

first  Lusitania  note  was  sent  on  the  13th  of  May 
and  it  was  not  until  the  1st  of  September  that  the 
German  Government  finally  gave  a  pledge  that  was 
acceptable  to  Wilson.  In  the  meantime  there  had 
been  continued  sinkings,  or  attempts  to  sink,  in 
clear  violation  of  the  principles  for  which  the  Presi 
dent  was  contending.  The  Nebraskan,  the  Armen 
ian,  the  Orduna,  were  subjected  to  submarine  at 
tacks.  On  the  19th  of  August  the  Arabic  was  sunk 
and  two  Americans  lost.  The  ridicule  heaped  upon 
the  President  by  the  British  and  certain  sections  of 
the  American  press,  for  his  writing  of  diplomatic 
notes,  was  only  equaled  by  the  sense  of  humiliation 
experienced  by  pro-Entente  elements  in  this  coun 
try.  Punch  issued  a  cartoon  in  which  Uncle  Sam 
pointed  to  Wilson  as  having  outstripped  the  record 
made  by  Job  for  patience.  Nevertheless  W7ilson 
obtained  the  main  point  for  which  he  was  striving. 
On  September  1,  1915,  the  German  Government 
gave  the  definite  pledge  that  "Liners  will  not  be 
sunk  by  our  submarines  without  warning  and  with 
out  safety  of  the  lives  of  non-combatants,  provided 
that  the  liners  do  not  try  to  escape  or  offer  resist 
ance."  Wilson  had  sought  to  safeguard  a  principle 
by  compelling  from  Germany  a  written  acknowl 
edgment  of  its  validity.  So  much  he  had  won 


THE  SUBMARINE  57 

and  without  the  exercise  of  force.  Even  those 
whose  nerves  were  most  overwrought  by  the  long- 
drawn-out  negotiations,  admitted  that  it  was  a 
diplomatic  victory. 

The  victory  was  not  clean-cut,  for  Germany  had 
not  yet  disavowed  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  nor 
did  the  category  "liners"  seem  to  include  all  mer 
chant  vessels .  How  real  was  even  the  partial  victory 
remained  to  be  seen.  Within  three  days  of  the  Ger 
man  pledge  the  Hesperian  was  sunk  and  an  Amer 
ican  citizen  drowned.  On  the  7th  of  November  the 
Ancona  was  torpedoed  in  the  Mediterranean  by  an 
Austrian  submarine  with  the  loss  of  more  American 
lives.  It  is  true  that  after  each  case  a  disavowal 
was  made  and  a  renewal  of  promises  vouchsafed. 
But  it  seemed  obvious  that  Germany  was  merely 
playing  for  time  and  also  that  she  counted  upon 
pro-German  and  pacifist  agitation  in  this  country. 
For  a  brief  period  it  appeared  as  if  her  hopes  were 
not  to  be  entirely  disappointed.  British  merchant 
vessels,  following  long-established  custom,  had  for 
some  months  been  armed  for  purposes  of  defense. 
The  German  Government  on  February  10,  1916, 
announced  that  henceforward  such  armed  mer 
chantmen  would  be  regarded  as  auxiliary  cruisers 
and  would  be  sunk  without  warning.  It  was 


58     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

unfortunate  that  Robert  Lansing,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  Bryan  as  Secretary  of  State,  had  proposed 
on  January  18, 1916,  to  the  diplomatic  representa 
tives  of  the  Allied  forces  that  they  cease  the  arming 
of  merchantmen  as  a  means  of  securing  from  Ger 
many  a  pledge  which  would  cover  all  merchantmen 
as  well  as  passenger  liners;  this  proposal  gave  to 
Germany  a  new  opportunity  for  raising  the  issue 
of  the  submarine.  But  either  Lansing's  proposal 
had  been  made  without  Mr.  Wilson's  sanction  or 
the  President  changed  his  mind,  since  on  the  10th 
of  February  Wilson  declared  that  he  intended  to 
recognize  the  right  of  merchantmen  to  arm  for  pur 
poses  of  defense.  Once  more  he  insisted  that  the 
rules  of  war  could  not  be  changed  during  war  for 
the  advantage  of  one  side. 

His  declaration  led  at  once  to  something  like  a 
revolt  of  Congress.  Already  some  of  those  who 
especially  feared  intervention  had  been  suffering 
from  an  attack  of  panic  as  a  result  of  Wilson's  re 
cent  decision  to  support  the  preparedness  move 
ment.  They  were  further  terrified  by  the  possi 
bility  that  some  American  citizen  traveling  on 
an  armed  merchantman  might  lose  his  life  and 
that  the  demand  for  entrance  into  the  war  might 
thus  become  irresistible.  Bryanites,  pro-German 


THE  SUBMARINE  59 

propagandists,  and  Irish  combined  against  the 
President,  and  were  reinforced  by  all  the  discon 
tented  elements  who  hoped  to  break  Wilson's  con 
trol  of  the  Democratic  party.  The  combination 
seemed  like  a  new  cave  of  Adullam.  Resolutions 
were  introduced  in  the  Senate  by  Thomas  P.  Gore 
and  in  the  House  by  Jeff  McLemore,  based  upon 
suggestions  made  by  Bryan  nine  months  before, 
that  American  citizens  should  be  warned  not  to 
travel  on  armed  merchant  vessels.  Senator  Stone, 
of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  supported 
these  resolutions  and  it  appeared  probable  that 
Germany  would  find  her  strongest  support  in  the 
American  Congress. 

Wilson  struck  sharply.  Not  merely  his  leader 
ship  of  the  party  and  the  country  was  at  stake,  but 
also  that  moral  leadership  of  neutral  nations  and 
the  world  toward  which  the  struggle  with  Germany 
was  to  take  him.  Refusing  to  receive  Senator 
Stone,  he  sent  him  a  letter  in  which  the  cardinal 
points  of  his  position  were  underlined.  "Once 
accept  a  single  abatement  of  right,"  he  insisted, 
"and  many  other  humiliations  would  certainly  fol 
low,  and  the  whole  fine  fabric  of  international  law 
might  crumble  under  our  hands  piece  by  piece. 
What  we  are  now  contending  for  in  this  matter  is 


60     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  very  essence  of  the  things  that  have  made 
America  a  sovereign  nation.  She  cannot  yield  them 
without  conceding  her  own  impotency  as  a  Nation 
and  making  virtual  surrender  of  her  independent 
position  among  the  nations  of  the  world."  This 
definite  enunciation  was  in  effect  an  appeal  to  the 
American  people,  which  came  as  a  relief  to  those 
who  had  suffered  from  presidential  patience  under 
German  outrages.  The  storm  of  public  feeling 
aroused  against  the  rebellious  Congressmen  was 
such  that  Wilson's  victory  became  assured.  De 
manding  concrete  justification  of  his  stand,  he  in 
sisted  that  the  resolutions  be  put  to  the  vote. 
The  issue  was  somewhat  confused  in  the  Senate 
so  that  the  vote  was  not  decisive;  but  in  the  House 
the  McLemore  resolution  was  defeated  by  a  vote 
of  276  to  142. 

And  yet  the  submarine  issue  was  not  finally 
closed.  Less  than  a  month  after  the  rights  of 
American  citizens  were  thus  maintained,  the  Brit 
ish  passenger  steamer  Sussex,  crossing  the  English 
Channel,  was  torpedoed  without  warning.  It  was 
the  clearest  violation  of  the  pledge  given  by  the 
German  Government  the  previous  September. 
Once  again  Wilson  acted  without  precipitancy. 
He  waited  until  the  Germans  should  present 


THE  SUBMARINE  61 

explanations  and  thereafter  took  more  than  a  week 
in  which  to  formulate  his  decision.  Finally,  on 
April  19,  1916,  he  called  the  two  houses  of  Congress 
in  joint  session  to  lay  before  them  his  note  to  Ger 
many.  Unlike  his  Lusitania  notes,  this  was  a  defi 
nite  ultimatum, clearly  warranted  by  the  undeniable 
fact  that  Germany  had  broken  a  solemn  pledge. 
After  recounting  the  long  list  of  events  which  had 
so  sorely  tried  American  patience,  Wilson  con 
cluded  that  "  unless  the  Imperial  German  Govern 
ment  should  now  immediately  declare  and  effect 
an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of  war 
fare  against  passenger  and  freight  carrying  vessels 
this  Government  can  have  no  choice  but  to  sever 
diplomatic  relations  with  the  Government  of  the 
German  Empire  altogether."  The  force  of  the  ul 
timatum  was  emphasized  by  the  general  tone  of 
the  note,  in  which,  as  in  the  Lusitania  notes,  the 
President  spoke  not  so  much  for  the  legal  rights  of 
the  United  States,  as  in  behalf  of  the  moral  rights 
of  all  humanity.  He  stressed  the  "principles  of 
humanity  as  embodied  in  the  law  of  nations,"  and 
excoriated  the  "inhumanity  of  submarine  war 
fare";  he  terminated  by  stating  that  the  United 
States  would  contemplate  a  diplomatic  break  with 
reluctance,  but  would  feel  constrained  to  take  the 


62     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

step  "in  behalf  of  humanity  and  the  rights  of  neu 
tral  nations."  This  note  of  emphasis  upon  Amer 
ica's  duty  to  mankind  rather  than  to  herself  formed 
the  main  theme  of  a  speech  delivered  two  days 
previous:  "America  will  have  forgotten  her  tradi 
tions  whenever  upon  any  occasion  she  fights  merely 
for  herself  under  such  circumstances  as  will  show 
that  she  has  forgotten  to  fight  for  all  mankind. 
And  the  only  excuse  that  America  can  ever  have 
for  the  assertion  of  her  physical  force  is  that  she 
asserts  it  in  behalf  of  the  interests  of  humanity." 
Germany  yielded  before  Wilson's  ultimatum, 
though  with  bad  grace,  and  promised  that  no  more 
merchant  ships  would  be  sunk  "without  warning 
and  without  saving  human  lives."  But  she  also 
tried  to  make  her  promise  conditional  upon  the  ces 
sation  by  Great  Britain  of  methods  of  warfare 
which  Germany  called  illegal,  implying  that  her 
pledge  might  be  withdrawn  at  her  pleasure:  "the 
German  Government  .  .  .  must  reserve  itself 
complete  liberty  of  action."  This  condition  Wil 
son,  in  taking  note  of  Germany's  pledge,  definitely 
waved  aside :  "the  Government  of  the  United  States 
notifies  the  Imperial  Government  that  it  cannot 
for  a  moment  entertain,  much  less  discuss,  a  sug 
gestion  that  respect  by  German  naval  authorities 


THE  SUBMARINE  63 

for  the  rights  of  American  citizens  upon  the  high 
seas  should  in  any  way  or  in  the  slightest  de 
gree  be  made  contingent  upon  the  conduct  of  any 
other  government  affecting  the  rights  of  neutrals 
and  noncombatants.  Responsibility  in  such  mat 
ters  is  single,  not  joint;  absolute,  not  relative/* 
By  its  silence  the  German  Government  seemed  to 
acquiesce  and  the  crisis  was  over.  The  country 
had  been  close  to  war,  but  intervention  might  yet 
be  avoided  if  Germany  kept  her  word.  That,  how 
ever,  was  a  condition  upon  which  people  were 
learning  not  to  rely. 

It  is  obvious  that  by  the  early  summer  of  1916 
President  Wilson's  attitude  on  foreign  affairs  had 
undergone  a  notable  transformation  from  that 
parochial  spirit  of  1914  which  had  led  him  to  de 
clare  that  the  war  was  no  concern  of  America;  he 
had  given  over  completely  the  tradition  that  if  we 
keep  our  own  hands  clean  we  fulfill  our  duty.  He 
had  begun  to  elaborate  an  idealistic  policy  of  ser 
vice  to  the  world,  not  unreminiscent  of  the  altruis 
tic  schemes  of  Clay  and  Webster  for  assisting  op 
pressed  republicans  in  Europe  during  the  first  third 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  Wilson,  like  those 
statesmen,  had  always  felt  that  the  position  of  the 
United  States  in  the  world  was  of  a  special  sort, 


64     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

quite  different  from  that  of  the  European  states, 
and  circumstances  were  forcing  him  to  take  the 
stand  that  the  nation  must  assume  the  lead  in  the 
world  in  order  to  ensure  the  operation  of  the  prin 
ciples  that  Americans  believe  in.  "We  are  in  some 
sort  and  by  the  force  of  circumstances  the  respon 
sible  spokesman  of  the  rights  of  humanity."  He 
still  opposed  active  intervention  in  the  war;  the 
mission  of  the  United  States  was  a  higher  one  than 
could  adequately  be  fulfilled  through  war;  the 
kind  of  service  we  could  best  give  was  not  fighting. 
Yet  he  was  brought  to  admit,  even  before  the  Sus 
sex  crisis  (February  26,  1916),  that  in  the  last  in 
stance  war  might  be  necessary  if  the  American  peo 
ple  were  to  assume  the  role  of  champion  of  liberty 
in  the  world  at  large,  as  they  had  championed  it  in 
the  Americas;  for  the  rights  of  humanity  must  be 
made  secure  against  menace:  "  America  ought  to 
keep  out  of  this  war  ...  at  the  expense  of 
everything  except  this  single  thing  upon  which  her 
character  and  history  are  founded,  her  sense  of  hu 
manity  and  justice.  .  .  .  Valor  withholds  itself 
from  all  small  implications  and  entanglements  and 
waits  for  the  great  opportunity,  when  the  sword 
will  flash  as  if  it  carried  the  light  of  heaven  upon 
its  blade."  Thus  the  possibility  of  ultimate  force 


THE  SUBMARINE  65 

was  implied.  Eighteen  months  previous,  peace 
had  been  for  Wilson  an  end  in  itself.  Now  it 
was  subordinated  to  the  greater  end  implied  in 
maintaining  the  principle  of  justice  in  the  world. 

During  this  period  popular  sentiment  also  under 
went  a  notable  development.  Americans  reacted 
sharply  to  German  threats  and  outrages,  and  were 
thrown  off  their  comfortable  balance  by  the  events 
which  touched  American  honor  and  safety  so  close 
ly.  Like  Wilson,  they  were  shaken  out  of  that 
sense  of  isolation  which  enveloped  them  in  1914, 
and  they  were  thus  prepared  for  the  reception  of 
broader  ideals.  The  process  of  education  was  slow 
and  difficult.  It  was  hampered  by  the  confusion  of 
foreign  issues.  Propagandists  took  advantage  of 
the  controversy  with  Great  Britain  in  order  to  ob 
scure  the  principles  upon  which  the  discussions  with 
Germany  were  based.  The  increasing  stringency  of 
British  control  of  commerce  and  the  blacklisting 
of  various  American  firms  by  the  British  au 
thorities  resulted  in  numerous  American  protests 
and  to  some  warmth  of  feeling.  Wilson  was  no 
particular  friend  of  the  British,  but  he  rightly  in 
sisted  upon  the  distinction  between  the  dispute 
with  Germany,  which  involved  the  common  right 
of  humanity  to  life,  and  that  with  Great  Britain, 

5 


66     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

which  involved  merely  rights  of  property.  Never 
theless  that  distinction  was  blurred  in  the  minds  of 
many  Americans,  and  their  perception  of  the  new 
ideals  of  foreign  policy  was  necessarily  confused. 

The  education  of  the  American  people  to  the  sig 
nificance  of  the  issue  was  also  hampered  by  the 
material  change  that  came  over  the  country  during 
the  latter  part  of  1915  and  the  spring  of  1916.  The 
influx  of  gold  and  the  ease  with  which  fortunes  were 
accumulated  could  not  but  have  widespread  effects. 
The  European  war  came  at  a  moment  when  the 
United  States  was  passing  through  a  period  of  com 
paratively  hard  times.  Stringency  was  naturally 
increased  by  the  liquidation  of  foreign  investments 
in  1914  and  the  closing  of  European  markets  to 
American  commerce.  Business  was  dull.  But 
this  condition  was  rapidly  altered  through  the 
placing  of  large  contracts  by  the  Entente  Govern 
ments  and  the  most  extensive  buying  by  foreign 
purchasers.  New  markets  were  found  among  the 
neutral  states,  which  were  unable  to  buy  in  Europe. 
Naturally  there  developed  a  rapid  extension  of 
industrial  activities.  New  manufacturing  concerns 
grew  up,  large  and  small,  as  a  result  of  these  ad 
ventitious  conditions,  which  paid  enormous  re 
turns.  Activities  upon  the  stock  market  were 


THE  SUBMARINE  67 

unparalleled.  New  and  sudden  fortunes  were 
made;  millionaires  became  common.  The  whole 
world  was  debtor  to  America  and  a  golden  stream 
flowed  across  the  Atlantic.  Prices  rose  rapidly 
and  wages  followed. 

Inevitably  materialism  conquered,  at  least  for 
the  moment.  The  demand  for  luxuries  was  only 
equaled  by  the  craze  for  entertainment.  Artisans 
and  shopgirls  invaded  the  jewelry  stores  of  Fifth 
Avenue.  Metropolitan  life  was  a  succession  of 
luncheons  and  teas,  where  fertile  brains  were  bus 
ied  with  the  invention  of  new  dancing  steps  rather 
than  the  issues  of  the  European  war.  Cabarets 
were  crowded  and  seats  for  midnight  beauty  shows 
must  be  secured  well  in  advance  or  by  means  of 
gargantuan  tips  to  pi utocratic  head  waiters.  Much 
of  the  materialism  was  simply  external.  In  every 
town  American  women  by  the  thousand  gave  lavish 
ly  of  their  time  and  strength  to  knit  and  roll  band 
ages  for  the  fighters  and  wounded  overseas. 
America  was  collecting  millions  for  the  relief  of 
Belgium,  Serbia,  and  for  the  Red  Cross.  The 
American  Ambulance  in  France  was  served  by  men 
imbued  with  the  spirit  of  sacrifice.  Thousands  of 
American  youths  enlisted  in  the  Canadian  forces. 
The  general  atmosphere  of  the  country,  however, 


68     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

was  heavy  with  amusement  and  money-making. 
Not  yet  did  America  fully  realize  that  the  war 
was  a  struggle  of  ideals  which  must  concern  every 
one  closely.  In  such  an  atmosphere  the  idealistic 
policy  of  Wilson  was  not  easily  understood. 

The  President  himself  cannot  escape  a  large 
share  of  the  blame  for  America's  blindness  to  the  is 
sue.  During  the  first  twelve  months  of  the  war, 
when  the  country  looked  to  him  for  leadership,  he 
had,  purposely  or  otherwise,  fostered  the  forces  of 
pacifism  and  encouraged  the  advocates  of  national 
isolation.  He  had  underlined  the  separation  of 
the  United  States  from  everything  that  went  on  in 
Europe  and  insisted  that  in  the  issues  of  the  war 
the  American  people  had  no  interest.  In  deference 
to  the  spirit  of  pacifism  that  engrossed  the  Middle 
West,  he  had  opposed  the  movement  for  military 
preparedness.  When,  late  in  1915,  Wilson  changed 
his  attitude  and  attempted  to  arouse  the  country 
to  a  sense  of  American  interest  in  world  affairs 
and  to  the  need  of  preparing  to  accept  responsi 
bility,  he  encountered  the  opposition  of  forces 
which  he  himself  had  helped  to  vitalize. 

Popular  education,  especially  upon  the  Atlantic 
coast,  was  further  hampered  by  the  personal  irrita 
tion  which  the  President  aroused.  Disliked  when 


THE  SUBMARINE  69 

inaugurated,  he  had  attracted  bitter  enmity  among 
the  business  men  who  dominate  opinion  in  New 
England  and  the  Eastern  States.  They  accused 
him  of  truckling  to  labor.  They  were  wearied  by 
his  idealism,  which  seemed  to  them  all  words  and 
no  deeds.  They  regarded  his  handling  of  foreign 
affairs,  whether  in  the  Mexican  or  submarine  crises, 
as  weak  and  vacillating.  He  was,  in  Rooseveltian 
nomenclature,  a  "pussyfooter."  Hence  grew  up 
the  tradition,  which  was  destined  to  endure  among 
many  elements  of  opinion,  that  everything  advo 
cated  by  Wilson  must,  simply  by  reason  of  its 
authorship,  be  essentially  wrong.  The  men  of  Bos 
ton,  New  York,  and  Philadelphia  were  beginning  to 
give  over  their  attitude  of  isolation  and  admit  with 
Roosevelt  that  the  United  States  ought  to  stand 
with  the  Entente.  The  Wilsonian  doctrine  of  ser 
vice  to  the  world,  however,  was  not  to  their  taste, 
partly  because  they  did  not  like  Wilson. 

It  was  to  the  rural  districts  of  the  upper  Missis 
sippi  and  to  the  South  that  the  President  looked 
most  eagerly  for  support  of  his  new  policy.  These 
were  the  regions  where  indifference  to  and  igno 
rance  of  foreign  affairs  had  been  most  conspicuous, 
but  they  were  also  the  regions  where  the  Presi 
dent's  personal  influence  was  strongest;  finally  they 


70     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

were  the  districts  where  extreme  pacifism  was  most 
deeply  embedded.  If  Wilson's  championship  of  the 
rights  of  liberty  throughout  the  world  could  be  ac 
complished  by  pacific  methods,  they  would  follow 
him;  but  if  it  meant  war,  no  one  could  guarantee 
what  their  attitude  might  be.  Bryan  was  popular 
in  those  parts.  As  yet  Wilson,  while  he  had  formu 
lated  his  policy  in  broad  terms,  had  not  indicated 
the  methods  or  mechanism  by  which  his  principles 
were  to  be  put  into  operation.  He  would  without 
question  encounter  strong  opposition  among  the 
German-Americans;  he  would  find  the  attitude  of 
the  Irish  foes  of  the  Entente  hostile;  he  would  find 
the  Pacific  coast  more  interested  in  Japanese  immi 
gration  than  in  the  ideals  of  the  European  war. 
Fortunately  events  were  to  unify  the  heterogeneous 
elements  of  the  country,  at  least  for  the  moment,  in 
a  way  that  simplified  greatly  the  President's  prob 
lem.  Not  the  least  of  the  unifying  forces  was  to 
be  found  in  German  psychology,  which  led  the  Im 
perial  Government  to  believe  that  the  United 
States  could  be  rendered  helpless  through  the 
intrigues  of  German  spies. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PLOTS   AND    PREPAREDNESS 

THE  Government  of  the  German  Empire  was  in 
spired  by  a  spirit  that  was  at  once  modern  and 
medieval,  and  this  contradictory  spirit  manifested 
itself  in  the  ways  and  means  employed  to  win  the 
sympathy  of  the  United  States  and  to  prevent  it,  as 
a  neutral  power,  from  assisting  the  Entente.  Ger 
many  worked  on  the  one  hand  by  means  of  open 
propaganda,  which  is  the  method  of  modern  com 
mercial  advertisement  translated  into  the  political 
field,  and  on  the  other  by  secret  intrigue  reminis 
cent  of  the  days  of  Louis  XI.  Her  propaganda 
took  the  form  of  organized  campaigns  to  influence 
opinion  through  speeches,  pamphlets,  and  books, 
which  were  designed  to  convince  the  country  of  the 
justice  of  Germany's  cause  and  the  dangers  of  be 
coming  the  catspaw  of  the  Entente.  Her  plans  of 
intrigue  were  directed  towards  the  use  of  German- 
Americans  or  German  spies  to  assist  in  the  return 

71 


72     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  German  officers  from  this  country,  to  hinder  the 
transport  of  Canadian  troops,  to  destroy  commu 
nications,  and  to  hamper  the  output  of  munitions 
for  the  Entente  by  strikes,  incendiary  fires,  and 
explosions. 

During  the  first  weeks  of  the  war  a  German  press 
bureau  was  established  in  New  York  for  the  dis 
tribution  of  pro-German  literature  and  the  support 
of  the  German- American  press.  Its  activities  were 
chiefly  directed  by  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg,  who 
defended  Germany  from  the  charge  of  responsi 
bility  for  the  war  and  expatiated  upon  her  effi 
ciency  and  the  beneficence  of  her  culture  in  the  same 
breath  that  he  attacked  the  commercial  greed  of 
Great  Britain,  the  cruel  autocracy  of  Russia,  and 
the  imperialistic  designs  of  Japan  in  the  Pacific. 
Its  pamphlets  went  so  far  as  to  excoriate  allied 
methods  of  warfare  and  to  level  accusations  of  inhu 
manity  against  the  Belgians.  It  distributed  broad 
cast  throughout  the  country  an  appeal  signed  by 
ninety-three  German  professors  and  intellectuals, 
and  countersigned  by  a  few  notable  Americans, 
which  besought  the  American  people  not  to  be  de 
ceived  by  the  "lies  and  calumnies"  of  the  enemies 
of  Germany. 

This  propaganda  left  all  cold  except  those  who 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  73 

already  sympathized  with  Germany.  Indeed  it 
reacted  unfavorably  against  the  German  cause,  as 
soon  as  the  well-authenticated  reports  came  of  Ger 
man  atrocities  in  Belgium,  of  the  burning  of  the 
Louvain  library,  and  of  the  shelling  of  Rheims  ca 
thedral.  The  efforts  of  German  agents  then  shifted, 
concentrating  in  an  attack  upon  the  United  States 
Government  for  its  alleged  unneutral  attitude  in 
permitting  the  export  of  munitions  to  the  Entente. 
In  some  sections  of  the  country  they  were  able  to 
arouse  an  opinion  favorable  to  the  establishment  of 
an  embargo.  In  the  Senate,  on  December  10, 1914, 
a  bill  was  offered  by  John  D.  Works  of  California 
providing  for  the  prohibition  of  the  sale  of  war  sup 
plies  to  any  belligerent  nation  and  a  similar  bill  was 
fathered  in  the  House  by  Charles  L.  Bartlett  of 
Georgia.  These  efforts  were  warmly  supported  by 
various  associations,  some  of  which  were  ad 
mittedly  German-American  societies,  although  the 
majority  attempted  to  conceal  their  partisan  feel 
ing  under  such  titles  as  American  Independence 
Union  and  American  Neutrality  League.  The  latter 
effectively  displayed  its  interest  in  America  and  in 
neutrality  by  tumultuous  singing  of  Deutschland 
ilber  Alles  and  Die  Wacht  am  Rhein.  Of  sincerely 
pacifist  organizations  there  were  not  a  few,  among 


74     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

which  should  not  be  forgotten  the  fantastic  effort  of 
Henry  Ford  in  December,  1915,  to  end  the  war  by 
sending  a  "Peace  Ship"  to  Europe,  designed  to 
arouse  such  public  opinion  abroad  in  favor  of  peace 
that  "the  boys  would  be  out  of  the  trenches  by 
Christmas."  The  ship  sailed,  but  the  expedition, 
which  was  characterized  by  equal  amounts  of  hon 
esty  and  foolishness,  broke  up  shortly  in  dissension. 
For  the  most  part  pacifism  and  pro-Germanism 
went  hand  in  hand  —  a  tragic  alliance  of  good  and 
evil  which  was  to  hamper  later  efforts  to  evolve 
an  international  organization  for  the  preservation 
of  peace. 

The  attempts  of  German  propagandists  to  influ 
ence  the  policy  of  the  Government  met,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  stubborn  resolve  of  the  President  not  to 
favor  one  camp  of  the  belligerents  by  a  departure 
from  international  custom  and  law  during  the  prog 
ress  of  the  war.  Their  efforts,  however,  were  not 
entirely  relaxed.  Appeals  were  made  to  workmen 
to  stop  the  war  by  refusing  to  manufacture  muni 
tions;  vigorous  campaigns  were  conducted  to  dis 
credit  the  Administration  by  creating  the  belief 
that  it  was  discriminating  in  favor  of  the  British. 
But  more  and  more  Germany  took  to  secret  in 
trigue,  the  strings  of  which  were  pulled  by  the 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  75 

military  and  naval  attaches,  von  Papen  and  Boy-Ed. 
The  German  Ambassador,  von  Bernstorff,  also 
took  a  lively  interest  in  the  plans  to  control  public 
opinion  and  later  to  hamper  munitions  production. 
With  his  approval,  German  manufacturing  com 
panies  were  organized  at  Bridgeport  and  elsewhere 
to  buy  up  the  machinery  and  supplies  essential  to 
the  production  of  powder,  shrapnel,  and  surplus 
benzol;  arrangements  were  made  with  the  Bosch 
Magneto  Company  to  enter  into  contracts  with  the 
Entente  for  fuses  and  at  the  last  moment  to  refuse 
to  complete  the  contract.  Von  Bernstorff  was  care 
ful  to  avoid  active  participation  in  plots  for  the 
destruction  of  property;  but  his  interest  and  com 
plicity,  together  with  that  of  Dr.  Heinrich  F.  Albert, 
Financial  Adviser  of  the  German  Embassy,  are  evi 
denced  by  the  checks  drawn  on  their  joint  account 
and  paid  to  convicted  criminals. 

One  of  the  first  of  the  plots  was  the  attempted 
blowing  up  of  the  international  bridge  at  Vance- 
boro,  Maine,  on  December  31, 1914.  The  materials 
for  this  explosion  were  collected  and  the  fuse  set  by 
a  German  reservist  lieutenant,  Werner  Horn,  who 
admitted  that  he  acted  under  the  orders  of  von 
Papen.  Another  plan  of  the  German  agents  was 
the  destruction  of  the  Welland  Canal,  which  was 


76     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

entrusted  to  a  brilliant  and  erratic  adventurer,  von 
der  Goltz,  who  later  confessed  that  he  was  under 
the  supervision  of  von  Papen  and  had  secured  his 
materials  from  Captain  Hans  Tauscher,  the  agent 
in  New  York  of  the  Hamburg- American  Line.  This 
company  was  involved  in  securing  false  manifests 
for  vessels  that  carried  coal  and  supplies  to  German 
cruisers,  thus  defrauding  the  United  States,  and  in 
ob taming  false  passports  for  German  reservists  and 
agents;  it  acted,  in  fact,  as  an  American  branch  of 
the  German  Admiralty.  More  serious  yet  was  an 
attempt  of  the  naval  attache,  Boy-Ed,  to  involve 
the  United  States  and  Mexico  in  a  dispute  by  a  plot 
to  bring  back  Huerta.  This  unhappy  Mexican 
leader  was  arrested  on  the  Mexican  border  in  June, 
1915,  and  shortly  afterwards  died. 

For  some  months  the  existence  of  such  activities 
on  the  part  of  German  agents  had  been  suspected 
by  the  public.  A  series  of  disclosures  followed.  In 
July,  1915,  Dr.  Albert,  while  riding  on  a  New  York 
elevated  train,  was  so  careless  as  to  set  his  portfolio 
on  the  seat  for  a  few  moments;  it  was  speedily 
picked  up  by  a  fellow  passenger  who  made  a  hasty 
exit.  Soon  afterwards  the  chief  contents  of  the 
portfolio  were  published.  They  indicated  the 
complicity  of  the  German  Embassy  in  different 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  77 

attempts  to  control  the  American  press  and  to  influ 
ence  public  opinion,  and  proved  the  energy  of  less 
notable  agents  in  illegal  undertakings.  Towards 
the  end  of  August,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  Dr. 
Constantin  Dumba,  made  use  of  an  American  cor 
respondent,  James  F.  J.  Archibald  by  name,  to  car 
ry  dispatches  to  the  Central  Empires.  He  was  ar 
rested  by  the  British  authorities  at  Falmouth,  and 
his  effects  proved  Dumba's  interest  in  plans  to  or 
ganize  strikes  in  American  munitions  plants.  "It 
is  my  impression,"  wrote  the  Austrian  Ambassa 
dor,  "that  we  can  disorganize  and  hold  up  for 
months,  if  not  entirely  prevent,  the  manufacture  of 
munitions  in  Bethlehem  and  the  Middle  West, 
which  in  the  opinion  of  the  German  military  at 
tache,  is  of  great  importance  and  amply  outweighs 
the  expenditure  of  money  involved."  Archibald 
also  carried  a  letter  from  von  Papen  to  his  wife  in 
which  he  wrote :  "  I  always  say  to  these  idiotic  Yan 
kees  that  they  had  better  hold  their  tongues."  Its 
publication  did  not  serve  to  allay  the  warmth  of 
American  feeling. 

It  was  with  great  satisfaction,  therefore,  that  the 
public  learned  in  September  that  President  Wilson 
had  requested  the  recall  of  Ambassador  Dumba 
in  the  following  words:  "By  reason  of  the  admitted 


78     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

purpose  and  intent  of  Ambassador  Dumba  to  con 
spire  to  cripple  legitimate  industries  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States  and  to  interrupt  their  legiti 
mate  trade,  and  by  reason  of  the  flagrant  diplo 
matic  impropriety  in  employing  an  American  citizen 
protected  by  an  American  passport,  as  a  secret 
bearer  of  official  despatches  through  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  of  Austria-Hungary.  .  .  .  Mr.  Dumba  is 
no  longer  acceptable  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States."  The  two  German  attaches  were 
given  a  longer  shrift,  but  on  the  30th  of  November 
von  Bernstorff  was  told  that  they  were  no  longer  ac 
ceptable;  von  Papen  sailed  on  the  22d  of  December 
and  was  followed  a  week  later  by  Boy -Ed. 

During  the  two  preceding  months  there  had  been 
a  constant  series  of  strikes  and  explosions  in  muni 
tions  plants  and  industrial  works,  and  public  opin 
ion  was  now  thoroughly  aroused.  The  feeling  that 
Germany  and  Austria-  were  thus  through  their 
agents  virtually  carrying  on  warfare  in  the  United 
States  was  intensified  by  the  revelations  of  Dr.  Jo 
seph  Goricar,  formerly  an  Austrian  consul,  but  a 
Jugoslav  who  sympathized  with  the  Entente;  ac 
cording  to  his  statement  every  Austrian  consul  in  the 
country  was  "a  center  of  intrigue  of  the  most  crim 
inal  character."  His  charges  came  at  the  moment 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  79 

when  Americans  were  reading  that  the  number  of 
strikes  in  munitions  plants  was  unparalleled,  no  less 
than  one  hundred  and  two  in  a  few  months,  of 
which  fifty  were  in  Bridgeport,  which  was  known  to 
be  a  center  of  German  activities.  Explosions  and 
fires  at  the  plants  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Com 
pany  and  the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works,  and  at 
the  Roebling  wire-rope  shop  in  Trenton  were  of 
mysterious  origin. 

To  what  extent  explosions  in  munitions  plants 
were  the  result  of  German  incendiarism  and  not  of 
an  accidental  nature,  it  is  difficult  to  determine. 
But  the  Department  of  Justice  was  so  thoroughly 
convinced  of  the  far-reaching  character  of  German 
plots  that  President  Wilson,  in  his  annual  message 
of  December,  1915,  frankly  denounced  the  "hy 
phenates"  who  lent  their  aid  to  such  intrigues.  "I 
am  sorry  to  say  that  the  gravest  threats  against  our 
national  peace  and  safety  have  been  uttered  within 
our  own  borders.  There  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States  .  .  .  who  have  poured  the  poison  of  dis 
loyalty  into  the  very  arteries  of  our  national  life; 
who  have  sought  to  bring  the  authority  and  good 
name  of  our  Government  into  contempt,  to  destroy 
our  industries  wherever  they  thought  it  effective 
for  their  vindictive  purposes  to  strike  at  them,  and 


80     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

to  debase  our  politics  to  the  uses  of  foreign  intrigue." 
His  attack  drew  forth  the  bitter  resentment  of  the 
foreign  language  press,  but  was  hailed  with  delight 
in  the  East,  where  German  intrigues  aroused  as 
great  excitement  against  the  Fatherland  as  the  sub 
marine  campaign.  Nor  was  it  calmed  by  the  con 
tinuance  of  fires  and  explosions  and  the  evident 
complicity  of  German  officials.  During  the  spring 
of  1916  a  German  agent,  von  Igel,  who  occupied  the 
former  offices  of  von  Papen,  was  arrested,  and  the 
activities  of  Franz  von  Rintelen,  who  had  placed 
incendiary  bombs  on  vessels  leaving  New  York 
with  food  and  supplies  for  the  Allies,  were  pub 
lished.  Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  sinking  of 
the  Sussex,  German  plots  were  now  stimulating 
the  American  people  to  a  keen  sense  of  their  inter 
est  in  the  war,  and  preparing  them  effectively  for  a 
new  attitude  toward  foreign  affairs  in  general. 

It  was  inevitable  that  such  revelations  should 
have  created  a  widespread  demand  for  increased 
military  efficiency.  The  nation  was  approaching 
the  point  where  force  might  become  necessary,  and 
yet  it  was  in  no  way  prepared  for  warfare,  either  on 
land  or  sea.  During  the  first  months  of  the  war  the 
helplessness  of  the  United  States  had  been  laid  bare 
by  General  Leonard  Wood,  who  declared  that  we 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  81 

had  never  fought  a  really  first-class  nation  and 
"were  pitifully  unprepared,  should  such  a  calamity 
be  thrust  upon  us."  The  regular  army  "  available 
to  face  such  a  crisis"  would  be  "just  about  equal  to 
the  police  forces  of  Boston,  New  York,  and  Phila 
delphia."  The  "preparedness  movement "  thus  in 
augurated  was  crystallized  by  the  formation  of  the 
National  Security  League,  designed  to  organize 
citizens  in  such  a  way  "as  may  make  practical  an 
intelligent  expression  of  public  opinion  and  may  en 
sure  for  the  nation  an  adequate  system  of  national 
defense."  Pacifists  and  pro-Germans  immediately 
organized  in  opposition;  and  the  movement  was 
hampered  by  President  Wilson's  unwillingness  to 
cooperate  in  any  way.  He  was  flatly  opposed,  in 
the  autumn  of  1914  and  the  spring  of  the  following 
year,  to  compulsory  military  service:  "We  will  not 
ask  our  young  men  to  spend  the  best  years  of  their 
lives  making  soldiers  of  themselves."  He  insisted 
that  the  American  people  had  always  been  able  to 
defend  themselves  and  should  be  able  to  continue 
to  do  so  without  altering  their  military  traditions. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  at  this  time  Wilson 
still  believed  in  absolute  isolation  and  refused  to 
consider  force  as  an  element  in  our  foreign  policy. 
His  attitude  was  sufficient  to  render  fruitless  various 


m     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

resolutions  presented  by  Congressman  Augustus 
P.  Gardner  and  Senator  George  E.  Chamber 
lain,  who  proposed  improvements  in  the  military 
system.  Congress  was  pacifically-minded.  This 
was  the  time  when  many  Congressmen  were  ad 
vocating  an  embargo  on  arms,  and  so  far  from  de 
siring  to  learn  how  to  make  and  use  munitions  of 
war  they  concentrated  their  efforts  on  methods  of 
preventing  their  export  to  the  Allies. 

The  preparedness  movement,  none  the  less, 
spread  through  the  country  and  the  influence  of  the 
National  Security  League  did  much  to  inform  the 
public.  In  the  summer  of  1915  there  was  organized 
at  Plattsburg,  New  York,  under  the  authority  of 
General  Wood,  a  civilian  camp  designed  to  give 
some  experience  in  the  rudiments  of  military 
science.  It  was  not  encouraged  by  the  Adminis 
tration,  but  at  the  end  of  the  year  the  President 
himself  confessed  that  he  had  been  converted.  He 
was  about  to  abandon  his  policy  of  isolation  for  his 
new  ideal  of  international  service,  and  he  realized 
the  logical  necessity  of  supporting  it  by  at  least  a 
show  of  force.  Mere  negative  "neutrality"  no 
longer  sufficed.  His  fear  that  greater  military 
strength  might  lead  to  an  aggressive  spirit  in  the 
country  had  been  obliterated  by  the  attacks  of 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  83 

submarines  and  by  the  German  plots.  He  admitted 
frankly  that  he  had  changed  his  mind.  "I  would 
be  ashamed,"  he  said,  "if  I  had  not  learned  some 
thing  in  fourteen  months."  To  the  surprise  of  many 
who  had  counted  upon  his  pacific  tendencies  to  the 
end,  he  did  what  he  had  not  heretofore  done  for 
any  of  his  policies;  he  left  his  desk  in  Washington 
and  took  to  the  platform. 

During  January  and  February,  1916,  Presi 
dent  Wilson  delivered  a  succession  of  speeches  in 
Pittsburgh,  Cleveland,  Chicago,  Milwaukee,  St. 
Louis,  and  other  places  in  the  upper  Mississippi 
Valley,  emphasizing  his  conversion  to  prepared 
ness.  Aware  that  his  transformation  would  be  re 
garded  as  anti-German  and  tending  to  draw  the 
United  States  into  the  conflict,  he  apparently 
sought  out  pro-German  and  pacifist  centers,  and 
for  the  first  time  utilized  something  of  the  tradi 
tional  "patriotic"  style  to  rouse  those  citizens  who, 
as  yet,  failed  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  the 
international  situation.  "I  know  that  you  are  de 
pending  upon  me  to  keep  the  nation  out  of  war. 
So  far  I  have  done  so,  and  I  pledge  you  my  word 
that,  God  helping  me,  I  will  —  if  it  is  possible.  You 
have  laid  another  duty  upon  me.  You  have  bidden 
me  see  that  nothing  stains  or  impairs  the  honor  of 


84     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  United  States.  And  that  is  a  matter  not  within 
my  control.  That  depends  upon  what  others  do, 
not  upon  what  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  does,  and  therefore  there  may  be  at  any  mo 
ment  a  time  when  I  cannot  both  preserve  the  honor 
and  the  peace  of  the  United  States.  Do  not  exact 
of  me  an  impossible  and  contradictory  thing,  but 
stand  ready  and  insist  that  everybody  that  repre 
sents  you  should  stand  ready  to  provide  the  means 
for  maintaining  the  honor  of  the  United  States." 
And  later:  "America  cannot  be  an  ostrich  with  its 
head  in  the  sand.  America  cannot  shut  itself  out 
from  the  rest  of  the  world.  .  .  .  Do  you  want 
the  situation  to  be  such  that  all  the  President  can 
do  is  to  write  messages,  to  utter  words  of  protest? 
If  these  breaches  of  international  law  which  are  in 
daily  danger  of  occurring  should  touch  the  very 
vital  interests  and  honor  of  the  United  States,  do 
you  wish  to  do  nothing  about  it?  Do  you  wish  to 
have  all  the  world  say  that  the  flag  of  the  United 
States,  which  we  all  love,  can  be  stained  with  im 
punity?"  What  a  transformation  from  those  days 
of  December,  1914,  when  he  believed  that  mili 
tary  preparation  would  prove  that  the  American 
people  had  been  thrown  off  their  balance  by  a 
war  with  which  they  had  nothing  to  do !  And  what 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  85 

a  revelation  of  the  wounds  inflicted  by  the  barbed 
taunts  cast  against  the  President  for  his  patience 
in  the  writing  of  diplomatic  notes! 

Had  the  President  carried  his  enthusiasm  into 
actual  accomplishment  and  provided  for  effective 
military  and  naval  preparation,  his  claim  to  the 
title  of  great  statesman  would  be  more  clear.  Un 
fortunately  when  it  came  to  forcing  Congress  to 
take  the  necessary  steps,  he  failed.  The  inertia 
and  reluctance  of  pacifist  or  partisan  representa 
tives  would  have  been  broken  by  Roosevelt.  But 
Wilson  did  mere  lip-service  to  the  principle  of  mili 
tary  efficiency.  The  bills  introduced  in  Congress 
were  denounced  by  military  experts  as  half-meas 
ures  likely  to  produce  no  efficient  result,  and  the 
President,  who  in  most  matters  was  determined  to 
dominate,  in  this  permitted  congressional  com 
mittees  to  have  their  way.  The  protests  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Lindley  M.  Garrison,  led  to  his 
resignation;  and  (most  curious  development)  the 
President  replaced  him  by  a  man,  Newton  D. 
Baker,  who,  whatever  his  capacity,  was  gener 
ally  known  as  a  pacifist.  Wilson's  intelligence 
told  him  that  military  preparation  was  neces 
sary,  if  his  policy  of  international  service  was  to 
be  anything  more  than  academic;  but  his  pacific 


86     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

instincts  prevented  him  from  securing  real  military 
efficiency. 

An  example  of  the  unreadiness  of  the  United 
States  was  furnished  in  the  late  spring  and  summer 
of  1916,  when  relations  with  Mexico  became 
strained  almost  to  the  breaking  point.  President 
Wilson's  handling  of  the  knotty  Mexican  problem 
had  been  characteristic.  He  had  temporized  in  the 
hope  that  anything  like  a  break  might  be  avoided 
and  was  resolutely  opposed  to  formal  armed  inter 
vention.  But  after  refusing  to  recognize  Huerta, 
who  had  gained  his  position  of  provisional  presi 
dent  of  Mexico  through  the  murder  of  Madero,  in 
which  he  was  evidently  implicated,  the  President 
had  ordered  the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz  by  United 
States  troops  in  retaliation  for  the  arrest  of  an 
American  landing  party  and  Huerta's  refusal  to  fire 
an  apologetic  salute.  Huerta  was  forced  to  give  up 
his  position  and  fled,  but  the  crisis  continued  and 
American-Mexican  relations  were  not  improved. 
The  country  was  left  in  the  hands  of  three  rival 
presidents,  of  whom  Carranza  proved  the  strong 
est,  and,  after  an  attempt  at  mediation  in  which  the 
three  chief  South  American  powers  participated, 
President  Wilson  decided  to  recognize  him.  But 
Mexican  conditions  remained  chaotic  and  American 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  87 

interests  in  Mexico  were  either  threatened  or 
destroyed.  In  the  spring  of  1916  an  attack  on 
American  territory  led  by  a  bandit,  Francisco  Villa, 
again  roused  Wilson  to  action.  He  dispatched 
General  John  J.  Pershing  across  the  border  to  pur 
sue  and  catch  Villa.  The  expedition  was  difficult, 
but  well-conducted;  it  extended  far  south  of  the 
frontier  and  provoked  the  protests  of  Carranza. 
At  the  moment  when  Pershing's  advance  guard 
seemed  to  have  its  hands  on  the  bandit,  orders  were 
given  to  cease  the  pursuit. 

The  opponents  of  the  Administration  had  some 
excuse  for  laughing  at  the  "inglorious  and  ineffec 
tual  war"  thus  waged.  It  had  failed  to  result  in  the 
capture  of  Villa  and  it  gave  rise  to  serious  danger  of 
an  open  break  with  Mexico.  On  the  21st  of  June 
an  attack  at  Carrizal  by  Carranza's  troops  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  some  United  States  cavalrymen 
and  the  mobilization  of  the  national  guard  troops 
for  the  protection  of  the  border.  But  President 
Wilson  was  not  to  be  drawn  into  intervention.  He 
might  be  compelled  to  exercise  force  in  carrying 
out  his  ideals  of  international  service  against  an 
international  criminal  like  Germany;  he  would  not 
use  it  against  a  weaker  neighbor  and  particularly 
at  the  moment  when  the  United  States  must  be 


88     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

free  to  face  European  complications.  But  the 
Mexican  crisis  proved  definitely  the  weakness  of 
the  military  system.  Though  the  regulars  who  ac 
companied  Pershing  proved  their  worth,  the  clumsy 
inefficient  mobilization  of  the  National  Guard,  on 
the  other  hand,  indicated  as  plainly  as  possible  the 
lack  of  trained  troops  and  officers. 

The  President's  determination  not  to  intervene 
in  Mexico  probably  assured  him  many  votes  in  the 
pacifist  regions  of  the  Middle  West  in  the  presiden 
tial  election  of  1916.  That  he  would  be  renomi- 
nated  by  the  Democrats  was  a  foregone  conclusion. 
He  had  alienated  the  machine  leaders  by  his  strict 
domination  of  Congress  and  the  party;  if  he  had 
permitted  certain  political  leaders  to  distribute  offi 
ces  for  necessary  organization  interests,  he  had  seen 
to  it,  none  the  less,  that  the  Democratic  bosses  had 
no  share  in  the  determination  of  policies.  Still  they 
could  not  hope  to  prevent  his  nomination.  What 
ever  chance  the  party  might  have  in  the  coming 
election  lay  in  the  personal  strength  of  Wilson  with 
the  masses.  In  the  South  and  the  districts  west  of 
the  Mississippi  he  was  regarded  as  the  greatest 
Democrat  since  Jackson.  His  patience  in  dealing 
with  Germany,  as  with  Carranza,  convinced  them 
of  his  desire  for  peace;  the  slogan,  "He  has  kept  us 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  39 

out  of  war,"  was  a  powerful  argument  in  those  re 
gions.  His  attitude  towards  labor  had  been  friend 
ly,  so  that  the  support  of  the  unions  in  the  large 
industrial  centers  might  be  expected.  Placards 
were  posted  showing  a  poor  man's  family  with  the 
caption,  "He  has  protected  me  and  mine,"  in  an 
swer  to  the  Republican  posters  which  showed  a 
widow  and  orphans  (presumably  of  a  drowned 
American  citizen)  and  the  caption,  "He  has  neg 
lected  me  and  mine."  The  remnants  of  the  Pro 
gressives,  who  were  not  purely  Roosevelt  support 
ers,  were  attracted  by  Wilson's  legislative  pro 
gramme  and  record  of  accomplishment.  He  could 
look  to  an  independent  vote  such  as  no  other 
Democrat  could  hope  for. 

Despite  this  strength,  the  Republican  leaders,  if 
they  could  succeed  in  effecting  a  reunion  of  their 
party,  awaited  the  results  of  the  election  with  con 
fidence.  They  counted  chiefly  upon  the  personal 
unpopularity  of  Wilson  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard 
and  the  normal  Republican  vote  in  the  industrial 
centers  of  the  Middle  West.  His  foreign  policy, 
east  of  the  Mississippi,  was  generally  looked  upon 
as  anaemic  and  nebulous.  He  had  permitted,  so 
the  Republicans  contended,  the  honor  of  the  coun 
try  to  be  stained  and  Americans  to  be  destroyed, 


90     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

without  effective  action.  His  early  opposition  to 
preparedness  and  the  half-hearted  measures  of 
army  reform  had  proved  his  weakness,  at  least  to 
the  satisfaction  of  Republican  stump  orators.  He 
had  won  the  hearty  dislike  of  the  bankers,  the 
manufacturers,  and  the  merchants  by  his  attacks 
on  capitalist  interests  and  by  his  support  of  labor 
unions.  The  Clayton  Act,  which  exempted  strikes 
from  Federal  injunctions,  and  the  Adamson  Act, 
which  granted,  under  threat,  the  immediate  de 
mands  of  the  striking  railroad  employees,  were 
cited  as  clear  proof  of  his  demagogic  character. 
Furthermore,  while  he  alienated  the  pro-Entente 
elements  in  New  England  and  the  Eastern  States, 
he  had  drawn  upon  himself  the  hatred  of  the 
German-Americans  by  his  attacks  upon  hyphen 
ates  and  his  refusal  to  accept  an  embargo  on 
American  munitions. 

Had  the  Republicans  been  willing  to  accept 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  victory  would  probably  have 
come  to  them.  He  alone  could  have  gathered  in 
the  Progressive  and  independent  vote,  and  that  of 
the  Pacific  coast,  which  ultimately  went  to  Wilson. 
But  the  Old  Guard  of  the  Republicans  refused  to 
consider  Roosevelt;  they  could  not  take  a  man  who 
had  broken  party  lines  four  years  before;  above  all 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  91 

they  wanted  a  "safe  and  sane"  President,  who 
would  play  the  political  game  according  to  rule  — 
the  rule  of  the  bosses  —  and  they  knew  that  were 
Roosevelt  elected  they  could  not  hope  to  share  in 
the  spoils.  The  Republican  convention  ultimately 
settled  upon  Charles  E.  Hughes,  who  certainly  was 
not  beloved  by  the  bosses,  but  who  was  regarded  as 
"steadier"  than  Roosevelt.  The  latter,  in  order  to 
defeat  Wilson,  refused  the  offer  of  the  Progressives, 
practically  disbanded  the  party  he  had  created,  and 
called  upon  his  friends  to  return  with  him  to  their 
first  allegiance. 

Hughes  did  not  prove  a  strong  candidate. 
Whereas  Wilson  had  stated  his  position  on  the  Ger 
man-American  problem  plainly,  "I  neither  seek 
the  favor  nor  fear  the  displeasure  of  that  small  alien 
element  among  us  which  puts  loyalty  to  any  foreign 
power  before  loyalty  to  the  United  States,"  Hughes 
was  ordered  by  his  party  managers  not  to  offend 
foreign-born  voters,  and  in  his  attempt  to  steer  a 
middle  course,  gave  a  clear  impression  of  vacilla 
tion.  Many  of  those  who  had  been  most  thor 
oughly  disgusted  with  Wilson  turned  back  to  him 
again,  as  the  weeks  passed  and  Hughes  more  and 
more  sought  refuge  in  vague  generalizations.  In  a 
campaign  in  which  the  issues  were  largely  personal 


92     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  Republican  candidate's  failure  to  evolve  a  con 
structive  policy  greatly  weakened  him,  especially 
as  Wilson  had  the  advantage  of  the  maxim  that  it 
is  best  not  to  change  horses  in  the  middle  of  the 
stream.  Finally,  Hughes  did  not  prove  adept  in 
reconciling  the  Progressives.  Indeed  it  was  said  to 
be  a  political  gaucherie  on  his  part,  or  that  of  his 
advisers,  which  alienated  the  friends  of  Gover 
nor  Hiram  Johnson  of  California  and  threw  the 
electoral  vote  of  that  State  to  Wilson. 

California  turned  the  scale.  When  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  7th  of  November  the  first  returns  came  in 
and  it  was  seen  that  Wilson  had  lost  New  York  and 
Illinois,  the  election  of  Hughes  was  generally  con 
ceded.  Even  the  New  York  Times  and  the  World 
admitted  Wilson's  defeat.  But  the  next  morning, 
news  from  the  west  indicated  that  the  President 
still  had  a  chance.  Later  in  the  day  the  chance 
grew  larger;  he  had  won  Ohio;  Minnesota  and  Cali 
fornia  were  doubtful.  In  both  States  voting  was 
close;  if  Wilson  won  either  the  election  would  be 
his.  It  was  not  until  the  llth  of  November  that 
the  returns  from  California  definitely  showed  a 
small  Wilson  plurality,  and  only  on  the  21st  that 
the  Republicans  finally  abandoned  hope.  Wilson 
had  secured  277  electoral  votes  to  254  for  Hughes. 


PLOTS  AND  PREPAREDNESS  93 

He  had  been  saved  by  the  pacifist  Middle  and  Far 
West,  in  combination  with  the  South.  But  the  vic 
tory  meant  something  far  different  from  peace  at 
any  price. 


CHAPTER  V 

AMERICA   DECIDES 

THE  presidential  campaign  of  1916,  taken  in  con 
junction  with  the  increasing  tension  of  European 
relations,  forced  Wilson  to  a  further  development 
of  his  international  ideals  and  a  more  definite 
formulation  of  the  means  by  which  to  attain  them. 
As  we  have  observed,  the  spring  of  that  year  saw 
him  reject  the  doctrine  of  isolation.  "We  are  par 
ticipants,"  he  said  on  the  27th  of  May,  "whether 
we  would  or  not,  in  the  life  of  the  world.  The  inter 
ests  of  all  nations  are  our  own  also.  We  are  part 
ners  with  the  rest.  What  affects  mankind  is  inevi 
tably  our  affair  as  well  as  the  affair  of  the  nations  of 
Europe  and  of  Asia."  This  recognition  of  our  in 
terest  in  world  affairs  immediately  took  him  con 
siderably  beyond  the  position  he  had  assumed 
during  the  earlier  stages  of  the  submarine  contro 
versy.  Until  the  spring  of  1916  he  had  restricted 
his  aims  to  the  championship  of  neutral  and  human 

94 


AMERICA  DECIDES  95 

rights  in  time  of  war.  But  now  he  began  to  de 
mand  something  more  far-reaching,  namely  a  sys 
tem  that  would  prevent  unjust  war  altogether  and 
would  protect  the  rights  of  all  peoples  in  time  of 
peace.  He  insisted,  in  this  same  speech  of  the  27th 
of  May,  before  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  at 
Washington,  "First  that  every  people  has  a  right 
to  choose  the  sovereignty  under  which  they  shall 
live.  .  .  .  Second,  that  the  small  states  of  the 
world  have  a  right  to  enjoy  the  same  respect  for 
their  sovereignty  and  for  their  territorial  integrity 
that  great  and  powerful  nations  expect  and  insist 
upon.  And,  third,  that  the  world  has  a  right  to  be 
free  from  every  disturbance  of  its  peace  that  has  its 
origin  in  aggression  and  disregard  of  the  rights  of 
peoples  and  nations . ' '  These  words  sum  up  the  gist 
of  his  international  aims  during  the  three  following 
years.  His  later  speeches  are  merely  refinement 
of  details. 

In  order  that  these  ends  might  be  secured  it  was 
necessary  that  some  international  system  be  in 
augurated  other  than  that  which  had  permitted  the 
selfishness  of  the  great  powers  to  produce  war  in 
the  past.  In  his  search  for  a  concrete  mechanism 
to  realize  his  ideals  and  secure  them  from  violation, 
Wilson  seized  upon  the  essential  principles  of  the 


96     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  of  which  William  How* 
ard  Tait  was  president.  The  basis  of  permanent 
peace,  Wilson  insisted,  could  be  found  only  by  sub 
stituting  international  cooperation  in  place  of  con 
flict,  through  a  mobilization  of  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world  against  international  lawbreakers : "  an 
universal  association  of  the  nations  to  maintain  the 
inviolate  security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the 
common  and  unhindered  use  of  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  and  to  prevent  any  war  begun  either  con 
trary  to  treaty  covenants  or  without  warning  and 
full  submission  of  the  causes  to  the  opinion  of  the 
world  —  a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integri 
ty  and  political  independence."  These  were  the 
principles  and  methods  which  formed  the  keynote 
of  his  foreign  policy  until  the  end  of  the  Peace  Con 
ference.  The  first  part  of  the  programme,  that  which 
concerned  the  security  of  the  seas  and  which  orig 
inated  in  the  particular  circumstances  of  1915, 
faded  from  his  sight  to  a  large  extent;  the  second 
portion,  more  general  in  its  nature,  became  of  in 
creasing  importance  until,  as  Article  X  of  the 
League  Covenant,  it  seemed  to  him  the  heart  of 
the  entire  settlement. 

The  unselfish  nature  of  his  idealism,  as  well  as  his 
continued  detachment  from  both  camps  of  the 


AMERICA  DECIDES  97 

belligerents,  was  obvious.  "We  have  nothing  ma 
terial  of  any  kind  to  ask  for  ourselves,"  he  said, 
"and  are  quite  aware  that  we  are  in  no  sense  or 
degree  parties  to  the  present  quarrel.  Our  interest 
is  only  in  peace  and  in  its  future  guarantees."  But 
noblesse  oblige,  and  we  must  serve  those  who  have 
not  had  our  good  fortune.  "The  commands  of 
democracy  are  as  imperative  as  its  privileges  are 
wide  and  generous.  Its  compulsion  is  upon  us. 
• .  .  .  We  are  not  worthy  to  stand  here  unless  we 
ourselves  be  in  deed  and  truth  real  democrats  and 
servants  of  mankind." 

That  the  United  States  might  be  drawn  into  the 
conflict  evidently  seemed  possible  to  the  President, 
despite  pacific  whispers  that  came  from  Germany 
in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1916.  There  was  a 
note  of  apprehension  in  his  speeches.  No  one  could 
tell  when  the  extremist  faction  in  Berlin  might  gain 
control  and  withdraw  the  Sussex  pledge.  The  tem 
per  of  Americans  was  being  tried  by  continued  sink 
ings,  although  the  exact  circumstances  of  each  case 
were  difficult  to  determine.  The  attacks  made  by 
the  German  U-53  immediately  off  the  American 
coast  and  the  deportation  of  Belgian  civilians  into 
Germany  made  more  difficult  the  preservation  of 
amicable  relations.  In  view  of  the  possibility  of  war 


98     WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Wilson  wanted  to  define  the  issue  exactly.  "We 
have  never  yet,"  he  said  at  Omaha,  a  peace  center,  on 
the  5th  of  October,  "sufficiently  formulated  our  pro 
gramme  for  America  with  regard  to  the  part  she  is 
going  to  play  in  the  world,  and  it  is  imperative  that 
she  should  formulate  it  at  once.  ...  It  is  very 
important  that  the  statesmen  of  other  parts  of  the 
world  should  understand  America.  .  .  .  We  are 
holding  off,  not  because  we  do  not  feel  concerned, 
but  because  when  we  exert  the  force  of  this  nation 
we  want  to  know  what  we  are  exerting  it  for." 
Ten  days  later  at  Shadowlawn  he  said:  "Define 
the  elements,  let  us  know  that  we  are  not  fighting 
for  the  prevalence  of  this  nation  over  that,  for  the 
ambitions  of  this  group  of  nations  as  compared 
with  the  ambitions  of  that  group  of  nations;  let  us 
once  be  convinced  that  we  are  called  in  to  a  great 
combination  to  fight  for  the  rights  of  mankind  and 
America  will  unite  her  force  and  spill  her  blood  for 
the  great  things  which  she  has  always  believed  in 
and  followed."  He  thus  gave  warning  that  the 
United  States  might  have  to  fight.  He  wanted 
to  be  certain,  however,  that  it  did  not  fight  as  so 
many  other  nations  have  fought,  greedily  or  vindic 
tively,  but  rather  as  in  a  crusade  and  for  clearly 
defined  ideals. 


AMERICA  DECIDES  99 

His  reelection  gave  to  the  President  an  opportu 
nity  for  bringing  before  the  world  his  international 
aims.  He  purposed  not  merely  to  end  the  exist 
ing  conflict  but  also  to  provide  a  basis  for  perma 
nent  peace  and  the  security  of  democracy.  During 
the  early  summer  of  1916  he  had  received  from 
Berlin  hints  that  his  mediation  would  not  be  un 
acceptable  and  it  is  possible  that  he  planned  at  that 
time  new  efforts  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close.  But 
such  a  step  was  bound  to  be  regarded  as  pro-Ger 
man  and  in  the  state  of  opinion  immediately  after 
the  Sussex  crisis  would  have  produced  a  storm  of 
American  protests.  Then  the  entrance  of  Rumania 
into  the  war  so  encouraged  the  Entente  powers  that 
there  seemed  little  chance  of  winning  French  and 
British  acceptance  of  mediation.  The  presidential 
election  further  delayed  any  overt  step  towards 
peace  negotiations.  Finally  the  wave  of  anti- 
German  feeling  that  swept  the  United  States  in 
November,  on  account  of  Belgian  deportations, 
induced  Wilson  to  hold  back  the  note  which  he 
had  already  drafted.  But  it  was  important  not 
to  delay  his  pacific  efforts  over-long,  since  news 
came  to  Washington  that  unless  Germany  could 
obtain  a  speedy  peace  the  extremist  group  in  Berlin 
would  insist  upon  a  resumption  of  "ruthless" 


100   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

submarine  warfare.  In  these  circumstances,  early 
in  December,  the  President  prepared  to  issue 
his  note. 

But  Germany  acted  more  rapidly.  Warned  of 
Wilson's  purpose  the  Berlin  Government,  on  De 
cember  12,  1916,  proposed  negotiations.  The  oc 
casion  seemed  to  them  propitious.  Rumania  had 
gone  down  to  disastrous  defeat.  Russia  was  torn 
by  corruption  and  popular  discontent.  On  the 
western  front,  if  the  Germans  had  failed  at  Verdun, 
they  were  aware  of  the  deep  disappointment  of  the 
Allies  at  the  paltry  results  of  the  great  Somme 
drive.  German  morale  at  home  was  weakening; 
but  if  the  Allies  could  be  pictured  as  refusing  all 
terms  and  determined  upon  the  destruction  of 
Germany,  the  people  would  doubtless  agree  to  the 
unrestricted  use  of  the  submarine  as  purely  defen 
sive  in  character,  even  if  it  brought  to  the  Allies  the 
questionable  assistance  of  America.  The  German 
note  itself  contained  no  definite  terms.  But  its 
boastful  tone  permitted  the  interpretation  that 
Germany  would  consider  no  peace  which  did  not 
leave  Central  and  Southeastern  Europe  under  Teu 
ton  domination;  the  specific  terms  later  communi 
cated  to  the  American  Government  in  secret, 
verified  this  suspicion.  A  thinly  veiled  threat  to 


AMERICA  DECtimS  101* 

neutral  nations  was  to  be  read  between  the  lines  of 
the  German  suggestion  of  negotiations. 

Although  it  was  obvious  that  he  would  be  ac 
cused  of  acting  in  collusion  with  Germany,  Presi 
dent  Wilson  decided  not  to  postpone  the  peace  note 
already  planned.  He  looked  upon  the  crisis  as  se 
rious,  for  if  peace  were  not  secured  at  this  time  the 
chances  of  the  United  States  remaining  out  of  the 
war  were  constantly  growing  less.  If  he  could  com 
pel  a  clear  definition  of  war  aims  on  both  sides,  the 
mutual  suspicion  of  the  warring  peoples  might  be 
removed;  the  German  people  might  perceive  that 
the  war  was  not  in  reality  for  them  one  of  defense; 
or  finally  the  Allies,  toward  whom  Wilson  was  be 
ing  driven  by  the  threats  of  German  extremists, 
might  define  their  position  in  such  terms  as  would 
justify  him  before  the  world  in  joining  with  them  in 
a  conflict  not  waged  for  selfish  national  purposes 
but  for  the  welfare  of  humanity.  Issued  on  Decem 
ber  18,  1916,  his  note  summed  up  the  chief  points 
of  his  recently  developed  policy.  It  emphasized 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  future  peace 
of  the  world,  the  irreparable  injury  to  civilization 
that  might  result  from  a  further  continuance  of  the 
existing  struggle,  the  advantages  that  would  follow 
an  explicit  exposure  of  belligerent  purposes,  and  the 


WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

possibility  of  making  "the  permanent  concord  of 
the  nations  a  hope  of  the  immediate  future,  a 
concert  of  nations  immediately  practicable." 

As  a  step  towards  peace  the  note  was  unsuccess 
ful.  Germany  was  evasive.  There  was  nothing 
her  Government  wanted  less  than  the  definite  ex 
posure  of  her  purposes  that  Wilson  asked.  Her 
leaders  were  anxious  to  begin  negotiations  while 
German  armies  still  held  conquered  territories  as 
pawns  to  be  used  at  the  peace  table.  They  would 
not  discuss  a  League  of  Nations  until  Germany's 
continental  position  was  secured.  The  Allies  on 
the  other  hand  would  not  make  peace  with  an  un 
beaten  Germany,  which  evidently  persisted  in  the 
hope  of  dominating  weaker  nationalities  and  said 
no  word  of  reparations  for  the  acknowledged 
wrongs  committed.  Feeling  ran  high  in  England 
and  France  because  Wilson's  note  had  seemed  to 
place  the  belligerents  on  the  same  moral  plane,  in 
its  statement  that  the  objects  on  both  sides  "are 
virtually  the  same,  as  stated  in  general  terms  to 
their  own  people  and  to  the  world."  The  state 
ment  was  verbally  accurate  and  rang  with  a  cer 
tain  grim  irony  which  may  have  touched  Wilson's 
sense  of  humor.  But  the  Allies  were  not  in  a  state 
of  mind  to  appreciate  such  humor.  Their  official 


AMERICA  DECIDES  103 

answer,  however,  was  frank,  and  in  substance  ac 
cepted  the  principles  of  permanent  peace  pro 
pounded  by  Wilson.  It  was  evident  to  most  Amer 
icans  that  the  main  purpose  of  Germany  was  to 
establish  herself  as  the  dominating  power  of  the 
continent  and  possibly  of  the  world;  the  aim  of  the 
Allies,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  to  be  the  peace  of 
the  world  based  upon  democracy  and  justice  rather 
than  material  force. 

The  President's  attempt  thus  cleared  the  air.  It 
made  plain  to  the  majority  of  Americans  that  in 
sympathy,  at  least,  the  United  States  must  be 
definitely  aligned  with  Great  Britain  and  France. 
Furthermore  the  replies  of  the  belligerents  gave  to 
Wilson  an  opportunity  to  inform  the  world  more 
definitely  of  the  aims  of  the  United  States,  in  case 
it  should  be  drawn  into  the  war.  This  he  did  in  a 
speech  delivered  to  the  Senate  on  January  22, 1917. 
America  would  play  her  part  in  world  affairs,  he 
said,  but  the  other  nations  must  clearly  understand 
the  conditions  of  our  participation.  The  basis  of 
peace  must  be  the  right  of  each  individual  nation  to 
decide  its  destiny  for  itself  without  interference  from 
a  stronger  alien  power .  "I  am  proposing  as  it  were, 
that  the  nations  should  with  one  accord  adopt  the 
doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the  doctrine  of  the 


104   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

world :  that  no  nation  should  seek  to  extend  its  pol 
ity  over  any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every 
people  should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own  pol 
ity,  its  own  way  of  development,  unhindered,  un- 
threatened,  unafraid,  the  little  along  with  the  great 
and  powerful."  Instead  of  the  old  system  of  alli 
ances  there  should  be  a  general  concert  of  powers: 
"There  is  no  entangling  alliance  in  a  concert  of 
powers.  When  all  unite  to  act  in  the  same  sense  and 
with  the  same  purpose,  all  act  in  the  common  inter 
est  and  are  free  to  live  their  own  lives  under  a  com 
mon  protection."  As  the  result  of  such  a  concert  no 
one  power  would  dominate  the  sea  or  the  land; 
armaments  might  safely  be  limited;  peace  would  be 
organized  by  the  major  force  of  mankind.  As  a 
guarantee  of  future  justice  and  tranquillity  the 
terms  that  settled  the  present  war  must  be  based 
upon  justice  and  not  be  of  the  sort  ordinarily  dic 
tated  by  the  victor  to  the  vanquished.  It  must  be 
a  "peace  without  victory."  Thus  while  Wilson 
warned  Germany  that  her  ambitions  for  conti 
nental  domination  would  not  be  tolerated,  he  also 
warned  the  Allies  that  they  could  not  count  upon 
the  United  States  to  help  them  to  crush  Germany 
for  their  selfish  individual  purposes. 

This  speech,   despite  the  unfortunate  phrase. 


AMERICA  DECIDES  105 

"peace  without  victory,"  was  hailed  in  all  liberal 
circles,  amongst  the  Allies  and  in  the  United  States, 
as  a  noble  charter  of  the  new  international  order. 
Wilson  had  expressed  the  hope  that  he  was  "speak 
ing  for  the  silent  mass  of  mankind  everywhere 
who  have  as  yet  had  no  place  or  opportunity  to 
speak  their  real  hearts  out  concerning  the  death 
and  ruin  they  see  to  have  come  already  upon  the 
persons  and  the  homes  they  hold  most  dear."  This 
hope  was  doubtless  realized.  The  first  reaction  in 
France  and  England  was  one  of  rather  puzzled 
contempt,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  press.  But  the 
newspaper  writers  soon  found  that  what  Wilson 
said  many  people  had  been  thinking,  and  waiting 
for  some  one  to  say.  Hall  Caine  wrote  to  the  Public 
Ledger,  "Let  President  Wilson  take  heart  from  the 
first  reception  of  his  remarkable  speech.  The  best 
opinion  here  is  one  of  deep  feeling  and  profound 
admiration."  From  that  moment  Wilson  began  to 
approach  the  position  he  was  shortly  to  hold— that 
of  moral  leader  of  the  world. 

The  President  had  been  anxious  to  make  plain 
his  principles,  before  the  United  States  became  in 
volved  in  the  conflict  through  the  withdrawal  of 
German  submarine  pledges,  as  well  as  to  convince 
the  world  that  every  honest  effort  possible  had  been 


106   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

made  to  preserve  the  peace.  He  was  only  just 
in  time.  Already  the  advocates  of  ruthlessness  in 
Berlin  had  persuaded  the  Kaiser  and  Bethmann- 
Hollweg.  They  recognized  that  the  resumption  of 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  meant,  in  all  prob 
ability,  the  intervention  of  the  United  States,  but 
they  recked  little  of  the  consequences.  On  January 
16, 1917,  the  Kaiser  telegraphed :  "  If  a  break  with 
America  is  unavoidable,  it  cannot  be  helped;  we 
proceed."  The  same  day  the  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Zimmermann,  telegraphed  to  the  German 
Minister  in  Mexico,  instructing  him  to  form  an  alli 
ance  with  Mexico  in  the  event  of  war  between  Ger 
many  and  the  United  States,  and  to  offer  as  bribe 
the  States  of  New  Mexico,  Arizona,  and  Texas; 
he  also  suggested  the  possibility  of  winning  Japan 
from  her  allegiance  to  the  Entente  and  persuading 
her  to  enter  this  prospective  alliance. 

On  the  31st  of  January,  von  Bernstorff  threw  off 
the  mask.  The  German  Ambassador  informed  our 
Government  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Sussex  pledge. 
On  and  after  the  1st  of  February,  German  sub 
marines  would  sink  on  sight  all  ships  met  within  a 
delimited  zone  around  the  British  Isles  and  in  the 
Mediterranean.  They  would  permit  the  sailing  of 
a  few  American  steamships,  however,  provided 


AMERICA  DECIDES  107 

they  followed  a  certain  defined  route  to  Falmouth 
and  nowhere  else,  and  provided  there  were  marked 
"on  ship's  hull  and  superstructure  three  vertical 
stripes  one  meter  wide,  to  be  painted  alternately 
white  and  red.  Each  mast  should  show  a  large  flag 
checkered  white  and  red,  and  the  stern  the  Amer 
ican  national  flag.  Care  should  be  taken  that  dur 
ing  dark,  national  flag  and  painted  marks  are  easily 
recognizable  from  a  distance,  and  that  the  boats  are 
well  lighted  throughout."  Other  conditions  fol 
lowed.  There  might  sail  one  steamship  a  week  "  in 
each  direction,  with  arrival  at  Falmouth  on  Sunday 
and  departure  from  Falmouth  on  Wednesday." 
Furthermore  the  United  States  Government  must 
guarantee  "that  no  contraband  (according  to  the 
German  contraband  list)  is  carried  by  those  steam 
ships."  Such  were  the  orders  issued  to  the  United 
States.  No  native  American  could  escape  the  hu 
mor  of  the  stipulations,  which  for  a  moment  pre 
vented  the  national  irritation  from  swelling  into  an 
outburst  of  deep-seated  wrath. 

There  seems  to  have  been  little  hesitation  on  the 
part  of  the  President.  On  April  19,  1916,  he  had 
warned  Germany  that  unrestricted  submarine  war 
fare  meant  a  severance  of  diplomatic  relations. 
Now,  on  February  3,  1917,  addressing  both  houses 


108   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  Congress,  he  announced  that  those  relations  had 
been  broken.  Von  Bernstorff  was  given  his  papers 
and  the  American  Ambassador,  James  W.  Gerard, 
was  recalled  from  Berlin.  No  other  course  of  action 
could  have  been  contemplated  in  view  of  the  for 
mality  of  the  President's  warning  and  the  definite- 
ness  of  Germany's  defiance.  Despite  the  protests  of 
scattered  pacifists,  the  country  was  as  nearly  a  unit 
in  its  approval  of  Wilson's  action  as  its  heterogene 
ous  national  character  permitted.  All  the  pent-up 
emotions  of  the  past  two  years  found  expression  in 
quiet  but  unmistakable  applause  at  the  departure 
of  the  German  Ambassador. 

The  promptitude  of  the  President's  dismissal  of 
von  Bernstorff  did  not  conceal  the  disappointment 
which  he  experienced  from  Germany's  revelation  of 
her  true  purposes.  He  seems  to  have  hoped  to  the 
end  that  the  German  liberals  would  succeed  in 
bringing  their  Government  to  accept  moderate 
terms  of  peace.  Even  now  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  Germany's  actions  would  not  be  such  as  to 
force  the  United  States  into  the  War:  "I  refuse  to 
believe  that  it  is  the  intention  of  the  German  au 
thorities  to  do  in  fact  what  they  have  warned  us 
they  will  feel  at  liberty  to  do.  .  .  .  Only  actual  overt 
acts  on  their  part  can  make  me  believe  it  even  now." 


AMERICA  DECIDES  109 

But  "if  American  ships  and  American  lives  should 
in  fact  be  sacrificed  by  their  naval  commanders  in 
heedless  contravention  of  the  just  and  reasonable 
understandings  of  international  law  and  the  ob 
vious  dictates  of  humanity,  I  shall  take  the  liberty 
of  coming  again  before  the  Congress  to  ask  that 
authority  be  given  me  to  use  any  means  that  may 
be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  our  seamen  and 
our  people  in  the  prosecution  of  their  peaceful  and 
legitimate  errands  on  the  high  seas.  I  can  do  noth 
ing  less.  I  take  it  for  granted  that  all  neutral  gov 
ernments  will  take  the  same  course."  He  was  care 
ful,  moreover,  to  underline  the  fact  that  his  ac 
tion  was  dictated  always  by  a  consistent  desire 
for  peace:  "We  wish  to  serve  no  selfish  ends. 
We  seek  merely  to  stand  true  alike  in  thought  and 
in  action  to  the  immemorial  principles  of  our  peo 
ple.  .  .  .  These  are  the  bases  of  peace,  not  war. 
God  grant  we  may  not  be  challenged  to  defend 
them  by  acts  of  willful  injustice  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  of  Germany!" 

But  Germany  proceeded  heedlessly.  Warned  that 
American  intervention  would  result  only  from  overt 
acts,  the  German  Admiralty  hastened  to  commit 
such  acts.  From  the  3d  of  February  to  the  1st  of 
April,  eight  American  vessels  were  sunk  by  sub- 


110   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

marines  and  forty-eight  American  lives  thus  lost. 
Because  of  the  practical  blockade  of  American 
ports  which  followed  the  hesitation  of  American 
shipping  interests  to  send  boats  unarmed  into  the 
dangers  of  the  "war  zone,"  President  Wilson  came 
again  to  Congress  on  the  26th  of  February  to  ask 
authority  to  arm  merchant  vessels  for  purposes  of 
defense.  Again  he  stressed  his  unwillingness  to 
enter  upon  formal  warfare  and  emphasized  the 
idealistic  aspect  of  the  issue:  "It  is  not  of  mate 
rial  interests  merely  that  we  are  thinking.  It  is, 
rather,  of  fundamental  human  rights,  chief  of  all 
the  right  of  life  itself.  I  am  thinking  not  only  of  the 
rights  of  Americans  to  go  and  come  about  their 
proper  business  by  way  of  the  sea,  but  also  of  some 
thing  much  deeper,  much  more  fundamental  than 
that.  I  am  thinking  of  those  rights  of  humanity 
without  which  there  is  no  civilization.  ...  I 
cannot  imagine  any  man  with  American  principles 
at  his  heart  hesitating  to  defend  these  things." 

Blinded  by  prejudice  and  tradition,  a  handful  of 
Senators,  twelve  "  willful  men," as  Wilson  described 
them,  blocked,  through  a  filibuster,  the  resolution 
granting  the  power  requested  by  the  President. 
But  the  storm  of  popular  obloquy  which  covered 
them  proved  that  the  nation  as  a  whole  was 


AMERICA  DECIDES  111 

determined  to  support  him  in  the  defense  of  Amer 
ican  rights.  The  country  was  stirred  to  the  depths. 
The  publication  of  the  plans  of  Germany  for  involv 
ing  the  United  States  in  war  with  Mexico  and  Japan 
came  merely  as  added  stimulus.  So  also  of  the 
story  of  the  cruelties  heaped  by  the  Germans  on 
the  American  prisoners  of  the  Yarrowdale.  There 
was  so  much  of  justice  in  the  cause  that  passion  was 
notable  by  its  absence.  When  finally  on  the  17th 
of  March  news  came  of  the  torpedoing  of  the  Vigi- 
lancia  without  warning,  America  was  prepared  and 
calmly  eager  for  the  President's  demand  that 
Congress  recognize  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war. 
The  demand  was  made  by  Wilson  in  an  extra 
ordinary  joint  session  of  Congress,  held  on  the  2d 
of  April.  In  this,  possibly  his  greatest  speech,  he 
was  careful  not  to  blur  the  idealistic  principles 
which,  since  the  spring  of  1916,  he  had  been  formu 
lating.  War  existed  because  Germany  by  its  ac 
tions  had  thrust  upon  the  United  States  the  status 
of  belligerent.  But  the  American  people  must 
meet  the  challenge  with  their  purpose  clearly  be 
fore  them.  "We  must  put  excited  feeling  away. 
Our  motive  will  not  be  revenge  or  the  victori 
ous  assertion  of  the  physical  might  of  the  nation, 
but  only  the  vindication  of  right,  of  humar  right, 


WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  which  we  are  only  a  single  champion.  .  .  . 
The  wrongs  against  which  we  now  array  ourselves 
are  no  common  wrongs;  they  cut  to  the  very  roots 
of  human  life."  He  went  on  to  define  the  objects 
of  the  war  more  specifically,  referring  to  his  earlier 
addresses:  "Our  object  now,  as  then,  is  to  vindi 
cate  the  principles  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life  of 
the  world  as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power 
and  to  set  up  amongst  the  really  free  and  self- 
governed  peoples  of  the  world  such  a  concert  of 
purpose  and  action  as  will  henceforth  ensure  the 
observance  of  those  principles."  Democracy  must 
be  the  soul  of  the  new  international  order:  "A 
steadfast  concert  for  peace  can  never  be  maintained 
except  by  a  partnership  of  democratic  nations.  No 
autocratic  government  could  be  trusted  to  keep 
faith  within  it  or  observe  its  covenants.  .  .  . 
Only  free  peoples  can  hold  their  purpose  and  their 
honor  steady  to  a  common  end  and  prefer  the  inter 
ests  of  mankind  to  any  narrow  interest  of  their 
own."  Because  the  existing  German  Government 
was  clearly  at  odds  with  all  such  ideals,  "We  are 
glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with  no  veil  of  false 
pretense  about  them,  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate 
peace  of  the  world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its 
peoples,  the  German  people  included :  for  the  rights 


AMERICA  DECIDES  113 

of  nations  great  and  small  and  the  privilege  of  men 
everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedi 
ence.  The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democ 
racy.  Its  peace  must  be  planted  upon  the  tested 
foundations  of  political  liberty." 

Wilson  thus  imagined  the  war  as  a  crusade,  the 
sort  of  crusade  for  American  ideals  which  Clay  and 
Webster  once  imagined.  He  was  in  truth  originat 
ing  nothing,  but  rather  resuscitating  the  generous 
dreams  which  had  once  inspired  those  statesmen. 
In  conclusion,  he  reiterated  his  love  of  peace. 
"  But  the  right  is  more  precious  than  peace,  and  we 
shall  fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always  car 
ried  nearest  our  hearts,  —  for  democracy,  for  the 
right  of  those  who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a 
voice  in  their  own  governments,  for  the  rights  and 
liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  dominion 
of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as  shall 
bring  peace  and  safety  .to  all  nations  and  make  the 
world  itself  at  last  free."  At  the  moment  of  the 
declaration  of  war  Wilson  was  still  the  man  of  peace, 
and  the  war  upon  which  the  nation  was  embarking 
was,  in  his  mind,  a  war  to  ensure  peace.  To  such  a 
task  of  peace  and  liberation,  he  concluded  in  a  pero 
ration  reminiscent  of  Lincoln  and  Luther,  "we  can 
dedicate  our  lives  and  our  fortunes,  everything  that 


114   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

we  are  and  everything  that  we  have,  with  the  pride 
of  those  who  know  that  the  day  has  come  when 
America  is  privileged  to  spend  her  blood  and  her 
might  for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth  and 
happiness  and  the  peace  which  she  has  treasured. 
God  helping  her,  she  can  do  no  other." 

How  many  Americans  caught  the  real  signifi 
cance  of  Wilson's  thought  with  all  its  consequences 
is  doubtful.  The  country  certainly  looked  upon 
the  war  as  a  crusade.  But  there  was  in  the  national 
emotion  much  that  did  not  accord  with  the  ideals 
of  Wilson.  The  people  hated  Germany  for  the 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  all  the  other  subma 
rine  outrages,  for  her  crimes  in  Belgium,  for  the 
plots  and  explosions  in  this  country,  for  the  Zim- 
mermann  note,  and  finally  for  her  direct  and  insult 
ing  defiance  of  American  rights.  They  recognized 
that  the  Allies  were  fighting  for  civilization;  they 
sympathized  with  the  democracies  of  Europe,  of 
which,  since  the  Russian  revolution  of  March,  the 
Allied  camp  was  composed,  and  they  wanted  to 
help  them.  They  feared  for  America's  safety  in  the 
future,  if  Germany  won  the  war.  Most  Americans 
entered  the  struggle,  therefore,  with  a  sober  glad 
ness,  based  partly  on  emotional,  partly  on  quixotic, 
and  partly  on  selfish  grounds.  But  nearly  all 


AMERICA  DECIDES  115 

fought  rather  to  beat  Germany  than  to  secure  a 
new  international  order.  Hence  it  was  that  after 
Germany  was  beaten,  Wilson  was  destined  to  dis 
cover  that  his  idealistic  preaching  had  not  fully 
penetrated,  and  that  he  had  failed  to  educate  his 
country,  as  completely  as  he  believed,  to  the  ideal 
of  a  partnership  of  democratic  and  peace-loving 
peoples  as  the  essential  condition  of  a  new  and 
safe  world. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   NATION   IN   ARMS 

WHEN  Congress  declared  that  the  United  States 
was  in  a  state  of  war  with  Germany,  on  April  6, 
1917,  the  public  opinion  of  the  country  was  unified 
to  a  far  greater  extent  than  at  the  beginning  of  any 
previous  war.  The  extreme  patience  displayed  by 
President  Wilson  had  its  reward.  When  the  year 
opened  the  majority  of  citizens  doubtless  still 
hoped  that  peace  was  possible.  But  German  ac 
tions  in  February  and  March  had  gone  far  towards 
the  education  of  the  popular  mind,  and  the  final 
speeches  of  the  President  crystallized  conviction. 
By  April  there  were  few  Americans,  except  those 
in  whom  pacifism  was  a  mania,  who  were  not  con 
vinced  that  war  with  Germany  was  the  only  course 
consistent  with  either  honor  or  safety.  It  is  prob 
able  that  many  did  not  understand  exactly  the 
ideals  that  actuated  Wilson,  but  nine  persons  out 
of  ten  believed  it  absolutely  necessary  to  fight. 

116 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  117 

But,  however  firmly  united,  the  country  was 
completely  unprepared  for  war  in  a  military  sense, 
and  must  now  pay  the  penalty  for  President  Wil 
son's  opposition  to  adequate  improvement  of  the 
military  system  in  1915  and  for  the  half-hearted 
measures  taken  in  1916.  Total  military  forces, 
including  regular  army,  national  guard,  and  re 
serves  amounted  to  hardly  three  hundred  thou 
sand  men  and  less  than  ten  thousand  officers.  Even 
the  regular  army  was  by  no  means  ready  for  im 
mediate  participation  in  the  sort  of  fighting  de 
manded  by  the  European  war;  and,  even  if  ade 
quate  troops  were  raised,  the  lack  of  trained  officers 
would  create  the  most  serious  difficulties.  No 
wonder  that  the  German  General  Staff  ranked  the 
United  States,  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
somewhere  between  Belgium  and  Portugal.  Fur 
thermore,  military  experts  had  been  discouraged  by 
the  attitude  of  the  Administration.  The  Secretary 
of  War,  Newton  D.  Baker,  had  failed,  either 
through  lack  of  administrative  capacity  or  because 
of  pacifistic  tendencies,  to  prepare  his  department 
adequately.  He  had  done  nothing  to  rouse  Con 
gress  or  the  nation  from  its  attitude  of  indifference 
towards  preparation.  By  faith  a  pacifist,  he  had 
been  opposed  to  universal  military  service.  An 


118   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

extreme  liberal,  he  distrusted  the  professional  mili 
tary  type  and  was  to  find  it  difficult  to  cooperate 
with  the  captains  of  industry  whose  assistance  was 
essential. 

Thus  with  a  President  and  War  Secretary,  both 
of  whom  had  been  instinctively  opposed  to  a  large 
army  and  who  had  expressed  their  fear  of  the  de 
velopment  of  a  militaristic  spirit,  and  with  a  major 
ity  in  Congress  favoring  the  traditional  volunteer 
system,  adherence  to  which  had  cost  the  British 
thousands  of  lives  that  might  better  have  been  used 
at  home,  the  building  of  an  effective  army  seemed 
a  matter  of  extreme  doubt.  Great  credit  must  go 
to  both  President  Wilson  and  Secretary  Baker  for 
sinking  their  natural  instincts  and  seeking,  as  well 
as  following,  the  advice  of  the  military  experts, 
who  alone  were  capable  of  meeting  the  problems 
that  arose  from  a  war  for  which  the  nation  was 
not  prepared. 

The  President  must  face  not  only  the  special  prob 
lems  caused  by  unreadiness,  but  also  the  general 
difficulties  which  confront  every  American  war- 
President  and  which  had  tried  nearly  to  the  break 
ing-point  even  the  capacity  of  Lincoln.  The  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  war  is  given  the 
supreme  unified  command  of  the  army  and  navy 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  119 

But  while  the  responsibility  is  his,  actual  con 
trol  often  rests  in  the  hands  of  others.  Members 
of  Congress  always  take  a  keen  interest  in  army 
matters;  many  of  them  have  been  or  are  militia 
men.  They  have  always  opposed  a  single  army 
which  could  be  recruited,  trained,  and  operated  as 
a  unit,  and  approved  the  system  of  State  militia 
which  makes  for  decentralization  and  gives  to  the 
separate  States  large  influence  in  the  formation  of 
military  policy.  Even  the  President's  control  of  the 
Federal  army,  regulars  and  volunteers,  is  limited 
by  the  decentralized  organization  of  the  different 
army  bureaus,  which  depend  upon  Congress  for 
their  appropriations  and  which  operate  as  almost 
independent  and  frequently  competing  units.  The 
creation  of  a  single  programme  for  the  army  as  a 
whole  is  thus  a  task  of  extreme  difficulty. 

President  Wilson,  as  historian,  was  well  aware  of 
the  tremendous  price  that  had  been  paid  in  past 
wars  for  such  decentralization,  accompanied  as  it 
was,  inevitably,  by  delays,  misunderstandings,  and 
mistakes.  He  was  determined  to  create  a  single 
coordinating  command,  and  his  war  policies  were 
governed  from  beginning  to  end  by  this  purpose. 
He  set  up  no  new  machinery,  but  utilized  as  his 
main  instrument  the  General  Staff,  which  had  been 


120   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

created  in  1903  as  a  result  of  the  blunders  and  con 
fusion  that  had  been  so  painfully  manifest  in  the 
Spanish  War.  When  the  United  States  entered  the 
World  War  the  General  Staff  had  by  no  means 
acquired  the  importance  expected  by  those  who 
had  created  it.1  But  to  it  the  President  turned, 
and  it  was  this  body  enlarged  in  size  and  influence 
that  ultimately  put  into  operation  Wilson's  policy 
of  centralization.  It  was  in  accordance  with  the 
advice  of  the  men  who  composed  the  General  Staff 
that  the  President  elaborated  the  larger  lines  of  the 
military  programme,  and  they  were  the  men  who 
supervised  the  operation  of  details. 

None  of  the  processes  which  marked  the  transi 
tion  of  the  United  States  from  a  peace  to  a  war 
basis  are  comprehensible  unless  we  remember  that 
the  President  was  constantly  working  to  over 
come  the  forces  of  decentralization,  and  also  that 
the  military  programme  was  always  on  an  emer 
gency  basis,  shifting  almost  from  week  to  week  in 
accordance  with  developments  in  Europe. 


1  In  April,  1917,  the  General  Staff  consisted  of  fifty-one  officers, 
only  nineteen  of  whom  were  on  duty  in  Washington.  Of  these, 
eight  were  occupied  with  routine  business,  leaving  but  eleven  free 
for  the  real  purpose  for  which  the  staff  had  been  created  —  "the 
study  of  military  problems,  the  preparation  of  plans  for  national 
defense,  and  utilization  of  the  military  forces  in  time  of  war." 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  121 

The  original  programme  did  not  provide  for  an  ex 
peditionary  force  in  France.  During  the  early  days 
of  participation  in  the  war  it  was  generally  be 
lieved  that  the  chief  contributions  of  the  United 
States  to  Allied  victory  would  not  be  directly  upon 
the  fighting  front.  If  the  United  States  concen 
trated  its  efforts  upon  financing  the  Allies,  furnish 
ing  them  with  food,  shipping,  and  the  munitions 
which  had  been  promised — so  many  persons  argued 
—  it  would  be  doing  far  better  than  if  it  weakened 
assistance  of  that  sort  by  attempting  to  set  up  and 
maintain  a  large  fighting  force  of  its  own.  The  im 
pression  was  unfortunately  prevalent  in  civilian 
circles  that  Germany  was  on  her  last  legs,  and  that 
the  outcome  of  the  war  would  be  favorably  settled 
before  the  United  States  could  put  an  effective 
army  in  the  field.  Military  experts,  on  the  other 
hand,  more  thoroughly  convinced  of  German 
strength,  believed  that  the  final  campaigns  could 
not  come  before  the  summer  of  1919,  and  did  not 
expect  to  provide  a  great  expeditionary  force  pre 
vious  to  the  spring  of  that  year  if  indeed  it  were 
ever  sent.  Thus  from  opposite  points  of  view  the 
amateur  and  the  professional  deprecated  haste  in 
dispatching  an  army  to  France.  From  the  mo 
ment  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  President 


WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Wilson  certainly  seems  to  have  resolved  upon  the 
preparation  of  an  effective  fighting  force,  if  we  may 
judge  from  his  insistence  upon  the  selective  draft, 
although  he  did  not  expect  that  it  would  be  used 
abroad.  But  it  may  be  asked  whether  he  did  not 
hope  for  the  arrangement  of  a  negotiated  peace, 
which  if  not  "without  victory"  would  at  least 
leave  Germany  uncrushed.  It  is  probable  that 
he  did  not  yet  perceive  that  "force  to  the  ut 
most"  would  be  necessary  before  peace  could  be 
secured;  that  realization  was  to  come  only  in  the 
dark  days  of  1918. 

A  few  weeks  after  America's  declaration  of  war, 
however,  France  and  Great  Britain  dispatched 
missions  led  by  Balfour,  Viviani,  and  Joffre,  to  re 
quest  earnestly  that  at  least  a  small  American  force 
be  sent  overseas  at  once  for  the  moral  effect  upon 
dispirited  France.  The  plea  determined  the  Presi 
dent  to  send  General  Pershing  immediately  with  a 
force  of  about  two  thousand,  who  were  followed  in 
June  and  July,  1917,  by  sufficient  additional  forces 
to  make  up  a  division.  Wilson  had  been  authorized 
by  Congress,  under  the  Selective  Service  Act,  to 
send  four  volunteer  divisions  abroad  under  the 
command  of  Roosevelt.  But  he  refused  to  inter 
fere  with  the  plans  of  the  military  experts,  who 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  123 

strongly  objected  to  any  volunteer  forces  whatever. 
Neither  the  valiant  ex-President  nor  the  prospec 
tive  volunteers  were  trained  for  the  warfare  of  the 
moment,  and  their  presence  in  France  would  bring 
no  practical  good  to  the  Allied  cause;  moreover  the 
officers  whom  Roosevelt  requested  were  sorely 
needed  in  American  training  camps. 

General  Pershing,  to  whom  was  now  entrusted 
the  military  fortunes  of  the  American  army  abroad, 
was  an  officer  fifty-seven  years  old,  who  had  under 
gone  wide  military  and  administrative  experience 
in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines;  he  had  been  given  ex 
traordinary  promotion  by  President  Roosevelt, 
who  had  jumped  him  from  the  rank  of  captain  to 
that  of  Brigadier  General;  and  he  had  been  selected 
to  lead  the  punitive  force  dispatched  in  pursuit  of 
Villa  in  the  spring  of  1916.  Distinguished  in  ap 
pearance,  with  superb  carriage,  thin  lips,  and 
squarely-chiselled  chin,  he  possessed  military  gifts 
of  a  sound  rather  than  brilliant  character.  A  strict 
disciplinarian,  he  failed  to  win  from  his  troops  that 
affection  which  the  poilus  gave  to  Petain,  while  he 
never  displayed  the  genius  that  compelled  univer 
sal  admiration  for  Foch.  Neither  ultimate  success 
nor  the  stories  of  his  dramatic  remarks  (as  at  the 
grave  of  La  Fayette:  "La  Fayette,  we  are  here!") 


124   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

succeeded  in  investing  him  with  the  heroic  halo 
that  ought  to  come  to  a  victorious  commander. 
As  time  passes,  however,  Pershing  takes  higher 
rank.  His  insistence  upon  soldierly  qualities,  his 
unyielding  determination  to  create  American  ar 
mies  under  an  independent  command,  his  skill  in 
building  up  a  great  organization,  his  successful 
operations  at  St.  Mihiel  and  in  the  Meuse-Argonne 
drive,  despite  faulty  staff  work  —  all  these  facts  be 
come  more  plain  as  we  acquire  perspective.  If  his 
torians  refuse  to  recognize  him  as  a  great  general, 
they  will  surely  describe  his  talents  as  more  than 
adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  military  situation. 
The  sending  of  the  Pershing  expedition  did  not  at 
once  alter  fundamentally  the  original  programme 
for  raising  an  army  of  about  a  million  men  to  be  kept 
in  the  United  States,  as  a  reserve  in  case  of  emer 
gency.  There  was  no  intention  of  sending  to  France 
more  troops  than  would  be  needed  to  keep  filled  the 
ranks  of  the  small  expeditionary  force.  But  the 
urgent  representations  of  the  Allies  and  reports 
from  American  officers  induced  a  radical  change  in 
policy.  The  latter  emphasized  the  unsound  mili 
tary  position  of  our  Allies  and  insisted  that  the 
deadlock  could  be  broken  and  the  war  won  only  by 
putting  a  really  effective  American  army  beside  the 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  125 

French  and  British  by  the  summer  of  1918.  A  pro 
gramme  was  drawn  up  in  France  and  sent  to  the  War 
Department,  according  to  which  an  army  of  thirty 
divisions  should  be  sent  abroad  before  the  end  of 
that  year.  Throughout  1917  this  plan  remained 
rather  a  hope  than  a  definite  programme  and  it  was 
not  until  early  in  1918  that  it  was  officially  ap 
proved.  It  was  thus  of  an  emergency  character  and 
this  fact  combined  with  the  indefiniteness  preva 
lent  during  the  autumn  of  1917  to  produce  extreme 
confusion.  In  July,  1918,  an  eighty-division  pro 
gramme  was  adopted  and  more  confusion  resulted. 
Furthermore  the  entire  problem  was  complicated 
by  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  ships  could  be 
found  for  transportation.  It  had  been  assumed 
that  it  would  take  six  months  to  transport  five  hun 
dred  thousand  troops.  But  in  May,  1918,  and 
thereafter  nearly  three  hundred  thousand  troops  a 
month  w^ere  carried  to  France,  largely  through  ton 
nage  obtained  from  the  British.  Such  a  develop 
ment  of  transportation  facilities  was  not  and  could 
not  be  foreseen.  It  increased  the  confusion.  In  the 
face  of  such  difficulties,  the  problems  of  man 
power,  training,  and  supplies  had  to  be  met  and  ul 
timately  solved,  largely  through  the  centralization 
carried  into  effect  by  the  General  Staff. 


126   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  problem  of  man-power  had  been  carefully 
considered  during  the  weeks  that  preceded  our  en 
trance  into  the  war  and  the  declaration  of  war 
found  the  Government  prepared  with  a  plan  for 
a  selective  draft.  On  the  7th  of  April,  the  day 
after  the  declaration  of  war,  President  Wilson  in 
sisted  that  "the  safety  of  the  nation  depended  upon 
the  measure." 

Congress,  however,  was  slow  to  accept  the  prin 
ciple  of  conscription,  and  the  President  encoun 
tered  fierce  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  advocates 
of  the  volunteer  system,  who  were  led  by  men  of 
such  influence  as  Speaker  Champ  Clark,  House 
Leader  Claude  Kitchin,  and  the  chairman  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  Stanley  H. 
Dent.  The  President  was  inflexible,  declaring  that 
the  Administration  would  not  "yield  an  inch  of 
any  essential  parts  of  the  programme  for  raising  an 
army  by  conscription,"  and  exercised  his  personal 
influence  to  its  fullest  extent  in  order  to  secure  a 
favorable  vote.  He  was  ably  seconded  by  Julius 
Kahn,  the  ranking  Republican  member  of  the 
House  Military  Committee,  who  was  himself  born 
in  Germany.  The  failure  of  House  and  Senate  to 
agree  on  the  matter  of  age  liability  delayed  action 
for  some  weeks.  Finally,  on  May  18,  1917,  what 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  127 

is  popularly  known  as  the  Selective  Service  Act 
became  law. 

This  Act  gave  to  the  President  power  to  raise  the 
regular  army  by  enlistment  to  287,000  men,  to  take 
into  the  Federal  service  all  members  of  the  national 
guard,  and  to  raise  by  selective  draft,  in  two  install 
ments,  a  force  of  a  million  troops.  All  men  between 
the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  thirty,  both  inclu 
sive,  were  registered  on  the  5th  of  June;  this  with 
the  subsequent  registration  of  men  coming  of  age 
later,  produced  an  available  body  of  more  than  ten 
millions.  And  when  in  the  following  year,  the  draft 
age  was  extended  to  include  all  men  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five,  both  inclusive,  thir 
teen  millions  more  were  added.  From  this  body  the 
names  of  those  who  were  to  serve  were  drawn  by  lot. 
All  men  registered  were  carefully  classified,  in  order 
that  the  first  chosen  might  be  those  not  merely  best 
fitted  for  fighting,  but  those  whose  absence  on  the 
firing  line  would  least  disturb  the  essential  econom 
ic  life  of  the  nation.  Liberal  exemptions  were  ac 
corded,  including  artisans  employed  in  industries 
necessary  to  war  production  and  men  upon  whom 
others  were  dependent.  On  the  20th  of  July  the 
first  drawings  were  made,  and  by  the  end  of  the 
year  about  half  a  million  of  the  drafted  men,  now 


128   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

called  the  National  Army,  were  mustered  in.  In 
the  meantime  enlistments  in  the  regular  army  and 
the  national  guard  had  raised  the  total  number  of 
troops  to  about  a  million  and  a  quarter  and  of 
officers  to  more  than  one  hundred  thousand.  Less 
than  a  year  later,  when  the  armistice  was  signed, 
the  army  included  over  three  and  a  half  millions, 
of  whom  nearly  two  millions  were  in  France. 

The  real  military  contribution  of  the  United 
States  to  allied  victory  lay  in  man-power.  It 
could  not  of  its  own  resources  transport  the 
troops  nor  equip  them  completely,  but  the  raising 
of  an  enormous  number  of  fresh  forces,  partially 
trained,  it  is  true,  but  of  excellent  fighting  cali 
ber,  made  possible  the  maneuvers  of  Foch  that 
brought  disaster  to  German  arms.  When  once 
these  armies  arrived  in  numbers  on  the  battle-line 
in  France,  the  realization  of  the  inexhaustible 
man-power  of  America  did  more  than  anything 
else  to  revive  the  spirit  of  the  Allies  and  discourage 
the  enemy. 

Infinitely  more  difficult  than  the  problem  of 
man-power  were  those  of  training  and  supplies.  As 
we  have  seen,  these  problems  were  complicated  by 
the  decision  to  send  abroad  an  effective  fighting 
force,  a  decision  which  completely  changed  the 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  129 

entire  military  situation.  The  original  plan  of 
maintaining  an  army  only  in  the  United  States,  as  a 
reserve,  permitted  the  questions  of  camps,  supplies, 
equipment,  munitions,  and  training  to  be  under 
taken  at  comparative  leisure.  But  if  a  large  army 
was  to  be  placed  in  France  by  1918,  these  problems 
must  be  solved  immediately  and  upon  an  emergency 
basis.  Hence  resulted  the  confusion  and  expense 
which  nearly  led  to  the  breakdown  of  the  whole 
programme  in  the  winter  of  1917-18.  The  War 
Department  faced  a  dilemma.  If  it  waited  until 
supplies  were  ready,  the  period  of  training  would 
be  too  short.  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  threw  the 
new  draft  armies  immediately  into  the  camps, 
assuming  that  the  camps  could  be  prepared,  the 
troops  would  lack  the  wool  uniforms  and  blankets 
necessary  for  protection,  as  well  as  the  equipment 
with  which  to  drill.  The  second  alternative  ap 
peared  the  less  dangerous,  and  in  September  the 
first  draft  calls  were  made  and  by  December  the 
camps  were  filled. f 

xThe  size  of  the  army  raised  in  1917  demanded  the  braiding  of 
enormous  cantonments.  Within  three  months  of  the  first  draw 
ings  sixteen  complete  cities  of  barracks  had  sprung  up,  each  to 
accommodate  40,000  inhabitants.  They  had  then*  officers'  quar 
ters,  hospitals,  sewage  systems,  filter  plants,  and  garbage  incinera 
tors,  electric  lighting  plants,  libraries,  theaters.  By  the  4th  of 
September  the  National  Army  cantonments  were  ready  for 


130  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Many  apprehensions  were  fulfilled  in  fact,  when 
the  terrible  winter  weather  came,  the  worst  in 
years.  The  northern  camps  faced  it  with  insufficient 
clothing.  Pneumonia  made  its  invasion.  Artil 
lerymen  were  trained  with  wooden  guns;  infantry 
men  with  wooden  rifles  or  antiquated  Krags.  But 
all  the  time  the  essential  training  proceeded  and  the 
calls  for  replacements  sent  by  General  Pershing  in 
France  were  met. 

The  first  and  vital  need  was  for  officers  to  train 
the  willing  but  inexperienced  recruits.  To  meet 
this  need  a  series  of  officers'  training  camps  had 
been  established  in  the  spring  of  1917  and  con 
tinued  for  a  year.  Each  camp  lasted  for  three 
months,  where  during  twelve  hours  a  day  the  can 
didates  for  commissions,  chiefly  college  graduates 

430,000  men,  two-thirds  of  the  first  draft.  A  single  camp  involved 
the  expenditure  of  approximately  $11,000,000.  Camp  Grant,  at 
Rockford,  Illinois,  included  1600  buildings  with  space  for  45,000 
men  and  12,000  horses.  The  water,  which  before  use  was  tested 
and  filtered,  was  supplied  from  six  huge  wells  drilled  175  feet 
deep,  carried  through  38  miles  of  water  main,  and  stored  in  reser 
voir  tanks  holding  550,000  gallons.  For  lighting  purposes  there 
were  1450  miles  of  electric  wire,  1200  poles,  35,000  incandescent 
lamps.  During  the  period  of  construction,  50  carloads  of  building 
material  were  daily  unloaded,  and  for  several  weeks  an  average 
of  500,000  board  feet  of  lumber  set  up  daily.  The  entire  construc 
tion  of  the  camp  demanded  50,000,000  feet  of  lumber,  700  tons 
of  nails,  4,000,000  feet  of  roofing,  and  3,000,000  square  feet  of 
wall  board. 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  131 

and  young  business  men,  were  put  through  the 
most  intensive  drill  and  withering  study.  All  told, 
more  than  eighty  thousand  commissions  were 
granted  through  the  camps,  and  the  story  of  the 
battlefields  proved  at  once  the  caliber  of  these  ama 
teur  officers  and  the  effectiveness  of  their  training. 
Special  camps,  such  as  the  school  of  fire  at  Fort 
Sill,  carried  the  officers  a  step  further,  and  when 
they  went  overseas  they  received  in  schools  in 
France  instruction  in  the  latest  experience  of  the 
AJlied  armies.  The  colleges  of  the  country  were  also 
formed  into  training  schools  and  ultimately  about 
170,000  young  men,  under  military  age,  in  five  hun 
dred  institutions  of  learning,  joined  the  Students* 
Army  Training  Corps. 

In  all  the  army  schools  French  and  British  offi 
cers  cooperated  as  instructors  and  gave  the  value 
of  their  three  years'  experience  on  the  fighting 
front.  But  the  traditions  of  the  American  regular 
army,  formulated  in  the  Indian  and  frontier  fights, 
rather  than  the  siege  methods  of  the  trenches, 
formed  the  basic  principles  of  the  instruction;  Gen 
eral  Pershing  was  insistent  that  an  offensive  spirit 
must  be  instilled  into  the  new  troops,  a  policy 
which  received  the  enthusiastic  endorsement  of 
the  President.  The  development  of  "a  self-reliant 


132  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

infantry  by  thorough  drill  in  the  use  of  a  rifle  and  in 
the  tactics  of  open  warfare"  was  always  uppermost 
in  the  mind  of  the  commander  of  the  expeditionary 
force,  who  from  first  to  last  refused  to  approve  the 
extreme  specialization  in  trench  warfare  that  was 
advised  by  the  British  and  the  French. 

The  emergency  nature  of  the  military  programme, 
resulting  from  the  sudden  decision  to  send  a  large 
army  to  France,  the  decentralization  of  army  af 
fairs,  and  the  failure  to  prepare  adequately  in  the 
years  preceding  entrance  into  the  war  —  all  these 
factors  made  a  shortage  of  supplies  in  the  training 
camps  inevitable. 

The  first  appropriation  bill  which  was  to  provide 
the  funds  to  purchase  clothing,  blankets,  and  other 
necessities  was  not  passed  until  the  15th  of  June, 
leaving  a  pitifully  brief  space  of  time  for  the  placing 
of  contracts  and  the  manufacture  and  transport  of 
supplies.  Many  factories  had  to  be  built,  and 
many  delays  resulted  from  the  expansion  of  the 
Quartermaster  Department,  which  had  not  been 
manned  or  equipped  for  such  an  emergency.  The 
shortage  of  clothing  was  felt  the  more  because  of 
the  extreme  severity  of  the  winter.  After  the  in 
itial  difficulties  had  been  passed  supplies  of  this  kind 
were  furnished  in  profusion;  but  lack  of  preparation 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  13S 

on  the  part  of  the  War  Department  and  the 
slowness  of  Congress  to  appropriate  promptly 
produced  a  temporary  situation  of  extreme  dis 
comfort  and  worse.  The  provision  of  food  supplies 
was  arranged  more  successfully.  Soldiers  would 
not  be  soldiers  if  they  did  not  complain  of  their 
"chow."  But  the  quality  and  variety  of  the  food 
given  to  the  new  troops  reached  a  higher  degree 
than  was  reasonably  to  have  been  expected.  The 
average  soldier  gained  from  ten  to  twelve  pounds 
after  entering  the  service.  Provision  was  also  made 
for  his  entertainment.  Vaudeville,  concerts,  mov 
ing  pictures  formed  an  element  of  camp  life,  much 
to  the  surprise  of  the  visiting  French  officers  and 
Civil  War  veterans. 

Americans  naturally  look  back  with  pride  to  the 
making  of  their  new  army.  The  draft  was  accom 
plished  smoothly  and  rapidly.  Demonstrations 
against  conscription,  which  in  view  of  the  Civil 
War  draft  riots  had  caused  some  apprehension, 
were  almost  unheard  of  and  never  serious.  Of  the 
three  million  called  for  service  on  the  first  draft,  all 
but  150,000  were  accounted  for,  and  of  those  miss 
ing  most  were  aliens  who  had  left  to  enlist  in  their 
own  armies.  The  problem  of  the  slacker  and  of  the 
conscientious  objector,  although  vexatious,  was 


134    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

never  serious.  The  educative  effect  of  the  training 
upon  the  country  was  very  considerable.  All  ranks 
and  classes  were  gathered  in,  representing  at  least 
fifty-six  different  nationalities;  artisans,  million 
aires,  and  hoboes  bunked  side  by  side;  the  youthful 
plutocrat  saw  life  from  a  new  angle,  the  wild  moun 
taineer  learned  to  read,  the  alien  immigrant  to 
speak  English.  Finally  the  purpose  of  the  training 
was  achieved,  for  America  sent  over  a  force  that 
could  fight  successfully  at  the  moment  of  crisis. 

Amateur  critics  had  assumed  that  the  problem  of 
raising  an  effective  number  of  troops  would  prove 
far  more  difficult  than  that  of  producing  the  neces 
sary  equipment  and  munitions.  It  was  generally 
believed  that  the  industrial  genius  of  America  was 
such  that  American  factories  could  provide  all  the 
artillery,  small-arms,  and  aircraft  that  the  armies 
could  use.  The  most  fantastic  prophecies  were  in 
dulged  in.  Experience  showed,  however,  that  it  is 
easier  to  raise,  train,  and  organize  troops  of  supe 
rior  sort  in  a  brief  period  than  it  is  to  arm  them.  It 
stands  as  a  matter  of  record  that  foreign  artillery 
and  machine  guns  alone  made  possible  the  attack 
on  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  and  the  advance  in  the  Ar- 
gonne.  As  for  military  airplanes,  had  the  Govern 
ment  relied  upon  those  of  American  manufacture 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  135 

there  would  have  been  no  American  squadrons  fly 
ing  over  the  German  lines  previous  to  August, 
1918,  and  not  many  between  then  and  the  signing 
of  the  armistice. 

Such  a  statement  should  not  imply  blanket  criti 
cism  of  the  Ordnance  Department.  The  Govern 
ment  was  perhaps  slow,  even  after  the  United 
States  entered  the  war,  to  realize  the  serious  char 
acter  of  the  military  situation  abroad  and  to  ap 
preciate  the  extent  to  which  American  aid  would  be 
necessary  to  allied  victory.  Hence  the  changes  in 
the  military  programme  which  inevitably  created 
confusion.  But  the  decision  to  ensure  against  un 
foreseen  disaster  by  preparing  heavily  for  1919  and 
1920  and  partially  disregarding  19 18  was  based  upon 
sound  strategical  reasoning.  The  war  was  brought 
to  a  close  sooner  than  had  been  expected ;  hence  the 
period  of  actual  hostilities  was  devoted  to  laying 
down  the  foundations  of  a  munitions  industry,  and 
the  munitions  actually  produced,  in  the  words  of 
Assistant  Secretary  Crowell,  "might  almost  be 
termed  casual  to  the  main  enterprise,  pilots  of  the 
quantities  to  come."  Such  a  policy  was  possible 
because  of  the  surplus  production  of  the  Allies. 
The  latter  stated  that  their  production  of  artil 
lery  was  such  that  they  could  equip  all  American 


136   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

divisions  as  they  arrived  in  France  during  the  year 
1918.1  This  gave  time  "to  build  manufacturing 
capacity  on  a  grand  scale  without  the  necessity  of 
immediate  production,  time  to  secure  the  best  in 
design,  time  to  attain  quality  in  the  enormous  out 
puts  to  come  later  as  opposed  to  early  quantities  of 
indifferent  class." 

The  lack  of  preparation  in  the  matter  of  machine 
guns  has  received  wide  publicity.  In  this,  as  in  ar 
tillery,  the  deficiency  was  made  good  by  the  Allies 
up  to  the  final  weeks  of  the  war.  In  April,  1917, 
the  army  possessed  only  a  small  number  of  machine 
guns  entirely  inadequate  even  for  the  training  of 
the  new  troops  and  half  of  which  would  not  take 
American  service  cartridges.  Less  than  seven  hun 
dred  machine  rifles  were  on  hand.  Manufacturing 
facilities  for  machine  guns  were  limited;  there  were 
only  two  factories  in  the  United  States  actually 
producing  in  quantity.  Orders  for  four  thousand 

1  As  a  result  of  the  agreement  thus  made  the  United  States 
shipped  overseas  between  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war  and 
the  signing  of  the  armistice  only  815  complete  pieces  of  mobile 
artillery,  including  all  produced  for  France  and  Great  Britain  as 
well  as  for  American  troops.  Of  the  75's  only  181  complete  units 
were  shipped  abroad,  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  securing 
1828  from  the  French.  Of  the  155  millimeter  howitzers  none  of 
American  manufacture  reached  the  front.  French  deliveries 
amounted  to  747. — America's  Munitions,  1917-1918  (Report  of 
Benedict  Crowell,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War),  p.  90. 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  137 

Vickers  had  been  placed  the  preceding  December, 
but  deliveries  had  not  been  made  by  the  beginning 
of  April.  Either  because  of  jealousy  in  the  depart 
ment,  or  because  of  justifiable  technical  reasons, 
various  experts  demanded  a  better  machine  gun 
than  any  used  by  the  Allies,  and  Secretary  Baker 
took  the  responsibility  of  delaying  matters  so  as  to 
hold  the  competition  recommended  by  a  board  of 
investigation.  This  competition  was  planned  for 
May  1,  1917,  with  the  result  that  we  entered  the 
war  without  having  decided  upon  any  type  of  ma 
chine  gun,  and  it  was  not  until  some  weeks  later 
that  the  Browning  was  approved. 

First  deliveries  of  this  gun  could  not  be  made  un 
til  April,  1918,  a  year  after  the  declaration  of  war. 
In  the  meantime,  the  War  Department  utilized  ex 
isting  facilities  to  the  limit,  and  placed  large  orders 
for  Colt,  Lewis,  and  Vickers  machine  guns.  But 
the  heavy  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles  used 
by  our  troops  in  the  field  were  furnished  by  the 
French  and  the  British  until  May,  1918.  During 
that  month  and  June  the  eleven  American  divisions 
that  sailed  were  provided  with  American-made 
Vickers,  although  they  still  used  the  French-made 
Chauchat  automatic  rifles.  After  June,  all  Amer 
ican  troops  to  sail  received  a  full  equipment  of 


138   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Brownings,  both  heavy  machine  guns  and  auto 
matic  rifles.  Altogether  27,000  heavy  Brownings 
and  29,000  light  Brownings  were  shipped  to  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force,  sufficient  by  the 
time  of  the  armistice  to  equip  completely  all  the 
American  troops  in  France.  They  were  not  used 
in  combat  until  the  Meuse-Argonne  battle,  where 
they  amply  justified  the  faith  of  General  Pershing. 
The  policy  of  delaying  production  in  order  to  ob 
tain  the  best  quality  was  not  followed  in  the  case 
of  the  rifle,  and  the  results  unquestionably  justi 
fied  the  plan,  ultimately  adopted,  of  accepting  a 
slightly  inferior  type  which  could  be  produced  at 
once  in  quantity.  The  American  army  rifle,  the 
Springfield,  was  generally  regarded  as  the  most  ac 
curate  the  world  had  seen.  Unfortunately  there 
was  little  hope  of  expanding  the  production  of 
Springfields  sufficiently  to  meet  the  necessities  of 
the  new  National  Army.  For  several  years  pre 
vious  to  1917  the  Government,  with  myopic  vision, 
had  cut  down  expenditures  for  the  manufacture  of 
small-arms  and  ammunition,  with  the  result  that 
artisans  skilled  in  making  Springfields  had  been 
scattered.  Even  if  the  two  factories  that  had  been 
turning  out  Springfields  could  be  restaffed,  their 
combined  production  would  be  insufficient.  Private 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  139 

plants  could  not  be  utilized  for  early  quantity 
production,  because  of  the  time  that  would  be 
taken  in  building  up  an  adequate  manufacturing 
equipment  and  training  the  artisans.  Fortune 
intervened.  It  happened  that  three  large  Amer 
ican  firms  were  about  to  complete  important  con 
tracts  for  supplying  Enfield  rifles  to  the  British 
Government.  Their  plants  and  skilled  labor  might 
be  turned  to  account,  but  the  Enfield  was  not  re 
garded  as  satisfactory,  principally  because  its  am 
munition  was  inferior  to  that  taken  by  the  Spring 
field.  The  War  Department  decided  to  attempt  a 
change  in  the  bore  of  the  Enfield  so  that  it  would 
use  Springfield  cartridges,  and  to  make  other  minor 
simplifications  and  improvements.  The  experi 
ment  proved  successful  to  the  highest  degree.  The 
modified  Enfields  were  reported  to  be  only  slightly 
inferior  to  the  Springfields  and  by  the  end  of  De 
cember,  1917,  five  thousand  a  day  were  being 
turned  out.  Altogether  American  manufactories 
produced  during  the  war  about  two  and  a  half  mil 
lion  rifles,  of  which  all  but  three  hundred  thousand 
were  modified  Enfields. 

In  the  matter  of  airplane  production  the  record 
is  far  less  satisfactory.  It  is,  perhaps,  too  early  to 
distribute  with  justice  the  blame  for  the  delays  in 


140   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

production,  and  full  cognizance  should  be  taken  of 
the  difficulties  which  had  to  be  overcome.  But 
whatever  explanations  are  to  be  found,  it  is  an  un 
deniable  fact  that  not  until  August,  1918,  three 
months  before  the  armistice,  was  an  American 
squadron  equipped  with  American  planes.  The 
Allies  had  looked  to  America  for  the  production  of 
combat  planes  in  quantity  and  Congress,  respond 
ing  to  popular  enthusiasm,  had  in  the  first  days  of 
the  war  appropriated  more  than  half  a  billion  dol 
lars  for  their  manufacture.  An  Aircraft  Production 
Board  was  organized,  with  Howard  E.  Coffin  as 
chairman,  although  the  actual  manufacture  of  the 
machines  was  under  the  supervision  of  the  Signal 
Corps.  Promises  were  made  that  by  the  spring  of 
1918  the  Germans  would  be  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  American  airmen. 

But  difficulties  developed.  A  new  type  of  motor 
had  to  be  produced,  capable  of  serving  in  any  kind 
of  airplane;  this  was  rapidly  and  successfully  ac 
complished,  and  in  July,  1917,  the  Liberty  Motor 
was  approved.  But  just  as  manufacturing  was 
about  to  begin  changes  in  the  design  were  de 
manded,  with  ensuing  delays.  There  was  confu 
sion  between  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Aircraft  Board 
and  that  of  the  Signal  Corps.  The  organization  of 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  141 

the  latter  was  less  efficient  than  had  been  expected, 
and  men  who  knew  little  or  nothing  of  the  tech 
nique  of  aircraft  were  placed  in  charge  of  produc 
tion.  When  orders  were  given  for  planes  to  be 
constructed  in  France,  seven  thousand  American 
machinists  had  to  be  sent  over  to  release  the  French 
machinists  who  were  to  work  on  these  contracts, 
with  consequent  delays  to  American  production. 
Repeated  alterations  in  the  designs  of  airplanes 
must  be  made  to  meet  changing  requirements  sent 
from  the  front,  and  large  numbers  of  planes  almost 
ready  for  delivery  had  to  be  scrapped.  Two  of  the 
types  manufactured  proved  to  be  unsatisfactory 
and  were  condemned,  with  an  estimated  loss  of 
twenty-six  million  dollars.  Finally  the  bitter  cold 
of  the  winter  made  it  difficult  to  secure  the  indis 
pensable  spruce  from  the  northwestern  forests,  and 
lumbering  operations  were  hampered  by  extensive 
strikes,  which  were  said  to  have  resulted  from 
German  intrigues. 

General  disappointment  at  the  failure  to  produce 
airplanes  in  quantity  by  the  spring  of  1918  was  the 
more  bitter  because  of  the  high  hopes  that  had  been 
aroused  by  those  in  authority.  Instead  of  confess 
ing  the  serious  nature  of  the  delays,  the  War 
Department  attempted  to  conceal  not  merely  the 


142   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

mistakes  made  but  the  fact  that  airplanes  could 
not  possibly  reach  France  in  any  numbers  before  the 
autumn  of  1918.  Thus  when  at  last,  in  February, 
a  single  combat  plane  was  completed  and  shipped, 
the  War  Department  issued  the  statement:  "The 
first  American-built  battle  planes  are  to-day  en 
route  to  France.  This  first  shipment,  although  not 
in  itself  large,  marks  the  final  overcoming  of  many 
difficulties  met  in  building  up  a  new  and  intricate 
industry."  When  General  Wood  returned  from 
France  in  March  and  reported  that  not  one  Amer 
ican-built  plane  was  in  action  there,  and  when  the 
Senate  investigation  committee  unearthed  the  ex 
istence  of  all  the  delays,  the  disillusioned  public 
gave  vent  to  fierce  criticism.  It  was  to  some  extent 
calmed  by  the  appointment,  in  April,  of  John  D. 
Ryan,  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Company,  as  di 
rector  of  aircraft  production  for  the  army.  By  this 
time  many  of  the  most  serious  difficulties  had  been 
passed.  When  the  armistice  was  signed  about  twelve 
thousand  airplanes  had  been  produced  by  American 
plants,  of  which  a  third  were  service-planes. x 

It  is  impossible  here  to  trace  the  activities  of  the 
various  departments  in  the  herculean  task  of  arm 
ing  the  nation.  But  one  should  not  forget  that 

1  Ayres,  The  War  with  Germany,  87-90. 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  143 

there  was  much  which  never  received  wide  pub 
licity.  The  development  of  ordnance  carried  with 
it  the  manufacture  of  quantities  of  ammunition 
hitherto  undreamt  of,  the  building  of  railway  and 
motorized  artillery,  the  improvement  of  sight  and 
fire-control  apparatus,  the  making  of  all  sorts  of 
trench-warfare  materiel.  The  Air  Service  had  to 
concern  itself  with  the  manufacture  of  radio  tele 
phones,  armament  for  airplanes,  the  synchronizing 
of  machine  guns  to  fire  through  propeller  blades, 
airplane  bombs,  air  photography,  and  pyrotechnics. 
The  Chemical  Warfare  Service  was  busy  with  the 
making  of  toxic  gases  and  gas  defense  equipment, 
using  the  peach  stones  and  cocoanut  shells  which 
every  one  was  asked  to  save.  The  enormous  quan 
tities  of  medical  and  dental  supplies  must  be  gath 
ered  by  the  Quartermaster  Department,  which  also 
had  charge  of  the  salvage  service  and  the  thousand 
gargantuan  household  occupations,  such  as  launder 
ing  and  incineration  of  garbage,  that  went  with  the 
maintenance  of  the  army  in  camp.  The  Signal 
Corps  must  produce  wire,  telegraphs,  telephones, 
switchboards,  radio  equipment,  batteries,  field 
glasses,  photographic  outfits,  and  carrier  pigeons. 

Upon  its  navy  the  United  States  has  always  re 
lied  chiefly  for  defense  and  in  this  branch  of  the 


144   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

service  the  country  was  better  prepared  for  war  in 
1917  than  in  the  army.  Indeed  when  the  nation 
entered  the  struggle  many  persons  believed  that 
the  sole  practical  fighting  assistance  the  United 
States  should  give  the  Allies  would  be  upon  the  sea. 
Josephus  Daniels,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  was 
a  Southern  politician,  of  limited  administrative  ex 
perience  and  capacity.  During  the  first  years  of 
his  appointment  he  had  alienated  navy  officers 
through  the  introduction  of  pet  reforms  and  his 
frank  advocacy  of  a  little  navy.  Resiliency,  how 
ever,  was  one  of  his  characteristics  and  he  followed 
President  Wilson  in  1916,  when  the  latter  demand 
ed  from  Congress  authority  for  an  expansion  in  the 
navy  which  seemed  only  prudent  in  view  of  in 
ternational  conditions.  Largely  owing  to  the  ef 
forts  of  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Franklin  D.  Roose 
velt,  the  months  immediately  preceding  the  dec 
laration  of  war  witnessed  strenuous  preparations 
to  render  aid  to  the  Allies  in  case  the  United 
States  should  participate.  Thereafter  Secretary 
Daniels  tended  to  sink  his  personality  and  judg 
ment  in  the  conduct  of  the  naval  war  and  to  defer 
to  the  opinion  of  various  officers,  of  whom  Admiral 
William  S.  Benson,  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
was  the  most  influential.  When  war  was  declared 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  145 

two  flotillas  of  destroyers  were  at  once  sent  to 
Queenstown  to  assist  in  chasing  and  sinking  sub 
marines,  and  were  placed  under  the  command  of 
Admiral  William  S.  Sims.  Battleships  and  cruisers 
followed,  though  by  no  means  with  the  expedition 
nor  in  the  numbers  desired  by  Sims,  who  believed 
that  by  using  practically  the  entire  naval  force  at 
once  the  submarine  could  be  exterminated  and  the 
war  ended. 

At  home,  the  Navy  Department  entered  upon  a 
process  of  expansion  which  increased  its  personnel 
from  65,000  to  497,000  when  the  armistice  was 
signed.  A  rapid  development  in  naval  construc 
tion  was  planned,  with  emphasis  upon  destroyers. 
The  effects  of  this  programme  became  visible  with 
in  a  year;  during  the  first  nine  months  of  1918  no 
less  than  eighty-three  destroyers  were  launched,  as 
against  sixty-two  for  the  preceding  nine  years. 
Submarine  chasers  of  a  special  design  were  built 
and  many  private  yachts  taken  over  and  adapted 
to  the  war  against  the  submarine.  During  the 
course  of  the  war  two  battleships  and  twenty-eight 
submarines  were  completed.  Expansion  in  naval 
shipbuilding  plans  was  paralleled  by  the  construc 
tion  of  giant  docks;  by  camps  sufficient  for  the 
training  of  two  hundred  thousand  men;  and  by  a 


146   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

naval  aircraft  factory  from  which  a  seaplane  was 
turned  out  seven  months  after  work  on  the  factory 
was  begun.  Naval  aviators  returning  from  the 
Channel  coasts  superintended  flying  schools  and 
undertook  the  patrol  of  our  Atlantic  seaboard. 

If  much  of  these  military  preparations  was  not 
translated  into  accomplishment  before  the  war 
ended,  it  was  because  the  United  States  was  pre 
paring  wisely  for  a  long  struggle  and  it  seemed 
necessary  that  the  foundations  should  be  broad  and 
deep.  "America  was  straining  her  energies  to 
wards  a  goal,"  said  the  Director  of  Munitions,  "to 
ward  the  realization  of  an  ambition  which,  in  the 
production  of  munitions,  dropped  the  year  1918 
almost  out  of  consideration  altogether,  which  in 
deed  did  not  bring  the  full  weight  of  American 
men  and  materiel  into  the  struggle  even  in  1919, 
but  which  left  it  for  1920,  if  the  enemy  had  not  yet 
succumbed  to  the  growing  American  power,  to  wit 
ness  the  maximum  strength  of  the  United  States 
in  the  field."  It  was  the  knowledge  of  this  prepa 
ration  which,  to  some  extent,  helped  to  convince 
the  German  General  Staff  of  the  futility  of  fur 
ther  resistance  and  thus  to  bring  the  war  to  an 
early  end. 

The  dependence  of  the  United  States  upon  the 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  147 

Allies  for  equipment  and  munitions  does  not  de 
serve  the  vitriolic  anathemas  of  certain  critics. 
The  country  did  not  enter  the  struggle  as  if  it  ex 
pected  to  fight  the  war  single-handed.  Distribu 
tion  of  labor  and  supplies  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Allies  was  merely  a  wise  and  eco 
nomic  measure.  At  their  own  request,  the  Allies 
were  furnished  with  that  which  they  most  needed 
—  money,  food,  and  man-power.  In  return  they 
provided  the  United  States  with  the  artillery  and 
machine  guns  which  they  could  spare  and  which 
they  could  manufacture  more  cheaply  and  rapidly. 
Finally  there  is  the  outstanding  fact,  of  which 
America  may  always  be  proud,  that  this  heteroge 
neous  democracy,  organized,  so  far  as  organization 
existed,  for  the  pursuits  of  peace,  was  able  in  the 
space  of  sixteen  months,  to  provide  an  army  capa 
ble  of  fighting  successfully  one  of  the  most  difficult 
campaigns  of  the  war,  and  that  which  led  directly 
to  the  military  defeat  of  Germany. 

The  ultimate  success  of  President  Wilson's  war 
policies  could  hardly  have  been  achieved  except  by 
the  process  of  centralization  which  he  never  lost 
from  view.  His  insistence  upon  centralized  re 
sponsibility  and  control  in  political  matters  was 
paralleled  in  the  military  field.  Nothing  illustrates 


148   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

this  principle  better  than  the  centralization  of  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force  under  the  absolute 
and  unquestioned  command  of  General  Pershing. 
The  latter  was  given  free  rein.  The  jealousies 
which  so  weakened  the  Union  armies  during  the 
first  years  of  the  Civil  War  were  ruthlessly  re 
pressed.  No  generals  were  sent  to  France  of  whom 
he  did  not  approve.  When  the  Allies  threatened 
to  appeal  to  Washington  over  Pershing's  head, 
President  Wilson  turned  a  deaf  ear. 

In  the  United  States,  the  President  sought  sim 
ilar  centralization  through  the  General  Staff.  It 
was  this  body  which  prepared  the  different  plans  for 
the  Draft  Act,  the  Pershing  expedition,  and  finally 
for  the  gigantic  task  of  putting  a  million  men  in 
France  by  the  summer  of  1918.  To  the  staff  was 
given  the  formulation  of  the  training  programme 
along  the  lines  recommended  by  Pershing.  Al 
ways,  however,  it  was  hampered  by  the  multiple 
responsibility  that  characterized  the  old-style  army 
machine  with  its  bureau  chiefs  competing  with  each 
other,  with  the  navy,  and  with  the  Allies.  Quar 
termaster  Department,  Ordnance  Department, 
Signal  Corps,  and  the  other  bureaus  were  uncoor 
dinated,  and  inevitable  waste  and  inefficiency  fol 
lowed  all  their  operations.  It  was  the  crisis  that 


THE  NATION  IN  ARMS  149 

arose  from  the  problem  of  supplies,  in  the  winter  of 
1917,  that  furnished  the  President  with  the  oppor 
tunity  to  cut  red-tape  and  secure  the  centraliza 
tion  he  desired.  That  opportunity  came  with  the 
blanket  powers  bestowed  upon  him  by  the  Over 
man  Act,  the  full  significance  of  which  can  only 
be  appreciated  after  a  consideration  of  the  meas 
ures  taken  to  centralize  the  industrial  resources  of 
the  nation. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   HOME   FRONT 

ON  May  18,  1917,  President  Wilson  issued  a  proc 
lamation  in  which  are  to  be  found  the  following 
significant  sentences : 

In  the  sense  in  which  we  have  been  wont  to  think  of 
armies  there  are  no  armies  in  this  struggle,  there  are 
entire  nations  armed.  Thus,  the  men  who  remain  to 
till  the  soil  and  man  the  factories  are  no  less  a  part  of 
the  army  that  is  in  France  than  the  men  beneath  the 
battle  flags.  It  must  be  so  with  us.  It  is  not  an  army 
that  we  must  shape  and  train  for  war  —  it  is  a  Nation. 
To  this  end  our  people  must  draw  close  in  one  compact 
front  against  a  common  foe.  But  this  cannot  be  if  each 
man  pursues  a  private  purpose.  All  must  pursue  one 
purpose.  The  Nation  needs  all  men,  but  it  needs  each 
man,  not  in  the  field  that  will  most  pleasure  him,  but 
in  the  endeavor  that  will  best  serve  the  common  good. 
Thus,  though  a  sharpshooter  pleases  to  operate  a  trip 
hammer  for  the  forging  of  great  guns,  and  an  expert 
machinist  desires  to  march  with  the  flag,  the  Nation 
is  being  served  only  when  the  sharpshooter  marches 
and  the  machinist  remains  at  his  levers.  The  whole 

150 


THE  HOME  FRONT  151 

Nation  must  be  a  team,  in  which  each  man  shall  play 
the  part  for  which  he  is  best  fitted. 

If  President  Wilson  deserves  severe  criticism  for 
his  failure  to  endorse  adequate  plans  of  preparation 
for  war  while  his  country  was  at  peace,  he  should  be 
given  due  credit  for  his  appreciation  that  the  home 
front  must  be  organized  if  the  fighting  front  was  to 
be  victorious.  He  perceived  clearly  that  it  was 
necessary  to  carry  into  the  industrial  life  of  the  na 
tion  that  centralizing  process  which  characterized 
his  military  policy.  That  the  nation  at  home  was 
made  to  feel  itself  part  of  the  fighting  forces  and  co 
operated  enthusiastically  and  effectively  in  the  or 
ganization  of  the  national  resources  was  not  the 
least  of  the  triumphs  of  the  United  States.  Such 
organization  demanded  great  sacrifice,  not  merely 
of  luxuries  or  comforts,  but  of  settled  habits,  which 
are  difficult  to  break.  It  must  necessarily  be  of  an 
emergency  character,  for  the  United  States  pos 
sessed  no  bureaucratic  system  like  that  which  ob 
tains  on  the  continent  of  Europe  for  the  centraliza 
tion  of  trade,  manufactures,  food  production,  and 
the  thousand  activities  that  form  part  of  economic 
life.  But  the  event  proved  that  both  the  spirit  and 
the  brains  of  the  American  people  were  equal  to 
the  crisis. 


152   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  problem  of  coordinating  the  national  indus 
tries  for  the  supply  of  the  army  was  complicated  by 
the  military  decentralization  described  in  the  pre 
ceding  chapter,  which  President  Wilson  was  not 
able  to  remedy  before  the  final  months  of  the  war. 
The  army  did  not  form  or  state  its  requirements  as 
one  body  but  through  five  supply  bureaus,  which 
acted  independently  and  in  competition  with  each 
other.  Bids  for  materials  from  the  different  bu 
reaus  conflicted  with  each  other,  with  those  of  the 
navy,  and  of  the  Allies.  Not  merely  was  it  essen 
tial  that  such  demands  should  be  coordinated,  but 
that  some  central  committee  should  be  able  to  say 
how  large  was  the  total  supply  of  any  sort  of  mate 
rials,  how  soon  they  could  be  produced,  and  to  pre 
vent  the  waste  of  such  materials  in  unessential  pro 
duction.  If  the  army  was  decentralized,  American 
industry  as  a  whole  was  in  a  state  of  complete 
chaos,  so  far  as  any  central  organization  was  con 
cerned.  On  the  side  of  business  every  firm  in  every 
line  of  production  was  competing  in  the  manufac 
ture  of  essential  and  unessential  articles,  in  trans 
portation,  and  in  bidding  for  and  holding  the  neces 
sary  labor.  Mr.  Wilson  set  himself  the  task  of 
evolving  order  out  of  this  chaos. 

The  President,  as  in  the  purely  military  problem 


THE  HOME  FRONT  153 

where  he  utilized  the  General  Staff  as  his  instru 
ment,  prepared  to  adapt  existing  machinery,  rather 
than  to  create  a  completely  new  organization.  For 
a  time  he  seems  to  have  believed  that  his  Cabinet 
might  serve  the  function.  But  it  was  ill-adapted  to 
handle  the  sort  of  problems  that  must  be  solved. 
It  was  composed  of  men  chosen  largely  for  political 
reasons,  and  despite  much  public  complaint  it  had 
not  been  strengthened  after  Wilson's  reelection. 
Franklin  K.  Lane,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
was  generally  recognized  as  a  man  of  excellent  busi 
ness  judgment,  willing  to  listen  to  experts,  and  ca 
pable  of  cooperating  effectively  with  the  economic 
leaders  of  the  country.  His  influence  with  the 
President,  however,  seemed  to  be  overshadowed  by 
that  of  Newton  D.  Baker  and  William  G.  McAdoo, 
Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Treasury,  who  had 
inspired  the  distrust  of  most  business  men.  Mc 
Adoo  in  particular  alienated  financial  circles  be 
cause  of  his  apparent  suspicion  of  banking  inter 
est,  and  both,  by  their  appeals  to  laboring  men, 
laid  themselves  open  to  the  charge  of  demagogic 
tactics.  Robert  Lansing,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
had  won  recognition  as  an  expert  international 
lawyer  of  long  experience,  but  he  could  not  be  ex . 
pected  to  exercise  great  influence,  inasmuch  as  the 


154   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

President  obviously  intended  to  remain  his  own 
foreign  secretary.  Albert  S.  Burleson,  Postmaster- 
General,  was  a  politician,  expert  in  the  minor  tac 
tics  of  party,  whose  conduct  of  the  postal  and  tele 
graphic  systems  was  destined  to  bring  a  storm  of 
protest  upon  the  entire  Administration.  Thomas 
W.  Gregory,  the  Attorney-General,  had  gained  en 
trance  into  the  Cabinet  by  means  of  a  railroad  suit 
which  had  roused  the  ire  of  the  transportation  in 
terests.  The  other  members  were,  at  that  time, 
little  known  or  spoken  of.  Wilson  spent  much  time 
and  effort  in  defending  his  Cabinet  members  from 
attacks,  and  yet  it  was  believed  that  he  rarely  ap 
pealed  to  them  for  advice  in  the  formulation  of 
policies.  Thus  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole  lacked  the 
very  qualities  essential  to  a  successful  organizing 
committee:  ability  to  secure  the  cooperation  and 
respect  of  the  industrial  leaders  of  the  country. 

Titular  functions  of  an  organizing  character, 
nevertheless,  had  been  conferred  upon  six  members 
of  the  Cabinet  in  August,  1916,  through  the  crea 
tion  of  a  " Council  of  National  Defense";  they  were 
charged  with  the  "coordination  of  industries  and 
resources  for  the  national  security  and  welfare." 
The  actual  labor  of  coordination,  however,  was  to 
be  exercised  by  an  advisory  commission  of  seven, 


THE  HOME  FRONT  155 

which  included  Howard  E.  Coffin,  in  charge  of 
munitions,  Daniel  Willard,  president  of  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  Railroad,  in  charge  of  transporta 
tion,  Julius  Rosenwald,  president  of  the  Sears- 
Roebuck  Company,  in  charge  of  supplies  including 
clothing,  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  a  versatile  financial 
trader,  in  charge  of  metals,  minerals,  and  raw  ma 
terials,  Samuel  Gompers,  president  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  in  charge  of  labor  and  the 
welfare  of  workers,  Hollis  Godfrey  in  charge  of  en 
gineering  and  education,  and  Franklin  H.  Martin 
in  charge  of  medicine.  The  commission  at  once 
prepared  to  lay  down  its  programme,  to  create  sub 
committees  and  technical  boards,  and  to  secure  the 
assistance  of  business  leaders,  without  whose 
cooperation  their  task  could  not  be  fulfilled. 

Following  plans  developed  by  the  Council  of 
National  Defense,  experts  in  every  business  likely 
to  prove  of  importance  were  called  upon  to  coordi 
nate  and  stimulate  war  necessities,  to  control  their 
distribution,  to  provide  for  the  settlement  of  dis 
putes  between  employers  and  wage-earners,  to  fix 
prices,  to  conserve  resources.  Scientific  and  tech 
nical  experts  were  directed  in  their  researches.  The 
General  Medical  Board  and  the  Committee  on  En 
gineering  and  Education  were  supervised  in  their 


156   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

mobilization  of  doctors  and  surgeons,  engineers, 
physicists  and  chemists,  professors  and  graduate 
students  in  the  university  laboratories.  Every 
where  and  in  all  lines  experience  and  brains  were 
sought  and  utilized.  State  Councils  of  Defense 
were  created  to  oversee  the  work  of  smaller  units 
and  to  establish  an  effective  means  of  communica 
tion  between  the  individual  and  the  national  Gov 
ernment.  Naturally  much  over-organization  re 
sulted  and  some  waste  of  time  and  energy;  but  the 
universal  spirit  of  voluntary  cooperation  evoked 
by  the  Councils  overbalanced  this  loss  and  aided 
greatly  in  putting  the  country  on  an  effective  war 
basis.  As  Wilson  said,  "beyond  all  question  the 
highest  and  best  form  of  efficiency  is  the  sponta 
neous  cooperation  of  a  free  people."  In  return  for 
their  efforts  the  people  received  an  education  in 
public  spirit  and  civic  consciousness  such  as  could 
have  come  in  no  other  way. 

Of  the  committees  of  the  Council,  that  on  muni 
tions  developed  along  the  most  elaborate  lines,  be 
coming  of  such  importance  that  on  July  28,  1917, 
it  was  reorganized  as  the  War  Industries  Board. 
As  such  it  gradually  absorbed  most  of  the  functions 
of  the  Council  which  were  not  transferred  to  other 
agencies  of  the  Government.  During  the  autumn 


THE  HOME  FRONT  157 

of  1917  the  activities  of  the  Board  underwent  rapid 
extension,  but  it  lacked  the  power  to  enforce  its 
decisions.  As  in  the  case  of  the  General  Staff,  it 
was  important  that  it  should  have  authority  not 
merely  to  plan  but  also  to  supervise  and  execute. 
Such  a  development  was  foreshadowed  in  the  re 
organization  of  the  Board  in  March,  1918,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  and  when 
the  President  received  the  blanket  authority  con 
ferred  by  the  Overman  Act,  he  immediately  in 
vested  the  War  Industries  Board  with  the  central 
izing  power  which  seemed  so  necessary.  Hence 
forth  it  exercised  an  increasingly  strict  control  over 
all  the  industries  of  the  country. 

The  purpose  of  the  Board  was,  generally  speak 
ing,  to  secure  for  the  Government  and  the  Allies 
the  goods  essential  for  making  war  successfully, 
and  to  protect  the  civil  needs  of  the  country.  The 
supply  of  raw  materials  to  the  manufacturer  as  well 
as  the  delivery  of  finished  products  was  closely 
regulated  by  a  system  of  priorities.  The  power  of 
the  Board  in  its  later  development  was  dictatorial, 
inasmuch  as  it  might  discipline  any  refractory  pro 
ducer  or  manufacturer  by  the  withdrawal  of  the 
assignments  he  expected.  The  leaders  of  each  of 
the  more  important  industries  were  called  into 


158   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

council,  in  order  to  determine  resources  and  needs, 
and  the  degree  of  preference  to  which  each  indus 
try  was  entitled.  Some  were  especially  favored,  in 
order  to  stimulate  production  in  a  line  that  was  of 
particular  importance  or  was  failing  to  meet  the 
exigencies  of  the  military  situation;  shipments  to 
others  of  a  less  essential  character  were  deferred. 
Committees  of  the  Board  studied  industrial  condi 
tions  and  recommended  the  price  that  should  be 
fixed  for  various  commodities;  stability  was  thus 
artificially  secured  and  profiteering  lessened.  The 
Conservation  Division  worked  out  and  enforced 
methods  of  standardising  patterns  in  order  to 
economize  materials  and  labor.  The  Steel  Divi 
sion  cooperated  with  the  manufacturers  for  the 
speeding-up  of  production;  and  the  Chemical  Di 
vision,  among  other  duties,  stimulated  the  vitally 
important  supply  of  potash,  dyes,  and  nitrates. 
Altogether  it  has  been  roughly  estimated  that  the 
industrial  capacity  of  the  country  was  increased  by 
twenty  per  cent  through  the  organizing  labors  and 
authority  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 

The  success  of  this  Board  would  have  been  im 
possible  without  the  building  up  of  an  extraordi 
nary  esprit  de  corps  among  the  men  who  were 
brought  face  to  face  with  these  difficult  problems  of 


THE  HOME  FRONT 

industry  and  commerce.  Their  chairman  relied, 
of  course,  upon  the  cooperation  of  the  leaders  of 
"big  business,"  who  now,  in  the  hour  of  the  coun 
try's  need,  sank  their  prejudice  against  govern 
mental  interference  and  gave  freely  of  their  expe 
rience,  brains,  and  administrative  power.  Men 
whose  incomes  were  measured  in  the  hundreds  of 
thousands  forgot  their  own  business  and  worked  at 
Washington  on  a  salary  of  a  dollar  a  year. 

The  same  spirit  of  cooperation  was  evoked  when 
it  came  to  the  conservation  and  the  production  of 
food.  If  steel  was  to  win  the  war,  its  burden  could 
not  be  supported  without  wheat,  and  for  some 
months  in  1917  and  1918  victory  seemed  to  depend 
largely  upon  whether  the  Allies  could  find  enough 
to  eat.  Even  in  normal  times  Great  Britain  and 
France  import  large  quantities  of  foodstuffs ;  under 
war  conditions  they  were  necessarily  dependent 
upon  foreign  grain -producing  countries.  The  sur 
plus  grain  of  the  Argentine  and  Australia  was  not 
available  because  of  the  length  of  the  voyage  and 
the  scarcity  of  shipping;  the  Russian  wheat  supply 
was  cut  off  by  enemy  control  of  the  Dardanelles 
even  before  it  was  dissipated  by  corrupt  officials  or 
reckless  revolutionaries.  The  Allies,  on  the  verge 
of  starvation,  therefore  looked  to  North  America. 


160  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Yet  the  stock  of  cereals  when  the  United  States  en 
tered  the  war  was  at  a  lower  level  than  it  had  been 
for  years  and  the  number  of  food  animals  had  also 
been  reduced. 

To  meet  the  crisis  President  Wilson  called  upon 
one  of  the  most  interesting  and  commanding  person 
alities  of  modern  times.  Herbert  Clark  Hoover  was 
a  Californian  mining  engineer,  of  broad  experience 
in  Australia,  China,  and  England,  who  in  1914  had 
been  given  control  of  Allied  Relief  abroad.  The  fol 
lowing  year  he  undertook  the  difficult  and  delicate 
task  of  organizing  food  relief  for  Belgium.  He  was 
able  to  arouse  the  enthusiastic  sympathy  of  Ameri 
cans,  win  financial  support  on  a  large  scale,  procure 
the  much-needed  food,  and  provide  for  its  effective 
distribution  among  the  suffering  Belgians,  in  spite 
of  the  suspicions  of  the  Germans  and  the  hindrances 
thrown  in  his  path.  A  master  organizer,  with  keen 
flair  for  efficient  subordinates,  of  broad  vision  never 
muddied  by  details,  with  sound  knowledge  of  busi 
ness  economics,  and  a  gift  for  dramatic  appeal, 
Hoover  was  ideally  fitted  to  conduct  the  greatest 
experiment  in  economic  organization  the  world  had 
seen.  Unsentimental  himself,  he  knew  how  to 
arouse  emotion  —  a  necessary  quality,  since  the 
food  problem  demanded  heavy  personal  sacrifices 


THE  HOME  FRONT  161 

which  would  touch  every  Individual;  brusque  in 
manner,  he  avoided  giving  the  offense  which  natu 
rally  follows  any  interference  with  the  people's  din 
ner  and  which  would  destroy  the  essential  spirit  of 
voluntary  cooperation. 

Five  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  President 
Wilson,  through  the  Council  of  National  Defense, 
named  a  committee  on  food  supply,  with  Hoover 
at  its  head,  and  shortly  thereafter  named  him  food 
commissioner.  Hoover  began  his  work  of  educat 
ing  the  people  to  realize  the  necessity  of  economy 
and  extra-production;  but  he  lacked  the  adminis 
trative  powers  which  were  essential  if  his  work  was 
to  prove  effective,  and  it  was  not  until  August  chat 
Congress  passed  the  Lever  Act  which  provided  for 
strict  control  of  food  under  an  administrator.  This 
measure  encountered  strong  opposition  in  the  Sen 
ate  and  from  the  farmers,  who  feared  lest  the  pro 
visions  against  hoarding  of  food  would  prevent 
them  from  holding  their  products  for  high  prices. 
Wilson  exerted  his  personal  influence  vigorously  for 
the  bill  in  the  face  of  congressional  opposition, 
which  demanded  that  large  powers  of  control 
should  be  given  to  a  Senate  committee  of  ten,  and 
he  was  finally  successful  in  his  appeal.  He  there 
upon  appointed  Hoover  Food  Administrator  with 


162  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

practically  unlimited  powers,  legalizing  the  work 
already  begun  on  his  own  initiative. 

Hoover  at  once  made  arrangements  to  prevent 
the  storage  of  wheat  in  large  quantities  and  to  elim 
inate  speculative  dealings  in  wheat  on  the  grain  ex 
changes.  He  then  offered  to  buy  the  entire  wheat 
crop  at  a  fair  price  and  agreed  with  the  millers  to 
take  flour  at  a  fair  advance  on  the  price  of  wheat. 
Fearful  lest  the  farmers  should  be  discouraged  from 
planting  the  following  year,  1918,  he  offered  to  buy 
all  the  wheat  that  could  be  raised  at  two  dollars  a 
bushel.  If  peace  came  before  the  crop  was  disposed 
of,  the  Government  might  be  compelled  to  take 
over  the  wheat  at  a  higher  price  than  the  market, 
but  the  offer  was  a  necessary  inducement  to  exten 
sive  planting.  In  the  meantime  Hoover  appealed 
to  the  country  to  utilize  every  scrap  of  ground  for 
the  growing  of  food  products.  Every  one  of  what 
ever  age  and  class  turned  gardener.  The  spacious 
and  perfectly  trimmed  lawns  of  the  wealthy,  as 
well  as  the  weed-infested  back  yards  of  the  poor, 
were  dug  up  and  planted  with  potatoes  or  corn. 
Community  gardens  flourished  in  the  villages  and 
outside  of  the  larger  towns,  where  men,  women, 
and  children  came  out  in  the  evening,  after  their 
regular  work,  to  labor  with  rake  and  hoe.  There 


THE  HOME  FRONT  163 

were  perhaps  two  million  "war  gardens"  over  and 
beyond  the  already  established  gardens,  which  un 
questionably  enabled  many  a  citizen  to  reduce  his 
daily  demands  on  the  grocer,  and  stimulated  his 
interest  in  the  problem  of  food  conservation.  As  a 
result  of  Hoover's  dealing  with  the  farmers,  during 
the  year  1917  the  planted  wheat  acreage  exceeded 
the  average  of  the  preceding  five  years  by  thirty- 
five  million  acres,  or  by  about  twelve  per  cent,  and 
another  additional  five  million  acres  were  planted 
in  1918.  The  result  was  the  largest  wheat  crop  in 
American  history  except  that  of  1915,  despite  the 
killing  cold  of  the  winter  of  1917  and  the  withering 
drought  of  the  summer  of  1918.  An  increase  in  the 
number  of  live  stock  was  also  secured  and  the  pro 
duction  of  milk,  meat,  and  wool  showed  a  notable 
development. 

Hoover  achieved  equal  success  in  the  problem  of 
conserving  food.  He  realized  that  he  must  bring 
home  to  the  individual  housewife  the  need  of  the 
closest  economy,  and  he  organized  a  nation-wide 
movement  to  secure  voluntary  pledges  that  the 
rules  and  requests  of  the  Food  Administration 
would  be  observed.  People  were  asked  to  use  other 
flours  than  wheat  whenever  possible,  to  be  sparing 
of  sugar  and  meat,  to  utilize  substitutes,  and  rigidly 


164   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

to  avoid  waste.  On  every  billboard  and  in  all  the 
newspapers  were  to  be  seen  appeals  to  save  food. 
Housewives  were  enrolled  as  "members  of  the  Food 
Administration"  and  were  given  placards  to  post  in 
their  windows  announcing  their  membership  and 
the  willingness  of  the  family  to  abide  by  its  re 
quests.  Certain  days  of  the  week  were  designated 
as  "wheatless"  or  "meatless"  when  voluntary 
demi-fasts  were  to  be  observed,  the  nonobservance 
of  which  spelled  social  ostracism.  To  "Hooverize" 
became  a  national  habit,  and  children  were  denied 
a  spoonful  of  sugar  on  their  cereal,  "because  Mr. 
Hoover  would  not  like  it."  Hoover,  with  his  broad 
forehead,  round  face,  compelling  eyes,  and  under 
hung  jaw,  became  the  benevolent  bogey  of  the  na 
tion.  It  was  a  movement  of  general  renunciation 
such  as  no  country  had  undergone  except  at  the 
pinch  of  biting  necessity. x  In  the  meantime  prices 
were  prevented  from  rapid  increase  by  a  system  of 
licenses,  which  tended  to  prevent  hoarding  or 
speculation.  Attempts  to  capitalize  the  need  of  the 
world  for  private  gain,  or  in  common  parlance,  to 

1  Restaurants  and  hotels  cooperated;  during  a  period  of  only 
two  months  they  were  reported  as  having  saved  nine  thousand 
tons  of  meat,  four  thousand  tons  of  flour,  and  a  thousand  tons  of 
sugar.  City  garbage  plants  announced  a  decrease  in  the  amount 
of  garbage  collected  ranging  from  ten  to  thirteen  per  cent. 


THE  HOME  FRONT  165 

"profiteer,"  were  comparatively  rare  and  were 
adequately  punished  by  revocation  of  license  or  by 
forced  sale  of  hoardings. 

As  a  result  of  the  organization  of  food  supply,  the 
stimulation  of  production,  and  the  prevention  of 
waste,  America  was  able  to  save  the  Entente  na 
tions,  and,  later,  much  of  central  and  southeastern 
Europe  from  starvation,  without  herself  enduring 
anything  worse  than  discomfort.  The  Government 
was  able  at  the  same  time  to  provide  the  troops  in 
France  with  food  which,  to  the  poilus  at  least, 
seemed  luxurious.  When  the  United  States  en 
tered  the  war  the  country  was  prepared  to  ex 
port  20,000,000  bushels  of  wheat;  instead  it  sent 
over  141,000,000.  In  four  months,  in  the  summer 
of  1918,  the  American  people  saved  out  of  their 
regular  consumption  and  sent  abroad  half  a  million 
tons  of  sugar.  The  autumn  of  1918  saw  an  increase 
of  nearly  a  million  tons  of  pork  products  over  what 
was  available  the  previous  year.  Altogether, 
during  the  crop  year  of  1918,  America  doubled  the 
average  amount  of  food  sent  to  Europe  imme 
diately  before  the  war,  notwithstanding  unfavor 
able  weather  conditions  and  the  congestion  of 
freight  that  resulted  from  other  war  necessities. 
The  total  contribution  in  foodstuffs  exported  to 


166  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Europe  that  year  amounted  to  a  value  of  about 
two  billion  dollars.  This  was  done  without  food 
cards  and  with  a  minimum  of  edicts.  It  was  the 
work  of  education  and  conscience. 

Fuel  like  food  was  a  war  necessity  and  there  was 
equal  need  of  stimulating  production  by  assuring 
a  fair  profit  and  of  eliminating  all  possible  waste. 
Without  the  steam  power  provided  by  coal,  raw 
materials  could  not  be  transformed  into  the  manu 
factured  articles  demanded  by  military  necessity, 
nor  distributed  by  the  railroads  and  steamships. 
Soon  after  the  declaration  of  war,  a  committee  of 
coal  operators,  meeting  under  the  authorization  of 
the  Council  of  National  Defense,  drew  up  a  plan 
for  the  stimulation  of  coal  production  and  its  more 
economical  distribution.  This  committee  volun 
tarily  set  a  price  for  coal  lower  than  the  current 
market  price,  in  order  to  prevent  a  rise  in  manu 
facturing  costs;  it  was  approved  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Interior,  who  warmly  praised  the  spirit  of 
sacrifice  displayed  by  the  operators.  Unfortu 
nately  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  chairman  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  repudiated  the  ar 
rangement,  on  the  ground  that  the  price  agreed 
upon  was  too  high.  The  operators  were  discour 
aged,  because  of  the  difficulty  of  stimulating 


THE  HOME  FRONT  167 

production  under  the  lower  price  which  Secretary 
Baker  insisted  upon;  they  were  further  disappoint 
ed  at  the  postponement  of  plans  for  a  zone  system 
and  an  elimination  of  long  cross  hauls,  designed  to 
relieve  the  load  that  would  be  thrown  upon  railroad 
transportation  in  the  coming  winter. 

In  August,  Wilson  was  empowered  by  the  Lever 
Act  to  appoint  a  Fuel  Administrator  and  chose 
Harry  A.  Garfield,  President  of  Williams  College. 
Conditions,  however,  became  more  confused.  The 
fuel  problem  was  one  of  transportation  quite  as 
much  as  of  production;  the  railroads  were  unable 
to  furnish  the  needed  coal-cars,  and  because  of  an 
expensive  and  possibly  unfair  system  of  car  allot 
ment,  coal  distribution  was  hampered.  Add  to 
this  the  fact  that  numerous  orders  for  coal  ship 
ments  had  been  deferred  until  autumn,  in  the  belief 
that  the  Administration,  which  in  the  person  of 
Baker  was  not  believed  to  look  on  the  coal  opera 
tors  with  favor,  would  enforce  low  prices.  Hence 
during  the  last  three  months  of  the  year  an  un 
precedented  amount  of  coal  had  to  be  shipped,  and 
the  congestion  on  the  competing  railroads  was  such 
that  the  country  faced  a  real  coal  famine.  In 
December,  the  Government  recognized  the  obvious 
fact  that  the  railroad  must  be  placed  under  one 


168   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

management,  if  the  confusion  in  the  whole  indus 
trial  situation  were  to  be  eliminated.  President 
Wilson  accordingly  announced  that  the  Federal 
Government  would  take  over  the  railroads  for  the 
period  of  the  war. 

This  measure  came  too  late  to  save  the  country 
from  the  evil  effects  of  the  fuel  shortage.  The 
penalty  for  the  delays  of  the  preceding  summer  had 
to  be  paid,  and  it  was  the  heavier  because  of  the 
severity  of  the  winter.  Overloaded  trains  were 
stalled  and  harbors  froze  over,  imprisoning  the 
coal  barges.  Thirty-seven  ships  laden  with  essen 
tial  military  supplies  were  held  up  in  New  York 
harbor  for  lack  of  fuel,  and  long  strings  of  empties 
blocked  the  sidings,  while  the  shippers  all  over  the 
country  cried  for  cars.  To  meet  the  crisis  Garfield 
decreed  that  all  manufacturing  plants  east  of  the 
Mississippi  should  be  shut  down  for  five  days  and 
for  a  series  of  Mondays,  until  the  25th  of  March. 
The  order  applied  also  to  places  of  amusement, 
private  offices,  and  most  stores,  which  were  not 
allowed  to  furnish  heat.  Munitions  plants  and 
essential  industries,  as  well  as  Government  offices 
were  naturally  excepted.  "Heatless  Mondays" 
caused  great  inconvenience  and  bitter  criticism, 
for  they  came  at  the  moment  when  it  was  most 


THE  HOME  FRONT  169 

important  that  the  economic  life  of  the  nation 
should  be  functioning  at  its  greatest  efficiency. 
But  the  embargo  helped  to  tide  over  the  crisis. 
As  in  the  case  of  food,  the  public,  once  it  appre 
ciated  the  necessity  of  the  situation,  accepted  it 
cheerfully.  Domestic  economy  was  also  widely 
preached  and  applied,  to  the  slogan,  "Save  a 
shovelful  of  coal  a  day."  The  elimination  of  elec 
tric  advertisements  and  the  diminution  of  street 
lighting,  served  to  lessen  the  non-essential  demand 
for  coal;  and  the  crisis  also  forced  the  introduction 
of  "daylight  saving, "  the  advancement  of  the  clock 
by  an  hour,  during  the  months  extending  from 
March  to  October,  thus  saving  artificial  light. 

In  the  meantime  the  Fuel  Administration,  the 
operators,  and  the  miners  were  cooperating  to 
increase  coal  production.  The  enthusiasm  of  the 
mine  workers  was  stimulated  by  making  them 
realize  that  they  were  indeed  part  of  the  fighting 
forces.  A  competitive  spirit  was  aroused  and 
mining  conditions  were  bettered  to  keep  them 
satisfied.  Labor  responded  to  the  call.  Holidays 
were  omitted  and  emulation  between  different 
shifts  became  keen.1  Increased  production  was 

1  In  1918  the  average  number  of  days  worked  by  each  miner 
in  the  bituminous  fields  was  greater  by  twelve  than  that  of  1917, 


170  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

paralleled  by  more  efficient  distribution.  A  zone 
system,  finally  put  into  operation,  eliminated 
approximately  160,000,000  car  miles.  Local  fuel 
administrators  kept  in  constant  touch  with  the 
need  of  the  localities  under  their  jurisdiction,  stud 
ied  methods  of  abolishing  unnecessary  manufac 
turing  use  of  coal  and  refused  coal  to  non-essential 
industries. 

Similar  increase  in  the  production  and  saving  of 
oil  was  accomplished.  The  oil-burning  vessels  of 
the  allied  navies  and  merchant  marines,  the  motor 
transport  service  of  the  armies,  all  made  this  neces 
sary.  In  1918  the  production  of  oil  in  the  United 
States  was  fourteen  per  cent  greater  than  in  1914. 
In  response  to  an  urgent  cable  from  Marshal  Foch, 
which  ran :  "  If  you  don't  keep  up  your  petrol  supply 
we  shall  lose  the  war,"  a  series  of  "gasless  Sun 
days"  was  suggested.  For  nearly  two  months, 
merely  at  the  request  of  the  Fuel  Administration 
and  without  any  compulsion  except  that  arising 
from  public  opinion,  Sunday  motoring  was  practi 
cally  abandoned.  That  most  crowded  of  motor 

and  by  twenty-five  than  that  of  1916.  During  the  half-year  pe 
riod  from  April  to  September,  1918,  bituminous  production  was 
twelve  per  cent  greater  than  in  the  corresponding  period  of  the 
previous  year,  which  had  itself  established  a  record,  despite  the 
decrease  in  the  number  of  mine  workers. 


THE  HOME  FRONT  171 

thoroughfares,  the  Boston  Post  Road  from  New 
York  to  Stamford,  might  have  served  as  playground 
for  a  kindergarten .  The  estimated  saving  of  gasoline 
amounted  to  a  million  barrels :  about  four  per  cent 
of  the  gasoline  sent  abroad  in  1918  was  provided 
by  the  gasless  Sundays. 

Credit  must  be  given  the  Fuel  Administration 
for  the  large  measure  of  success  which  it  finally 
secured.  It  was  slow  in  its  early  organization  and 
at  first  failed  to  make  full  use  of  the  volunteer 
committees  of  coal  operators  and  labor  representa 
tives  who  offered  their  assistance  and  whose  ex 
perience  qualified  them  to  give  invaluable  advice. 
But  Garfield  showed  his  capacity  for  learning  the 
basic  facts  of  the  situation,  and  ultimately  chose 
strong  advisers.  When  he  entered  upon  his  duties 
he  found  the  crisis  so  far  advanced  that  it  could 
not  be  immediately  solved.  Furthermore,  in  a 
situation  which  demanded  the  closest  cooperation 
between  the  Fuel  and  the  Railroad  Administration, 
he  did  not  always  receive  the  assistance  from  the 
latter  which  he  had  a  right  to  expect. 

As  a  war  measure,  the  temporary  nationalization 
of  the  railroads  was  probably  necessary.  Whatever 
the  ultimate  advantages  of  private  ownership  and 
the  system  of  competition,  during  the  period  of 


172  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

military  necessity  perfect  coordination  was  essen 
tial.  Railroad  facilities  could  not  be  improved 
because  new  equipment,  so  far  as  it  could  be  manu 
factured,  had  to  be  sent  abroad;  the  only  solution 
of  the  problem  of  congestion  seemed  to  be  an 
improvement  of  service.  During  the  first  nine 
months  after  the  declaration  of  war  a  notable 
increase  in  the  amount  of  freight  carried  was 
effected;  nevertheless,  as  winter  approached,  it 
became  obvious  that  the  roads  were  not  operat 
ing  as  a  unit  and  could  not  carry  the  load  de 
manded  of  them.  Hence  resulted  the  appointment 
of  McAdoo  in  December,  1917,  as  Director- 
General,  with  power  to  operate  all  the  railroads  as 
a  single  line. 

During  the  spring  of  1918  the  Administration 
gradually  overcame  the  worst  of  the  transporta 
tion  problems.  To  the  presidents  and  management 
of  the  various  railroads  must  go  the  chief  share  of 
credit  for  the  successful  accomplishment  of  this 
titanic  task.  Despite  their  distrust  of  McAdoo 
and  their  objections  to  his  methods,  they  co 
operated  loyally  with  the  Railroad  Administration 
in  putting  through  the  necessary  measures  of  co 
ordination  and  in  the  elimination  of  the  worst 
features  of  the  former  competitive  system.  They 


THE  HOME  FRONT  173 

adopted  a  permit  system  which  prevented  the  load 
ing  of  freight  unless  it  could  be  unloaded  at  its  des 
tination;  they  insisted  upon  more  rapid  unloading 
of  cars;  they  consolidated  terminals  to  facilitate  the 
handling  of  cars;  they  curtailed  circuitous  routing 
of  freight;  they  reduced  the  use  of  Pullman  cars  for 
passenger  service.  As  a  result,  after  May,  1918, 
congestion  was  diminished  and  during  the  summer 
was  no  longer  acute.  This  was  accomplished 
despite  the  number  of  troops  moved,  amounting 
during  the  first  ten  months  of  1918  to  six  and  a  half 
millions.  In  addition  the  railroads  carried  large 
quantities  of  food,  munitions,  building  materials 
for  cantonments,  and  other  supplies,  most  of  which 
converged  upon  eastern  cities  and  ports.  The  in 
crease  in  the  number  of  grain-carrying  cars  alone, 
from  July  to  November,  was  135,000  over  the  same 
period  of  the  previous  year. 

Unquestionably  the  Government's  administra 
tion  of  the  railroads  has  a  darker  side.  Complaints 
were  frequent  that  the  Railroad  Administration 
sacrificed  other  interests  for  its  own  advantage. 
The  future  of  the  roads  was  said  not  to  be  care 
fully  safeguarded,  and  equipment  and  rolling  stock 
mishandled  and  allowed  to  deteriorate.  Above  all, 
at  the  moment  when  it  was  quite  as  essential  to 


174    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

preserve  the  morale  of  labor  on  the  home  front  as 
that  of  the  troops  in  France,  McAdoo  made  con 
cessions  to  labor  that  were  more  apt  to  destroy 
discipline  and  esprit  de  corps  than  to  maintain  them. 
The  authority  given  for  the  unionization  of  rail 
road  employees,  the  stopping  of  piecework,  the 
creation  of  shop  committees,  weakened  the  control 
of  the  foremen  and  led  to  a  loss  of  shop  efficiency 
which  has  been  estimated  at  thirty  per  cent. 
Government  control  was  necessary,  but  in  the  form 
in  which  it  came  it  proved  costly. 

During  the  months  when  manufacturing  plants 
were  built  and  their  output  speeded  up,  when  fuel 
and  food  were  being  produced  in  growing  amounts, 
when  the  stalled  freight  trains  were  being  disen 
tangled,  there  was  unceasing  call  for  ocean-going 
tonnage.  Food  and  war  materials  would  be  of 
little  use  unless  the  United  States  had  the  ships  in 
which  to  transport  them  across  the  Atlantic.  The 
Allies  sorely  needed  American  help  to  replace  the 
tonnage  sunk  by  German  submarines;  during  some 
months,  Allied  shipping  was  being  destroyed  at  the 
rate  of  six  million  tons  a  year.  Furthermore  if  an 
effective  military  force  were  to  be  transported  to 
France,  according  to  the  plans  that  germinated  in 
the  summer  of  1917,  there  would  be  need  of  every 


THE  HOME  FRONT  175 

possible  cubic  inch  of  tonnage.  The  entire  military 
situation  hinged  upon  the  shipping  problem.  Yet 
when  the  United  States  joined  in  war  on  Germany 
there  was  not  a  shipyard  in  the  country  which 
would  accept  a  new  order;  every  inch  of  available 
space  was  taken  by  the  navy  or  private  business. 

In  September,  1916,  the  United  States  Shipping 
Board  had  been  organized  to  operate  the  Emer 
gency  Fleet  Corporation,  which  had  been  set  up 
primarily  to  develop  trade  with  South  America. 
This  body  now  prepared  a  gigantic  programme  of 
shipbuilding,  which  expanded  as  the  need  for  ton 
nage  became  more  evident.  By  November  15, 
1917,  the  Board  planned  for  1200  ships  with 
dead  weight  tonnage  of  seven  and  a  half  millions. 
The  difficulties  of  building  new  yards,  of  collect 
ing  trained  workmen  and  technicians  were  un 
doubtedly  great,  but  they  might  have  been  over 
come  more  easily  had  not  unfortunate  differences 
developed  between  William  Denman,  the  chair 
man  of  the  Board,  who  advocated  wooden  ships, 
and  General  George  W.  Goethals,  the  head  of  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  who  depended  up 
on  steel  construction.  The  differences  led  to  the 
resignation  of  both  and  continued  disorganization 
hampered  the  rapid  fulfillment  of  the  programme. 


176   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Edward  N.  Hurley  became  chairman  of  the  Ship 
ping  Board,  but  it  was  not  until  the  spring  of  1918, 
when  Charles  M.  Schwab  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel 
Company  was  put  in  charge  of  the  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation  as  Director  General  of  ship 
building,  that  public  confidence  in  ultimate  success 
seemed  justified. 

Much  of  the  work  accomplished  during  the  latter 
days  of  the  war  was  spectacular.  Waste  lands 
along  the  Delaware  overgrown  with  weeds  were 
transformed  within  a  year  into  a  shipyard  with 
twenty-eight  ways,  a  ship  under  construction  on 
each  one,  with  a  record  of  fourteen  ships  already 
launched.  The  spirit  of  the  workmen  was  voiced 
by  the  placard  that  hung  above  the  bulletin  board 
announcing  daily  progress,  which  proclaimed, 
"Three  ships  a  week  or  bust."  The  Hog  Island 
yards  near  Philadelphia  and  the  Fore  River  yards 
in  Massachusetts  became  great  cities  with  docks, 
sidings,  shops,  offices,  and  huge  stacks  of  building 
materials.  Existing  yards,  such  as  those  on  the 
Great  Lakes,  were  enlarged  so  that  in  fourteen 
months  they  sent  to  the  ocean  a  fleet  of  181  steel 
vessels.  The  new  ships  were  standardized  and 
built  on  the  "fabricated"  system,  which  provided 
for  the  manufacture  of  the  various  parts  in  different 


THE  HOME  FRONT  177 

factories  and  their  assembling  at  the  shipyards. 
In  a  single  day,  July  4,  1918,  there  were  launched 
in  American  shipyards  ninety-five  vessels,  with  a 
dead  weight  tonnage  of  474,464.  In  one  of  the 
Great  Lakes  yards  a  5500  ton  steel  freighter  was 
launched  seventeen  days  after  the  keel  was  laid, 
and  seventeen  days  later  was  delivered  to  the 
Shipping  Board,  complete  and  ready  for  service. 

This  work  was  not  accomplished  without  tre 
mendous  expenditure  and  much  waste.  The 
Shipping  Board  was  careless  in  its  financial  manage 
ment  and  unwise  in  many  of  its  methods.  By  in 
troducing  the  cost  plus  system  in  the  letting  of 
contracts  it  fostered  extravagance  and  waste  and 
increased  and  intensified  the  industrial  evils  that 
had  resulted  from  its  operation  in  the  building  of 
army  cantonments.  The  contractors  received  the 
cost  of  construction  plus  a  percentage  commission; 
obviously  they  had  no  incentive  to  economize; 
the  greater  the  expense  the  larger  their  commission. 
Hence  they  willingly  paid  exorbitant  prices  for 
materials  and  agreed  to  "fancy"  wages.  Not 
merely  was  the  expense  of  securing  the  necessary 
tonnage  multiplied,  but  the  cost  of  materials  and 
labor  in  all  other  industries  was  seriously  enhanced. 
The  high  wages  paid  tended  to  destroy  the  patriotic 


178   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

spirit  of  the  shipworkers,  who  were  enticed  by 
greed  rather  than  by  the  glory  of  service.  The 
effect  on  drafted  soldiers  was  bound  to  be  unfor 
tunate,  for  they  could  not  but  realize  the  injustice 
of  a  system  which  gave  them  low  pay  for  risking 
their  lives,  while  their  friends  in  the  shipyards  re 
ceived  fabulous  wages.  Such  aspects  of  the  early 
days  of  the  Shipping  Board  were  ruthlessly  re 
formed  by  Schwab  when  he  took  control  of  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation.  Appealing  to  the 
patriotism  of  the  workers  he  reduced  costs  and  in 
creased  efficiency,  according  to  some  critics,  by 
thirty  per  cent,  according  to  others,  by  no  less 
than  one  hundred  and  ten  per  cent. 

By  September,  1918,  the  Shipping  Board  had 
brought  under  its  jurisdiction  2600  vessels  with  a 
total  dead  weight  tonnage  of  more  than  ten  millions. 
Of  this  fleet,  sixteen  per  cent  had  been  built  by  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation.  The  remainder  was 
represented  by  ships  which  the  Board  had  requi 
sitioned  when  America  entered  the  war,  by  the 
ships  of  Allied  and  neutral  countries  which  had 
been  purchased  and  chartered,  and  by  interned 
enemy  ships  which  had  been  seized.  The  last- 
named  were  damaged  by  their  crews  at  the  time 
of  the  declaration  of  war,  but  were  fitted  for 


THE  HOME  FRONT  179 

service  with  little  delay  by  a  new  process  of  elec 
tric  welding.  Such  German  boats  as  the  Vaterland, 
rechristened  the  Leviathan,  and  the  George  Wash 
ington,  together  with  smaller  ships,  furnished  half 
a  million  tons  of  German  cargo-space.  The  ships 
which  transported  American  soldiers  were  not  chief 
ly  provided  by  the  Shipping  Board,  more  than  fifty 
per  cent  being  represented  by  boats  borrowed  from 
Great  Britain. r 

More  effective  use  of  shipping  was  fostered  by 
the  War  Trade  Board,  which  had  been  created  six 
months  after  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Trading 
with  the  Enemy  Act  (October  6,  1917),  and  which, 
in  conjunction  with  the  activities  of  the  Alien  Prop 
erty  Custodian,  possessed  full  powers  to  curtail 
enemy  trade.  It  thereby  obtained  practical  control 
of  the  foreign  commerce  of  this  country,  and  was  able 
both  to  conserve  essential  products  for  American  use 
and  to  secure  and  economize  tonnage. 

Such  control  was  assured  through  a  system  of 

1  In  the  last  six  months  of  the  war  over  1,500,000  men  were  car 
ried  abroad  as  follows: 

44  per  cent  in  United  States  ships 
51  per  cent  in  British  ships 

3  per  cent  in  Italian  ships 

2  per  cent  in  French  ships 

The  United  States  transports  included  450,000  tons  of  German 
origin;  300,000  tons  supplied  by  commandeered  Dutch  boats;  and 
718,000  tons  provided  by  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation. 


180  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

licenses  for  exports  and  imports.  No  goods  could 
be  shipped  into  or  out  of  the  country  without  a 
license,  which  was  granted  by  the  War  Trade 
Board  only  after  investigation  of  the  character  of 
the  shipment  and  its  destination  or  source.  The 
earlier  export  of  goods  which  had  found  their 
way  to  Germany  through  neutral  countries  was 
thus  curtailed  and  the  blockade  on  Germany  be 
came  strangling.  Products  necessary  to  military 
effectiveness  were  secured  from  neutral  states 
in  return  for  permission  to  buy  essentials  here. 
Two  millions  of  tonnage  were  obtained  from  neu 
tral  states  for  the  use  of  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain.  Trade  in  non-essentials  with  the 
Orient  and  South  America  was  limited,  extra 
bottoms  were  thus  acquired,  and  the  production 
of  non-essentials  at  home  discouraged.  Altogether, 
the  War  Trade  Board  exercised  tremendous  pow 
ers  which,  however  necessary,  might  have  pro 
voked  intense  resentment  in  business  circles;  but 
these  powers  were  enforced  with  a  tact  and  dis 
cretion  characteristic  of  the  head  of  the  Board, 
Vance  McCormick,  who  was  able  successfully  to 
avoid  the  irritation  that  might  have  been  expected 
from  such  governmental  interference  with  freedom 
of  commerce. 


THE  HOME  FRONT  181 

The  problem  of  labor  was  obviously  one  that 
must  be  faced  by  each  of  the  war  boards  or  ad 
ministrations,  and  nearly  all  of  them  were  com 
pelled  to  establish  some  sort  of  labor  division  or 
tribunal  within  each  separate  field.  The  demands 
made  upon  the  labor  market  by  war  industry  were 
heavy,  for  the  withdrawal  of  labor  into  the  army 
created  an  inevitable  scarcity  at  the  moment  when 
production  must  be  increased,  and  the  different 
industries  naturally  were  brought  to  bid  against 
each  other;  the  value  of  any  wage  scale  was  con 
stantly  affected  by  the  rising  prices,  while  the 
introduction  of  inexperienced  workmen  and  women 
affected  the  conditions  of  piecework,  so  that  the 
question  of  wages  and  conditions  of  labor  gave 
rise  to  numerous  discussions.  The  Labor  Com 
mittee  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  had 
undertaken  to  meet  such  problems  as  early  as 
February,  1917,  but  it  was  not  until  the  begin 
ning  of  the  next  year  that  the  Department  of 
Labor  underwent  a  notable  reorganization  with 
the  purpose  of  effecting  the  coordination  necessary 
to  complete  success. 

Unlike  the  food,  fuel,  and  transportation  prob 
lems,  which  were  solved  through  new  adminis 
trations  not  connected  with  the  Department  of 


182   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Agriculture,  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  or  the  Inter 
state  Commerce  Commission  respectively,  that  of 
labor  was  met  by  new  bureaus  and  boards  which 
were  organic  parts  of  the  existing  Department 
of  Labor.  In  January,  1918,  that  Department 
undertook  the  formulation  and  administration  of 
a  national  war  labor  policy.  Shortly  afterwards 
delegates  of  the  National  Industrial  Conference 
Board  and  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor, 
representing  capital  and  labor,  worked  out  a 
unanimous  report  upon  the  principles  to  be  fol 
lowed  in  labor  adjustment.  To  enforce  these 
recommendations  the  President,  on  April  9,  1918, 
appointed  a  National  War  Labor  Board,  which 
until  November  sat  as  a  court  of  final  appeal  in 
labor  disputes.  An  index  of  the  importance  of 
the  Board  was  given  by  the  choice  of  ex-President 
Taft  as  one  of  its  chairmen.  A  month  later,  a  War 
Labor  Policies  Board  was  added  to  the  system  to 
lay  down  general  rules  for  the  use  of  the  War  Labor 
Board  in  the  rendering  of  its  judgments. 

Not  merely  enthusiasm  and  brains  enabled 
America  to  make  the  extraordinary  efforts  de 
manded  by  the  exigencies  of  war.  Behind  every 
line  of  activity  lay  the  need  of  money;  and  the 
raising  of  money  in  amounts  so  large  that  they 


THE  HOME  FRONT 

passed  the  comprehension  of  the  average  citizen, 
forms  one  of  the  most  romantic  stories  of  the  war. 
It  is  the  story  of  the  enthusiastic  cooperation  of 
rich  and  poor :  Wall  Street  and  the  humblest  foreign 
immigrants  gave  of  their  utmost  in  the  attempt  to 
provide  the  all-important  funds  for  America  and 
her  associates  in  the  war.  Citizens  accepted  the 
weight  of  income  and  excess  profit  taxes  far  heavier 
than  any  American  had  previously  dreamed  of. 
They  were  asked  in  addition  to  buy  government 
bonds  to  a  total  of  fourteen  billions,  and  they  re 
sponded  by  oversubscribing  this  amount  by  nearly 
five  billions.  Of  the  funds  needed  for  financing  the 
war,  the  Government  planned  to  raise  about  a 
third  by  taxation,  and  the  remainder  by  the  sale  of 
bonds  and  certificates  maturing  in  from  five  to 
thirty  years.  It  would  have  proved  the  financial 
statesmanship  of  McAdoo  had  he  dared  to  raise  a 
larger  proportion  by  taxation;  for  thus  much  of  the 
inflation  which  inevitably  resulted  from  the  bond 
issues  might  have  been  avoided.  But  the  Govern 
ment  feared  alike  for  its  popularity  and  for  the 
immediate  effect  upon  business,  which  could  not 
safely  be  discouraged.  As  it  was,  the  excess  profit 
taxes  aroused  great  complaint.  The  amount  raised 
in  direct  taxation  represented  a  larger  proportion 


184   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  the  war  budget  than  any  foreign  nation  had  been 
able  to  secure  from  tax  revenues. 

In  seeking  to  sell  its  bonds  the  Government, 
rather  against  its  will,  was  compelled  to  rely  largely 
upon  the  capitalists.  The  large  popular  subscrip 
tions  would  have  been  impossible  but  for  the  assist 
ance  and  enthusiasm  shown  by  the  banks  in  the 
selling  campaign.  Wall  Street  and  the  bankers  of 
the  country  were  well  prepared  and  responded  with 
all  their  strength,  a  response  which  deserves  the 
greater  credit  when  we  remember  the  lack  of  sym 
pathy  which  had  existed  between  financial  circles 
and  President  Wilson's  Administration.  Largely 
under  banking  auspices  the  greatest  selling  cam 
paign  on  record  was  inaugurated.  Bonds  were 
placed  on  sale  at  street  corners,  in  theaters,  and 
restaurants;  disposed  of  by  eminent  operatic  stars, 
moving-picture  favorites,  and  wounded  heroes 
from  the  front.  Steeple  jacks  attracted  crowds  by 
their  perilous  antics,  in  order  to  start  the  bidding 
for  subscriptions.  Villages  and  isolated  farm 
houses  were  canvassed.  The  banks  used  their 
entire  machinery  to  induce  subscriptions,  offering 
to  advance  the  subscription  price.  When  during 
the  first  loan  campaign  the  rather  unwise  optimism 
of  the  Treasury  cooled  enthusiasm  for  a  moment, 


THE  HOME  FRONT  185 

by  making  it  appear  that  the  loan  could  be  floated 
without  effort,  Wall  Street  took  up  the  load.  The 
first  loan  was  oversubscribed  by  a  billion.  The 
success  of  the  three  loans  that  followed  was  equally 
great;  the  fourth,  coming  in  October,  1918,  was  set 
for  six  billion  dollars,  the  largest  amount  that  had 
ever  been  asked  of  any  people,  and  after  a  three 
weeks'  campaign,  seven  billions  were  subscribed. 
Quite  as  notable  as  the  amount  raised  was  the 
progressive  increase  in  the  number  of  subscribers, 
which  ranged  from  four  million  individuals  in  the 
first  loan  to  more  than  twenty-one  millions  in  the 
fourth.  Equally  notable,  as  indicating  the  educa 
tive  effect  of  the  war  and  of  the  sale  of  these 
Liberty  Bonds,  was  the  successful  effort  to  en 
courage  thrift.  War  Savings  societies  were  insti 
tuted  and  children  saved  their  pennies  and  nickels 
to  buy  twenty -five  cent  "thrift  stamps"  which 
might  be  accumulated  to  secure  interest-bearing 
savings  certificates.  Down  to  November  1,  1918, 
the  sale  of  such  stamps  totalled  $834,253,000,  with 
a  maturity  value  of  more  than  a  billion  dollars. 

The  successful  organizing  of  national  resources 
to  supply  military  demands  obviously  depended, 
in  the  last  instance,  upon  the  education  of  the 
people  to  a  desire  for  service  and  sacrifice.  The 


186  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Liberty  Loan  campaigns,  the  appeals  of  Hoover, 
and  the  Fuel  Administration,  all  were  of  impor 
tance  in  producing  such  morale.  In  addition  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  through  the  Com 
mittee  on  Public  Information,  spread  pamphlets 
emphasizing  the  issues  of  the  war  and  the  objects 
for  which  we  were  fighting.  At  every  theater  and 
moving-picture  show,  in  the  factories  during  the 
noon  hours,  volunteer  speakers  told  briefly  of  the 
needs  of  the  Government  and  appealed  for  co 
operation.  These  were  the  so-called  "Four  Minute 
Men."  The  most  noted  artists  gave  their  talent  to 
covering  the  billboards  with  patriotic  and  infor 
mative  posters.  Blue  Devils  who  had  fought  at 
Verdun,  captured  tanks,  and  airplanes,  were  parad 
ed  in  order  to  bring  home  the  realities  of  the  life 
and  death  struggle  in  which  America  was  engaged. 
The  popular  response  was  inspiring.  In  the  face 
of  the  national  enthusiasm  the  much-vaunted 
plans  of  the  German  Government  for  raising  civil 
disturbance  fell  to  the  ground.  Labor  was  some 
times  disorganized  by  German  propaganda;  de 
struction  of  property  or  war  material  was  accom 
plished  by  German  agents;  and  valuable  informa 
tion  sometimes  leaked  out  to  the  enemy.  But 
the  danger  was  always  kept  in  check  by  the 


THE  HOME  FRONT  187 

Department  of  Justice  and  also  by  a  far-reach* 
ing  citizen  organization,  the  American  Protective 
League.  Equally  surprising  was  the  lack  of  opposi 
tion  to  the  war  on  the  part  of  pacifists  and  socialists. 
It  was  rare  to  find  the  "sedition"  for  which  some 
of  them  were  punished,  perhaps  over-promptly, 
translated  from  words  to  actions. 

The  organization  of  the  industrial  resources  of 
the  nation  was  complicated  by  the  same  conditions 
that  affected  the  purely  military  problems  —  de 
centralization  and  the  emergency  demands  that 
resulted  from  the  sudden  decision  to  send  a  large 
expeditionary  force  to  France.  The  various  or 
ganizing  boards  were  so  many  individual  solutions 
for  individual  problems.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
war  the  Council  of  National  Defense  represented 
the  only  attempt  at  a  central  business  organiza 
tion,  and  as  time  went  on  the  importance  and  the 
influence  of  the  Council  diminished.  The  effects  of 
decentralization  became  painfully  apparent  during 
the  bitter  cold  of  the  winter  months,  when  the 
fuel,  transportation,  and  food  crises  combined  to 
threaten  almost  complete  paralysis  of  the  economic 
and  military  mobilization. 

The  distrust  and  discouragement  that  followed 


188  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

brought  forth  furious  attacks  upon  the  President's 
war  policies,  led  not  merely  by  Roosevelt  and  Re 
publican  enemies  of  the  Administration,  but  by 
Democratic  Senators.  The  root  of  the  whole 
difficulty,  they  contended,  lay  in  the  fact  that 
Wilson  had  no  policy.  They  demanded  practically 
the  abdication  of  the  presidential  control  of  mili 
tary  affairs,  either  through  the  creation  of  a  Minis 
try  of  Munitions  or  of  a  War  Cabinet.  In  either 
case  Congress  would  control  the  situation  through 
its  definition  of  the  powers  of  the  new  organization 
and  the  appointment  of  its  personnel. 

President  Wilson  utilized  the  revolt  to  secure 
the  complete  centralization  toward  which  he  had 
been  aiming.  He  fought  the  new  proposals  on  the 
ground  that  they  merely  introduced  new  machinery 
to  complicate  the  war  organization,  and  he  in 
sisted  that  true  policy  demanded  rather  an  increase 
in  the  efficiency  of  existing  machinery.  If  the 
General  Staff  and  the  War  Industries  Board  were 
given  power  to  supervise  and  execute  as  well  as  to 
plan,  the  country  would  have  the  machinery  at 
hand  capable  of  forming  a  central  organization, 
which  could  determine  in  the  first  place  what  was 
wanted  and  where,  and  in  the  second  place  how  it 
could  be  supplied.  All  that  was  necessary  was  to 


THE  HOME  FRONT  189 

give  the  President  a  free  hand  to  effect  any  trans 
fer  of  organization,  funds,  or  functions  in  any  of 
the  existing  departments  of  government,  without 
being  compelled  to  apply  to  Congress  in  each  case. 
The  struggle  between  Wilson  and  his  opponents 
was  sharp,  but  the  President  carried  the  day.  He 
exerted  to  the  full  his  influence  on  Congress  and 
utilized  skillfully  the  argument  that  at  this  moment 
of  crisis  a  swapping  of  horses  might  easily  prove 
fatal.  Opposing  Congressmen  drew  back  at  the 
thought  of  shouldering  the  responsibility  which 
they  knew  the  President  would  throw  upon  them 
if  he  were  defeated.  On  May  20,  1918,  the  Over 
man  Act  became  law,  giving  to  the  President  the 
blanket  powers  which  he  demanded  and  which  he 
immediately  used  to  centralize  the  military  and 
industrial  organization.  Bureau  chiefs  were  bitter 
in  their  disapproval;  the  National  Guard  grumbled, 
even  as  it  fought  its  best  battles  in  France;  poli 
ticians  saw  their  chance  of  influencing  military 
affairs  disappear;  business  men  complained  of  the 
economic  dictatorship  thus  secured  by  the  Presi 
dent.  But  Mr.  Wilson  was  at  last  in  a  position 
to  effect  that  which  seemed  to  him  of  greatest 
importance  —  the  concentration  of  responsibility 
and  authority. 


190  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Upon  the  shoulders  of  the  President,  accord 
ingly,  must  rest  in  the  last  instance  the  major 
portion  of  the  blame  and  the  credit  to  be  distrib 
uted  for  the  mistakes  and  the  achievements  of  the 
military  and  economic  organization.  He  took  no 
part  in  the  working  out  of  details.  Once  the  de 
velopment  of  any  committee  of  organization  had 
been  started,  he  left  the  control  of  it  entirely  to 
those  who  had  been  placed  in  charge.  But  he 
would  have  been  untrue  to  his  nature  if  he  had  not 
at  all  times  been  determined  to  keep  the  reins  of 
supreme  control  in  his  own  hands.  His  opponents 
insisted  that  the  organization  was  formed  in  spite 
of  him.  It  is  probable  that  he  did  not  himself 
perceive  the  crying  need  for  centralization  so 
clearly  in  1917  as  he  did  in  1918;  and  the  protests 
of  his  political  opponents  doubtless  brought  the 
realization  of  its  necessity  more  definitely  home  to 
him.  But  there  is  no  evidence  to  indicate  that  the 
process  of  centralization  was  forced  upon  him 
against  his  will  and  much  to  show  that  he  sought 
always  that  concentration  of  responsibility  and 
power  which  he  insisted  upon  in  politics.  The  task 
was  herculean;  ironically  enough  it  was  facilitated 
by  the  revolt  against  his  war  policies  which  resulted 
in  the  Senate  investigation  and  the  Overman  Act. 


THE  HOME  FRONT  191 

His  tactics  were  by  no  means  above  reproach,  and 
his  entire  policy  nearly  went  on  the  rocks  in  the 
winter  of  1917  because  of  his  inability  to  treat 
successfully  with  the  Senate  and  with  Republican 
Congressmen. 

When  all  is  said,  however,  the  organization  that 
was  developed  during  the  last  six  months  of  the 
war  transported  and  maintained  in  Europe  more 
than  a  million  and  a  half  American  soldiers;  at 
home  it  maintained  two  millions  more,  ready  to  sail 
at  the  earliest  opportunity;  and  it  was  prepared  to 
raise  and  equip  an  army  of  five  and  a  half  millions 
by  June  30,  1920.  The  process  had  been  slow  and 
the  results  were  not  apparent  for  many  months. 
Furthermore,  because  of  the  intensity  of  the  danger 
and  the  absolute  need  of  victory,  cherished  tradi 
tions  were  sacrificed  and  steps  taken  which  were  to 
cost  much  later  on;  for  the  price  of  these  achieve 
ments  was  inevitable  reaction  and  social  unrest. 
But  with  all  the  mistakes  and  all  the  cost,  the  fact 
still  remains  that  the  most  gigantic  transformation 
of  history  —  the  transformation  of  an  unmili- 
tary  and  peace-loving  nation  of  ninety  million 
souls  into  a  belligerent  power  —  was  successfully 
accomplished. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FIGHTING   FRONT 

THE  encouragement  given  to  the  Allies  by  the 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  injected 
a  temporary  ray  of  brightness  into  the  situation 
abroad,  but  with  the  realization  that  long  months 
must  elapse  before  American  aid  could  prove  effec 
tive,  came  deep  disappointment.  The  spring  of 
1917  did  not  bring  the  expected  success  to  the 
French  and  British  on  the  western  front;  and  the 
summer  and  autumn  carried  intense  discourage 
ment.  Hindenburg,  early  in  the  spring,  executed  a 
skillful  retreat  on  the  Somme  front,  which  gave  to 
the  Allies  the  territory  to  which  their  previous 
capture  of  Peronne  and  Bapaume  entitled  them. 
But  the  Germans,  losing  some  square  miles,  saved 
their  troops  and  supplies.  British  attacks  on  the 
north  gained  little  ground  at  terrible  cost.  The 
French  offensive,  planned  by  Nivelle,  which  was 
designed  to  break  the  German  line,  had  to  be  given 

192 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  193 

up  after  bloody  checks.  There  was  mutiny  in 
the  French  armies  and  the  morale  of  the  civilian 
population  sank. 

The  hopes  that  had  been  aroused  by  the  Russian 
revolution  were  seen  to  be  deceptive;  instead  of  a 
national  movement  directed  towards  a  more  active 
struggle  against  Germany,  it  now  appeared  in  its 
true  colors  as  a  demand  for  peace  and  land  above 
everything.  The  Brusilov  attack,  which  the  Allies 
insisted  upon,  proved  to  be  a  flash  in  the  pan  and 
ended  with  the  complete  military  demoralization 
of  Russian  armies.  The  collapse  of  the  Italian 
forces  at  Caporetto  followed.  Italy  was  not  merely 
unable  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  Central 
Powers  by  a  determined  offensive  against  Austria, 
but  she  threatened  to  become  a  liability;  no  one 
knew  how  many  French  divisions  might  have  to 
be  diverted  to  aid  in  the  defense  of  the  new  Piave 
front.  General  Byng's  break  of  the  German  lines 
at  Cambrai  was  more  than  offset  by  the  equally 
brilliant  German  counter-attack.  And  every  day 
the  submarine  was  taking  its  toll  of  Allied  shipping. 

Following  the  Italian  debacle,  the  Bolshevik 
revolution  of  November  indicated  that  Russia 
would  wholly  withdraw  and  that  that  great  poten 
tial  source  of  man-power  for  the  Allies  could  no 
13 


194   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

longer  be  counted  upon.  Allied  leaders  realized 
that  Germany  would  be  able  to  transfer  large 
numbers  of  troops  to  the  western  front,  and  be 
came  seriously  alarmed.  "The  Allies  are  very 
weak,"  cabled  General  Pershing,  on  the  2d  of 
December,  "and  we  must  come  to  their  relief  this 
year,  1918.  The  year  after  may  be  too  late.  It  is 
very  doubtful  if  they  can  hold  on  until  1919  unless 
we  give  them  a  lot  of  support  this  year."  Showing 
that  the  schedule  of  troop  shipments  would  be 
inadequate  and  complaining  that  the  actual  ship 
ments  were  not  even  being  kept  up  to  programme, 
Pershing  insisted  upon  the  importance  of  the 
most  strenuous  efforts  to  secure  extra  tonnage, 
which  alone  would  make  it  possible  for  the  Amer 
ican  army  to  take  a  proper  share  in  the  military 
operations  of  1918. 

The  serious  representations  of  General  Pershing 
were  reinforced  by  Colonel  House  when  he  returned 
from  abroad  on  the  15th  of  December.  For  six 
weeks  he  had  been  in  conference,  as  .head  of  a  war 
mission,  with  the  Allied  political  and  military 
leaders,  who  now  realized  the  necessity  of  unity  of 
plan.  Because  of  his  personal  intimacy  with 
French  and  British  statesmen  and  his  acknowl 
edged  skill  in  negotiations,  House  had  done  much 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  195 

to  bring  about  Allied  harmony  and  to  pave  the 
way  for  a  supreme  military  command.  Like  Per- 
shing,  he  was  convinced  of  the  danger  threatening 
the  Allies,  and  from  the  moment  of  his  return 
began  the  speeding-up  process,  which  was  to  result 
in  the  presence  of  a  large  American  force  on  the 
battle  front  at  the  moment  of  crisis  in  the  early 
summer  of  1918. 

Tonnage  was  obviously  the  vital  factor  upon 
which  effective  military  assistance  depended.  The 
United  States  had  the  men,  although  they  were  not 
completely  trained,  but  the  apparent  impossibility 
of  transporting  them  formed  the  great  obstacle. 
The  problem  could  not  have  been  solved  without 
the  assistance  of  the  Allies.  With  the  threat  of  the 
German  drive,  and  especially  after  the  first  Ger 
man  victories  of  1918,  they  began  to  appreciate 
the  necessity  of  sacrificing  everything  to  the  ton 
nage  necessary  to  transport  American  soldiers  to 
France.  After  long  hesitation  they  agreed  to  a 
pooling  of  Allied  tonnage  for  this  purpose.  Most 
of  the  Allied  ships  ultimately  furnished  the  United 
States  were  provided  by  the  British,  whose  trans 
ports  carried  a  million  American  troops  to  France. 
French  and  Italian  boats  transported  112,000;  our 
own  transports,  927,000. 


196   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Thus  by  relying  largely  upon  the  shipping  assist 
ance  of  our  associates  in  the  war  we  were  able  to 
respond  to  the  demands  of  General  Pershing  and, 
later,  Marshal  Foch.  And  thus  came  about  the 
extraordinary  development  of  our  military  pro 
gramme  from  the  thirty  to  the  eighty  and  one  hun 
dred  division  plans,  which  resulted  in  tremendous 
confusion,  but  which  also  ultimately  ensured  Allied 
victory  in  1918.  Until  the  end  of  the  year  1917, 
we  had  put  into  France  only  195,000  troops,  in 
cluding  7500  marines,  an  average  of  about  28,000 
a  month.  From  December  to  February  the  aver 
age  rose  to  48,000;  from  March  to  May  it  was 
149,000;  and  from  June  to  August  it  was  290,000 
men  a  month.  During  the  four  months  from  May 
to  August  inclusive,  1,117,000  American  troops 
were  transported  to  France. 

Altogether  about  two  million  Americans  were 
sent  to  France,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  man 
while  under  the  escort  of  United  States  vessels. 
No  navy  troop  transports  were  torpedoed  on  east- 
bound  trips  although  three  were  sunk  on  the  re 
turn  trip  with  loss  of  138  lives.  To  the  American 
and  British  navies  must  go  the  credit  for  carrying 
through  this  stupendous  feat,  and  in  the  work  of 
assuring  the  safety  of  the  troop  transports  the  navy 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  197 

of  the  United  States  may  claim  recognition  for  the 
larger  share,  since  82  per  cent  of  the  escorts  fur 
nished  were  American  cruisers  and  destroyers.  It 
was  a  nerve-racking  and  tantalizing  experience  — 
the  troop  ships  sailing  in  echelon  formation,  pre 
ceded,  followed,  and  flanked  by  destroyers;  at  night 
every  glimmer  of  light  eclipsed,  the  ships  speeding 
ahead  in  perfect  blackness,  each  inch  of  the  sea  swept 
by  watchful  eyes  to  discover  the  telltale  ripple  of  a 
periscope  or  the  trail  of  a  torpedo,  gun  crews  on  the 
alert,  depth  bombs  ready.  Nor  was  the  crossing 
anything  like  a  vacation  yachting  cruise  for  the 
doughboys  transported,  packed  as  they  were  like 
sardines  two  and  three  decks  below  the  waterline* 
brought  up  in  shifts  to  catch  a  brief  taste  of  fresh 
air,  assailed  at  once  by  homesickness,  seasickness, 
and  fears  of  drowning  like  rats  in  a  trap. 

The  work  of  the  navy  was  far  more  extensive, 
moreover,  than  the  safe  convoying  of  troop  ships, 
important  though  that  was.  The  very  first  con 
tingent  of  American  overseas  fighting  forces  was 
made  up  of  two  flotillas  of  destroyers,  which  upon 
the  declaration  of  war  had  been  sent  to  Queens- 
town  where  they  were  placed  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  William  S.  Sims.  Their  main  function 
Was  to  hunt  submarines,  which,  since  the  decree  of 


198   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  1st  of  February,  had  succeeded  in  committing 
frightful  ravages  upon  Allied  commerce  and  seri 
ously  threatened  to  starve  the  British  Isles.  Ad 
miral  Sims  was  two  years  older  than  Pershing  and 
as  typical  a  sailor  as  the  former  was  soldier.  With 
his  bluff  and  genial,  yet  dignified,  manner,  his  rubi 
cund  complexion,  closely-trimmed  white  beard, 
and  piercing  eyes,  no  one  could  have  mistaken  his 
calling.  Free  of  speech,  frank  in  praise  and  criti 
cism,  abounding  in  indiscretions,  he  possessed  the 
capacity  to  make  the  warmest  friends  and  enemies. 
He  was  an  ardent  admirer  of  the  British,  rejoiced 
in  fighting  with  them,  and  ashamed  that  our  Navy 
Department  was  unwilling  to  send  more  adequate 
and  immediate  assistance  to  their  fleet.  Sims's 
international  reputation  as  an  expert  in  naval 
affairs  was  of  long  standing.  Naval  officers  in 
every  country  of  Europe  knew  of  him  as  the  in 
ventor  of  a  system  of  fire  control  which  had  been 
adopted  by  the  great  navies  of  the  world,  and  it 
was  largely  because  of  his  studies  and  devices  that 
the  extraordinary  records  of  the  American  fleets 
at  target  practice  had  been  secured.  The  British 
naval  officers  reciprocated  Sims's  admiration  for 
them,  and,  according  to  popular  belief ,  it  was  at  their 
special  request  that  he  had  been  sent  to  command 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  199 

our  overseas  naval  forces.  No  one  else  could  have 
obtained  such  effective  cooperation  between  the 
British  and  American  fleets. 

While  at  first  the  major  portion  of  the  American 
fleet  was  retained  in  home  waters  for  the  protection 
of  American  coasts  and  ports,  a  policy  which 
aroused  the  stinging  criticism  of  Admiral  Sims, 
gradually  the  fleet  added  strength  to  the  Allied 
navies  in  their  patrol  of  European  coasts  and  the 
bottling-up  of  the  German  high  seas  fleet.  De 
stroyer  bases  were  maintained  at  Queenstown, 
Brest,  and  Gibraltar,  from  which  were  dispatched 
constant  patrols.  Individual  destroyers,  during 
the  first  year  of  service  overseas,  steamed  a  total 
of  60,000  miles.  Their  crews  were  on  the  watch 
in  the  dirtiest  weather,  unable  to  sleep,  tossed  and 
battered  by  the  incessant  rolling,  without  warm 
food,  facing  the  constant  peril  of  being  swept  over 
board  and  knowing  that  their  boat  could  not  stop 
to  pick  them  up.  American  submarine-chasers 
and  converted  yachts,  mine-sweepers  on  their 
beneficent  and  hazardous  duty,  were  equally  active. 
Naval  aviators  cooperated  with  the  British  to 
patrol  the  coasts  in  search  of  submarines.  Late  in 
1917,  six  battleships  were  sent  to  join  the  British 
Grand  Fleet,  which  was  watching  for  the  Germans 


200   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

in  the  North  Sea,  thus  constituting  about  twelve 
per  cent  of  the  guarding  naval  force.    More  impor 
tant,  perhaps,  was  the  American  plan  for  laying  a 
mine  barrage  from  the  Scotch  coast  across  to  Nor 
wegian  waters.  The  Ordnance  Bureau  of  the  navy, 
despite   the   discouragement   of   British   experts, 
manufactured  the  mines,   100,000  of  them,  and 
shipped  them  abroad  in  parts  ready  for  final  as 
sembling.     The  American  navy  was  responsible 
for  eighty  per  cent  of  the  laying  of  the  barrage, 
which  when  finished  was  245  miles  long  and  twenty 
miles  wide.     The  complete  story  of  the  achieve 
ments  of  the  navy  cannot  now  be  told  in  detail. 
It  was  not  always  inspiring,  for  numerous  mistakes 
were  made.     Confusion  of  counsels  in  the  Naval 
Board  left  one  important  bombing  squadron  so 
bereft  of  supplies  that  after  an  expenditure  of  four 
millions  only  two  bombs  were  dropped  in  the  en 
tire  course  of  its  operations.     But  there  are  also 
to  be  remembered  the  unheralded  stories  of  hero 
ism  and  skill,  such  as  the  dash  of  the  submarine- 
chasers  and  destroyers  through  the  mine  fields  at 
Durazzo,  and  the  work  of  our  naval  guns  in  the 
attack  on  Zeebrugge. 

The  armies,   safely  brought   to   France,   were 
meanwhile    undergoing    the    essential    intensive 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  201 

training,  and  the  task  of  organizing  the  service  of 
supply  was  being  undertaken.  The  training  given 
in  the  United  States  before  sailing  had  been  in  the 
ordinary  forms  of  drill  and  tactics;  now  it  was 
necessary  that  there  should  be  greater  specializa 
tion.  Numerous  schools  for  the  training  of  officers 
were  established.  For  the  troops  the  plan  for 
training  allowed,  according  to  the  intent  of  General 
Pershing,  "a  division  one  month  for  acclimatiza 
tion  and  instruction  in  small  units  from  battalions 
down,  a  second  month  in  quiet  trench  sectors  by 
battalion,  and  a  third  month  after  it  came  out  of 
the  trenches  when  it  should  be  trained  as  a  com 
plete  division  in  war  of  movement."1  The  entire 
process  of  training  was  a  compromise  between 
speed  and  efficiency.  During  the  latter  months  of 
the  war  many  of  the  American  troops  were  put  on 
the  battle-line  when  they  were  by  no  means  suffi 
ciently  trained.  Certain  draft  units  were  trans 
ported  and  thrown  up  to  the  front  after  experience 
of  a  most  superficial  character;  there  are  instances 
of  men  going  into  action  without  knowing  how  to 
load  their  rifles  or  adjust  their  gas  masks  properly. 
But  en  the  whole  the  training  given  was  surprisingly 

1  This  plan  could  not  be  fulfilled  for  troops  coming  to  France  in 
1918,  because  of  lack  of  time. 


202   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

effective  in  view  of  the  speed  with  which  it  was 
accomplished.  American  skill  with  the  rifle  won 
the  envy  of  foreign  officers,  and  the  value  of 
American  troops  in  open  warfare  was  soon  to  be 
acknowledged  by  the  Germans. 

The  same  sort  of  centralization  sought  by  Wilson 
in  America  obviously  became  necessary  in  France 
with  the  expanding  plans  for  an  enormous  army. 
In  February,  1918,  the  Service  of  Supply  was  or 
ganized.  With  its  headquarters  at  Tours,  the 
S.  O.  S.  was  responsible  for  securing,  organizing, 
and  distributing  all  the  food,  equipment,  building 
materials,  and  other  necessities  demanded  by  the 
expeditionary  force.  In  order  to  provide  for  the 
quantities  of  essential  supplies  and  to  avoid  the 
congestion  of  the  chief  ports  of  France,  certain 
ports  were  especially  allotted  to  our  army,  of  which 
the  most  important  were  St.  Nazaire,  Bordeaux, 
and  Brest.  The  first,  a  somnolent  fishing  village, 
was  transformed  by  the  energy  of  American  en 
gineers  into  a  first-class  port  with  enormous  docks, 
warehouses,  and  supply  depots;  Brest  rose  in  the 
space  of  twelve  months  from  the  rank  of  a  second- 
class  port  to  one  that  matched  Hamburg  in  the 
extent  of  its  shipping.  In  all,  more  than  a  dozen 
ports  were  used  by  the  Americans  and  in  each 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  203 

extensive  improvements  and  enlargements  proved 
necessary.  At  Bordeaux  not  more  than  two  ships 
a  week,  of  any  size,  could  conveniently  be  unloaded 
prior  to  June,  1917.  Eight  months  later,  docks  a 
mile  long  had  been  constructed,  concrete  platforms 
and  electric  cranes  set  up;  within  a  year  fourteen 
ships  could  be  unloaded  simultaneously,  the  rate  of 
speed  being  determined  only  by  the  number  of 
stevedores.  For  unloading  purposes  regiments  of 
negroes  were  stationed  at  each  port. 

A  few  miles  back  from  the  coast  were  the  base 
depots  where  the  materials  were  stored  as  they 
came  from  the  ships.  Thence  distribution  was 
made  to  the  intermediate  depots  in  the  cities  of 
supply,  and  finally  to  the  depots  immediately 
behind  the  fighting  front.  All  these  depots  in 
volved  enormous  building  operations;  at  first  the 
lumber  was  shipped,  but  later,  American  lumber 
jacks  were  brought  over  to  cut  French  forests.  At 
one  supply  depot  three  hundred  buildings  were  put 
up,  covering  an  area  of  six  square  miles,  operated 
by  20,000  men,  and  holding  in  storage  a  hundred 
million  dollars'  worth  of  supplies.  For  distribution 
purposes  it  proved  necessary  for  American  en 
gineers  to  take  over  the  construction  and  main 
tenance  of  communications.  At  first  American 


204   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

engines  and  cars  were  operated  under  French 
supervision;  but  ultimately  many  miles  of  French 
railroads  were  taken  over  bodily  by  the  American 
army  and  many  more  built  by  American  engineers. 
More  than  400  miles  of  inland  waterways  were  also 
used  by  American  armies.  This  transportation 
system  was  operated  by  American  experts  of  all 
grades  from  brakemen  to  railroad  presidents, 
numbering  altogether  more  than  70,000. 

In  order  to  meet  the  difficulty  of  securing  ton 
nage  for  supplies  and  to  avoid  competition  with 
the  Allies,  a  General  Purchasing  Board  was  created 
for  the  coordination  of  all  purchases.  Agents  of 
this  board  were  stationed  in  the  Allied  countries, 
in  Switzerland,  Holland,  and  Spain,  who  recon- 
noitered  resources,  analyzed  requirements,  issued 
forecasts  of  supplies,  supervised  the  claims  of 
foreign  governments  on  American  raw  materials, 
and  procured  civilian  manual  labor.  Following  the 
establishment  of  the  supreme  interallied  command, 
the  Interallied  Board  of  Supplies  was  organized 
in  the  summer  of  1918,  with  the  American  purchas 
ing  agent  as  a  member.  Other  activities  of  the 
S.  O.  S.,  too  numerous  to  recount  in  detail,  in 
cluded  such  important  tasks  as  the  reclassification 
of  personnel,  the  installation  and  operation  of  a 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  205 

general  service  of  telephone  and  telegraph  com 
munication,  with  115,500  kilometers  of  lines,  and 
the  renting  and  requisitioning  of  the  land  and 
buildings  needed  by  the  armies.  It  was  a  gigan 
tic  business  undertaking,  organized  at  top  speed, 
involving  tremendous  expenditure.  Its  success 
would  have  been  impossible  without  the  coopera 
tion  of  hundreds  of  men  of  business,  who  found  in 
it  a  sphere  of  service  which  enabled  the  army  to 
utilize  the  proverbial  American  genius  for  meeting 
large  problems  of  economic  organization.  At  the 
time  of  the  armistice  the  S.  O.  S.  reached  a  numeri 
cal  strength  in  personnel  of  668,000,  including 
23,000  civilian  employees. 

From  the  first,  Pershing  had  been  determined 
that  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  should 
ultimately  operate  as  an  independent  unit,  al 
though  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Allies.  Dur 
ing  the  autumn  of  1917  the  disasters  in  Italy  and 
the  military  demoralization  of  Russia  had  led  to 
the  formation  of  the  Supreme  Military  Council  of 
the  Allies,  upon  which  the  United  States  was  rep 
resented  by  General  Tasker  Bliss,  whose  rough 
visage  and  gruff  manner  gave  little  indication  of 
his  wide  interests.  Few  suspected  that  this  sol 
dierly  character  took  secret  pleasure  in  the  reading 


206   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  Latin  poets.  The  coordination  that  resulted 
from  the  creation  of  the  Supreme  Council,  however, 
proved  insufficient  to  meet  the  crisis  of  the  spring 
of  1918. 

On  the  21st  of  March,  the  Germans  attacked  in 
overwhelming  force  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
British  lines,  near  where  they  joined  the  French, 
and  disastrously  defeated  General  Gough's  army. 
The  break-through  was  clean  and  the  advance  made 
by  the  endless  waves  of  German  shock-troops 
appalling.  Within  eight  days  the  enemy  had 
swept  forward  to  a  depth  of  fifty-six  kilometers, 
threatening  the  capture  of  Amiens  and  the  separa 
tion  of  the  French  and  British.  As  the  initial 
momentum  of  the  onslaught  was  lost,  the  Allied 
line  was  re-formed  with  the  help  of  French  reserves 
under  Fayolle.  But  the  Allies  had  been  and  still 
were  close  to  disaster.  Complete  unity  of  com 
mand  was  essential.  It  was  plain  also,  in  the  words 
of  Pershing's  report,  that  because  of  the  inroads 
made  upon  British  and  French  reserves,  "defeat 
stared  them  in  the  face  unless  the  new  American 
troops  should  prove  more  immediately  available 
than  even  the  most  optimistic  had  dared  to  hope." 
The  first  necessity  was  satisfied  early  in  April. 
The  extremity  of  the  danger  reinforced  the  demand 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  207 

long  made  by  the  French,  and  supported  by  Presi 
dent  Wilson  through  Colonel  House,  that  a  gen 
eralissimo  be  appointed.  The  British  finally  sank 
their  objection,  and  on  the  28th  of  March  it  was 
agreed  that  General  Ferdinand  Foch  should  be 
made  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Allied  armies 
with  the  powers  necessary  for  the  strategic  direc 
tion  of  all  military  operations.  The  decision  was 
ratified  on  the  3d  and  approved  by  President 
Wilson  on  the  16th  of  April. 

General  Foch  had  long  been  recognized  as  an 
eminent  student  of  strategy,  and  he  had  proved  his 
practical  capacity  in  1914  and  later.  It  was  he 
who  commanded  the  French  army  that  broke  the 
German  line  at  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  in  the 
battle  of  the  Marne,  thus  assuring  victory  to  Joffre, 
and  he  had  later  in  the  year  secured  fresh  laurels 
in  the  first  battle  of  the  Yser.  At  the  moment  of 
extreme  danger  to  Italy,  after  Caporetto,  in  1917, 
he  had  been  chosen  to  command  the  assisting  force 
sent  down  by  the  French.  Unsentimental  and  un 
swayed  by  political  factors,  he  was  temperamen 
tally  and  intellectually  the  ideal  man  for  the  post 
of  supreme  Allied  commander;  he  was  furthermore 
supported  by  the  capacity  of  General  Petain,  the 
French  commander-in-chief,  and  by  a  remarkable 


208  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

group  of  army  commanders,  among  whom  Fayolle, 
Mangin,  and  Gouraud  were  to  win  particular  fame. 
But  he  lacked  troops,  the  Germans  disposing  of 
200  divisions  as  against  162  Allied  divisions. 

Hence  the  hurry  call  sent  to  America  and  hence 
the  heavy  sacrifice  now  forced  upon  Pershing. 
Much  against  his  will  and  only  as  a  result  of  ex 
treme  pressure,  the  American  commander-in-chief 
agreed  to  a  temporary  continuance  of  the  brigading 
of  American  troops  with  the  British  and  the  French. 
He  had  felt  all  along  that  "there  was  every  reason 
why  we  could  not  allow  them  to  be  scattered  among 
our  Allies,  even  by  divisions,  much  less  as  replace 
ments,  except  by  pressure  of  pure  necessity."  He 
disliked  the  emphasis  placed  by  the  Allies  upon 
training  for  trench  warfare;  he  feared  the  effect  of 
the  lack  of  homogeneity  which  would  render  the 
mixed  divisions  "difficult  to  maneuver  and  almost 
certain  to  break  up  under  the  stress  of  defeat," 
and  he  believed  that  the  creation  of  independent 
American  armies  "would  be  a  severe  blow  to  Ger 
man  morale."  When  the  pinch  of  necessity  came, 
however,  Pershing  sank  his  objections  to  amalga 
mation  and,  to  his  credit,  agreed  with  a  beau  geste 
and  fine  phrase  which  concealed  the  differences 
between  the  Allied  chiefs  and  won  the  heartiest 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  209 

sympathy  from  France  and  England.  The  prin 
ciple  of  an  independent  American  force,  however, 
Pershing  insisted  upon,  and  he  made  clear  that  the 
amalgamation  of  our  troops  with  the  French  and 
British  was  merely  a  temporary  expedient. 

Immediately  after  the  stabilization  of  the  battle- 
line  near  Amiens,  the  Germans  began  their  second 
great  drive,  this  time  against  the  British  along  the 
Lys,  in  Flanders.  The  initial  success  of  the  attack, 
which  began  on  the  9th  of  April,  was  undeniable, 
and  Sir  Douglas  Haig  himself  admitted  the  danger 
of  the  moment:  "Every  position  must  be  held  to 
the  last  man.  There  must  be  no  retirement.  With 
our  backs  to  the  wall  and  believing  in  the  justice 
of  our  cause,  each  one  of  us  must  fight  to  the  end. 
The  safety  of  our  homes  and  the  freedom  of  man 
kind  depend  alike  upon  the  conduct  of  each  one 
of  us  at  this  critical  moment."  The  value  of  Al 
lied  unity  of  command  now  became  apparent,  for 
heavy  French  reinforcements  were  brought  up  in 
time  to  help  stave  off  the  German  drive  on  the 
Channel  Ports. 

But  still  the  demand  went  up  for  more  men  and 
ships.  "Scrap  before  shipping  every  pound  that 
takes  tonnage  and  is  not  necessary  to  the  killing 
of  Germans,"  wrote  a  French  military  authority 


210   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

"Send  the  most  infantry  by  the  shortest  route  to 
the  hottest  corner.  No  matter  what  flag  they 
fight  under,  so  long  as  it  is  an  Allied  flag."  On  the 
27th  of  May  the  Germans  caught  Foch  by  surprise 
and  launched  a  violent  attack  on  the  Chemin  des 
Dames,  between  Soissons  and  Berry-au-Bac.  This 
formed  the  third  phase  of  their  great  offensive.  In 
four  days  they  pushed  before  them  the  tired  French 
divisions,  sent  into  that  sector  to  recuperate,  a  dis 
tance  of  fifty  kilometers  and  reached  the  Marne. 
Again,  as  in  1914,  Paris  began  to  empty,  fearful  of 
capture.  A  statement  sent  to  Wilson  on  the  2d  of 
June  and  signed  by  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  and 
Orlando,  read  as  follows :  "  There  is  great  danger  of 
the  war  being  lost  unless  the  numerical  inferiority 
of  the  Allies  can  be  remedied  as  rapidly  as  possible 
by  the  advent  of  American  troops.  .  .  .  We  are 
satisfied  that  General  Foch  ...  is  not  over-esti 
mating  the  needs  of  the  case."  Such  was  the  peril 
of  the  Allies.  But  in  the  month  of  May  245,000 
Americans  had  been  landed,  and  in  the  following 
month  there  were  to  be  278,000  more. 

Previous  to  June,  1918,  the  participation  of 
American  troops  in  military  operations  had  been 
of  comparative  unimportance  and  less  for  tacti 
cal  purposes  than  as  a  part  of  their  training.  In 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT 

October,  1917,  the  First  Division  had  been  sent 
into  trenches  on  the  quiet  Lorraine  front  and  had 
engaged  in  raids  and  counter-raids.  Three  other 
divisions,  the  Second,  the  Forty-second,  or  "Rain 
bow,"  and  the  Twenty-sixth  from  New  England, 
followed,  and  by  March,  1918,  they  were  all  de 
scribed  by  Pershing  as  "equal  to  any  demands  of 
battle  action."  On  the  29th  of  April,  the  last- 
named  division  was  engaged  in  something  more 
serious  than  a  mere  raid  at  Seicheprey,  near  St. 
Mihiel;  the  number  of  prisoners  lost  indicated  lack 
of  experience,  but  the  vigor  of  the  American  coun 
ter-attack  proved  definitely  the  will  to  fight.  That 
belligerent  spirit  was  equally  displayed  by  various 
engineering  units  which,  during  the  break  of  Gen 
eral  Gough's  army  before  the  German  assault  of 
March,  near  St.  Quentin,  had  dropped  their  tools, 
seized  rifles,  and,  hastily  organizing  to  cover  the 
retreat,  had  secured  valuable  respite  for  various 
fleeing  units. 

More  important  yet,  because  of  the  moral  effect 
achieved,  was  the  engagement  at  Cantigny  near 
Montdidier,  on  the  28th  of  May.  The  Americans 
launched  their  attack  with  skill  as  well  as  dash,  and 
stood  firm  against  the  violence  of  the  German  re 
action;  this  they  met  without  assistance  from  the 


212   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

French,  who  had  been  called  to  oppose  the  German 
advance  on  the  Marne.  Pershing  spoke  of  the 
"desperate  efforts"  of  the  enemy  at  Cantigny, 
"determined  at  all  costs  to  counteract  the  most 
excellent  effect  the  American  success  had  pro 
duced."  For  three  days  guns  of  all  calibers  were 
vainly  concentrated  upon  the  new  positions. 
Coming  at  the  moment  of  extreme  discouragement, 
Cantigny  was  of  an  importance  entirely  out  of  pro 
portion  to  the  numbers  involved.  For  months 
France  had  been  awaiting  American  assistance. 
A  year  before  the  French  had  seen  Pershing  and 
the  first  few  doughboys,  but  the  long  delay  had 
caused  them  to  lose  the  confidence  which  that  sight 
had  aroused.  Now  suddenly  came  the  news  that 
the  Americans  were  arriving  in  tremendous  num 
bers  and  from  Cantigny,  north  and  south  along  the 
lines,  spread  the  report:  "These  men  will  fight." 

Four  days  later  at  Chateau-Thierry, I  Americans 
proved  not  merely  the  moral  but  the  practical 
value  of  their  assistance.  The  German  drive  of  the 
27th  of  May,  beginning  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames, 
had  pushed  south  to  the  Marne  and  westward 

1  The  reader  should  distinguish  the  defensive  operations  at 
Chateau-Thierry,  on  the  1st  of  June,  from  the  attack  launched 
from  this  sector  in  July.  Both  are  known  as  the  battle  of  Chateau- 
Thierry. 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  213 

towards  Meaux.  The  French  falling  back  in  haste 
had  maintained  their  lines  intact,  but  were  pessi 
mistic  as  to  the  possibility  of  stopping  the  enemy 
advance.  On  the  31st  of  May,  German  vanguard 
units  entered  Chateau-Thierry,  crossed  the  river, 
and  planned  to  secure  the  bridges.  At  this  moment 
American  machine  gunners  of  the  Third  Division 
came  up  with  a  battalion  of  French  colonials  in 
support,  drove  the  Germans  back  to  the  north 
bank,  covered  the  retreat  of  the  French  forces 
across  the  Marne,  on  the  following  day,  and  gave 
time  to  blow  up  the  bridges.  On  the  same  day,  the 
1st  of  June,  northwest  of  Chateau-Thierry,  the 
Second  Division  came  into  line  to  support  the 
wearied  French,  and  as  the  latter  came  filtering 
back  and  through,  soon  found  itself  meeting  direct 
German  assaults.  Stretching  across  the  road  to 
Paris,  with  the  French  too  weak  to  make  a  stand, 
it  blocked  the  German  advance.  Even  so,  the 
danger  was  not  entirely  parried,  since  the  enemy 
held  strong  positions  from  Vaux  northwest  to 
Veuilly,  which,  when  German  reinforcements  came 
up,  would  enable  them  to  deliver  deadly  assaults. 
Those  positions  had  to  be  taken.  From  the  6th  to 
the  llth  of  June,  American  troops,  among  them 
marine  regiments,  struck  viciously,  concentrating 


214   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

against  the  railroad  embankment  atBouresches  and 
the  hill  of  Belleau  Woods.  The  stiffness  of  the  Ger 
man  defense,  maintained  by  their  best  troops,  was 
overcome  by  fearless  rushing  of  machine-gun  nests, 
ruthless  mopping-up  of  isolated  stragglers,  and  a 
final  clearing  of  the  Woods  by  heavy  artillery  fire. 
On  the  18th  of  June  the  Americans  took  the  ap 
proaches  to  Torcy  and  on  the  1st  of  July  the  village 
of  Vaux.  If  the  attack  on  Belleau  Woods  proved 
their  courage,  the  capture  of  Vaux  vindicated  their 
skill,  for  losses  were  negligible. 

The  Allied  line  was  now  in  a  position  to  contest 
actively  any  deepening  of  the  Marne  salient  to  the 
west,  and  American  troops  had  so  clearly  proved 
their  quality  that  Pershing  could  with  justice  de 
mand  a  radical  revision  of  the  Allied  opinion  that 
American  soldiers  were  fit  only  for  the  defense. 
His  confidence  in  their  fighting  capacity  was  soon 
further  put  to  the  test  and  vindicated.  On  the 
15th  of  July  the  Germans  opened  the  fourth  and 
last  of  their  great  drives,  with  tremendous  artillery 
fire  from  Rheims  to  the  Marne.  They  hoped  to 
capture  the  former,  swing  far  to  the  south  and  west, 
and,  if  they  failed  to  take  Paris,  at  least  to  draw 
sufficient  troops  from  Flanders  and  Picardy  as  to 
assure  a  successful  drive  on  Amiens  and  the  Channel 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT 

Ports.  For  the  first  time,  however,  the  element 
of  surprise  in  their  attack  was  lacking.  At  the 
eastern  end  of  the  battle-line  General  Gouraud, 
with  whom  were  fighting  the  Forty-second  Division 
and  four  colored  regiments,  warned  of  the  moment 
of  attack,  withdrew  his  front  lines  and  permitted 
the  Germans  to  shell  empty  trenches;  all  important 
positions  he  held  firmly.  On  the  Marne,  east  of 
Chateau-Thierry,  the  enemy  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  river  in  the  early  morning.  At  various  points 
the  American  line  was  compelled  to  yield,  although 
one  of  the  American  regiments  stood  its  ground 
while  on  either  flank  the  Germans,  who  had  gained 
a  footing  on  the  south  bank,  pressed  forward;  it 
was,  according  to  Pershing's  report,  "one  of  the 
most  brilliant  pages  in  our  military  annals."  At 
noon,  heedless  of  the  warning  given  by  the  French 
commander,  American  reinforcements  launched  a 
strong  counter-attack  and  drove  the  enemy  back 
to  the  river;  on  the  next  morning  no  Germans  were 
to  be  found  on  the  south  bank  in  front  of  the 
American  troops.  During  the  next  two  days  Ger 
man  efforts  to  press  forward  were  unrelaxing  but 
in  vain,  and  on  the  18th  of  July,  Foch  launched  his 
counter-offensive. 
The  inherent  weakness  of  the  Marne  salient  from 


216   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  German  point  of  view  and  the  opportunity 
which  it  offered  the  Allied  command  had  not  been 
forgotten  by  the  generalissimo.  Foch  waited  until 
the  enemy  had  spent  his  strength  in  the  attacks 
around  Rheims  and  on  the  Marne,  then  struck 
fiercely  between  Soissons  and  Chateau-Thierry. 
The  spearhead  of  the  main  drive  was  composed  of 
the  First  and  Second  American  Divisions,  im 
mediately  to  the  south  of  Soissons,  who  were 
operating  under  Mangin  with  the  First  French 
Moroccan  Division  between  them.  Straightway, 
without  the  orthodox  preliminary  artillery  fire,  a 
deep  thrust  was  made  against  the  western  side  of 
the  salient;  near  Soissons,  despite  fierce  resistance, 
advances  of  from  eight  to  ten  kilometers  and  large 
numbers  of  prisoners  were  reported  in  the  first 
twenty -four  hours.  "Due  to  the  magnificent  dash 
and  powers  displayed  on  the  field  of  Soissons  by 
our  First  and  Second  Divisions,"  said  Pershing, 
"the  tide  of  war  was  definitely  turned  in  favor  of 
the  Allies."  Further  to  the  south,  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-sixth  Divisions  crossed  the  road  running 
from  Chateau-Thierry  to  Soissons,  pushing  east; 
while  from  the  southern  bank  of  the  Marne,  the 
Third  Division  pushed  north  across  the  river.  It 
was  obvious  to  the  Germans  that  retreat  from  the 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  217 

perilous  salient  must  proceed  at  once,  especially  as 
Franco -British  counter-attacks  on  the  eastern  side 
threatened  to  close  it  at  the  neck  and  cut  the  main 
line  of  German  withdrawal.  The  retreat  was  exe 
cuted  with  great  skill  and  valor.  While  holding  on 
the  sides,  the  enemy  forces  were  slowly  pulled  back 
from  the  apex,  striving  to  win  time  to  save  artillery, 
although  they  must  perforce  lose  or  destroy  great 
quantities  of  ammunition.  Against  the  retreating 
foe  fresh  American  divisions  were  hurled.  On  the 
25th  of  July  the  Forty-second  division  relieved  the 
Twenty-sixth,  advancing  toward  the  Vesle,  with 
elements  of  the  Twenty-eighth,  until  relieved  on 
August  3d,  by  the  Fourth  Division.  Farther  east 
the  Thirty-second  had  relieved  the  Third.  The 
Americans  had  to  face  withering  fire  from  machine- 
gun  nests  and  fight  hand  to  hand  in  the  crumbled 
streets  of  the  Champagne  villages.  Here  were  car 
ried  on  some  of  the  fiercest  conflicts  of  American 
military  history.  Finally  on  the  6th  of  August  the 
Germans  reached  the  line  of  the  Vesle,  their  retreat 
secured,  although  their  losses  had  been  terrific. 
But  the  pause  was  only  momentary.  Before 
they  could  bring  up  replacements,  the  British 
launched  their  great  drive  south  of  the  Somme, 
the  American  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty-second,  and 


218  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Seventy-seventh  divisions  crossed  the  Vesle  push 
ing  the  Germans  before  them,  and  there  began  what 
Ludendorff  in  his  memoirs  calls  "the  last  phase." 
Pershing  had  not  lost  sight  of  his  original  object, 
which  was  to  assemble  the  American  divisions  into 
a  separate  army.  After  the  victories  of  July,  which 
wiped  out  the  Marne  salient,  and  those  of  August, 
which  put  the  enemy  definitely  on  the  defensive,  he 
felt  that  "the  emergency  which  had  justified  the 
dispersion  of  our  divisions  had  passed."  Soon 
after  the  successful  British  attack,  south  of  Amiens, 
he  overcame  the  objections  of  Foch  and  concluded 
arrangements  for  the  organization  of  this  army, 
which  was  to  operate  in  the  Lorraine  sector.1  It 
contained  600,000  men,  fourteen  American  divi 
sions  and  two  French.  On  the  30th  of  August  the 
sector  was  established  and  preparations  made  for 
the  offensive,  the  first  step  in  which  was  to  be  the 
wiping  out  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient.  This  salient 
had  existed  since  1914,  when  the  Germans,  failing 
to  storm  the  scarp  protecting  Verdun  on  the  east, 
had  driven  a  wedge  across  the  lower  heights  to  the 
south.  The  elimination  of  this  wedge  would  have 

1  Allied  opposition  to  an  American  army  was  so  strong  as  to 
bring  threats  of  an  appeal  to  Wilson.  The  President  steadfastly 
supported  Pershing. 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  219 

great  moral  effect;  it  would  free  the  Paris-Nancy 
railway  from  artillery  fire;  and  would  assure  Per- 
shing  an  excellent  base  for  attack  against  the  Metz- 
Sedan  railway  system  and  the  Briey  iron  basin. 
The  German  positions  were  naturally  strong  and  had 
withstood  violent  French  attacks  in  1915.  But 
there  was  only  one  effective  line  of  retreat  and  the 
enemy,  if  he  persisted  in  holding  the  apex  of  the  sa 
lient,  risked  losing  his  entire  defending  force,  should 
the  sides  be  pressed  in  from  the  south  and  west. 

On  the  12th  of  September  the  attack  was 
launched.  It  was  originally  planned  for  the  15th, 
but  word  was  brought  that  the  Germans  were 
about  to  retire  at  a  rate  which  would  have  left 
none  of  them  in  the  salient  by  that  date.  Hence 
the  attack  was  advanced  by  three  days.  The  at 
tempted  withdrawal  secured  the  retreat  of  the 
German  main  force,  but  they  were  unable  to  save 
their  rear  guard.  After  four  hours  of  vigorous 
artillery  preparation,  with  the  largest  assemblage 
of  aviation  ever  engaged  in  a  single  operation 
(mainly  British  and  French)  and  with  American 
heavy  guns  throwing  into  confusion  all  rail  move 
ments  behind  the  German  lines,  the  advancing 
Americans  immediately  overwhelmed  all  of  the 
enemy  that  attempted  to  hold  their  ground.  By 


220   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  afternoon  of  the  second  day  the  salient  was 
extinguished,  16,000  prisoners  were  taken,  443 
guns  and  large  stores  of  supplies  captured.  Ameri 
can  casualties  totaled  less  than  7000.  The  effects 
of  the  victory  were  incalculable.  Apart  from  the 
material  results,  hope  of  which  had  motivated  the 
attack,  the  moral  influence  of  the  battle  of  St. 
Mihiel  in  the  making  of  American  armies  and  the 
discouragement  of  the  German  High  Command 
was  of  the  first  importance.  "An  American  army 
was  an  accomplished  fact,"  wrote  Pershing,  "and 
the  enemy  had  felt  its  power.  No  form  of  propa 
ganda  could  overcome  the  depressing  effect  on  the 
morale  of  the  enemy  of  this  demonstration  of  our 
ability  to  organize  a  large  American  force  and  drive 
it  successfully  through  his  defense.  It  gave  our 
troops  implicit  confidence  in  their  superiority  and 
raised  their  morale  to  the  highest  pitch.  For  the 
first  time  wire  entanglements  ceased  to  be  regarded 
as  impassable  barriers  and  open-warfare  training, 
which  had  been  so  urgently  insisted  upon,  proved 
to  be  the  correct  doctrine." 

The  victory  of  St.  Mihiel  was  merely  the  neces 
sary  prelude  to  greater  things.  During  the  first 
week  of  September  the  Allied  command  decided 
that  the  general  offensive  movement  of  their  armies 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  221 

should  be  pressed  as  rapidly  as  possible,  converging 
upon  the  main  line  of  German  retreat  through 
Mezieres  and  Sedan.  The  British  were  to  pursue 
the  attack  in  the  direction  of  Cambrai,  the  center 
of  the  French  armies,  west  of  Rheims,  was  to  drive 
the  enemy  beyond  the  Aisne,  while  the  Americans 
were  to  attack  through  the  Argonne  and  on  both 
sides  of  the  Meuse,  aiming  for  Sedan.  Pershing 
was  given  his  choice  of  the  Champagne  or  Argonne 
sectors,  and  chose  the  latter,  which  was  the  more 
difficult,  insisting  that  no  other  Allied  troops 
possessed  the  offensive  spirit  which  would  be  neces 
sary  for  success.  In  the  meantime  a  new  American 
army  was  to  be  organized,  to  operate  south  of 
Verdun  and  against  Metz,  in  the  spring  of  1919; 
in  fact  this  was  designed  to  be  the  chief  American 
effort.  As  matters  turned  out  this  second  Ameri 
can  army  was  ready  to  make  its  offensive  early  in 
No\*ember,  but  in  September  none  of  the  Allied 
chiefs  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  final  victory 
could  be  achieved  in  1918.  Such  were  the  difficul 
ties  of  terrain  in  the  Argonne  advance  that  the 
French  did  not  believe  that  the  attack  could 
be  pushed  much  beyond  Montfaucon,  between 
the  forest  and  the  Meuse,  before  winter  forced  a 
cessation  of  active  operations. 


222    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  defensive  importance  of  the  Argonne  for  the 
Germans  could  hardly  be  overestimated,  for  if  the 
railway  line  running  through  Sedan  and  Mezieres 
were  severed,  they  would  be  cut  in  two  by  the 
Ardennes  and  would  be  unable  to  withdraw  from 
France  the  bulk  of  their  forces,  which,  left  without 
supplies,  would  suffer  inevitable  disaster.  As  a 
consequence  the  Argonne  had  been  strengthened 
by  elaborate  fortifications  which,  taken  in  conjunc 
tion  with  the  natural  terrain,  densely  wooded, 
covered  with  rugged  heights,  and  marked  by  ridges 
running  east  and  west,  made  it  apparently  im 
pregnable.  The  dense  undergrowth,  the  bowlders, 
and  the  ravines  offered  ideal  spots  for  machine- 
gun  nests.  The  Germans  had  the  exact  range  of 
each  important  position. 

But  Pershing's  confidence  in  the  offensive  valor 
of  the  Americans  was  amply  justified.  On  the 
morning  of  the  26th  of  September  the  initial  attack 
was  delivered,  the  main  force  of  the  blow  falling  east 
of  the  forest,  where  the  natural  strength  of  the  ene 
my  positions  was  less  formidable.  By  noon  of  the 
second  day  Montfaucon  was  captured,  and  by  the 
59th  all  the  immediate  objectives  of  the  attack  were 
secured.  Losses  were  heavy,  staff  work  was  fre 
quently  open  to  severe  criticism,  communications 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  223 

were  broken  at  times,  the  infantry  had  not  al 
ways  received  adequate  artillery  support,  but  the 
success  of  the  drive  was  undeniable.  Before  the 
American  troops,  however,  still  lay  two  more  lines 
of  defense,  the  Freya  and  Kriemhilde,  and  the 
Germans  were  bringing  up  their  best  divisions. 
On  the  4th  of  October  the  attack  was  renewed,  in 
cooperation  with  the  French  under  Gouraud  to 
the  west  of  the  forest  who  pressed  forward  actively; 
a  week's  more  bitter  fighting  saw  the  Argonne  itself 
cleared  of  the  enemy.  Hard  struggles  ensued, 
particularly  around  Grandpre,  which  was  taken 
and  retaken,  while  on  the  east  of  the  Meuse  the 
enemy  was  pushed  back.  By  the  end  of  the  month 
the  Kriemhilde  line  had  been  broken  and  the  great 
railway  artery  was  threatened.  On  the  1st  of 
November  the  third  phase  of  the  great  advance 
began.  The  desperate  efforts  of  the  Germans  to 
hold  were  never  relaxed,  but  by  the  evening  of  that 
day  the  American  troops  broke  through  their  last 
defense  and  forced  rapid  retreat.  Motor  trucks 
were  hurriedly  brought  up  for  the  pursuit,  and  by 
the  fifth  the  enemy's  withdrawal  became  general. 
Two  days  later  Americans  held  the  heights  which 
dominated  Sedan,  the  strategic  goal,  and  the  Ger 
man  line  of  communications  was  as  good  as  severed. 


224   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  converging  offensive  planned  by  Foch  had 
succeeded.  At  Cambrai,  Le  Catelet,  and  St.  Quen- 
tin,  the  British,  with  whom  were  operating  four 
American  divisions  (the  Twenty-seventh,  Thirtieth, 
Thirty-seventh,  and  Ninety-first),  had  broken  the 
Hindenburg  line;  the  French  had  pushed  the  Ger 
mans  back  from  Laon,  north  of  the  Aisne,  and  with 
the  British  were  driving  them  into  the  narrow 
neck  of  the  bottle;  and  now  the  French  and  Ameri 
cans,  by  their  Argonne-Meuse  advance  had  closed 
the  neck.  The  enemy  faced  an  appalling  disaster. 
A  few  weeks,  if  not  days,  of  continued  fighting 
meant  the  most  striking  military  debacle  of  his 
tory.  Germany's  alliss  hr.d  fallen  from  her.  Tur 
key,  Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary  had  sued  for 
peace  and  agreed  to  cease  fighting  on  what  amount 
ed  to  terms  of  unconditional  surrender.  At  home, 
the  German  Government  faced  revolution;  the  Kai 
ser  was  about  to  abdicate  and  flee.  On  the  6th  of 
November,  the  Berlin  Government  begged  for  an 
immediate  armistice  and  five  days  later  agreed  to 
the  stringent  terms  which  the  Allies  presented.  On 
the  llth  of  November,  at  eleven  in  the  morning, 
firing  ceased.  Until  the  last  second  the  battle  raged 
with  a  useless  intensity  dictated  by  stern  military 
tradition;  then  perfect  quiet  on  the  battle  front. 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  225 

At  the  present  moment  we  lack  the  perspective, 
perhaps,  to  evaluate  exactly  the  share  of  credit 
which  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  deserves 
for  the  Allied  military  victory  of  1918.  Previous  to 
June  the  military  contribution  of  the  United  States 
had  no  material  effects.  The  defense  of  Chateau- 
Thierry  at  the  beginning  of  the  month  and  the 
operations  there  and  at  Belleau  Woods  had,  how 
ever,  important  practical  as  well  as  moral  effects. 
The  fighting  was  of  a  purely  local  character,  but  it 
came  at  a  critical  moment  and  at  a  critical  spot. 
It  was  a  crisis  when  the  importance  of  standing 
firm  could  not  be  overestimated,  and  the  defensive 
capacity  of  the  French  had  been  seriously  weak 
ened.  The  advance  of  American  divisions  with  the 
French  in  the  clearing  of  the  Marne  sector  was 
of  the  first  military  importance.  The  Americans 
were  better  qualified  than  any  European  troops, 
at  that  stage  of  the  war,  to  carry  through  offensive 
operations.  They  were  fearless  not  merely  because 
of  natural  hardihood,  but  through  ignorance  of 
danger;  they  were  fresh  and  undefeated,  physically 
and  morally  capable  of  undergoing  the  gruelling 
punishment  delivered  by  the  rearguards  of  the  re 
treating  Germans;  their  training  had  been  pri 
marily  for  open  warfare.  The  same  qualities  were 


£26   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

essential  for  the  arduous  and  deadly  task  of  break 
ing  the  German  line  in  the  Argonne,  which  was  the 
finishing  blow  on  the  western  battlefields. 

The  defects  of  the  American  armies  have  been 
emphasized  by  European  experts.  They  point 
especially  to  the  faulty  staff- work,  apparent  in  the 
Argonne  particularly,  which  resulted  in  heavy 
losses.  Staff-officers  in  numerous  instances  seem 
to  have  been  ill-trained  and  at  times  positively 
unequal  to  the  exigencies  of  the  campaign.  Mis 
takes  in  selection  account  for  this  to  some  degree, 
for  men  were  appointed  who  were  not  equipped 
temperamentally  or  intellectually  for  the  positions 
given  them.  Equally  frequent  were  mistakes  in 
the  distribution  of  staff-officers.  It  is  a  notable 
fact,  however,  that  such  mistakes  resulted  from 
inexperience  and  ignorance  and  not  from  the  in 
trusion  of  politics.  President  Wilson  guaranteed 
to  General  Pershing  complete  immunity  from  the 
pleas  of  politicians  and  in  no  war  fought  by  the 
United  States  have  political  factors  played  a  role 
of  such  insignificance. 

Finally,  and  aside  from  the  fighting  qualities  of 
the  rank  and  file  and  certain  defects  of  the  higher 
command,  the  Americans  represented  numbers; 
and  without  the  tremendous  numerical  force 


THE  FIGHTING  FRONT  227 

transported  to  Europe  in  the  spring  and  summer. 
the  plans  of  Foch  could  not  have  been  completed. 
We  have  the  testimony  of  the  Allied  chiefs  in  June 
that  without  American  man-power  they  faced  de 
feat.  It  is  equally  obvious  that  without  the 
1,390,000  American  troops  which,  by  November, 
had  appeared  on  the  fighting  lire,  the  autumn 
of  1918  would  not  have  witnessed  the  military 
triumph  of  the  Allies. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   PATH    TO   PEACE 

THE  armistice  of  November  11,  1918,  resulted 
directly  from  the  military  defeat  of  German  armies 
in  France,  following  upon  the  collapse  of  Turkey, 
Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary.  But  there  were 
many  circumstances  other  than  military  that  led  to 
Germany's  downfall,  and  by  no  means  of  least 
importance  were  the  moral  issues  so  constantly 
stressed  by  Wilson.  His  speeches  had  been  care 
fully  distributed  through  the  Central  Empires; 
they  had  done  much  to  arouse  the  subject  peoples 
of  Austria-Hungary  to  revolt  for  their  freedom,  and 
also  to  weaken  the  morale  of  the  German  people. 
The  value  of  Wilson's  "verbiage  drives"  was  ques 
tioned  in  this  country.  Abroad,  his  insistence 
upon  a  peace  of  justice  was  generally  reckoned  a 
vital  moral  force  in  the  political  movements  that 
supplemented  the  victories  of  Marshal  Foch.  Jugo 
slavs  consented  to  cooperate  with  their  Italian 

228 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  229 

enemies  because  they  felt  that  "Wilson's  justice" 
would  guarantee  a  fair  court  for  their  aspirations 
in  the  Adriatic;  Magyars  and  Austrians  threw 
down  their  arms  in  the  belief  that  his  promise  to 
"be  as  just  to  enemies  as  to  friends"  secured  a 
better  future  than  they  could  hope  for  through  the 
continuance  of  the  war;  the  leaders  of  the  German 
Reichstag  demanded  the  Kaiser's  abdication  in 
November,  under  the  impression  that  Wilson  had 
laid  it  down  as  a  condition  of  peace. 

From  the  time  when  the  United  States  entered 
the  war  it  was  obvious  that  Wilson  placed  less 
emphasis  upon  defeating  Germany  than  upon  se 
curing  a  just  peace.  Military  victory  meant  noth 
ing  to  him  except  as  the  road  to  peace.  In  his 
first  war  speeches  the  President,  much  to  the  irrita 
tion  of  many  Americans,  insisted  that  the  United 
States  was  fighting  the  government  and  not  the 
people  of  Germany.  "We  have  no  quarrel,"  he 
said,  "  with  the  German  people.  We  have  no  feel 
ing  towards  them  but  one  of  sympathy  and  friend 
ship."  In  his  Flag  Day  address  he  was  careful 
not  to  attack  "Germany"  but  only  "the  mili 
tary  masters  under  whom  Germany  is  bleeding." 
Certain  effects  of  this  attitude  were  to  be  seen  in 
the  Reichstag  revolt  of  July,  1917,  led  by  that  most 


230  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

sensitive  of  political  weathercocks,  Matthias  Erz- 
berger,  which  was  designed  to  take  political  control 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  military  clique.  That  crisis, 
however,  was  safely  survived  by  Ludendorff,  who 
remained  supreme.  President  Wilson  then  re 
turned  to  the  attack  in  his  reply  to  the  Pope's 
peace  proposals  of  August.  "The  object  of  this 
war  is  to  deliver  the  free  peoples  of  the  world  from 
the  menace  and  the  actual  power  of  a  vast  military 
establishment  controlled  by  an  irresponsible  gov 
ernment.  .  .  .  This  power  is  not  the  German 
people.  It  is  the  ruthless  master  of  the  German 
people.  .  .  .  We  cannot  take  the  word  of  the 
present  rulers  of  Germany  as  a  guarantee  of  any 
thing  that  is  to  endure,  unless  explicitly  support 
ed  by  such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will  and 
purpose  of  the  German  people  themseves  as  the 
other  peoples  of  the  world  would  be  justified 
in  accepting." 

There  was  serpentine  wisdom  in  these  words, 
for  their  very  vagueness  attracted  German  liberals. 
Wilson  did  not  demand  a  republic;  he  did  not  in 
sist  upon  the  Kaiser's  abdication,  for  which  Ger 
many  was  not  then  prepared;  all  that  he  asked 
was  a  government  responsible  to  the  people,  and 
more  and  more  the  Germans  were  demanding  that 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  331 

themselves.  Furthermore,  he  again  laid  stress 
upon  the  fact  that  the  Germans  need  not  fear 
vengeance  such  as  the  Allies  had  threatened. 
"  Punitive  damages,  the  dismemberment  of  em 
pires,  the  establishment  of  selfish  and  exclusive 
economic  leagues,  we  deem  inexpedient."  The 
appeal  was  fruitless  hi  its  immediate  effects,  for 
the  political  party  leaders  were  still  dominated  by 
the  military;  but  ultimately,  in  conjunction  with 
a  dozen  other  appeals,  its  influence  acted  like  a 
subtle  corrosive  upon  the  German  will  to  conquer. 
Still  less  successful  were  the  attempts  to  win 
Austria  away  from  her  ally  by  secret  diplomatic 
conversations.  In  these  neither  President  Wilson 
nor  his  personal  adviser,  Colonel  House,  placed 
great  confadence.  They  had  been  undertaken  by 
the  French  through  Prince  Sixtus  of  Bourbon,  and 
in  August,  1917,  Maior  Armand  of  France  dis 
cussed  with  the  Austrian  emissary,  Revertata, 
possible  means  of  bringing  about  peace  between 
Austria  and  the  Allies.  Lloyd  George  enthusias 
tically  approved  this  attempt  to  drive  a  wedge 
betv/een  Austria  and  Germany,  was  anxious  to 
send  Lord  Reading  as  intermediary,  and,  upon  the 
refusal  of  the  latter  to  undertake  the  mission, 
actually  dispatched  General  Smuts  to  Switzerland* 


232   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

The  Emperor  Carl  seemed  sincerely  anxious  to 
make  sacrifices  for  peace  and  was  urged  by  lib 
eral  counselors,  such  as  Forster  and  Lammasch, 
in  whom  the  Allies  had  confidence,  to  meet  many 
of  the  demands  of  his  discontented  Slav  subjects 
by  granting  autonomy  to  the  Czechs,  Poles,  and 
Jugoslavs.  Negotiations  were  hampered  by  the 
belief  of  the  Italians  that  immediate  peace  with 
Austria  would  prevent  them  from  securing  the  ter 
ritories  they  coveted;  by  the  sullen  obstinacy  of 
the  Magyars,  who  were  jealous  of  their  mastery 
over  the  Hungarian  Slavs,  and  above  all,  as  Colonel 
House  had  foreseen,  by  Austria's  fear  of  Germany. 
In  fact  it  was  a  stern  ultimatum  sent  by  Luden- 
dorff  that  brought  the  wavering  Carl  back  to 
his  allegiance. 

In  the  autumn  of  1917,  however,  talk  of  peace  was 
in  the  air  and  a  definite  demand  for  its  considera 
tion  was  made  in  a  noteworthy  speech  by  Lord 
Lansdowne,  a  Conservative  leader  in  England. 
Negotiations  were  inaugurated  between  Germany 
and  the  new  Bolshevik  Government  of  Russia,  and 
for  a  few  weeks  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  year 
the  w  ar-weary  world  seemed  close  to  the  possibility 
of  a  general  understanding.  For  the  first  time 
Lloyd  George  outlined  in  specific  language  the 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  233 

main  terms  that  would  be  considered  by  the  Allies. 
It  was  President  Wilson's  opportunity.  Careless  of 
securing  an  overwhelming  military  victory,  indeed 
unwilling  to  crush  Germany,  anxious  to  pledge  the 
Entente  to  his  programme  in  this  moment  of  their 
discouragement,  he  formulated  on  January  8, 1918, 
his  Fourteen  Points,  upon  which  he  declared  the 
final  peace  settlement  should  be  based.  His  speech 
was  at  once  an  appeal  to  the  liberals  and  peace- 
hungry  of  the  Central  Empires,  a  warning  to  the 
military  clique  in  Germany  then  preparing  to  en 
force  degrading  terms  upon  Russia,  and  a  notifica 
tion  to  the  Allies  that  the  United  States  could  not 
be  counted  upon  to  fight  for  selfish  national  in 
terests.  He  reiterated  the  principles  which  had 
actuated  the  United  States  when  it  entered  the 
war:  "What  we  demand  in  this  war,  therefore,  is 
nothing  peculiar  to  ourselves.  It  is  that  the  world 
be  made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in;  and  particularly 
that  it  be  made  safe  for  every  peace-loving  nation 
which,  like  our  own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life, 
determine  its  own  institutions,  be  assured  of  jus 
tice  and  fair  dealing  by  the  other  peoples  of  the 
world  as  against  force  and  selfish  aggression.  All 
the  peoples  of  the  world  are  in  effect  partners  in  this 
interest,  and  for  our  own  part  we  see  very  clearly 


234   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

that  unless  justice  be  done  to  others  it  will  not  be 
done  to  us." 

Of  the  Fourteen  Points  into  which  he  then 
divided  his  peace  programme,  the  first  five  were 
general  in  nature.  The  first  insisted  upon  open 
diplomacy,  to  begin  with  the  approaching  Peace 
Conference:  "Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly 
arrived  at,  after  which  there  shall  be  no  private 
international  understandings  of  any  kind."  Next 
came  "absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the 
seas  .  .  .  alike  in  peace  and  in  war."  Then  "the 
removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers 
and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  con 
ditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the 
peace."  There  followed  a  demand  for  the  reduc 
tion  of  armaments  "to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety."  The  fifth  point  called  for 
an  "impartial  adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims, 
based  upon  .  .  .  the  interests  of  the  populations 
concerned"  as  well  as  "the  equitable  claims  of  the 
government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined." 

These  generalizations  were  not  so  much  God- 
given  tables  which  must  determine  the  inter 
national  law  of  the  future  as  they  were  subtle  in 
ducements  to  cease  fighting;  they  were  idealistic 
in  tone,  but  intensely  practical  in  purpose.  They 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  235 

guaranteed  to  any  Germans  who  wanted  peace 
that  there  would  be  protection  against  British 
"navalism,"  against  the  threatened  Allied  eco 
nomic  boycott,  as  well  as  a  chance  of  the  return  of 
the  conquered  colonies.  The  force  of  their  seduc 
tiveness  was  proved,  when,  many  months  later,  in 
October,  1918,  defeated  Germany  grasped  at  them 
as  a  drowning  man  at  a  straw.  At  the  same  time 
Wilson  offered  to  liberals  the  world  over  the  hope 
of  ending  the  old-style  secret  diplomacy,  and  to 
business  men  and  labor  the  termination  of  the 
system  of  competitive  armaments,  with  their 
economic  and  moral  waste.  No  one  would  suggest 
that  Wilson  did  not  believe  in  the  idealism  of  these 
first  five  points;  no  one  should  forget,  however, 
that  they  were  carefully  drafted  with  the  political 
situation  of  the  moment  definitely  in  view.  They 
might  be  construed  as  a  charter  for  future  inter 
national  relations,  but  they  were  designed  primarily 
to  serve  as  a  diplomatic  weapon  for  the  present. 

Each  of  the  succeeding  eight  points  was  more 
special  in  character,  and  dealt  with  the  territorial 
and  political  problems  of  the  warring  states.  They 
provided  for  the  evacuation  and  restoration  of  all 
conquered  territories  in  Europe,  including  Russia, 
Belgium,  France,  and  the  Balkan  States.  The 


236   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

sovereignty  of  Belgium  should  be  unlimited  in  fu 
ture;  the  "wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in  1871 
in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine  .  .  .  should  be 
righted";  Italian  frontiers  should  be  readjusted 
"along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality"; 
the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  "should  be  accord 
ed  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  develop 
ment";  the  relations  of  the  Balkan  States  should 
be  determined  "along  historically  established 
lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality";  nationalities 
under  Turkish  rule  should  receive  opportunity  for 
security  of  life  and  autonomous  development,  and 
the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently  opened  to 
all  nations  under  international  guarantees;  an 
independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected  to 
"include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indisputably 
Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free 
and  secure  access  to  the  sea." 

Generally  speaking  these  stipulations  seemed  to 
guarantee  the  moderate  war  aims  of  the  Entente 
and  corresponded  closely  to  the  demands  made  by 
Lloyd  George;  they  certainly  repudiated  the  ex 
treme  purposes  attributed  to  German  imperialists. 
And  yet  these  eight  points  were  so  vague  and  ca 
pable  of  such  diverse  interpretation  that,  like  the 
first  five  general  points,  they  might  prove  not 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  237 

unattractive  to  liberals  in  Germany  and  Austria. 
France  was  not  definitely  promised  Alsace-Lor 
raine;  any  hint  at  the  dismemberment  of  Austria- 
Hungary  was  carefully  avoided;  the  readjustment 
of  Italian  frontiers  might  mean  much  or  little. 
What  were  "historically  established  lines  of  alle 
giance  and  nationality"  in  the  Balkans?  And  if 
Poland  were  to  include  only  populations  "indis 
putably  Polish,"  was  it  possible  to  assure  them 
"free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea"?  The  political 
advantage  in  such  generalities  was  obvious.  But 
there  was  also  great  danger.  The  time  might  come 
when  both  belligerent  camps  would  accept  the 
Fourteen  Points  and  would  still  be  uncertain  of 
their  meaning  and  application.  The  struggle  for 
definite  interpretation  would  be  the  real  test.  The 
President's  fourteenth  and  last  point,  however,  was 
unmistakable  and  expressed  the  ideal  nearest  his 
heart:  "A  general  association  of  nations  must  be 
formed  under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  mutual  guarantees  of  political  independ 
ence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small 
states  alike." 

Later  events  have  magnified  the  significance  of 
this  notable  speech  of  the  8th  of  January.  It  was  a 
striking  bid  for  peace,  which  indeed  was  not  far 


238   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

away  and  it  ultimately  formed  the  general  basis  of 
the  peace  terms  actually  drafted.  But  it  contained 
nothing  new.  Its  definition  of  the  conditions  of 
peace  was  vague;  its  formulation  of  principles 
followed  exactly  along  the  lines  developed  by 
President  Wilson  ever  since  he  had  adopted  the 
idea  of  a  League  of  Nations  founded  upon  inter 
national  justice.  His  summing  up  of  the  main 
principle  underlying  his  whole  policy  was  merely 
the  echo  of  his  speeches  for  the  past  twelve-month : 
"The  principle  of  justice  to  all  peoples  and  nation 
alities,  and  their  right  to  live  on  equal  terms  of 
liberty  and  safety  with  one  another,  whether  they 
be  strong  or  weak."  The  importance  of  the  speech 
does  not  lie  in  its  novelty  but  in  its  timeliness.  It 
came  at  a  moment  when  the  world  was  anxiously 
listening  and  the  undeniable  idealism  of  its  content 
assured  to  President  Wilson,  at  least  temporarily, 
the  moral  leadership  of  mankind.  Unfortunately 
as  the  event  proved,  it  promised  more  than  could 
ever  be  secured  by  any  single  man.  The  President 
was  to  pay  the  price  for  his  leadership  later  when 
he  encountered  the  full  force  of  the  reaction. 

As  a  step  toward  immediate  peace  the  speech 
of  the  Fourteen  Points  failed.  WTiat  might  have 
been  the  result  had  von  Hertling,  Chancellor  of 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  239 

Germany,  and  Czernin,  in  Austria,  possessed  full 
powers,  it  is  difficult  to  say.  But  the  military 
masters  of  Germany  could  not  resist  the  tempta 
tion  which  the  surrender  of  Russia  brought  before 
their  eyes.  By  securing  the  eastern  front  and  re 
leasing  prisoners  as  well  as  troops  there,  they  would 
be  able  to  establish  a  crushing  superiority  in  the 
west;  France  would  be  annihilated  before  the  Amer 
ican  armies  could  count,  if  indeed  they  were  ever 
raised.  Hence  the  heavy  terms  of  Brest-Litovsk 
and  Bucharest  and  the  preparations  for  the  great 
drive  of  March.  As  Wilson  said,  "The  tragical 
circumstance  is  that  this  one  party  in  Germany  is 
apparently  willing  and  able  to  send  millions  of  men 
to  their  death  to  prevent  what  all  the  world  now 
sees  to  be  just."  Thus  Germany  lost  her  last  chance 
to  emerge  from  the  war  uncrushed. 

The  ruthless  policy  followed  by  Ludendorff  and 
his  associates  gave  the  President  new  opportunities 
to  appeal  to  the  peoples  of  the  Central  Empires. 
He  incorporated  in  his  speeches  the  phrases  of 
the  German  Socialists.  "  Self -Determination  "  and 
"No  annexations  and  no  indemnities  "  were  phrases 
that  had  been  made  in  Germany  before  Russia 
imported  them;  and  when  they  formed  the  text 
of  presidential  addresses,  many  Germans,  despite 


240   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

themselves,  doubtless  felt  a  twinge  of  sympathy. 
Coupled  with  these  appeals  went  the  President's 
warnings  that  if  they  persisted  in  tying  up  their 
fortunes  with  those  of  their  rulers,  they  must  share 
the  penalties.  If  Germany  insisted  upon  making 
force  alone  the  deciding  element,  then  he  must 
accept  the  challenge  and  abide  the  issue.  "There 
is,  therefore,  but  one  response  possible  from  us: 
Force,  Force  to  the  utmost,  Force  without  stint  or 
limit,  the  righteous  and  triumphant  Force  which 
shall  make  Right  the  law  of  the  world  and  cast 
every  selfish  dominion  down  in  the  dust."  Neither 
the  appeals  nor  the  warnings  of  Wilson  had  any 
effect  apparent  at  the  moment,  and  yet  the  seed 
was  sown.  During  the  victorious  German  drives  of 
March,  April,  and  May,  opinion  to  the  east  of  the 
Rhine  seemed  to  have  rallied  firmly  behind  the 
Teuton  Government;  but  with  the  first  slight  set 
backs  of  the  following  month  the  process  of  crum 
bling  began.  An  American  economist  and  banker, 
Henry  C.  Emery,  then  prisoner  in  Germany,  tells 
of  the  pessimism  prevalent  as  early  as  June  and 
the  whispers  of  the  approaching  fall  of  the  Kaiser. 
In  his  memoirs  Ludendorff  lays  the  failure  of 
the  German  armies  in  August  to  the  complete 
breakdown  of  the  national  spirit. 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  241 

The  end  came  with  extraordinary  speed.  Al 
ready  in  September,  after  the  defection  of  Bulgaria 
and  the  startling  success  of  Foch's  converging 
movement  on  Sedan,  Germany  knew  that  she  was 
defeated.  The  Berlin  Government  turned  to  Wilson 
and  on  the  5th  of  October  requested  an  armistice. 
At  the  same  time  Austria-Hungary  made  a  similar 
request  offering  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  the 
Fourteen  Points.  Wilson's  position  was  delicate. 
He  knew  in  September  that  the  end  was  near 
and  prepared  for  the  situation  in  some  degree  by 
sending  Colonel  House  abroad  to  be  ready  to  dis 
cuss  armistice  terms  with  the  Allies.  But  the 
sudden  character  of  the  German  collapse  had  in 
toxicated  public  opinion  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
political  idealism  which  he  had  voiced  ran  the  risk 
of  becoming  swamped.  If  Germany  were  indeed 
helpless  and  the  Allies  triumphant,  there  was  the 
danger  that,  in  the  flush  of  victory,  all  the  promises 
of  a  just  peace  would  be  forgotten.  He  must 
provide  against  such  a  contingency.  On  the  other 
hand  he  must  secure  guarantees  that  Germany  had 
indeed  thrown  off  her  militaristic  cloak,  as  Prince 
Max  of  Baden,  the  new  Chancellor,  insisted;  and 
also  that  under  cover  of  an  armistice  she  might  not 
effect  a  withdrawal  of  her  defeated  armies,  only  to 

zd 


242   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

renew  the  struggle  under  more  favorable  condi 
tions  on  her  own  borders.  He  was  caught  between 
the  danger  of  German  fraud  and  Allied  exuberance. 
There  ensued  a  month  of  negotiations,  during 
which  the  military  victory  of  the  Allies  was  further 
assured,  as  described  in  the  preceding  pages.  The 
German  Government  was  first  asked  by  Wilson  if 
it  accepted  the  Fourteen  Points  and  the  similar 
stipulations  made  by  the  President  in  subsequent 
addresses.  Replying  in  the  affirmative,  Prince 
Max  then  promised  to  acquiesce  in  armistice  terms 
that  would  leave  the  military  situation  unchanged, 
and  further  agreed  to  order  a  cessation  of  unre 
stricted  submarine  warfare  and  of  the  wanton  de 
struction  caused  by  the  German  armies  in  their 
retreat.  Finally  he  declared  in  answer  to  Wilson's 
demand,  that  the  request  for  an  armistice  and 
peace  came  from  a  government  "which  is  free  from 
any  arbitrary  and  irresponsible  influence,  and  is 
supported  by  the  approval  of  an  overwhelming 
majority  of  the  German  people."  The  President 
then  formally  transmitted  the  correspondence  to 
the  Allies,  and  Colonel  House  entered  upon  dis 
cussions  to  establish  with  them  the  understanding 
that  the  basis  of  the  peace  negotiations  would  be 
the  Wilsonian  programme.  He  was  successful ;  and 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  243 

the  Fourteen  Points,  with  reservation  of  the  sec 
ond,  "Freedom  of  the  seas, "  were  accepted  by  the 
Allied  governments.  The  Allies,  on "  the  other 
hand,  secured  President  Wilson's  approval  of  the 
principle  that  "compensation  will  be  made  by 
Germany  for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  popu 
lation  of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the  ag 
gression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the 
air."  Upon  this  understanding  the  details  of  the 
armistice  were  left  to  the  military  leaders.  The 
terms  a?  fixed  reflected  the  military  situation  on 
the  fighting  front  and  the  political  situation  in  Ger 
many  and  placed  Germany  entirely  in  the  power  of 
the  victors  without  possibility  of  renewing  the  war. 
The  conditions  laid  down  were  so  stringent  that  un 
til  the  last  moment  a  refusal  by  the  German  dele 
gates  seemed  imminent;  but  on  the  llth  of  Novem 
ber,  just  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit 
allowed  them,  they  accepted  the  inevitable. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  regard  the  armistice  as  forced 
upon  the  Allies  by  President  Wilson.  Many  per 
sons  abroad,  as  in  this  country,  felt,  it  is  true,  that 
it  was  wrong  to  permit  the  peaceful  withdrawal  of 
the  German  armies,  even  though  the  full  military 
advantages  of  victory  were  secured  by  the  armis 
tice  conditions;  the  Allies  ought,  they  argued,  to 


244   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

impress  on  the  Germans  the  magnitude  of  their 
defeat  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  this  could  not  be 
done  so  long  as  German  soil  had  been  free  from 
warfare.  General  Pershing  was  strongly  opposed 
to  the  granting  of  an  armistice.  The  Allied  chiefs 
knew,  however,  that  although  the  continuation  of 
the  fighting  would  lead  to  the  surrender  of  a  great 
German  force,  every  day  would  cost  the  victorious 
armies  a  heavy  toll  of  killed  and  wounded,  and 
the  advantage  to  be  gained  thereby  was  at  least 
questionable.  This  fact  was  emphasized  even  by 
Marshal  Foch.  They  hesitated,  certainly,  to  ac 
cept  the  Fourteen  Points  as  the  basis  for  peace, 
for  they  feared  lest  the  interpretation  put  upon 
them  at  the  Peace  Conference  might  rob  them  of 
what  they  believed  to  be  the  just  fruits  of  victory. 
In  both  France  and  England  there  was,  it  is  true, 
a  body  of  liberal  opinion  which  would  not  brook 
open  repudiation  of  the  ideals  that  Wilson  had 
sponsored  during  the  war  and  to  which  Allied  min 
isters  had  themselves  paid  tribute.  In  each  coun 
try  there  was  another  group  demanding  a  "peace  of 
annihilation,"  with  the  payment  of  all  war  costs 
by  the  defeated,  but  Lloyd  George  and  Clemen- 
ceau  feared  at  the  moment  to  raise  this  issue. 
Both  England  and  France  were  dependent  upon 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  245 

American  assistance  for  the  immediate  future 
as  they  had  been  during  the  war.  They  needed 
American  food,  raw  materials,  and  money.  A  break 
with  Wilson,  who  for  the  moment  was  the  popular 
hero  of  Europe,  taken  in  conjunction  with  an 
economic  crisis,  might  be  the  signal  for  domestic 
disturbances  if  not  revolution. 

Thus  with  Germany  helpless  and  the  Allies  at 
least  outwardly  accepting  his  peace  programme, 
Woodrow  Wilson  seemed  to  be  master  of  the  situa 
tion.  And  yet  his  power  was  more  apparent  than 
real.  Apart  from  that  moral  influence  which  he 
exercised  over  the  European  liberals  and  which 
among  some  of  the  working  classes  was  so  extreme 
that  candles  were  burnt  before  his  picture,  but 
which  also  was  inevitably  unstable  and  evanescent, 
Wilson's  power  rested  upon  the  fact  that  he  was 
President  of  the  United  States.  But  the  nation 
was  no  longer  united  behind  him  or  his  policy,  if 
indeed  it  had  ever  been  so.  That  hatred  and  dis 
trust  which  had  marked  the  electoral  campaign  of 
1916,  and  which,  stifled  for  the  moment  by  en 
trance  into  the  war,  had  flamed  out  early  in  1918 
in  the  attack  upon  his  war  administration,  now  in 
the  autumn  threatened  an  explosion  of  popular 
disapprobation  in  some  parts  of  the  country.  Men 


246   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

had  long  whispered  "autocrat"  but  had  generally 
been  silenced  during  the  war  by  the  admonition 
not  to  weaken  the  government  by  factious  criti 
cism.  Now  they  began  to  shout  it  from  the 
house-tops.  Because  of  his  inability  to  grasp  the 
importance  of  either  tact  or  tactics,  the  President 
made  the  way  of  his  opponents  easy  for  them. 

Shortly  before  the  Congressional  elections  of  No 
vember,  at  the  moment  when  he  felt  the  need 
of  national  support  in  order  to  strengthen  his  posi 
tion  with  the  Allies,  the  President  was  prevailed 
upon  to  issue  an  appeal  to  the  electors,  asking  them 
to  vote  for  Democratic  candidates  on  the  ground 
that  the  nation  ought  to  have  unified  leadership 
in  the  coming  moment  of  crisis,  and  that  a  Repub 
lican  Congress  would  divide  the  leadership.  There 
was  nothing  novel  in  such  an  appeal;  in  1898, 
McKinley  had  begged  for  a  Republican  Congress 
on  the  ground  that  "this  is  no  time  for  divided 
councils, "  the  same  ground  as  that  taken  by  Wil 
son  in  1918.  Roosevelt  in  the  same  year  (1898) 
had  said:  "Remember  that  whether  you  will  or 
not  your  votes  this  year  will  be  viewed  by  the 
nations  of  Europe  from  one  standpoint  only.  .  .  . 
A  refusal  to  sustain  the  President  this  year  will, 
in  their  eyes,  be  read  as  a  refusal  to  sustain  the  war 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  247 

and  to  sustain  the  efforts  of  the  peace  commission." 
Wilson's  appeal  in  1918  was  merely  an  echo  of 
Roosevelt's  in  1898.  Yet  it  was  a  mistake  in  tac 
tics.  It  enabled  the  Republicans  to  assert  that, 
whereas  they  had  sunk  partisan  differences  during 
the  war  in  order  to  secure  the  victory  of  the  nation, 
Wilson  was  now  capitalizing  the  war  and  foreign 
problems  to  win  a  partisan  advantage.  The  result 
of  the  elections  was  Republican  success,  assuring 
to  that  party  a  slight  majority  in  the  Senate  and 
a  goodly  majority  in  the  House  after  March  4, 1919. 
The  President  made  other  tactical  mistakes. 
Instead  of  taking  the  Senate  into  his  confidence 
by  entering  upon  numerous  conferences  with  its 
leaders,  he  stood  upon  the  letter  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  gave  the  clear  impression  that  he  would 
conduct  the  peace  negotiations  himself  without 
Senatorial  assistance,  leaving  the  Senators  merely 
their  constitutional  privilege  of  "advice  and  con 
sent"  when  a  treaty  should  be  laid  before  them. 
He  would  have  done  better  to  remember  a  remark 
able  passage  in  one  of  his  own  lectures,  delivered 
ten  years  before.  Speaking  of  the  difficulty  of 
brmging  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Senate,  he  had 
said  that  there  is  a  "course  which  the  President 
may  follow,  and  which  one  or  two  Presidents  of 


248   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

unusual  political  sagacity  have  followed,  with  the 
satisfactory  results  that  were  to  have  been  ex 
pected.  He  may  himself  be  less  stiff  and  offish, 
may  himself  act  in  the  true  spirit  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  establish  intimate  relations  of  confidence 
with  the  Senate  on  his  own  initiative,  not  carrying 
his  plans  to  completion  and  then  laying  them  in 
final  form  before  the  Senate  to  be  accepted  or  re 
jected,  but  keeping  himself  in  confidential  com 
munication  with  the  leaders  of  the  Senate  while 
his  plans  are  in  course,  when  their  advice  will  be 
of  service  to  him  and  his  information  of  the  greatest 
service  to  them,  in  order  that  there  may  be  verit 
able  counsel  and  a  real  accommodation  of  views, 
instead  of  a  final  challenge  and  contest."  Had 
Wilson  in  1918,  and  after,  followed  his  own  advice, 
the  outcome  might  have  been  different.  But 
nothing  describes  so  perfectly  the  exact  opposite 
of  his  attitude  as  the  passage  quoted  above. 

The  President  might  at  least  have  assuaged  the 
sense  of  injury  that  rankled  in  the  hearts  of  the 
Senators  by  asking  for  their  advice  in  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  Peace  Commission.  Instead  he  kept 
his  own  counsel.  He  decided  to  go  to  Paris  himself 
as  head  of  the  Commission,  and  chose  for  his  asso 
ciates  men  who  were  not  qualified  to  win  for  him 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  249 

the  support  that  he  needed  in  the  Senate  or  in  the 
country.  Robert  Lansing,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
was  a  necessary  appointment.  Colonel  House  was 
probably  the  best-fitted  man  in  America  for  the 
approaching  negotiations,  alike  by  his  tempera 
ment,  by  the  breadth  of  his  knowledge  of  foreign 
questions,  and  by  his  intimacy  with  foreign  states 
men.  But  at  least  two  places  on  the  Commission 
should  have  been  given  to  eminent  Republicans 
and  to  men  universally  known  and  respected.  If 
Wilson  was  unwilling  to  select  members  of  the 
Senate,  he  might  have  heeded  public  opinion  which 
called  definitely  for  William  Howard  Taft  and 
Elihu  Root.  Both  were  pledged  to  the  most  im 
portant  item  of  Wilson's  programme,  the  League 
of  Nations;  both  exercised  wide  influence  in  the 
country  and  in  the  Republican  party.  The  Senate, 
with  a  Republican  majority,  would  almost  cer 
tainly  ratify  any  treaty  which  they  had  signed. 
But  the  President,  for  reasons  of  a  purely  negative 
character,  passed  them  over  and  with  what  looked 
to  the  public  like  mere  carelessness,  chose  General 
Tasker  Howard  Bliss  and  Henry  White,  formerly 
Ambassador  to  Rome  and  Paris  under  Presidents 
Roosevelt  and  Taft.  Both  were  men  of  ability 
and  experience,  but  neither  enjoyed  the  particular 


250  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

confidence  of  the  American  people;  and  what 
Americans  chiefly  wanted  was  the  assurance  of 
persons  they  knew  and  trusted,  that  the  peace 
was  right.  In  the  existing  state  of  public  opin 
ion,  the  assurance  of  the  President  was  not  in 
itself  sufficient. 

President  Wilson's  decision  to  go  to  Paris  as  a 
member  of  the  Commission  aroused  still  fiercer 
opposition,  but  had  reasons  infinitely  more  cogent. 
He  knew  that  there  would  be  great  difficulty  in 
translating  his  ideals  into  fact  at  the  Peace  Con 
ference.  He  believed  that  he  could  count  upon  the 
support  of  liberal  opinion  in  Europe,  but  realized 
that  the  leading  politicians  had  not  yet  been  won 
sincerely  to  his  policy.  The  pledge  they  had  given 
to  accept  the  Fourteen  Points  might  mean  much  or 
little;  everything  depended  upon  interpretation. 
A  peace  of  justice  and  a  League  of  Nations  still 
hung  in  the  balance.  At  this  moment,  with  Ger 
many  clearly  helpless,  opinion  abroad  appeared  to 
be  tending,  naturally  enough,  toward  the  old-style 
division  of  the  spoils  among  the  victors.  More  than 
one  influential  French  and  British  newspaper  began 
to  sound  the  cry  Vce  victis.  Moreover,  in  Amer 
ica  broke  forth  a  chorus  of  encouragement  to  the 
Allies  to  pay  no  attention  to  Wilsonian  idealism. 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  251 

On  the  27th  of  November,  shortly  before  the 
Commission  sailed,  Roosevelt  wrote:  "Our  Allies 
and  our  enemies  and  Mr.  Wilson  himself  should  all 
understand  that  Mr.  Wilson  has  no  authority 
whatever  to  speak  for  the  American  people  at  this 
time.  His  leadership  has  just  been  emphatically 
repudiated  by  them.  .  .  .  Mr.  Wilson  and  his 
Fourteen  Points  and  his  four  supplementary  points 
and  his  five  complementary  points  and  all  his 
utterances  every  which  way  have  ceased  to  have 
any  shadow  of  right  to  be  accepted  as  expressive 
of  the  will  of  the  American  people.  .  .  .  Let  them 
[the  Allies]  impose  their  common  will  on  the  nations 
responsible  for  the  hideous  disaster  which  has  al 
most  wrecked  mankind."  It  was  frank  encourage 
ment  to  the  Allies,  coming  from  the  American  who, 
with  Wilson,  was  best-known  abroad,  to  divide  the 
spoils  and  to  disregard  all  promises  to  introduce  a 
new  international  order,  and  it  must  have  brought 
joy  to  Clemenceau  and  Sonnino. 

Wilson  feared  that  having  won  the  war  the 
United  States  might  lose  the  peace:  not  by  softness 
towards  Germany  —  as  yet  there  was  no  danger  of 
that  —  but  by  forgetting  the  ideals  for  which  it  had 
entered  the  war,  by  forgetting  that  a  peace  of  in 
justice  sows  the  seeds  of  the  next  war,  and  by  a 


252   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

relapse  into  the  old  bankrupt  system  of  the  Balance 
of  Power.  He  realized  that  the  peoples  of  France, 
England,  and  Italy  had  felt  the  pinch  of  war  as  the 
American  people  had  never  done,  and  that  it  was 
demanding  too  much  of  human  nature  to  expect 
that  their  attitude  would  be  one  of  moderation, 
He  knew  that  in  the  negotiations  Clemenceau  and 
Sonnino  would  be  definitely  opposed  to  his  pro 
gramme  and  that  he  could  not  count  upon  Lloyd 
George.  He  decided  therefore  that  he  must  him 
self  go  to  Paris  to  fight  for  his  ideals.  The  decision 
was  one  of  tremendous  significance.  At  the  mo 
ment  when  domestic  problems  of  reconstruction 
would  be  most  acute,  an  American  President  was 
going  to  leave  the  country  because  of  the  interest  of 
America  in  European  affairs.  The  United  States  was 
now  so  much  a  part  of  the  world  system  that  domes 
tic  issues  seemed  of  less  importance  than  the  danger 
that  Europe  might  fall  back  into  the  old  interna 
tional  system  which  had  proved  unable  to  keep  the 
peace.  The  President's  voyage  to  France  was  the 
clearest  manifestation  yet  vouchsafed  of  the  settled 
position  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power. 

If  the  justice  of  his  policy  and  the  necessity  of 
full  participation  in  the  peace  as  in  the  war  be  ad 
mitted,  Wilson  was  probably  right  in  going  to 


THE  PATH  TO  PEACE  25S 

Paris.  No  one  else  could  have  secured  so  much  of 
his  programme.  No  one  else  was  possessed  of  the 
political  power  or  the  personal  prestige  which  be 
longed  to  him.  The  history  of  the  Conference 
was  to  show  that  when  he  absented  himself  in 
February  and  after  he  left  Paris  in  June,  his  sub 
ordinates  found  great  difficulty  in  meeting  Allied 
opposition.  But  the  decision  of  the  President  to 
attend  the  Peace  Conference  furnished  fresh  ma 
terial  for  criticism  at  home.  It  was  a  new  thing 
in  our  history;  people  did  not  understand  the  im 
portance  of  the  issues  involved  and  attributed  his 
voyage  to  vanity.  Unquestionably  it  weakened 
Wilson  in  America  as  much  as  it  strengthened  him 
abroad.  When  on  the  4th  of  December,  the  presi 
dential  ship,  George  Washington,  sailed  out  of  New 
York  harbor,  saluted  by  the  wild  shrieks  of  a 
thousand  sirens  and  the  showers  of  glittering  white 
papers  streaming  from  the  windows  of  the  sky 
scrapers,  preceded  by  the  battleship  Pennsylvania, 
flanked  by  destroyers,  with  acrobatic  airplanes 
and  a  stately  dirigible  overhead,  external  enthu 
siasm  was  apparently  at  its  height.  But  Wilson 
left  behind  him  glowing  embers  of  intense  opposi 
tion  which,  during  the  next  six  months,  were  to  be 
fanned  into  a  dangerous  flame. 


CHAPTER  X 

WAYS   OF   THE   PEACE    CONFERENCE 

ON  Friday,  December  13,  1918,  the  George  Wash 
ington  steamed  slowly  into  Brest  harbor  through  a 
long  double  line  of  gray  battleships  and  destroyers, 
greeted  by  the  thunder  of  presidential  salutes  and 
the  blare  of  marine  bands.  Europe  thrilled  with 
emotion,  which  was  half  curiosity  and  half  genuine 
enthusiasm :  it  was  to  see  and  applaud  the  man  who 
during  the  past  eighteen  months  had  crystallized 
in  speech  the  undefined  thought  of  the  Allied  world, 
who  represented  (at  least  in  European  eyes)  the 
strength  and  idealism  of  America,  and  who  stood, 
for  the  moment,  as  the  political  Messiah  to  liber 
als  in  every  country  of  the  Old  World,  victors  or 
defeated.  The  intensity  of  the  curiosity  as  well 
as  the  sincerity  of  the  enthusiasm  was  attested  on 
the  following  day,  when  President  Wilson  drove 
through  the  streets  of  Paris,  welcomed  by  the  vo 
ciferous  plaudits  of  the  close-packed  crowd.  It  was 

254 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  255 

for  him  a  public  triumph,  no  greater  than  that 
accorded  to  King  Albert  of  Belgium  and  certainly 
less  demonstrative  than  the  jubilations  of  armis 
tice  night,  but  nevertheless  undeniably  sweet  to 
the  President,  who  looked  to  popular  opinion  as 
the  bulwark  upon  which  he  must  rely  during  the 
difficult  days  ahead. 

Further  triumphs  awaited  him  in  his  trips  to 
England  and  to  Italy.  In  London  and  Rome,  as  in 
Paris,  he  was  the  object  of  demonstrations  which  at 
tunes  became  almost  delirious;  more  than  once  his 
admirers  must  have  been  reminded  of  the  Biblical 
phrase  that  alludes  to  the  honor  of  a  prophet  out 
side  his  own  country.  The  emotion  of  Europe  is 
not  difficult  to  understand.  The  man  in  the  street 
was  ready  to  shout,  for  the  war  was  finished  and  the 
miseries  of  the  peace  that  was  no  peace  were  not 
yet  realized .  Wilson  stood  for  Justice  above  every 
thing,  and  the  people  of  each  country  believed 
whole-heartedly  that  their  particular  demands 
were  just;  the  President,  therefore,  must  stand 
with  them.  To  Frenchmen  it  was  obvious  that  he 
must  approve  the  "simple  justice"  of  the  claim 
that  Germany  pay  the  entire  cost  of  the  war; 
Italians  were  convinced  that  he  would  sanction 
their  "just"  demand  for  the  annexation  of  Fiume. 


256   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

So  long  as  Justice  remained  something  abstract  his 
popularity  remained  secure.  Could  he  retain  it 
when  concrete  issues  arose?  As  early  as  the  be 
ginning  of  January  ebullitions  of  approval  became 
less  frequent.  Discordant  voices  were  audible 
suggesting  that  Wilson  was  too  prone  to  sacrifice 
the  material  necessities  of  the  war-burdened  na 
tions  to  his  idealistic  notions.  People  asked  why 
he  failed  to  visit  Belgium  and  the  devastated  re 
gions  of  France,  so  as  to  see  for  himself  what  suf 
ferings  had  been  endured.  And  the  historian  may 
well  inquire  if  it  were  because  he  had  not  gauged 
the  depth  of  feeling  aroused  by  German  war  prac 
tices,  or  because  he  had  determined  to  show  the 
Germans  that  he  would  not  let  his  judgment  be 
clouded  by  emotion.  Whatever  the  explanation, 
his  popularity  suffered. 

Without  question  the  original  strength  of  Presi 
dent  Wilson's  position,  resting  in  part  upon  the 
warmth  of  popular  feeling,  which  is  ever  uncer 
tain,  was  undermined  by  the  delays  that  marked 
the  opening  of  the  Peace  Conference.  Such  delays 
may  have  resulted  in  part  from  the  purpose  of  the 
Allied  leaders,  who  wished  to  permit  public  enthu 
siasm  for  Wilson  to  cool;  they  may  also  have  been 
caused  in  part  by  the  differences  that  developed 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  257 

over  the  incorporation  of  the  League  of  Nations  in 
the  Treaty.  But  a  prime  cause  of  delay  is  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  a  Peace  Conference  of  this 
character  was  a  new  experience  and  the  statesmen 
assembled  were  not  quite  sure  how  to  conduct  it. 
Too  little  thought  had  been  given  to  the  problem 
of  organization,  and  the  plans  which  had  been 
drawn  up  by  the  French  and  Americans  were  ap 
parently  forgotten.  The  host  of  diplomatic  at 
taches  and  technical  advisers,  who  crowded  the 
Quai  d'Orsay  and  the  hotels  of  Paris,  had  only  a 
vague  notion  as  to  their  duties  and  waited  uneasily, 
wondering  why  their  chiefs  did  not  set  them  to 
work.  In  truth  the  making  of  peace  was  to  be 
characterized  by  a  looseness  of  organization,  a 
failure  to  coordinate,  and  a  waste  of  time  and 
energy  resulting  from  slipshod  methods.  In  the 
deliberations  of  the  Conference  there  was  a  curious 
mixture  of  efficiency  and  ineffectiveness;  a  wealth 
of  information  upon  the  topics  under  discussion 
and  an  inability  to  concentrate  that  information. 
Important  decisions  were  made  and  forgotten  in 
the  welter  of  conferential  disorganization. 

No  one  could  complain  that  delays  were  caused 
by  the  kind  of  gay  frivolity  that  characterized 
the  Vienna  Congress  a  hundred  years  ago.  The 


258   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

atmosphere  of  the  Paris  Conference  was  more  like 
that  of  a  convention  of  traveling  salesmen.  The 
Hotel  Crillon,  home  of  the  American  Commission, 
was  gray  and  gaunt  as  the  State,  War,  and  Navy 
Building  in  Washington.  Banquets  were  rare; 
state  balls  unheard  of.  The  President  who  had 
separate  headquarters,  first  in  the  Pare  Monceau 
and  later  on  the  Place  des  Etats  Unis,  avoided  the 
orthodox  diversions  of  diplomacy  and  labored  with 
an  intensity  that  was  destined  to  result  in  physical 
collapse.  The  very  dress  of  the  delegates  mirrored 
their  businesslike  attitude :  high  silk  hats  were  sel 
dom  seen;  Lloyd  George  appeared  in  the  plainest 
of  bowlers  and  Colonel  House  in  his  simple,  black 
felt.  Experts  worked  far  into  the  early  morning 
hours  in  order  that  principals  might  have  statis 
tics;  principals  labored  even  on  Easter  Day,  and 
were  roused  from  their  beds  at  four  in  the  morn 
ing  to  answer  telegrams.  Unique  departure  in  the 
history  of  diplomacy:  this  was  a  working  Peace 
Conference ! 

Each  of  the  different  commissions  had  brought 
to  Paris  a  staff  of  attaches  and  experts,  upon  whom 
the  principal  delegates  were  to  rely  in  questions  of 
fact,  and  who  were  themselves  to  decide  points  of 
detail  in  drafting  the  economic  and  political  clauses 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  259 

of  the  treaties  and  in  determining  new  boundaries. 
The  expert  staff  of  the  American  Commission  had 
been  carefully  selected  and  was  generally  regarded 
as  equal  to  that  of  any  other  power.  Compared 
with  the  foreign  experts,  its  members  lacked  experi 
ence  in  diplomatic  methods,  no  doubt,  but  they 
were  as  well  or  better  equipped  with  exact  informa 
tion.  There  is  an  instance  of  an  American  expert 
on  a  minor  commission  asking  that  a  decision  be  al 
tered  in  view  of  new  facts  just  brought  to  light,  and 
offering  to  place  those  facts  in  detail  before  the 
commission.  "I  suggest, "  said  a  foreign  delegate, 
"that  we  accept  the  amendment  without  investi 
gation.  Hitherto  the  facts  presented  by  the  Amer 
icans  have  been  irrefutable;  it  would  be  waste  of 
time  to  investigate  them." 

Such  men  as  Hoover,  Hurley,  and  Gompers  were 
at  hand  to  give  their  expert  opinions  on  questions 
which  they  had  mastered  during  the  course  of  the 
war.  Norman  Davis  and  Thomas  Lamont  acted 
as  financial  advisers.  Baruch  and  McCormick 
brought  the  wealth  of  experience  which  resulted 
from  their  administration  of  the  War  Industries 
and  War  Trade  Boards.  The  foresight  of  Colonel 
House,  furthermore,  had  gathered  together  a  group 
of  men  who,  organized  since  the  summer  of  1917  in 


260   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

what  had  been  called  "The  Inquiry,"  had  been 
studying  the  conditions  that  would  determine  new 
political  boundaries  on  the  basis  of  justice  and 
practicability.  The  principal  delegates  could  not 
be  expected  to  know  the  details  that  would  decide 
the  disposition  of  Danzig,  the  fate  of  Fiume,  the 
division  of  the  Banat  of  Temesvar.  They  would 
need  some  one  to  tell  them  the  amount  of  coal 
produced  in  the  Saar  Basin,  the  location  of  mines 
in  Teschen,  the  ethnic  character  of  eastern  Galicia, 
the  difference  between  Slovaks  and  Ruthenians. 
It  was  all  very  well  to  come  to  the  Conference  with 
demands  for  justice,  but  our  commissioners  must 
have  cold  facts  to  support  those  demands.  The 
fact  that  exact  information  was  available,  and 
played  a  role  in  the  decisions  of  the  Conference, 
marks  a  step  forward  in  the  history  of  diplomatic 
relations. 

Contrary  to  general  expectation  and  rumor,  Wil 
son,  although  he  disregarded  the  American  Com 
missioners,  except  Colonel  House,  made  constant 
use  of  the  various  experts.  On  the  George  Wash 
ington  he  had  told  a  group  of  them  that  he  would 
rely  absolutely  upon  the  results  of  their  investi 
gations.  "Tell  me  what's  right,"  he  had  said, 
"and  I'll  fight  for  it.  Give  me  a  guaranteed 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  261 

position."  During  the  negotiations  he  called  in 
the  experts  for  daily  consultations;  they  sat  behind 
him  at  the  sessions  of  the  Council  of  Ten  and  on 
the  sofa  beside  him  in  the  Council  of  Four.  Their 
advice  was  not  always  followed  to  the  letter ;  in  the 
Shantung  issue  it  was  reluctantly  discarded;  but 
in  such  important  matters  as  the  Fiume  problem, 
Wilson  rested  his  case  wholly  upon  the  knowledge 
and  opinions  of  the  experts. 

In  defiance  of  the  example  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  which  never  formally  gathered  in  plenary 
session,  the  Paris  Conference  met  with  all  delegates 
for  the  first  time,  on  January  18,  1919.  It  was  a 
picturesque  scene,  cast  in  the  long  Clock  Room  of 
the  Quai  d'Orsay,  the  conventional  black  of  the 
majority  of  delegates  broken  by  the  horizon-blue 
uniform  of  Marshal  Foch,  the  natty  red-trimmed 
khaki  of  British  staff  officers,  and  the  white  flow 
ing  robes  and  golden  headdress  of  the  Arabian 
Emir  Faisal;  down  the  center  of  the  room  ran  the 
traditionally  diplomatic  green  baize  tables  behind 
which  sat  the  delegates;  attaches  and  press  cor 
respondents  crowded  into  the  corners  or  peered 
around  the  curtains  of  adjoining  rooms;  at  the  end, 
in  front  of  the  white  marble  fireplace,  sat  the 
dominating  personalities  of  the  Allied  world.  But 


262   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

such  plenary  sessions  were  not  to  witness  the  actual 
work  of  the  Conference,  nor  was  Wilson's  de 
mand  for  "open  covenants  openly  arrived  at"  to 
be  translated  literally  into  accomplishment.  To 
conduct  the  Peace  Conference  by  sessions  open  to 
the  public  was  obviously  not  feasible.  There  were 
too  many  delegates.  Time,  which  was  precious 
beyond  evaluation,  would  be  lost  in  the  making  of 
speeches  for  home  consumption.  More  time  would 
be  lost  in  translation  of  the  Babel  of  languages. 
Frankness  and  directness  of  negotiation  would  be 
impossible,  for  if  the  papers  should  print  what  the 
delegates  said  about  each  other  there  would  be  a 
national  crisis  every  day.  Finally,  a  congress  is  by 
nature  ill-adapted  for  the  study  of  intricate  inter 
national  problems,  as  was  later  to  be  illustrated  in 
the  history  of  the  United  States  Senate. 

The  representatives  of  the  larger  European 
Powers  had  assumed  that  the  direction  of  the  Con 
ference  would  be  taken  by  a  small  executive  com 
mittee,  corresponding  to  the  Supreme  Wrar  Coun 
cil,  and  to  this  President  W7ilson  agreed.  Such  a 
committee  would  necessarily  meet  in  secret,  in  or 
der  that  it  might  not  be  hampered  by  formalities 
and  that  there  might  be  frank  speech.  Only  a 
brief  communique,  stating  the  subject  of  discussion 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  263 

and  the  decision  reached,  would  be  issued  to  the 
press.  The  committee  would  provide  for  the  execu 
tive  measures  that  must  be  taken  to  oppose  the 
growth  of  economic  and  political  anarchy  in  central 
and  southeastern  Europe,  would  distribute  the 
problems  that  were  to  be  studied  by  special  com 
missions,  and  would  formulate  or  approve  the  solu 
tions  to  those  problems.  It  would  supervise  the 
drafting  of  the  treaties  and  present  them  to  the 
plenary  conference  in  practically  final  form.  Since 
the  bulk  of  the  fighting  had  been  carried  by  the 
major  powers  and  since  they  would  guarantee  the 
peace,  this  supreme  council  of  the  Conference  was 
composed  of  two  representatives  of  the  major  five, 
France,  Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  Italy, 
and  Japan,  the  last-named  now  entering  the  sacred 
coterie  of  "Great  Powers."  Among  the  delegates 
of  the  smaller  powers  there  was  lively  dissatisfac 
tion  at  the  exclusion  from  the  inner  council  of  such 
states  as  Belgium  and  Serbia,  which  had  been  in 
vaded  by  the  enemy  and  had  made  heavy  sacrifices 
in  the  war;  they  complained  also  that  the  number 
of  delegates  allotted  them  was  insufficient.  Al 
ready,  it  was  whispered,  the  phrases  that  dealt 
with  the  "rights  of  small  nations"  were  being  for 
gotten,  and  this  peace  congress  was  to  be  but  a 


264   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

repetition  of  those  previous  diplomatic  assemblies 
where  the  spoils  went  to  the  strong.  But  Wilson, 
who  was  regarded  as  the  defender  of  the  rights 
of  the  small  states,  agreed  with  Clemenceau  that 
practical  necessity  demanded  an  executive  council 
of  restricted  numbers,  and  felt  that  such  a  body 
could  be  trusted  to  see  that  effective  justice  was 
secured.  In  truth  the  President  was  almost  as 
much  impressed  by  the  extreme  nationalistic  ardor 
of  the  small  powers,  as  a  source  of  future  danger,  as 
he  was  by  the  selfishness  of  the  large. 

The  Supreme  Council,  during  the  early  days  of 
the  Conference,  was  generally  known  as  the  Coun 
cil  of  Ten.  It  met  in  the  study  of  Stephane  Pichon, 
the  French  Foreign  Minister,  which  opened  on 
to  the  garden  of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  and 
which,  with  its  panelled  walls,  covered  with  gor 
geous  Gobelins  picturing  Ruben's  story  of  Marie 
de'  Medici,  its  stately  brocaded  chairs,  and  old- 
rose  and  gray  Aubusson  carpets,  was  redolent  of 
old-time  diplomacy.  In  the  center,  behind  a  mas 
sive  desk,  sat  the  president  of  the  Conference, 
Georges  Clemenceau  —  short,  squat,  round-shoul 
dered,  with  heavy  white  eyebrows  and  mustache 
serving  perfectly  to  conceal  the  expression  both  of 
eyes  and  of  mouth.  Ordinarily  he  rested  immobile, 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  265 

his  hands  folded  in  the  eternal  gray  gloves>  on 
his  face  an  expression  of  bored  tolerance,  the 
expression  of  a  man  who,  after  half  a  century  in 
the  political  arena  of  France,  had  little  to  learn 
either  of  men  or  of  affairs,  even  from  a  Peace 
Conference.  Skeptical  in  attitude,  a  cold  listen 
er,  obviously  impermeable  to  mere  verbiage  and 
affected  by  the  logic  of  facts  alone,  he  had  a  ruth 
less  finger  ready  to  poke  into  the  interstices  of 
a  loosely-woven  argument.  Clemenceau  spoke 
but  rarely,  in  low  even  tones,  with  a  paucity  and 
awkwardness  of  gesture  surprising  in  a  Latin;  he 
was  chary  of  eloquence,  disdaining  the  obvious 
arts  of  the  rhetor,  but  he  had  at  his  command  an 
endless  string  of  biting  epigrams,  and  his  satire 
wounded  with  a  touch  so  sharp  that  it  was  scarcely 
felt  or  seen  except  by  the  unfortunate  recipient. 
Upon  infrequent  occasion,  in  the  course  of  hot 
debate,  some  one  would  pierce  his  armor  and  touch 
him  upon  the  unguarded  quick;  then  the  man  was 
transformed,  the  eyebrows  would  shoot  up,  the 
eyes  flash,  the  mustache  bristle,  the  voice  vibrate, 
and  the  invective  which  he  poured  forth  scalded  like 
molten  lead.  One  understood  at  such  a  moment 
why  he  was  called  "  the  Tiger."  But  such  outbursts 
were  rare.  More  characteristic  of  his  method  of 


266   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

debate  was  the  low-voiced  ironical  phrase,  when 
his  arid  humor  crackled  like  a  wireless  message. 

Clemenceau  dwarfed  the  other  French  delegates, 
with  a  single  exception,  not  alone  by  the  magic  of 
his  personality  but  by  the  grip  which  he  had  on  the 
imagination  of  France.  The  people  remembered 
that  long  career,  beginning  with  the  early  days  of 
the  Republic  and  culminating  with  the  miracle  of 
the  political  salvation  he  brought  to  France  in  the 
dark  days  of  1917,  when  the  morale  of  the  nation 
was  near  the  breaking-point,  and  which  made 
possible  the  military  victory  of  Foch.  France  was 
grateful.  He  had  no  political  party  in  the  Chamber 
upon  which  to  rely,  but  the  nation  was  behind  him, 
at  least  for  the  moment.  "If  I  should  die  now," 
he  is  reported  to  have  said  during  the  early  days 
of  the  Conference,  "France  would  give  me  a  great 
funeral.  If  I  live  six  months,  no  one  knows  what 
may  happen."  For  Clemenceau  was  a  realist;  he 
did  not  permit  himself  the  luxury  of  being  deceived 
even  by  the  good  qualities  of  his  own  countrymen. 
If  he  feared  anything  it  was  the  domination  of 
politics  by  the  impractical.  Mankind  must  be 
taken  as  it  is  and  not  as  we  should  like  it  to  be.  He 
was  troubled  by  what  he  called  the  "noble  sim 
plicity"  of  Wilson.  Statesmen  must  be  inspired 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  267 

by  the  sacred  egotism  which  provides  for  the  ma 
terial  safety  and  progress  of  their  own  nation. 
Above  all,  in  his  mind,  France  was  particularly 
vulnerable  and  thus  must  insist  upon  particular 
means  of  defense  against  the  secular  enemy  across 
the  Rhine. 

Behind  Clemenceau,  in  the  Council,  hovered  his 
friend  and  Foreign  Secretary,  Stephane  Pichon. 
More  in  evidence,  however,  was  Andre  Tardieu, 
who  alone  of  the  French  delegates  remained  un- 
dwarfed  by  the  Prime  Minister.  Journalist,  poli 
tician,  captain  of  Blue  Devils,  Franco-American 
Commissioner,  now  the  youngest  of  the  French 
peace  commission,  Tardieu,  more  than  any  one  else 
supplied  the  motive  energy  that  carried  the  treaty 
to  completion.  Debonair  and  genial,  excessively 
practical,  he  was  the  "troubleman"  of  the  Con 
ference:  when  difficulties  arose  over  the  Saar,  or 
Fiume,  or  reparations,  Tardieu  was  called  in  to 
work  with  a  special  committee  and  find  a  com 
promise.  Not  a  regular  member  of  the  Council  of 
Ten,  he  was  nevertheless  at  Clemenceau's  elbow, 
and  especially  after  the  attempt  on  the  latter 's  life, 
he  labored  day  and  night  on  the  details  which 
were  too  much  for  the  strength  and  time  of  the 
older  man. 


268   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

On  Clemenceau's  right,  and  half  facing  him,  sat 
the  two  American  delegates,  Wilson  and  Lansing. 
The  President,  to  the  surprise  of  many,  was  by  no 
means  the  awkward  college  professor  lost  among 
practical  politicians.  His  speech  was  slow  and  his 
manner  might  almost  be  called  ponderous,  but  the 
advisers  who  whispered  over  his  shoulder,  during 
the  course  of  the  debate,  attested  the  rapidity 
with  which  his  mind  operates  and  his  skill  in  catch 
ing  the  points  suggested.  There  was  far  less  of  the 
dogmatic  doctrinaire  in  his  attitude  than  had  been 
looked  for.  Occasionally  his  remarks  bordered  up 
on  the  sententious,  but  he  never  "orated,"  in 
variably  using  a  conversational  tone;  many  of  his 
points  were  driven  home  by  humorous  allusions  or 
anecdotes  rather  than  by  didactic  logic.  Like  that 
of  the  other  delegates  his  manner  was  informal. 
During  the  cold  days  of  late  January  he  walked 
about  the  room  during  discussions  in  order  to  keep 
his  feet  warm.  Indeed  the  proceedings  of  the 
Council  of  Ten  were  characterized  by  a  noted  ab 
sence  of  stiffness.  It  was  evidently  expected  that 
the  prestige  which  Wilson  possessed  among  the 
masses  would  evaporate  in  this  inner  council;  but 
nothing  of  the  kind  was  apparent.  It  was  not  un 
interesting  to  note  that  when  a  point  was  raised 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  269 

every  one  looked  involuntarily  to  see  how  it  would 
be  taken  by  the  President;  and  when  the  dele 
gates  of  the  smaller  Powers  appeared  before  the 
Council  they  addressed  their  remarks  almost  di 
rectly  at  him.  Lansing  spoke  seldom,  but  then 
with  force  and  conviction,  and  was  evidently  more 
troubled  than  Wilson  by  the  compromises  with  ex 
pediency  which  the  Americans  were  compelled  to 
make.  His  attention  was  never  distracted  by  the 
sketches  which  he  drew  without  ceasing,  during 
the  course  of  the  debates — grotesque  and  humorous 
figures,  much  in  demand  by  every  one  present  as 
mementos  of  the  Conference. 

Next  on  the  right  sat  David  Lloyd  George,  with 
thick  gray  hair  and  snapping  Celtic  eyes.  Alert 
and  magnetic,  he  was  on  the  edge  of  his  chair, 
questioning  and  interrupting.  Frankly  ignorant 
of  the  details  of  continental  geography  and  politics, 
naive  in  his  inquiries,  he  possessed  the  capacity 
for  acquiring  effective  information  at  lightning 
speed.  Unfortunately  he  was  not  over-critical  and 
the  source  of  his  information  was  not  invariably 
the  highest  authority;  he  was  prone  to  accept  the 
views  of  journalists  rather  than  those  of  his  own 
Foreign  Office.  Effervescent  as  a  bottle  just  rid  of 
its  cork,  he  was  also  unstable,  twisting  and  veering 


270  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

in  his  suggestions;  not  so  much  blown  about  by  the 
winds  of  hostile  criticism,  to  which  he  paid  but 
little  attention,  as  carried  on  by  the  shifting  tides  of 
political  events  at  home.  For  his  eye  was  always 
across  the  Channel,  calculating  the  domestic  effect 
of  each  treaty  provision.  Few  could  resist  his  per 
sonal  magnetism  in  conversation  and  no  one  would 
deny  him  the  title  of  master-politician  of  his  age. 
During  the  first  weeks  of  the  Conference,  Wilson 
seems  to  have  fallen  under  the  spell  of  Lloyd 
George  to  some  extent,  who  showed  himself  quite 
as  liberal  as  the  President  in  many  instances.  But 
Wilson  was  clearly  troubled  by  the  Welshman's 
mercurial  policy,  and  before  he  finally  left  for 
America,  found  relief  in  the  solid  consistency  of 
Clemenceau.  He  always  knew  where  the  French 
Premier  stood,  no  matter  how  much  he  might  differ 
from  him  in  point  of  view. 

Beside  Lloyd  George,  a  perfect  foil,  sat  Arthur 
J.  Balfour,  assuming  the  attitude  habitual  to  him 
after  long  years  in  the  House  of  Commons  —  head 
on  the  back  of  his  chair,  body  reclining  at  a  com 
fortable  angle,  long  legs  stretched  in  front,  hands 
grasping  the  lapels  of  his  coat,  eyes  at  frequent 
intervals  closed.  Rising,  he  overtopped  every  one 
present,  white  and  bent  though  he  was,  in  physical 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  271 

stature  as  he  did  also  in  pure  intellectual  power. 
Graceful  in  tone  and  expression  his  outlook  was 
the  philosophical,  possibly  over-tolerant  for  the 
exigencies  of  the  situation,  although  upon  occasion 
his  judgment  proved  a  valuable  counterweight  to 
the  hasty  enthusiasm  of  Lloyd  George.  But  Bal- 
four,  like  Lansing,  was  sometimes  treated  with 
scant  consideration  by  his  chief  and  by  no  means 
exercised  the  influence  which  his  experience  and 
capacity  would  lead  one  to  expect. 

On  the  right  of  the  British  delegates  sat  the  two 
Japanese,  silent,  observant,  their  features  immobile 
as  the  Sphinx.  It  was  a  bold  man  who  would 
attempt  to  guess  the  thoughts  masked  by  their 
impassive  faces.  They  waited  for  the  strategic 
moment  when  they  were  to  present  their  special 
claims;  until  then  they  attended  all  meetings, 
scarcely  speaking  a  word,  unwilling  to  commit 
themselves.  Upon  one  occasion,  in  a  minor  com 
mission,  the  Japanese  delegate  held  the  deciding 
vote,  the  other  four  delegations  being  tied;  when 
asked  by  the  chairman  how  he  voted,  whether  with 
the  French  and  Americans  or  with  the  British  and 
Italians,  the  Japanese  responded  simply,  "Yes." 
Next  the  Japanese,  but  facing  Clemenceau  and 
about  twelve  feet  from  him,  were  the  Italians: 


272   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Sonnino  with  his  close-cropped  white  bullet  head 
and  heavy  drooping  mustache,  his  great  Roman 
nose  coming  down  to  meet  an  equally  strong  out- 
jutting  chin,  his  jaw  set  like  a  steel  latch.  The 
hawklike  appearance  of  the  man  was  softened  in 
debate  by  the  urbanity  of  his  manner  and  the 
modulations  of  his  voice.  Orlando  was  less  dis 
tinctive  in  appearance  and  character.  Eloquent 
and  warm-hearted,  he  was  troubled  by  the  con 
sciousness  that  failure  to  secure  the  full  extent  of 
Italian  claims  spelled  the  downfall  of  his  ministry 
in  Rome.  It  is  of  some  historical  importance  that 
Sonnino,  who  spoke  perfect  English  with  just  a 
trace  of  Etonian  inflection,  was  the  more  obsti 
nate  in  his  demands;  Orlando,  who  showed  himself 
inclined  to  compromise,  spoke  no  English  and 
therefore  could  come  into  intellectual  contact  with 
Wilson  and  Lloyd  George  only  through  the  medium 
of  an  interpreter. 

Proceedings  were  necessarily  in  both  French 
and  English,  because  none  of  the  big  men  except 
Clemenceau  and  Sonnino  used  the  two  languages 
with  comfort.  The  interpreter,  Mantoux,  who  sat 
behind  Clemenceau,  was  no  mere  translator.  A 
few  notes  scribbled  on  a  pad  were  sufficient  for  him 
to  render  the  sense  of  a  speech  with  keen  accuracy 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  273 

and  frequently  with  a  fire  and  a  pungency  that  sur 
passed  the  original.  He  spoke  always  in  the  first 
person  as  though  the  points  made  in  debate  were 
his  own,  and  the  carrying  of  each  particular  point 
the  ideal  nearest  his  heart.  Behind  the  principals, 
the  "Olympians,"  as  they  came  to  be  called,  were 
the  experts  and  attaches,  with  long  rolls  of  maps 
and  complex  tables  of  statistics,  ready  to  answer 
questions  of  detailed  facts.  In  truth  there  was 
more  reference  to  sources  of  exact  information  by 
the  chief  delegates  than  would  have  been  expected 
by  the  student  of  former  diplomatic  practices. 

In  the  center  of  the  room,  facing  the  Olympians, 
stood  or  sat  the  particular  claimant  or  expert 
witness  of  the  seance.  Now  it  might  be  Marshal 
Foch,  with  wrinkled,  weary,  war-worn  visage,  and 
thin  rumpled  hair,  in  shabby  uniform,  telling  of  Ger 
many's  failure  to  fulfill  the  armistice  conditions;  one 
would  meet  him  later  in  the  corridor  outside  — 
like  Grant,  he  was  apt  to  have  the  stump  of  a  black 
cigar  in  the  corner  of  his  mouth  —  usually  shaking 
his  head  ominously  over  the  failure  of  the  politi 
cians  to  treat  Germany  with  the  requisite  severity. 
Or  the  claimant  before  the  Ten  might  be  the  grave, 
self-contained  Venizelos,  once  outlaw  and  revolu 
tionary,  now,  after  many  turns  of  fortune's  wheel, 

18 


274    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

master  of  Greece  and  perhaps  the  greatest  states 
man  of  them  all.  Then  again  would  appear  the 
boyish  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Czecho-Slovak 
Republic,  Edward  Benes,  winning  friends  on  all 
sides  by  his  frank  sincerity  and  ready  smile;  or, 
perfect  contrast,  the  blackbearded  Bratiano  of 
Rumania,  claiming  the  enforcement  of  the  secret 
treaty  that  was  to  double  the  area  of  his  state. 
Later,  Paderewski  came  from  Warsaw,  his  art 
sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  patriotism,  leonine  in 
appearance,  but  surprisingly  untemperamental  in 
diplomatic  negotiation. 

To  each  of  these  and  to  many  others  who  pre 
sented  problems  for  immediate  settlement  the 
Council  listened,  for  it  had  not  merely  to  draw  up 
treaties  and  provide  for  the  future  peace  of  the 
world,  but  also  to  meet  crises  of  the  moment.  The 
starving  populations  of  central  and  southeastern 
Europe  must  be  fed;  tiny  wars  that  had  sprung  up 
between  smaller  nationalities  must  be  attended  to 
and  armistice  commissions  dispatched;  the  reha 
bilitation  of  railroads  and  river  transportation  de 
manded  attention;  coal  mines  must  be  operated  and 
labor  difficulties  adjusted.  This  economic  renais 
sance  had  to  be  accomplished  in  face  of  national 
istic  quarrels  and  the  social  unrest  that  threatened 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  275 

to  spread  the  poison  of  communistic  revolution  as 
far  west  as  the  Rhine  and  the  Adriatic. 

From  the  beginning  it  was  clear  that  the  actual 
drafting  of  the  treaty  clauses  would  have  to  be 
undertaken  by  special  commissions.  The  work 
could  never  be  completed  except  by  a  subdivision 
of  labor  and  the  assignment  of  particular  problems 
to  especially  competent  groups.  As  the  Council 
of  Ten  faced  the  situation,  they  decided  that  the 
number  of  the  commissions  must  be  increased.  By 
the  beginning  of  February  the  work  was  largely 
subdivided.  There  was  a  commission  headed  by 
President  Wilson  working  on  the  League  of  Na 
tions,  while  others  studied  such  problems  as 
responsibility  for  the  war,  reparations,  interna 
tional  labor  legislation,  international  control  of 
ports,  waterways,  and  railways,  financial  and  eco 
nomic  problems,  military,  naval,  and  aerial  ques 
tions.  When  the  Council  of  Ten  found  themselves 
puzzled  by  the  conflicting  territorial  claims  of  dif 
ferent  Allied  nations,  they  decided  to  create  also 
special  territorial  commissions  to  study  bounda 
ries  and  to  report  their  recommendations  back 
to  the  Supreme  Council.  It  was  President  Wilson, 
chafing  at  the  early  delays  of  the  Conference,  who 
eagerly  adopted  a  suggestion  of  Colonel  House  to 


276   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

the  effect  that  time  might  be  saved  if  the  experts  of 
the  different  states  attacked  boundary  problems 
and  thus  relieved  the  strain  upon  the  time  and 
nerves  of  the  Olympians,  who  could  not  be  ex 
pected  to  know  or  understand  the  details  of  each 
question.  The  suggestion  was  approved  by  the 
chiefs  of  the  Allied  governments.  There  were  five 
such  territorial  commissions,  which  were  in  turn 
subdivided,  while  a  single  central  territorial  com 
mission  was  appointed  to  coordinate  the  reports. 
The  more  important  commissions,  such  as  that 
upon  the  League  of  Nations,  were  composed  of 
plenipotentiaries  and  included  generally  represen 
tatives  from  the  smaller  states.  The  reparations, 
financial,  and  labor  commissions  were  made  up  of 
business  men  and  financiers,  the  American  repre 
sentatives  including  such  figures  as  Lamont,  Nor 
man  Davis,  Baruch,  and  McCormick.  The  terri 
torial  commissions  were  composed  of  the  represen 
tatives  of  the  four  principal  Powers;  most  of  the 
European  delegates,  who  were  in  some  cases  also 
plenipotentiaries,  were  chosen  from  the  staffs  of 
the  Foreign  Offices,  and  included  such  men  as  Sir 
Eyre  Crowe,  Jules  Cambon,  Tardieu,  and  Sal- 
vago  Raggi.  The  American  delegates  were  gen 
erally  members  of  the  Inquiry,  men  who  had  been 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  277 

working  on  these  very  problems  for  more  than  a 
year.  The  special  commissions  worked  with  care 
and  assiduity,  and  their  decisions  rested  gener 
ally  on  facts  established  after  long  discussion.  To 
this  extent,  at  least,  the  Paris  Conference  was 
characterized  by  a  new  spirit  in  diplomacy. 

Upon  the  reports  of  these  commissions  were 
based  the  draft  articles  of  the  treaties,  which  were 
then  referred  back  to  the  Supreme  Council.  By 
the  time  the  reports  were  finished,  that  body  had 
divided  inco  two  smaller  bodies:  the  Council  of 
Foreign  Ministers,  and  the  Council  of  Premiers, 
composed  of  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  Wilson, 
and  Orlando.  The  latter  body,  which  came  to  be 
known  as  the  Council  of  Four,  or,  colloquially, 
the  "Big  Four,"  naturally  assumed  complete  di 
rection.  It  was  unfortunate  certainly  that  a  con 
gress  which  had  started  with  the  cry  of  "open 
covenants"  should  thus  find  itself  practically 
resolved  into  a  committee  of  four.  Disappoint 
ed  liberals  have  assumed  that  the  inner  council 
was  formed  with  the  object  of  separating  Presi 
dent  Wilson  from  contact  with  popular  ideas 
and  bringing  him  to  acceptance  of  the  old-style 
peace  desired  by  Clemenceau.  In  reality  the  Coun 
cil  of  Four  was  simply  a  revival  of  the  informal 


278   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

committee  which  had  sat  during  the  autumn  of 
1918,  when  Colonel  House,  Lloyd  George,  and 
Clemenceau  had  met  by  themselves  to  formulate 
the  policy  to  be  adopted  when  Germany  presented 
her  demand  for  an  armistice.  When  Wilson  left 
Paris  in  February,  Colonel  House,  who  became 
chiefly  responsible  for  the  American  side  of  nego 
tiations,  found  the  Council  of  Ten  unwieldy.  It 
was  attended  by  as  many  as  thirty  or  forty  per 
sons,  some  of  whom  seemed  inclined  to  spread  col 
ored  accounts  of  what  was  going  on,  and  the  very 
size  of  the  meeting  tended  toward  the  making 
of  speeches  and  the  slowing-down  of  progress. 
Furthermore,  at  that  time  Clemenceau,  confined 
to  his  house  by  the  wound  inflicted  by  a  would-be 
assassin,  was  unable  to  attend  the  sessions  of  the 
Council  of  Ten.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  the 
three  statesmen  who  had  worked  so  effectively  the 
preceding  autumn  should  now  renew  their  private 
conferences.  When  Wilson  returned  to  Paris  in 
March,  and  learned  from  Colonel  House  how  much 
more  rapidly  the  small  committee  was  able  to  dis 
pose  of  vexatious  questions,  he  readily  agreed  to  it. 
Nor  is  there  any  valid  evidence  extant  to  show  that 
his  influence  was  seriously  impaired  by  the  change, 
although  the  sessions  of  the  Council  of  Four  took 


WAYS  OF  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  279 

on  a  greater  appearance  of  secrecy  than  had  been 
desired  by  Colonel  House. 

The  Council  of  Four  acted  as  a  board  of  review 
and  direction  rather  than  of  dictators.  When  the 
reports  of  the  expert  commissions  were  unanimous 
they  were  generally  accepted  with  little  or  no 
alteration.  Wlien  a  divided  report  was  sent  up, 
the  Four  were  compelled  to  reach  a  compromise, 
since  every  delay  threatened  to  give  new  oppor 
tunity  to  the  forces  of  social  disorder  in  Germany 
and  southeastern  Europe.  The  Council  met  or 
dinarily  in  the  house  used  by  President  Wilson,  on 
the  Place  des  Etats-Unis.  Some  of  the  conferences 
were  held  in  a  small  room  downstairs  without  the 
presence  of  secretaries  or  advisers;  frequently,  how 
ever,  the  experts  were  called  in  to  meet  with  the 
chiefs  in  the  large  front  room  upstairs,  and  would 
often  monopolize  the  discussion,  the  Four  playing 
the  part  of  listeners  merely.  Formality  was  dis 
pensed  with.  During  a  debate  upon  the  south 
ern  boundary  of  Austria,  President  Wilson  might 
have  been  seen  on  all  fours,  kneeling  on  the 
floor  and  tracing  out  the  suggested  frontier  on  a 
huge  map,  while  other  peace  commissioners  and 
experts  surrounded  him,  also  on  their  hands  and 
knees.  Hours  of  labor  were  long.  There  was, 


280  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

certainly,  much  discussion  that  hinged  upon  self 
ish  nationalist  interests,  but  also  much  that  was 
inspired  by  a  sincere  desire  to  secure  the  solution 
that  would  permanently  restore  the  tranquillity 
of  Europe. 

The  presence  of  President  Wilson  did  much  to 
maintain  the  idealism  that  jostled  national  self- 
seeking  in  the  final  drafting  of  the  treaties.  Though 
he  lacked  the  political  brilliance  of  Lloyd  George 
and  had  not  the  suppressed  but  irresistible  vehe 
mence  that  characterized  Clemenceau,  his  very 
simplicity  of  argument  availed  much.  He  was  not 
destined  to  carry  through  the  full  programme  of 
idealism  as  set  out  in  the  Fourteen  Points,  at  least 
not  as  interpreted  by  most  liberals.  He  could  not 
secure  the  peace  of  reconciliation  which  he  had 
planned,  but  even  with  his  popularity  in  France, 
Belgium,  and  Italy  lost,  and  his  prestige  dimmed, 
he  retained  such  a  strong  position  in  the  Council 
of  Four  that  he  was  able  to  block  some  of  the 
more  extreme  propositions  advanced  by  imperial 
ist  elements,  and,  more  positively,  to  secure  what 
he  had  most  at  heart,  the  League  of  Nations. 
Whether  he  yielded  more  than  he  gained  is  a  ques 
tion  which  demands  more  detailed  consideration. 


CHAPTER  XI 

BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS? 

WHATEVER  mistakes  President  Wilson  made  at 
Paris,  he  did  not  greatly  underestimate  the  diffi 
culties  of  his  task  when  he  set  forth  from  the  United 
States.  The  liberal  utterances  of  the  Allied  chiefs 
during  the  war  had  never  succeeded  in  winning  his 
sincere  confidence;  more  than  once  he  had  even  in 
timated  that  he  did  not  consider  their  governments 
completely  representative  of  public  opinion.  He 
anticipated  a  struggle  with  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd 
George  over  the  amount  of  indemnity  which  was  to 
be  demanded  from  Germany,  as  well  as  over  the 
territory  of  which  she  was  to  be  deprived.  Their 
formal  approval  of  the  Fourteen  Points  had  been  a 
cause  of  intense  satisfaction  to  him,  but  he  realized 
definitely  that  they  would  make  every  effort  to  in 
terpret  them  in  terms  of  purely  national  self-inter 
est.  This  he  regarded  as  the  greatest  difficulty  to 
be  met  at  Paris.  The  second  difficulty  lay  in  the 

281 


282   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

extreme  demands  that  were  being  made  by  the 
smaller  nationalities,  now  liberated  from  Teuton 
dominion  or  overlordship.  Poland,  Rumania,  Ser 
bia,  Greece,  were  all  asking  for  territory  which 
could  only  be  assigned  to  them  on  the  ancient  prin 
ciple  of  the  division  of  spoils  among  the  victors. 
The  spirit  of  nationalism  which  had  played  a  role 
of  so  much  importance  in  the  antecedents  of  the 
war,  as  well  as  in  the  downfall  of  the  Central 
Empires,  now  threatened  to  ruin  the  peace.  As 
we  have  seen,  it  was  partly  because  of  this  second 
danger  that  Wilson  agreed  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  smaller  states  from  the  Supreme  Council  of 
the  Allies. 

Upon  the  details  of  the  treaties,  whether  of  an 
economic  or  a  territorial  character,  the  President 
did  not  at  first  lay  great  stress.  He  was  interested 
chiefly  in  the  spirit  that  lay  behind  the  treaties. 
The  peace,  he  insisted,  must  be  one  of  justice  and, 
if  possible,  one  of  reconciliation.  More  concretely, 
the  great  point  of  importance  was  the  establish 
ment  of  a  League  of  Nations ;  for  the  President  be 
lieved  that  only  through  the  building  up  of  a  new 
international  system,  based  upon  the  concert  of 
all  democratic  states,  could  permanent  justice  and 
amity  be  secured.  Only  a  new  system  could  suffice 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    283 

to  prevent  the  injustice  that  great  states  work  upon 
small,  and  to  stamp  out  the  germs  of  future  war. 
It  would  be  the  single  specific  factor  that  would 
make  this  treaty  different  from  and  better  than 
treaties  of  the  past.  The  ultimate  origin  of  the 
great  war  was  less  to  be  sought  in  the  aspirations 
and  malevolence  of  Germany,  he  believed,  than  in 
the  disorganized  international  system  of  Europe. 
Unless  that  were  radically  reformed,  unless  a  re 
gime  of  diplomatic  cooperation  were  substituted 
for  the  Balance  of  Power,  neither  justice  nor  peace 
could  last.  The  old  system  had  failed  too  often. 

Wilson  does  not  seem  to  have  formulated  defi 
nitely  before  he  reached  Paris  the  kind  of  League 
which  he  desired  to  see  created.  He  was  opposed 
to  such  intricate  machinery  as  that  proposed  by  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace,  and  favored  an  extremely 
simple  organization  which  might  evolve  naturally 
to  meet  conditions  of  the  future.  The  chief  organ 
of  a  League,  he  felt,  should  be  an  executive  council, 
possibly  composed  of  the  ambassadors  to  some 
small  neutral  power.  If  trouble  threatened  in  any 
quarter,  the  council  was  to  interfere  at  once  and 
propose  a  settlement.  If  this  proved  unsuccessful, 
a  commercial  boycott  might  be  instituted  against 
the  offending  state:  it  was  to  be  outlawed,  and,  as 


284   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Wilson  said,  "outlaws  are  not  popular  now."  He 
regarded  it  as  important  that  the  German  colonies 
should  not  be  divided  among  the  Allies,  but  should 
be  given  to  the  League,  to  be  administered  possibly 
through  some  smaller  power;  for  an  institution, 
he  felt,  is  always  stabilized  by  the  possession  of 
property. 

Such  were,  broadly  speaking,  the  ideas  which 
seemed  uppermost  in  the  President's  mind  when  he 
landed  in  France,  and  which  he  was  determined 
should  form  the  basis  of  the  peace.  He  anticipated 
opposition,  and  he  was  in  a  measure  prepared  to 
fight  for  his  ideals.  But  he  failed  adequately  to 
appreciate  the  confusion  which  had  fallen  upon 
Europe,  after  four  years  and  more  of  war,  and 
which  made  the  need  of  a  speedy  settlement  so  im 
perative.  If  he  had  gauged  more  accurately  the 
difficulties  of  his  task  he  would  have  been  more 
insistent  upon  the  drafting  of  a  quick  preliminary 
peace,  embodying  merely  general  articles,  and 
leaving  all  the  details  of  the  settlement  to  be 
worked  out  by  experts  at  their  leisure.  He  might 
thus  have  utilized  his  popularity  and  influence  when 
it  was  at  its  height,  and  have  avoided  the  loss  of 
prestige  which  inevitably  followed  upon  the  dis 
cussion  of  specific  issues,  when  he  was  compelled  to 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    285 

take  a  stand  opposed  to  the  national  aspirations 
of  the  various  states.     Such  a  general  preliminary 
treaty  would  have  gone  far  towards  restoring  a 
basis  for  the  resumption  of  normal  political  and 
economic  activity;  it  would  have  permitted  Wilson 
to  return  to  the  United  States  as  the  unquestioned 
leader  of  the  world;  it  would  have  blunted  the  edge 
of  senatorial  opposition;  and  finally  it  might  have 
enabled  him  to  avoid  the  controversies  with  Allied 
leaders  which  compelled  him  to  surrender  much  of 
his  original  programme  in  a  series  of  compromises. 
It  is  only  fair  to  Wilson  to  remember  that  his 
original  plan,  in  November,  was  to  secure  such  a 
preliminary  treaty,  which  was  to  embody  merely 
the  general  lines  of  a  territorial  settlement  and  the 
disarmament  of  the  enemy.     The  delays  which 
postponed  the  treaty  were  not  entirely  his  fault. 
Arriving  in  France  on  the  13th  of  December,  he  ex 
pected  that  the  Conference  would  convene  on  the 
seventeenth,  the  date  originally  set.     But  days 
passed  and  neither  the  French  nor  the  British  took 
steps  toward  the  opening  of  negotiations.    They 
had  not  even  appointed  their  delegates.     Lloyd 
George  sent  messages  of  welcome  from  across  the 
Channel,  but  explained  that  domestic  affairs  de 
tained  him  in  England.    Conscious  of  the  struggle 


286    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

that  was  likely  to  arise  between  the  "practical" 
aspirations  of  Europe  and  the  "idealism"  of  Amer 
ica,  the  Allied  leaders  evidently  were  in  no  hurry  to 
give  to  the  exponent  of  the  ideal  the  advantage  of 
the  popular  support  that  he  enjoyed  during  the 
early  days  following  his  arrival  upon  European 
shores.  Hence  it  was  not  until  the  second  week  of 
January  that  the  delegations  began  to  assemble 
at  Paris.  In  the  interval  Wilson  had  become  in 
volved  in  various  detailed  problems  and  he  had 
lost  the  opportunity,  if  indeed  it  ever  offered,  to 
demand  immediate  agreement  on  preliminary  terms 
of  peace. 

Notwithstanding  the  delays,  the  President  se 
cured  an  early  triumph  in  the  matter  which  he  had 
closest  at  heart,  namely,  a  League  of  Nations  and 
its  incorporation  in  the  Treaty.  Clemenceau  had 
taken  issue  publicly  with  Wilson.  WTien  the  Presi 
dent,  in  the  course  of  his  English  speeches,  affirmed 
that  this  was  the  first  necessity  of  a  world  which 
had  seen  the  system  of  alliances  fail  too  often,  the 
French  Premier  replied  in  the  Chamber  of  Depu 
ties,  on  the  29th  of  December,  that  for  his  part  he 
held  to  the  old  principle  of  alliances  which  had 
saved  France  in  the  past  and  must  save  her  in  the 
future,  and  that  his  sense  of  the  practical  would  not 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE?    287 

be  affected  by  the  "noble  candeur"  of  President 
Wilson.  The  polite  sneer  that  underlay  the  latter 
phrase  aroused  the  wrath  of  the  more  radical  depu 
ties,  but  the  Chamber  gave  Clemenceau  an  over 
whelming  vote  of  confidence  as  he  thus  threw 
down  the  gage.  In  the  meantime  Lloyd  George  had 
shown  himself  apparently  indifferent  to  the  League 
and  much  more  interested  in  what  were  beginning 
to  be  called  the  "practical  issues." 

With  the  opening  of  the  Conference,  however,  it 
soon  became  apparent  that  WTilson  had  secured  the 
support  of  the  British  delegates.  It  is  possible  that 
a  trade  had  been  tacitly  consummated.  Certain  it 
is  that  the  "freedom  of  the  seas,"  which  the  British 
delegates  were  determined  should  not  enter  into 
the  issues  of  the  Peace  Conference  and  which  had 
threatened  to  make  the  chief  difficulty  between 
British  and  Americans,  was  never  openly  discussed. 
Had  Wilson  decided  to  drop  or  postpone  this  most 
indefinite  of  his  Fourteen  Points,  on  the  under 
standing  that  the  British  would  give  their  support 
to  the  League  ?  At  all  events,  the  League  of  Nations 
was  given  an  important  place  on  the  programme 
of  deliberations,  and  at  the  second  of  the  plenary 
sessions  of  the  Conference,  held  on  January  25, 1919, 
the  principle  of  a  League  was  approved  without  a 


288   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

dissentient  voice;  it  was  also  decided  that  the 
League  should  be  made  an  integral  part  of  the 
Treaty.  Wilson,  in  addition  to  acquiring  British 
support  had  won  that  of  the  Italians,  to  whom 
he  had  promised  his  aid  in  securing  the  Brenner 
frontier  in  the  Tyrol.  Clemenceau,  according 
to  an  American  delegate,  "had  climbed  on  the 
band-wagon." 

The  President's  victory  was  emphasized  when  he 
also  won  the  Europeans  and  the  representatives 
of  the  British  overseas  Dominions  to  acceptance 
of  the  principle  of  "mandatories,"  according  to 
which  the  German  colonies  were  not  to  be  distrib 
uted  as  spoils  amongst  the  victors,  but  to  become 
the  property  of  the  League  and  to  be  adminstered 
by  the  mandatory  states,  not  for  their  own  benefit 
but  for  that  of  the  colonies.  The  victory  was  not 
complete,  since  Wilson's  first  intention  had  been 
that  the  mandatory  states  should  not  be  the  great 
powers,  but  such  states  as  Holland  or  one  of  the 
Scandinavian  nations.  He  was  compelled  to  ad 
mit  the  right  of  the  British  and  French  to  take  over 
the  colonies  as  mandatories.  Even  so,  the  strug 
gle  over  the  issue  was  intense,  Premier  Hughes  of 
Australia  leading  the  demand  that  the  German 
colonies  should  be  given  outright  to  the  Allies  and 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    289 

the  British  self-governing  Dominions.  Again  the 
support  of  Lloyd  George  brought  success  to  the 
American  policy. 

In  order  to  assure  his  victory  in  the  foundation 
of  a  League  of  Nations,  it  was  necessary  that  before 
returning  home  Wilson  should  see  some  definite 
scheme  elaborated.  Until  the  14th  of  February  he 
labored  with  the  special  committee  appointed  to 
draft  a  specific  plan,  which  included  much  of  the 
best  political  talent  of  the  world:  Lord  Robert 
Cecil,  General  Smuts,  Venizelos,  Leon  Bourgeois. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  criticism  that  consideration 
of  a  League  was  delaying  the  preparation  of  peace 
terms,  the  commission  met  in  the  evenings  so  as  not 
to  interrupt  the  regular  meetings  of  the  Council  of 
Ten.  It  was  a  tour  de  force,  this  elaboration  of  a 
charter  for  the  new  international  order,  in  less  than 
three  weeks.  At  times  the  task  seemed  hopeless 
as  one  deadlock  after  another  developed.  Wilson, 
who  presided  over  the  commission,  lacked  the  skill 
and  courage  displayed  by  Clemenceau  in  his  con 
duct  of  the  plenary  sessions,  and  proved  unable  to 
prevent  fruitless  discussion;  possibly  he  feared  lest 
he  be  regarded  as  autocratic  in  pushing  his  pet  plan. 
At  all  events  precious  moments  were  dissipated  in 
long  speeches,  and  general  principles  threatened  to 

10 


290   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

be  lost  In  a  maze  of  details.  With  but  two  days  left 
before  the  plenary  session  of  the  Conference  and 
the  date  set  for  Wilson's  sailing,  the  commission 
had  approved  only  six  of  the  twenty-seven  articles 
of  the  Covenant.  Fortune  intervened.  The  pres 
ence  of  Wilson  was  demanded  at  the  Council  of 
Ten  and  his  place  as  chairman  was  taken  by  Lord 
Robert  Cecil.  The  latter  showed  himself  effective. 
Ably  seconded  by  Colonel  House,  he  passed  over 
all  details  and  pushed  the  final  stages  of  the  report 
through  at  top  speed;  on  the  14th  of  February  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  was  completed.  It  was 
sanctioned  by  the  plenary  session  of  the  Conference 
that  afternoon,  and  in  the  evening  Wilson  left  for 
America  with  the  document  in  his  pocket.  Doubt 
less  it  seemed  to  him  that  the  major  portion  of  his 
task  had  been  accomplished. 

The  mechanism  of  the  League  thus  proposed  is 
said  to  have  been  largely  evolved  by  Smuts  and 
Cecil,  but  it  coincided  roughly  with  the  ideas  that 
Wilson  had  already  conceived.  Much  of  the  lan 
guage  of  the  Covenant  is  Wilson's;  its  form  was 
mainly  determined  by  the  British  and  American 
legal  experts,  C.  J.  B.  Hurst  and  D.  H.  Miller. 
It  provided  for  an  executive  council  representing 
nine  powers,  and  a  deliberative  assembly  of  all  the 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    291 

members  of  the  League.  The  Council  must  meet 
annually  and  take  under  advisement  any  mat 
ters  threatening  to  disturb  international  peace. 
Its  recommendations  must  be  unanimous.  The 
Assembly  was  entirely  without  executive  power. 
The  members  of  the  League  were  to  agree  not  to 
make  war  without  first  submitting  the  matter  un 
der  dispute  to  arbitration  or  to  the  consideration 
of  the  Council.  Failure  to  abide  by  this  agree 
ment  would  constitute  an  act  of  war  against 
the  League,  which  upon  recommendation  of  the 
Council,  might  boycott  the  offending  state  eco 
nomically  or  exercise  military  force  against  it. 
The  Covenant  declared  it  "to  be  the  friendly  right 
of  each  Member  of  the  League  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  any 
circumstance  whatever  affecting  international  re 
lations  which  threatens  to  disturb  international 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations 
upon  which  peace  depends."  The  members  of  the 
League,  furthermore,  undertook  "to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  terri 
torial  integrity  and  existing  independence  of  all 
members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  ag 
gression  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means 
by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled"  (Article 


292   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

X).  These  two  provisions  embodied  the  particu 
lar  contributions  of  Wilson  to  the  Covenant,  who 
believed  that  the  capacity  of  the  League  to  pre 
serve  justice  and  peace  depended  chiefly  upon  them. 
The  Covenant  also  provided  in  some  measure  for 
military  and  naval  disarmament  by  giving  to  the 
Council  the  right  to  recommend  the  size  of  the  force 
to  be  maintained  by  each  member  of  the  League, 
and  it  attacked  secret  diplomacy  by  abrogating 
previous  obligations  inconsistent  with  the  Cove 
nant  and  by  providing  that  every  future  treaty 
must  be  registered  and  published. 

If  the  President  expected  to  be  hailed  at  home  as 
conquering  hero,  he  was  destined  to  bitter  disap 
pointment.  He  must  now  pay  the  price  for  those 
tactical  mistakes  which  had  aroused  opinion 
against  him  in  the  previous  autumn.  The  elements 
which  he  had  antagonized  by  his  war-policies,  by 
his  demand  for  a  Democratic  Congress,  by  his  fail 
ure  to  cooperate  with  the  Senate  in  the  formulation 
of  American  policy  and  in  the  appointment  of  the 
Peace  Commission,  and  which  had  opposed  his  de 
parture  in  person  to  Paris — all  those  elements  now 
had  their  chance.  Having  won  a  difficult  victory 
over  reactionary  forces  in  Europe,  Wilson  was  now 
compelled  to  begin  the  struggle  over  again  at  home. 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    293 

And  whereas  at  Paris  he  had  displayed  some  skill 
in  negotiation  and  an  attitude  of  conciliation  even 
when  firm  in  his  principles,  upon  his  return  he 
adopted  a  tone  which  showed  that  he  had  failed  to 
gauge  the  temper  of  the  people.  He  probably  had 
behind  him  the  majority  of  the  independent  think 
ers,  even  many  who  disliked  him  personally  but 
who  appreciated  the  importance  and  the  value  of 
the  task  he  was  trying  to  carry  through.  The  mass 
of  the  people,  however,  understood  little  of  what 
was  going  on  at  Paris.  The  situation  abroad  was 
complex  and  it  had  not  been  clarified  adequately  by 
the  press.  Opinion  needed  to  be  educated.  It 
wanted  to  know  why  a  League  was  necessary  and 
whether  its  elaboration  was  postponing  peace  and 
the  return  of  the  doughboys.  Why  must  the 
League  be  incorporated  in  the  Treaty?  And  did 
the  League  put  the  United  States  at  the  mercy  of 
European  politicians  and  would  it  involve  our 
country  in  a  series  of  European  wars  in  which  we 
had  no  interest? 

What  followed  must  be  counted  as  little  less  than 
a  tragedy.  The  man  of  academic  antecedents  with 
masterly  powers  of  exposition,  who  had  voiced 
popular  thought  during  the  years  of  the  war  so  ad 
mirably,  now  failed  completely  as  an  educator  of 


294   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

opinion.  The  President  might  have  shown  that  the 
League  Covenant,  instead  of  postponing  peace, 
was  really  essential  to  a  settlement,  since  it  was  to 
facilitate  solutions  of  various  territorial  problems 
which  might  otherwise  hold  the  Conference  in  de 
bate  for  months.  He  could  have  demonstrated 
with  a  dramatic  vigor  which  the  facts  made  pos 
sible,  the  anarchical  condition  of  Europe  and  the 
need  for  some  sort  of  international  system  of  co 
operation  if  a  new  cataclysm  was  to  be  avoided,  and 
he  might  have  pictured  the  inevitable  repercussive 
effect  of  such  a  cataclysm  upon  America.  He  might 
have  shown  that  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty,  it  was  necessary  that  the  League 
Covenant  should  be  included  within  it.  He  could 
have  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  Covenant  took 
from  Congress  no  constitutional  powers,  that  the 
Council  of  the  League,  on  which  the  United  States 
was  represented,  must  be  unanimous  before  taking 
action,  and  then  could  only  make  recommenda 
tions.  But  the  President  failed  to  explain  the  situ 
ation  in  terms  comprehensible  to  the  average  man. 
However  adequate  his  addresses  seemed  to  those 
who  understood  the  situation  abroad,  they  left  the 
American  public  cold.  His  final  speech  in  the 
Metropolitan  Opera  House  in  New  York  City  was 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE?    295 

especially  unfortunate,  for  his  statement  that  he 
would  bring  back  the  Treaty  and  the  League  so 
intertwined  that  no  one  could  separate  them  sound 
ed  like  a  threat.  At  the  moment  when  he  needed 
the  most  enthusiastic  support  to  curb  the  oppo 
sition  of  the  Senate,  he  alienated  thousands  and 
lost  the  chance  to  convince  tens  of  thousands. 

These  developments  did  not  pass  unnoticed  in 
Europe.  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  had  yielded 
to  Wilson  during  the  first  weeks  of  the  Conference 
because  they  could  not  afford  to  separate  their  for 
tunes  from  the  United  States,  upon  whom  they  de 
pended  for  economic  support,  and  because  an  open 
break  with  Wilson  would  weaken  their  own  position 
with  liberals  in  France  and  England.  But  now  it 
became  apparent  to  them  that  Wilson's  position  at 
home  was  so  unstable  that  they  might  be  justified 
in  adopting  a  stronger  tone.  Each  of  them  could 
point  to  the  tangible  evidence  of  victorious  elec 
tions  and  votes  of  confidence.  President  Wilson 
could  not.  The  party  in  the  Senate  which,  after  the 
4th  of  March,  would  hold  the  majority,  expressly 
repudiated  Wilson's  policy.  WTien  the  President 
returned  to  Paris,  on  the  14th  of  March,  he  found  a 
different  atmosphere.  The  League  was  no  longer 
the  central  topic  of  discussion.  Concrete  questions 


296   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

were  uppermost.  How  much  should  Germany 
pay?  What  territory  should  be  taken  from  her? 
How  was  the  Kaiser  to  be  punished?  Wilson  had 
been  given  the  satisfaction  of  securing  approval  for 
the  principle  of  the  League.  Now  he  must  permit 
the  Conference  to  satisfy  the  practical  aspirations 
of  France,  England,  and  Italy. 

It  is  a  tribute  to  the  personality  of  Wilson  that 
by  his  presence  at  this  critical  juncture,  when  the 
attitude  of  the  Allies  differed  but  slightly,  if  at  all, 
from  that  of  the  powers  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
he  was  able  to  bring  back  something  of  the  spirit  of 
justice  which  had  been  so  frequently  and  loudly  de 
claimed  before  the  armistice,  and  to  repress  at 
least  in  some  degree  the  excessive  claims  which  de 
manded  satisfaction  in  the  treaties.  The  plans 
which,  during  his  absence,  had  been  evolved  for  the 
separation  of  the  Covenant  from  the  Treaty  and 
for  its  postponement,  and  which  had  received  the 
hearty  support  of  several  French  and  British  diplo 
mats,  were  quickly  dropped.  Wilson  was  able  to 
announce  without  contradiction,  that  the  Cove 
nant  would  be  an  integral  part  of  the  Treaty,  as  de 
cided  on  the  25th  of  January.  Far  more  difficult 
was  the  situation  that  resulted  from  French  and 
British  plans  for  indemnities  from  Germany,  and 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    297 

from  the  French  territorial  claims  on  the  Rhine. 
In  each  of  these  matters  Wilson  could  secure  noth 
ing  better  than  a  compromise. 

From  the  day  when  peace  dawned  upon  Europe, 
the  question  that  had  touched  Allied  peoples  most 
closely  was,  How  much  will  Germany  pay?  It  was 
not  so  much  the  shout  of  the  brutal  victor  greedy 
for  loot,  as  the  involuntary  cry  of  nations  which 
had  seen  their  homes  and  factories  pulverized, 
their  ships  sunk,  the  flower  of  their  youth  killed 
and  maimed,  and  which  now  faced  years  of  crush 
ing  taxation.  They  had  carried  the  load  of  war 
gallantly  and  they  would  enter  the  struggle  for 
recuperation  courageously.  But  they  would  not 
endure  that  the  enemy,  which  had  forced  these  mis 
eries  upon  them,  should  not  make  good  the  material 
damage  that  had  been  done.  WThat  was  the  mean 
ing  of  the  word  justice,  if  the  innocent  victors  were 
to  emerge  from  the  war  with  keener  sufferings  and 
more  gloomy  future  than  the  guilty  defeated?  An 
other  question  stirred  the  mind  of  every  French 
man.  For  generations  the  eastern  frontier  of 
France  had  lain  open  to  the  invasion  of  the  Teuton 
hordes.  The  memory  of  Prussian  brutality  in  1814 
had  been  kept  alive  in  every  school;  the  horrors  of 
1870  had  been  told  and  retold  by  participants  and 


298   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

eye-witnesses;  and  the  world  had  seen  the  German 
crimes  of  1914.  From  all  France  the  cry  went  up, 
How  long?  It  would  be  the  most  criminal  stupid 
ity  if  advantage  were  not  taken  of  the  momentary 
helplessness  of  the  inevitable  enemy  in  order  to 
make  that  vulnerable  frontier  secure.  This  was 
not  the  end.  Some  day  the  struggle  would  be  re 
newed.  Already,  within  two  months  of  the  armis 
tice,  the  French  General  Staff  were  considering 
mobilization  plans  for  the  next  war.  France  must 
be  made  safe  while  she  had  the  chance. 

These  feelings  had  such  a  hold  on  the  people  that 
the  statesmen  of  Europe  would  have  been  over 
thrown  on  the  day  they  forgot  them.  Popular  sen 
timent  was  reenforced  by  practical  considerations 
less  justifiable.  Crushing  indemnities  would  not 
merely  ease  the  load  of  Allied  taxation  and  furnish 
capital  for  rapid  commercial  development;  they 
would  also  remove  Germany  as  an  economic  com 
petitor.  French  control  of  all  territory  west  of  the 
Rhine  would  not  only  assure  France  against  the 
danger  of  another  German  invasion,  but  would  also 
provide  her  capitalists  with  a  preponderating  eco 
nomic  advantage  in  regions  by  no  means  French  in 
character.  Such  selfish  interests  the  Americans 
strove  to  set  aside,  although  they  never  forgot  their 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE?    299 

desire  to  secure  as  complete  justice  for  the  Allies 
as  seemed  compatible  with  a  stable  and  tranquil 
settlement. 

In  the  matter  of  indemnities,  or  reparations  as 
they  came  to  be  called,  the  experts  of  the  various 
powers  soon  established  the  fact  that  Germany 
would  be  unable  to  pay  the  total  bill  of  reparation, 
even  at  the  most  conservative  reckoning.  There 
was  a  long  discussion  as  to  whether  or  not  the  costs 
of  war,  aside  from  material  damage  done,  that  had 
been  incurred  by  the  Allies,  should  be  included  in 
the  amount  that  Germany  was  to  pay.  It  was  finally 
determined,  in  accordance  with  the  arguments  of 
the  American  financial  delegates  who  were  warmly 
supported  by  President  Wilson,  that  such  war 
costs  should  be  excluded.  On  the  other  hand  it 
was  agreed  that  pensions  might  properly  be  made 
part  of  Germany's  reparation  bill.  The  two  items 
of  damages  and  pensions  were  calculated  by  the 
American  experts  as  amounting  to  a  total  figure  of 
not  less  than  $30,000,000,000  present  capital  sum, 
which  Germany  ought  to  pay. 

The  next  step  was  to  determine  how  much  Ger 
many  could  be  made  to  pay.  By  drafting  too 
severe  terms  German  trade  might  be  destroyed 
completely  and  Germany  left  without  the  economic 


300  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

capacity  to  make  the  money  that  was  to  pay  the 
bill.  It  was  obvious  to  careful  students  that  the 
total  amount  which  she  could  turn  over  to  the  Al 
lies  could  not  be  much  more  than  the  excess  of  her 
exports  over  imports;  and  that  even  if  payments 
were  extended  over  twenty  or  thirty  years  their 
value  for  purposes  of  reparation  would  probably 
not  much  exceed  twenty-five  billion  dollars.  Lloyd 
George  in  his  election  pledges  had  promised  that 
the  complete  reparations  account  would  be  settled 
by  the  enemy;  neither  he  nor  Clemenceau  dared  to 
confess  that  the  sum  which  could  be  exacted  from 
Germany  would  fall  far  below  their  early  promises. 
The  British  experts,  Sumner  and  Cunliffe,  con 
tinued  to  encourage  Lloyd  George  in  his  belief  that 
Germany  could  afford  to  pay  something  in  the 
neighborhood  of  a  hundred  billion  dollars,  and  the 
French  Finance  Minister,  Klotz,  was  equally  op 
timistic.  At  first,  accordingly,  Allied  demands  on 
Germany  seemed  likely  to  be  fantastic. 

The  Americans,  on  the  other  hand,  were  in 
finitely  more  conservative  in  their  estimates  of 
what  Germany  could  pay.  Even  after  certain 
Allied  experts,  including  Montagu  and  Loucheur, 
affirmed  the  necessity  of  scaling  down  the  sug 
gested  sum  of  reparations,  the  difference  between 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    301 

the  American  proposals  and  those  of  the  Allies 
was  serious.1  Political  considerations,  however, 
interposed,  and  preventing  the  settling  of  a  defi 
nite  total  sum  which  Germany  must  pay.  Neither 
Lloyd  George  nor  Clemenceau  dared  to  go  to  their 
constituents  with  the  truth,  namely  that  Germany 
could  not  possibly  pay  the  enormous  indemnities 
which  the  politicians  had  led  the  people  to  expect. 
(Lloyd  George,  for  example,  had  stated  the  sum 
that  Germany  must  pay  at  about  $120,000,000,- 
000.)  Both  the  chiefs  of  state  asserted  that  they 
were  almost  certain  to  be  turned  out  of  office  as 
a  result,  with  consequent  confusion  in  the  Peace 
Conference,  and  a  prolongation  of  the  crisis.  The 
only  escape  seemed  to  be  in  a  postponement  of 
the  problem  by  not  naming  any  definite  sum 
which  Germany  must  pay,  but  requiring  her  to 
acknowledge  full  liability.  The  disadvantages  of 
this  method  were  apparent  to  the  President  and 

1  At  first  the  French  and  British  refused  to  name  any  specific 
sum  that  might  be  collected  from  Germany,  requesting  the  Amer 
icans  to  submit  estimates.  The  latter  named  $5,000,000,000  as 
representing  a  sum  that  might  be  collected  prior  to  May  1,  1921, 
and  thereafter  a  capital  sum  as  high  as  $25,000,000,000,  al 
ways  provided  that  the  other  clauses  in  the  treaty  did  not  too 
greatly  drain  Germany's  resources.  After  some  weeks  of  discus 
sion  the  French  experts  stated  that  if  the  figures  could  be  revised 
up  to  $40,000,000,000  they  would  recommend  them  to  their  chiefs. 
The  British  refused  to  accept  a  figure  below  $47,000,000,000. 


302   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

his  financial  advisers,  for  it  was  clear  that  the 
economic  stability  of  the  world  could  not  be  re 
stored  until  the  world  knew  how  much  Germany 
was  going  to  pay. 

Equally  difficult  was  the  problem  of  the  French 
frontier.  The  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France 
was  unanimously  approved.  The  French  claimed 
in  addition,  the  districts  of  the  Saar,  with  their 
valuable  coal-fields,  a  portion  of  which  had  been 
left  to  France  after  the  first  abdication  of  Napoleon 
but  annexed  to  Prussia  after  his  defeat  at  Water 
loo;  and  they  contended  that  if  the  German  terri 
tories  west  of  the  Rhine  were  not  to  be  annexed  to 
France,  they  must  at  least  be  separated  from  Ger 
many,  which  had  secured  a  threatening  military 
position  mainly  through  their  possession.  Amer 
ican  experts  had  felt  inclined  to  grant  a  part  of 
the  Saar  region  to  France  as  compensation  for  the 
wanton  destruction  of  French  mines  at  Lens  and 
Valenciennes  by  the  Germans;  but  both  Wilson  and 
Lloyd  George  were  opposed  to  absolute  annexation 
of  the  district  which  the  French  demanded,  includ 
ing,  as  it  did,  more  than  six  hundred  thousand  Ger 
mans  and  no  French.  Wilson  was  definitely  hostile 
to  any  attempt  to  separate  from  the  Fatherland 
such  purely  German  territory  as  that  on  the  left 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE?    SOS 

bank  of  the  Rhine.  The  Allies,  as  well  as  himself, 
had  given  assurances  that  they  did  not  aim  at  the 
dismemberment  of  Germany,  and  it  was  on  the  basis 
of  such  assurances  that  the  Germans  had  asked  for 
an  armistice.  Wilson  admitted  that  from  the  point 
of  view  of  military  strategy  the  argument  of  Foch 
was  unanswerable,  under  the  old  conditions;  but  he 
insisted  that  the  League  of  Nations  would  obviate 
the  necessity  of  the  strategic  protection  asked  for. 
The  struggle  over  these  issues  nearly  broke  the 
back  of  the  Conference.  If  Clemenceau  had 
yielded  in  January  when  the  League  was  demanded 
by  Wilson,  it  was  with  the  mental  reservation  that 
when  the  "practical"  issues  came  up,  the  victory 
should  be  his.  The  French  press  were  not  slow  to 
give  support  to  their  Government,  and  within  a 
short  time  the  President,  so  recently  a  popular  idol, 
found  himself  anathematized  as  a  pro-German  and 
the  sole  obstacle  to  a  speedy  and  satisfactory  peace. 
The  more  noisy  section  of  the  British  press  followed 
suit.  Liberals  were  silenced  and  American  idealism 
was  cursed  as  meddlesome  myopia.  For  some  days 
the  deadlock  appeared  interminable  and  likely  to 
become  fatal.  In  a  contest  of  obstinacy  even  Wil 
son  could  be  matched  by  Clemenceau.  The  in 
creasing  bitterness  of  French  attacks  upon  the 


304   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Americans  began  to  tell  upon  Wilson;  for  the  first 
time  his  physical  strength  seemed  likely  to  collapse 
under  the  strain.  Matters  were  brought  to  a  head 
by  a  bold  stroke,  on  the  7th  of  April,  when  Wilson 
ordered  the  George  Washington  to  sail  for  Brest. 
The  inference  was  plain :  the  President  would  leave 
the  Conference  unless  the  Allies  abated  their  claims. 

The  week  of  strain  was  followed  by  one  of  ad 
justment.  Fearing  an  open  break  with  America, 
Allied  leaders  showed  themselves  anxious  to  find  a 
compromise,  and  Wilson  himself  was  willing  to 
meet  them  part  way,  since  he  realized  that  without 
France  and  England  his  new  international  system 
could  never  operate.  Colonel  House  found  oppor 
tunity  for  his  tested  skill  and  common  sense  as  a 
mediator,  and  he  was  assisted  by  Tardieu,  who 
proved  himself  to  be  fertile  in  suggestions  for  a 
practical  middle  course.  As  in  the  case  of  all  com 
promises,  the  solutions  satisfied  no  one  completely. 
But  clearly  some  sort  of  treaty  had  to  be  framed, 
if  the  world  were  to  resume  normal  life  and  if  the 
spread  of  social  revolution  were  to  be  checked. 
At  least  the  compromises  had  the  virtue  of  win 
ning  unanimity,  without  which  Europe  could  not 
be  saved. 

The  indemnity  problem  was  settled,  at  least  for 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE?    305 

the  moment,  by  postponing  a  final  definite  state 
ment  of  the  total  amount  that  Germany  must 
pay.  It  was  decided  that  the  sum  of  five  billion 
dollars  (twenty  billion  gold  marks),  in  cash  or  kind, 
should  be  demanded  from  Germany  as  an  initial 
payment,  to  be  made  before  May  1,  1921.  Cer 
tain  abatements  were  to  be  permitted  the  Germans, 
since  this  sum  was  to  include  the  expenses  of  the 
army  of  occupation,  which  were  reckoned  as  in 
the  neighborhood  of  a  billion  dollars;  and  supplies 
of  food  and  raw  materials,  which  Germany  might 
need  to  purchase,  could  be  paid  for  out  of  that  sum. 
In  the  second  place,  Germany  was  required  to  de 
liver  interest-bearing  bonds  to  a  further  amount  of 
ten  billions;  and,  if  the  initial  payment  of  cash  fell 
short  of  five  billions  by  reason  of  permitted  deduc 
tions,  the  amount  of  bonds  was  to  be  so  increased 
as  to  bring  the  total  payments  in  cash,  kind,  or 
bonds,  up  to  fifteen  billions  by  May  1,  1921.  If  a 
Reparations  Commission,  the  decisions  of  which 
Germany  must  agree  to  accept,  should  be  satisfied 
that  more  yet  could  be  paid,  a  third  issue  of  bonds, 
amounting  to  a  further  ten  billions  might  be  ex 
acted.  Even  this  total  of  twenty-five  billions  was 
not  to  be  regarded  as  final,  if  Germany's  capacity 
to  pay  more  were  determined  by  the  Reparations 


306   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Commission.  Germany  was  required  to  acknowl 
edge  full  liability,  and  the  total  sum  which  she 
might  theoretically  have  to  pay  was  reckoned  by  a 
British  expert  as  between  thirty-two  and  forty- 
four  billions.  The  Reparations  Commission,  how 
ever,  was  given  the  power  to  recommend  abate 
ments  as  well  as  increased  payments;  upon  the  wis 
dom  of  its  members  the  practical  application  of  the 
treaty  would  obviously  depend.  * 

In  truth  the  reparations  clauses  of  the  treaty, 
which  compelled  Germany  to  hand  over  what  was 
practically  a  blank  check  to  the  Allies,  represented 
no  victory  for  Wilson.  But  he  had  at  least  pre 
vented  the  imposition  of  the  crushing  indemnities 
that  had  been  proposed,  and  which  must  have  been 
followed  by  political  and  economic  consequences 
hardly  short  of  disastrous.  As  for  the  eastern  fron 
tier  of  France,  it  was  agreed  that  the  right  of  prop 
erty  in  the  coal  mines  of  the  Saar  district  should 
be  given  outright  to  France,  as  partial  but  imme 
diate  compensation  for  the  damage  done  at  Lens  and 

1  The  proposal  of  a  permanent  commission  for  handling  the 
whole  matter  of  reparations  was  made  first  by  an  American  finan 
cial  adviser,  John  Foster  Dulles.  The  idea  was  accepted  by  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau  as  an  efficacious  method  of  enabling  them 
to  postpone  the  decision  of  a  definite  sum  to  be  paid  by  Germany 
until  the  political  situation  in  France  and  Great  Britain  should  be 
more  favorable. 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?    307 

elsewhere.  But  the  district  itself  was  to  be  placed 
under  the  League  of  Nations  and  a  plebiscite  at  the 
end  of  fifteen  years  was  to  determine  its  final  des 
tiny.  The  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
was  left  to  Germany,  but  it  was  to  be  demilitarized 
entirely,  a  condition  which  also  applied  to  a  zone 
fifty  kilometers  broad  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine. 
The  bridgeheads  on  the  Rhine,  as  well  as  the  Ger 
man  districts  to  the  west  of  the  river,  were  to  be  oc 
cupied  for  periods  extending  from  five  to  fifteen 
years,  in  order  to  ensure  the  execution  of  the  treaty 
by  the  Germans.  The  French  press  contended  that 
Clemenceau  had  made  over-great  concessions,  pro 
testing  that  the  League  would  be  utterly  unable  to 
protect  France  against  sudden  attack,  especially 
since  the  Covenant  had  not  provided  for  a  general 
military  force.  In  return  for  these  concessions  by 
Clemenceau,  Wilson  gave  an  extraordinary  quid 
pro  quo.  He  who  had  declaimed  vigorously  against 
all  special  alliances  now  agreed  that  until  the 
League  was  capable  of  offering  to  France  the  pro 
tection  she  asked,  there  should  be  a  separate  treaty 
between  France,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United 
States,  according  to  which  the  two  latter  powers 
should  promise  to  come  to  the  defense  of  France 
in  case  of  sudden  and  unprovoked  attack  by 


308   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Germany.  The  treaty  did  not,  according  to  Wil 
son,  constitute  a  definite  alliance  but  merely  an 
"undertaking,"  but  it  laid  him  open  to  the  charge 
of  serious  inconsistency. 

Thus  was  passed,  by  means  of  compromise,  the 
most  serious  crisis  of  the  Conference.  In  France 
Wilson  never  recovered  the  popularity  which  he 
then  lost  by  his  opposition  to  French  demands.  In 
many  quarters  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  attacked  by  liber 
als  for  having  surrendered  to  the  forces  of  reaction. 
In  the  Conference,  however,  he  had  maintained  his 
prestige,  and  most  moderates  who  understood  the 
situation  felt  that  he  had  done  as  well  as  or  better 
than  could  be  expected.  He  had  by  no  means  had 
his  way  in  the  matter  of  reparations  or  frontiers, 
but  he  had  gone  far  towards  a  vindication  of  his 
principles  by  avoiding  a  defeat  under  circumstances 
where  the  odds  were  against  him.  More  he  prob 
ably  could  not  have  obtained  and  no  other  Amer 
ican  at  that  time  could  have  secured  so  much.  The 
sole  alternative  would  have  been  for  the  American 
delegates  to  withdraw  from  the  Conference.  Such 
a  step  might  have  had  the  most  disastrous  conse 
quences.  It  was  true,  or  Europe  believed  it  to 
be  true,  that  the  Conference  represented  for  the 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  OR  LEAGUE  ?  309 

moment  the  single  rallying-point  of  the  elements  of 
social  order  on  the  Continent.  The  withdrawal  of 
the  Americans  would  have  shattered  its  waning 
prestige,  discouraged  liberals  in  every  country,  and 
perhaps  have  led  to  its  dissolution.  Nearly  every 
one  in  Paris  was  convinced  that  the  break-up  of 
the  Conference  would  be  the  signal  for  widespread 
communistic  revolt  throughout  central  Europe. 
By  his  broad  concessions  President  Wilson  had 
sacrificed  some  of  his  principles,  but  he  had  held 
the  Conference  together,  the  supreme  importance 
of  which  seemed  at  the  time  difficult  to  over-em 
phasize.  Having  weathered  this  crisis  the  Confer 
ence  could  now  meet  the  storms  that  were  to  arise 
from  the  demands  of  the  Italians  and  the  Japanese. 
Wilson  himself  was  to  be  encouraged  in  the  midst 
of  those  difficulties  by  the  triumph  accorded  him  on 
the  28th  of  April.  On  that  day  the  plenary  ses 
sion  of  the  Conference  adopted  without  a  word  of 
dissent  the  revised  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  including  the  amendment  that  formally 
recognized  the  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   SETTLEMENT 

PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  success  in  securing  approval 
for  the  League  as  the  basis  of  the  Peace  Treaty  was 
his  greatest  triumph  at  Paris;  and  it  was  accentu 
ated  by  the  acceptance  of  certain  of  the  amend 
ments  that  were  demanded  in  America,  while  those 
which  the  French  and  Japanese  insisted  upon  were 
discarded  or  postponed.  In  comparison  with  this 
success,  he  doubtless  regarded  his  concessions  in 
the  matter  of  reparations  and  the  special  Franco- 
British-American  alliance  as  mere  details.  His 
task,  however,  was  by  no  means  completed,  since 
Italian  and  Japanese  claims  threatened  to  bring  on 
crises  of  almost  equal  danger. 

From  the  early  days  of  the  Conference  there  had 
been  interested  speculation  in  the  corridors  of  the 
Quai  d 'Or say  as  to  whether  the  promises  made  to 
Italy  by  the  Entente  Powers  in  1915,  which  were 
incorporated  in  the  secret  Treaty  of  London,  would 

310 


THE  SETTLEMENT  311 

be  carried  into  effect  by  the  final  peace  settlement. 
That  treaty  had  been  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  old- 
time  diplomacy  and  had  assigned  to  Italy  districts 
which  disinterested  experts  declared  could  not  be 
hers  except  upon  the  principle  of  the  spoils  to  the 
strong.  Much  of  the  territories  promised  in  the 
Tyrol,  along  the  Julian  Alps,  and  on  the  Adriatic 
coast  was  inhabited  entirely  by  non-Italians,  whose 
political  and  economic  fortunes  were  bound  up 
with  states  other  than  Italy;  justice  and  wisdom 
alike  seemed  to  dictate  a  refusal  of  Italian  claims. 
The  annexation  of  such  districts  by  Italy,  the  ex 
perts  agreed,  would  contravene  directly  the  right 
of  self-determination  and  might  lead  to  serious 
difficulties  in  the  future.  Would  the  President 
sanction  the  application  of  treaties  consummated 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  United  States  and  in 
defiance  of  the  principles  upon  which  he  had  de 
clared  that  peace  must  be  made?  The  applica 
tion  of  the  Treaty  of  London,  furthermore,  would 
be  at  the  expense,  chiefly,  of  the  Jugoslavs,  that 
is,  a  small  nation.  The  Allies,  as  well  as  Wilson, 
had  declared  that  the  war  had  been  waged  and 
that  the  peace  must  be  drafted  in  defense  of  the 
rights  of  smaller  nationalities.  Justice  for  the 
weak  as  for  the  strong  was  the  basis  of  the  new 


312  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

international   order  which   Wilson   was   striving 
to  inaugurate. 

Had  the  struggle  been  simply  over  the  validity 
of  the  Treaty  of  London,  Wilson's  position  would 
have  been  difficult  enough,  for  the  Premiers  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  had  declared  that  they 
could  do  nothing  else  but  honor  the  pledges  given 
in  1915.  But  Italian  opinion  had  been  steadily 
aroused  by  a  chauvinist  press  campaign  to  demand 
not  merely  the  application  of  the  Treaty  of  London 
but  the  annexation  of  Fiume,  which  the  treaty  as 
signed  to  the  Jugoslavs.  To  this  demand  both  the 
British  and  French  were  opposed,  although  they 
permitted  Wilson  to  assume  the  burden  of  denying 
Italian  claims  to  Fiume.  As  time  went  on,  Or 
lando  and  Sonnino  pressed  for  a  decision,  even 
threatening  that  unless  their  demands  were  satis 
fied,  Italy  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Ger 
man  treaty.  Finally,  on  the  23d  of  April,  the  crisis 
came  to  a  head.  On  that  day  the  President  pub 
lished  a  statement  setting  forth  the  American  posi 
tion,  which  he  felt  had  been  entirely  misrepresented 
by  a  propagandist  press.  Emphasizing  the  fact 
that  Italian  claims  were  inconsistent  with  the  prin 
ciples  upon  which  all  the  Allies  had  agreed,  as 
necessary  to  the  future  tranquillity  of  the  world,  he 


THE  SETTLEMENT  313 

appealed  directly  to  the  Italian  people  to  join  with 
the  United  States  in  the  application  of  those  prin 
ciples,  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  what  seemed  their 
own  interest. 

The  appeal  was  based  upon  sound  facts.  Its 
statements  were  approved  publicly  by  allied  ex 
perts  who  knew  the  situation,  and  privately  by 
Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George.  It  had  been  dis 
cussed  in  the  Council  of  Four  and  by  no  means 
took  Orlando  by  surprise.  But  it  gave  Orlando  an 
opportunity  for  carrying  out  his  threat  of  retiring 
from  the  Conference.  Insisting  that  Wilson  had 
appealed  to  the  Italian  people  over  his  head  and 
that  they  must  choose  between  him  and  the  Presi 
dent,  he  set  forth  at  once  for  Rome,  followed  by 
the  other  Italian  commissioners,  although  the  eco 
nomic  experts  remained  at  Paris.  Orlando  was 
playing  a  difficult  game.  He  was  hailed  in  Rome 
as  the  defender  of  the  sacred  rights  of  Italy,  but  in 
Paris  he  lacked  partners.  Both  the  British  and 
French  agreed  with  Wilson  that  Italy  ought  not  to 
have  Fiume.  They  secretly  regretted  the  promises 
of  the  London  Treaty,  although  they  were  prepared 
to  keep  their  word,  and  they  were  by  no  means  in 
clined  to  make  further  concessions  in  order  to  bring 
Orlando  and  his  colleagues  back.  After  a  few  days 


314   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  hesitation,  they  decided  to  go  on  with  the  Ger 
man  treaty  and  to  warn  the  Italians  that,  if  they 
persisted  in  absenting  themselves  from  the  Con 
ference,  their  withdrawal  would  be  regarded  as  a 
breach  of  the  Treaty  of  London  which  stipulated  a 
common  peace  with  the  enemy.  They  also  decided 
that  Italy  could  not  expect  to  share  in  German  rep 
arations  if  her  delegates  were  not  present  to  sign 
the  German  treaty.  Such  arguments  could  not 
fail  to  weigh  heavily  with  the  Italian  delegates, 
even  at  the  moment  when  the  Italian  press  and 
people  were  giving  them  enthusiastic  encourage 
ment  to  persist  in  their  uncompromising  course. 
On  the  5th  of  May  Orlando  left  Rome  to  resume 
his  place  in  the  Peace  Conference. 

In  the  meantime  the  Japanese  had  taken  advan 
tage  of  the  embarrassment  caused  by  the  Italian 
withdrawal,  to  put  forward  their  special  claims  in 
the  Far  East.  During  the  early  days  of  the  Con 
ference  they  had  played  a  cautious  game,  as  we 
have  seen,  attending  meetings  but  taking  no  de 
cided  stand  upon  European  matters.  They  had 
even  refused  to  press  to  the  limit  the  amendment 
to  the  League  Covenant  which  enunciated  their 
favorite  principle  of  the  equality  of  races.  But  now 
they  insisted  that  on  one  point,  at  least,  Japanese 


THE  SETTLEMENT  315 

claims  must  be  listened  to;  their  right  of  inherit 
ance  to  the  German  lease  of  Kiau-Chau  and  eco 
nomic  privileges  in  the  Shantung  peninsula  must 
receive  recognition.  This  claim  had  long  been  ap 
proved  secretly  by  the  British  and  French;  it  had 
even  been  accepted  by  the  Chinese  at  the  time 
when  Japan  had  forced  the  twenty-one  demands 
upon  her.  It  was  disapproved,  however,  by  the 
American  experts  in  Paris,  and  Wilson  argued 
strongly  for  more  generous  treatment  of  China. 
His  strategic  position,  one  must  admit,  was  not 
nearly  so  strong  as  in  the  Fiume  controversy.  In 
the  latter  he  was  supported,  at  least  covertly,  by 
France  and  England,  whose  treaty  with  Italy  ex 
plicitly  denied  her  claim  to  Fiume.  The  Japan 
ese  threat  of  withdrawal  from  the  Conference,  if 
their  claims  were  not  satisfied,  carried  more  real 
danger  with  it  than  that  of  the  Italians;  if  the 
Japanese  delegates  actually  departed  making  the 
second  of  the  big  five  to  go,  the  risk  of  a  complete 
debacle  was  by  no  means  slight.  Even  assuming 
that  justice  demanded  as  strong  a  stand  for  the 
Chinese  as  Wilson  had  taken  for  the  Jugoslavs,  the 
practical  importance  of  the  Shantung  question  in 
Europe  was  of  much  less  significance.  The  eyes  of 
every  small  nation  of  Europe  were  upon  Fiume, 


316   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

which  was  regarded  as  the  touchstone  of  Allied  pro 
fessions  of  justice.  If  the  Allied  leaders  permitted 
Italy  to  take  Fiume,  the  small  nations  would  scoff 
at  all  further  professions  of  idealism;  they  would 
take  no  further  interest  either  in  the  Conference  or 
its  League.  Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the  small 
nationalities  of  Europe  knew  and  cared  little  about 
the  justice  of  Chinese  pleas. 

Such  considerations  may  have  been  in  the  mind 
of  the  President  when  he  decided  to  yield  to  Japan. 
The  decision  throws  interesting  light  upon  his  char 
acter;  he  is  less  the  obstinate  doctrinaire,  more 
the  practical  politician  than  has  sometimes  been 
supposed.  The  pure  idealist  would  have  remained 
consistent  in  the  crisis,  refused  to  do  an  injustice  in 
the  Far  East  as  he  had  refused  in  the  settlement  of 
the  Adriatic,  and  would  have  taken  the  risk  of 
breaking  up  the  Conference  and  destroying  all 
chance  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Instead,  Wilson 
yielded  to  practical  considerations  of  the  moment. 
The  best  that  he  could  secure  was  the  promise  of 
the  Japanese  to  retire  from  the  peninsula,  a  promise 
the  fulfillment  of  which  obviously  depended  upon 
the  outcome  of  the  struggle  between  liberal  and 
conservative  forces  in  Japan,  and  which  according 
ly  remained  uncertain.  He  was  willing  to  do  what 


THE  SETTLEMENT  317 

he  admitted  was  an  injustice,  in  order  to  assure 
what  seemed  to  him  the  larger  and  the  more  certain 
justice  that  would  follow  the  establishment  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

The  settlement  of  the  Shantung  problem  re 
moved  the  last  great  difficulty  in  completing  the 
treaty  with  Germany,  and  on  the  7th  of  May  the 
German  delegates  appeared  to  receive  it.  Nearly 
eight  weeks  of  uncertainty  followed,  taken  up  with 
the  study  of  German  protests,  the  construction  of 
the  treaty  with  Austria,  and  finally  the  last  crisis 
that  preceded  the  signature.  The  terms  were  dras 
tic  and  the  German  Government,  in  the  persons  of 
Scheidemann,  the  Premier,  and  Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  seemed  deter 
mined  that,  helpless  as  she  was,  Germany  should 
not  accept  them  without  radical  modifications. 
Their  protests  touched  chiefly  upon  the  economic 
clauses  and  reparations,  the  solution  of  the  Saar 
problem,  the  cession  of  so  much  German  territory 
to  Poland,  and  the  exclusion  of  Germany  from  the 
League  of  Nations.  Ample  opportunity  was  given 
their  delegates  to  formulate  protests,  which,  al 
though  they  rarely  introduced  new  facts  or  argu 
ments  that  had  not  been  discussed,  were  carefully 
studied  by  Allied  experts.  Week  after  week  passed . 


318   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

In  certain  quarters  among  the  Allies  appeared  a 
tendency  to  make  decided  concessions  in  order  to 
win  the  consent  of  the  German  delegates.  No  one 
wanted  to  carry  out  an  invasion  of  the  defeated 
country,  and  there  was  no  guarantee  that  a  mili 
tary  invasion  would  secure  acquiescence.  Ger 
many's  strength  was  in  sitting  still,  and  she  might 
thus  indefinitely  postpone  the  peace.  Was  it  not 
the  wise  course,  one  heard  whispered  in  Paris,  to 
sugar  the  bitterness  of  the  treaty  and  thus  win 
Germany's  immediate  signature? 

Early  in  June,  Lloyd  George,  evidently  under 
pressure  from  his  Cabinet,  declared  himself  for  a 
decided  "softening"  of  the  peace  terms  in  order  to 
secure  the  acceptance  of  the  enemy.  What  would 
Wilson  do?  He  had  been  anathematized  at  home 
and  abroad  as  pro-German  and  desirous  of  saving 
Germany  from  the  consequences  of  her  misdeeds; 
here  was  his  chance.  Would  he  join  with  the  Brit 
ish  in  tearing  up  this  treaty,  which  after  four 
months  of  concentrated  effort  had  just  been  com 
pleted,  in  order  to  secure  the  soft  peace  that  he  was 
supposed  to  advocate?  His  attitude  in  this  con 
tingency  showed  his  ability  to  preserve  an  even  bal 
ance.  In  the  meeting  of  the  American  delegation 
that  was  called  to  consider  the  British  proposal, 


THE  SETTLEMENT  319 

he  pronounced  himself  as  strongly  in  favor  of 
any  changes  that  would  ensure  more  complete  jus 
tice.  If  the  British  and  French  would  consent  to  a 
definite  and  moderate  sum  of  reparations  (a  con 
sent  which  he  knew  was  out  of  the  question)  he 
would  gladly  agree.  But  he  would  not  agree  to  any 
concessions  to  Germany  that  were  not  based  upon 
justice,  but  merely  upon  the  desire  to  secure  her 
signature.  He  was  not  in  favor  of  any  softening 
which  would  mar  the  justice  of  the  settlement  as 
drafted.  "We  did  not  come  over,"  he  said,  "sim 
ply  to  get  any  sort  of  peace  treaty  signed.  We 
came  over  to  do  justice.  I  believe,  even,  that  a 
hard  peace  is  a  good  thing  for  Germany  herself,  in 
order  that  she  may  know  what  an  unjust  war 
means.  We  must  not  forget  what  our  soldiers 
fought  for,  even  if  it  means  that  we  may  have  to 
fight  again."  Wilson's  stand  for  the  treaty  as 
drafted  proved  decisive.  Certain  modifications  in 
details  were  made,  but  the  hasty  and  unwise  en 
thusiasm  of  Lloyd  George  for  scrapping  entire  sec 
tions  was  not  approved.  The  Conference  could 
hardly  have  survived  wholesale  concessions  to  Ger 
many:  to  prolong  the  crisis  would  have  been  a 
disastrous  confession  of  incompetence.  For  what 
confidence  could  have  been  placed  in  statesmen 


320   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

who  were  so  patently  unable  to  make  and  keep 
their  minds? 

Still  the  German  Government  held  firm  and  re 
fused  to  sign.  Foch  inspected  the  Allied  troops  on 
the  Rhine  and  Pershing  renounced  his  trip  to  Eng 
land,  in  order  to  be  ready  for  the  invasion  that  had 
been  ordered  if  the  time  limit  elapsed  without  sig 
nature.  Only  at  the  last  moment  did  the  courage 
of  the  Germans  fail.  A  change  of  ministry  brought 
into  power  men  who  were  willing  to  accept  the  in 
evitable  humiliation.  On  the  20th  of  June,  the 
guns  and  sirens  of  Paris  announced  Germany's  ac 
ceptance  of  the  peace  terms  and  their  promise  to 
sign,  and,  surprising  fact,  a  vast  crowd  gathered  on 
the  Place  de  la  Concorde  to  cheer  Wilson;  despite 
his  loss  of  popularity  and  the  antagonism  which  he 
had  aroused  by  his  opposition  to  national  aspira 
tions  of  one  sort  or  another,  he  was  still  the  man 
whose  name  stood  as  symbol  for  peace. 

Eight  days  later  in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  at  Ver 
sailles,  where  forty-eight  years  before  had  been 
born  the  German  Empire,  the  delegates  of  the  Al 
lied  states  gathered  to  celebrate  the  obsequies  of 
that  Empire.  It  was  no  peace  of  reconciliation, 
this  treaty  between  the  new  German  Republic  and 
the  victorious  Allies.  The  hatred  and  distrust 


THE  SETTLEMENT  321 

inspired  by  five  years  of  war  were  not  so  soon  to 
be  liquidated.  As  the  German  delegates,  awkward 
and  rather  defiant  in  their  long  black  frock  coats, 
marched  to  the  table  to  affix  their  signatures,  they 
were  obviously,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Allied  delegates 
and  the  hundreds  of  spectators,  always  "the  en 
emy."  The  place  of  the  Chinese  at  the  treaty  table 
was  empty;  for  them  it  was  no  peace  of  justice  that 
gave  Shantung  to  the  Japanese,  and  they  would 
not  sign.  The  South  African  delegate,  General 
Smuts,  could  not  sign  without  explaining  the  bal 
ance  of  considerations  which  led  him  to  sanction  an 
international  document  containing  so  many  flaws. 
It  was  not,  indeed,  the  complete  peace  of  justice 
which  Wilson  had  promised  and  which,  at  times, 
he  has  since  implied  he  believed  it  to  be.  Belgians 
complained  that  they  had  not  been  given  the  left 
bank  of  the  Scheldt;  Frenchmen  were  incensed  be 
cause  their  frontier  had  not  been  protected;  Ital 
ians  were  embittered  by  the  refusal  to  approve 
their  claims  on  the  Adriatic;  radical  leaders,  the 
world  over,  were  frank  in  their  expression  of  dis 
appointment  at  the  failure  to  inaugurate  a  new  so 
cial  order.  The  acquiescence  in  Japanese  demands 
for  Kiau-Chau  was  clearly  dictated  by  expediency 
rather  than  by  justice.  Austria,  reduced  in  size 


322   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

and  bereft  of  material  resources,  was  cut  off  from 
the  sea  and  refused  the  possibility  of  joining  with 
Germany.  The  nationalistic  ambitions  of  the 
Rumanians,  of  the  Jugoslavs,  of  the  Czechoslovaks, 
and  of  the  Poles  were  aroused  to  such  an  extent 
that  conflicts  could  hardly  be  avoided.  Hungary, 
deprived  of  the  rim  of  subject  nationalities,  looked 
forward  to  the  first  opportunity  of  reclaiming  her 
sovereignty  over  them.  The  Ruthenians  com 
plained  of  Polish  domination.  Further  to  the  east 
lay  the  great  unsettled  problem  of  Russia. 

But  the  most  obvious  flaws  in  the  treaty  are  to 
be  found  in  the  economic  clauses.  It  was  a  mistake 
to  compel  Germany  to  sign  a  blank  check  in  the 
matter  of  reparations.  Germany  and  the  world 
needed  to  know  the  exact  amount  that  was  to  be 
paid,  in  order  that  international  commerce  might 
be  set  upon  a  stable  basis.  The  extent  of  control 
granted  to  the  Allies  over  German  economic  life 
was  unwise  and  unfair. 

Complete  justice  certainly  was  not  achieved  by 
President  Wilson  at  Paris,  and  it  may  be  ques 
tioned  whether  all  the  decisions  can  be  regarded 
even  as  expedient.  The  spirit  of  the  Fourteen 
Points,  as  commonly  interpreted,  had  not  governed 
the  minds  of  those  who  sat  at  the  council  table. 


THE  SETTLEMENT  323 

The  methods  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ten  and 
the  Council  of  Four  were  by  no  means  those  to 
which  the  world  looked  forward  when  it  hailed  the 
ideal  expressed  in  the  phrase,  "Open  covenants 
openly  arrived  at."  The  "freedom  of  the  seas,"  if 
it  meant  the  disappearance  of  the  peculiar  position 
held  by  Great  Britain  on  the  seas,  was  never  seri 
ously  debated,  and  Wilson  himself,  in  an  interview 
given  to  the  London  Times,  sanctioned  "Britain's 
peculiar  position  as  an  island  empire."  Adequate 
guarantees  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  were 
certainly  not  taken  at  Paris ;  all  that  was  definitely 
stipulated  was  the  disarmament  of  the  enemy,  a 
step  by  no  means  in  consonance  with  the  Presi 
dent's  earlier  policy  which  aimed  at  universal  dis 
armament.  An  "absolutely  impartial  adjustment 
of  all  colonial  claims"  was  hardly  carried  out  by 
granting  the  German  colonies  to  the  great  powers, 
even  as  mandatories  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Nevertheless  the  future  historian  will  probably 
hold  that  the  Peace  Conference,  with  all  its  selfish 
interests  and  mistakes,  carried  into  effect  an  amaz 
ingly  large  part  of  President  Wilson's  programme, 
when  all  the  difficulties  of  his  position  are  duly 
weighed.  The  territorial  settlements,  on  the  whole, 
translated  into  fact  the  demands  laid  down  by  the 


324   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

more  special  of  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points.  France^ 
Belgium,  and  the  other  invaded  countries  were, 
of  course,  evacuated  and  their  restoration  promised; 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  returned  to  France  and  the 
wrong  of  1871  thus  righted;  an  independent  Poland 
was  recognized  and  given  the  assured  access  to  the 
sea  that  Wilson  had  insisted  upon;  the  subject  na 
tionalities  of  Austria-Hungary  received  not  merely 
autonomy  but  independence.  Even  as  regards  the 
larger  principles  enunciated  in  the  Fourteen  Point's, 
it  may  at  least  be  argued  that  President  Wilson  se 
cured  more  than  he  lost.  Open  diplomacy  in  the 
sense  of  conducting  international  negotiations  in 
an  open  forum  was  not  the  method  of  the  Peace 
Conference;  and  it  may  not  be  possible  or  even  de 
sirable.  The  article  in  the  Covenant,  however, 
which  insists  upon  the  public  registration  of  all 
treaties  before  their  validity  is  recognized,  goes  far 
towards  a  fulfillment  of  the  President's  pledge  of 
open  covenants,  particularly  if  his  original  meaning 
is  liberally  interpreted.  Similarly  the  Covenant 
makes  provision  for  the  reduction  of  armaments. 
If  the  treaty  did  not  go  far  in  assuring  the  "re 
moval  of  economic  barriers,"  at  all  events  the 
Conference  did  much  to  provide  for  an  interna 
tional  control  of  traffic  which  would  ensure  to 


THE  SETTLEMENT  325 

all  European  countries,  so  far  as  possible,  equal 
facilities  for  forwarding  their  goods. 

Apart  from  the  Fourteen  Points  Wilson  had  em 
phasized  two  other  principles  as  necessary  to  a  just 
and  permanent  peace.  The  first  of  these  was  that 
the  enemy  should  be  treated  with  a  fairness  equal 
to  that  accorded  to  the  Allies;  the  second  was  the 
principle  that  peoples  should  have  the  right  to 
choose  the  government  by  which  they  were  to  be 
ruled  —  the  principle  of  self-determination.  Nei 
ther  of  these  principles  received  full  recognition  in 
the  peace  settlement.  Yet  their  spirit  was  infused 
more  completely  throughout  the  settlement  than 
would  have  been  the  case  had  not  Wilson  been  at 
Paris,  and  to  that  extent  the  just  and  lasting  quali 
ties  of  the  peace  were  enhanced.  In  the  matter  of 
German  reparations  the  question  of  justice  was  not 
the  point  at  issue;  the  damage  committed  by  Ger 
many  surpassed  in  value  anything  that  the  Allies 
could  exact  from  her.  As  to  frontiers,  the  un 
biased  student  will  probably  admit  that  full  jus 
tice  was  done  Germany  when  the  aspirations  of 
France  for  annexation  of  the  Saar  district  and  the 
provinces  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  were  disap 
pointed;  it  was  the  barest  justice  to  France,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  she  should  receive  the  coal  mines 


326   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

of  the  former  district  and  that  the  latter  should  be 
demilitarized.  In  the  question  of  Danzig,  and  the 
Polish  corridor  to  the  sea,  it  was  only  fair  to  Poland 
that  she  receive  the  adequate  outlet  which  was 
necessary  to  her  economic  life  and  which  had  been 
promised  her,  even  if  it  meant  the  annexation  of 
large  German  populations,  many  of  which  had  been 
artificially  brought  in  as  colonists  by  the  Berlin 
Government;  and  in  setting  up  a  free  city  of  Dan 
zig,  the  Conference  broke  with  the  practices  of  old 
style  diplomacy  and  paid  a  tribute  to  the  rights  of 
peoples  as  against  expediency.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  the  decision  to  provide  for  plebiscites  in  East 
Prussia  and  in  upper  Silesia.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  refusal  to  permit  the  incorporation  of  the  new, 
lesser  Austria  within  Germany  was  at  once  unjust 
and  unwise  —  a  concession  to  the  most  shortsighted 
of  old-style  diplomatic  principles. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  former  Hapsburg 
territories,  Wilsonian  principles  were  always  in  the 
minds  of  the  delegates,  although  in  a  few  cases 
they  were  honored  more  in  the  breach  than  in  the 
observance.  Wilson  himself  surrendered  to  Italy 
extensive  territories  in  the  Tyrol  south  of  the  Bren 
ner  which,  if  he  had  followed  his  own  professions, 
would  have  been  left  to  Austria.  A  large  Jugoslav 


THE  SETTLEMENT  327 

population  on  the  Julian  Alps  and  in  Istria  was 
placed  under  Italian  rule.  The  new  Czechoslovak 
state  includes  millions  of  Germans  and  Magyars. 
The  boundaries  of  Rumania  were  extended  to  in* 
elude  many  non-Rumanian  peoples.  Bulgars  were 
sacrificed  to  Greeks  and  to  Serbs.  In  the  settle 
ment  of  each  problem  the  balance  always  inclined 
a  little  in  favor  of  the  victors.  But  the  injustices 
committed  were  far  less  extensive  than  might  have 
been  expected,  and  in  most  cases  where  popula 
tions  were  included  under  alien  rule,  the  decision 
was  based  less  on  political  considerations  than  on 
the  practical  factors  of  terrain,  rivers,  and  railroads 
which  must  always  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
the  drawing  of  a  frontier.  Wherever  the  issue  was 
clean-cut,  as  for  example  between  the  selfish  na 
tionalism  of  the  Italians  in  their  Adriatic  demands 
and  the  claim  to  mere  economic  life  of  the  Jugo 
slavs,  the  old  rule  which  granted  the  spoils  to  the 
stronger  power  was  vigorously  protested. 

Whatever  the  mistakes  of  the  Conference,  Wil 
son  secured  that  which  he  regarded  as  the  point  of 
prime  importance,  the  League  of  Nations.  This, 
he  believed,  would  remedy  the  flaws  and  eradicate 
the  vices  of  the  treaties.  No  settlement,  however 
perfect  at  the  moment,  could  possibly  remain 


328   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

permanent,  in  view  of  the  constantly  changing  con 
ditions.  What  was  necessary  was  an  elasticity  that 
would  permit  change  as  change  became  necessary. 
If  the  disposition  of  the  Saar  basin,  for  example, 
proved  to  be  so  unwise  or  unjust  as  to  cause  danger 
of  violence,  the  League  would  take  cognizance  of 
the  peril  and  provide  a  remedy.  If  the  boundaries 
of  eastern  Germany  gave  undue  advantage  to  the 
Poles,  the  League  would  find  ways  and  means  of 
rectifying  the  frontier  peacefully.  If  Hungary  or 
Czechoslovakia  found  themselves  cut  off  from  sea 
ports,  the  League  could  hear  and  act  upon  their  de 
mands  for  freedom  of  transit  or  unrestricted  access 
to  fair  markets.  That  the  League  was  necessary 
for  such  and  other  purposes  was  recognized  by 
many  notable  economic  experts  and  statesmen  be 
sides  the  President.  Herbert  Hoover  insisted  upon 
the  necessity  of  a  League  if  the  food  problems  of 
central  Europe  were  to  be  met,  and  Venizelos 
remarked  that  "without  a  League  of  Nations, 
Europe  would  face  the  future  with  despair  in  its 
heart."  Because  he  had  the  covenant  of  such  an 
association  incorporated  in  the  German  treaty, 
Wilson  accepted  all  the  mistakes  and  injustices 
of  the  treaty  as  minor  details  and  could  say  of 
it,  doubtless  in  all  sincerity,  "It's  a  good  job." 


THE  SETTLEMENT  329 

Conscious  of  victory  in  the  matter  which  he  had 
held  closest  to  his  heart,  the  President  embarked 
upon  the  George  Washington  on  the  29th  of  June, 
the  day  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  and  set 
forth  for  home.  All  that  was  now  needed  was  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate. 


CHAPTER 

THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY 

NEITHER  President  Wilson  nor  those  who  had  been 
working  with  him  at  Paris  seriously  feared  that, 
after  securing  the  point  of  chief  importance  to  him 
at  the  Conference,  he  would  fail  to  win  support  for 
the  League  of  Nations  and  the  treaty  at  home. 
They  recognized,  of  course,  that  his  political  op 
ponents  in  the  Senate  would  not  acquiesce  without 
a  struggle.  The  Republicans  were  now  in  the  ma 
jority,  and  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  the  new  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  had  gone 
far  in  his  efforts  to  undermine  Wilson's  policy  at 
Paris.  He  had  encouraged  the  Italians  in  their  im 
perialistic  designs  in  the  Adriatic  and  had  done  his 
best  to  discredit  the  League  of  Nations.  Former 
Progressive  Senators,  such  as  Johnson  and  Borah, 
who  like  Lodge  made  personal  hostility  to  Wilson 
the  chief  plank  in  their  political  programme,  had  de 
clared  vigorously  their  determination  to  prevent  the 

330 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   331 

entrance  of  the  United  States  into  a  League.  The 
Senators  as  a  whole  were  not  well-informed  upon 
foreign  conditions  and  Wilson  had  done  nothing  to 
enlighten  them.  He  had  not  asked  their  advice  in 
the  formulation  of  his  policy,  nor  had  he  supplied 
them  with  the  facts  that  justified  the  position  he 
had  taken.  Naturally  their  attitude  was  not  likely 
to  be  friendly,  now  that  he  returned  to  request 
their  consent  to  the  treaty,  and  the  approach  of  a 
presidential  election  was  bound  to  affect  the  action 
of  all  ardent  partisans. 

Opposition  was  also  to  be  expected  in  the  coun 
try.  There  was  always  the  ancient  prejudice 
against  participation  in  European  affairs,  which 
had  not  been  broken  even  by  the  events  of  the  past 
two  years.  The  people,  even  more  than  the  Senate, 
were  ignorant  of  foreign  conditions  and  failed  to 
understand  the  character  of  the  obligations  which 
the  nation  would  assume  under  the  treaty  and  the 
covenant  of  the  League.  There  was  genuine  fear 
lest  the  United  States  should  become  involved  in 
wars  and  squabbles  in  which  it  had  no  material  in 
terest,  and  lest  it  should  surrender  its  independence 
of  action  to  a  council  of  foreign  powers.  This 
was  accompanied  by  the  belief  that  an  irresponsi 
ble  President  might  commit  the  country  to  an 


332   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

adventurous  course  of  action  which  could  not  be 
controlled  by  Congress.  The  chief  opposition  to 
the  treaty  and  covenant,  however,  probably  result 
ed  from  the  personal  dislike  of  Wilson.  This  feeling, 
which  had  always  been  virulent  along  the  Atlantic 
coast  and  in  the  industrial  centers  of  the  Middle 
West,  had  been  intensified  by  the  President's  ap 
parent  disregard  of  Congress.  More  than  one  man 
of  business  argued  that  the  treaty  must  be  bad  be 
cause  it  was  Wilson's  work  and  the  covenant  worst 
of  all,  since  it  was  his  pet  scheme.  One  heard  daily 
in  the  clubs  and  on  the  golf-courses  of  New  Eng 
land  and  the  Middle  Atlantic  States  the  remark: 
"I  know  little  about  the  treaty,  but  I  know  Wilson, 
and  I  know  he  must  be  wrong." 

And  yet  the  game  was  probably  in  the  Presi 
dent's  hands,  had  he  known  how  to  play  it.  Di 
vided  as  it  was  on  the  question  of  personal  devotion 
to  Wilson,  the  country  was  a  unit  in  its  desire  for 
immediate  peace  and  normal  conditions.  Admit 
ting  the  imperfections  of  the  treaty,  it  was  prob 
ably  the  best  that  could  be  secured  in  view  of  the 
conflicting  interests  of  the  thirty-one  signatory 
powers,  and  at  least  it  would  bring  peace  at  once. 
To  cast  it  aside  meant  long  delays  and  prolongation 
of  the  economic  crisis.  The  covenant  of  the  League 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   333 

might  not  be  entirely  satisfactory,  but  something 
must  be  done  to  prevent  war  in  the  future;  and  if 
this  League  proved  unsatisfactory,  it  could  be 
amended  after  trial.  Even  the  opposing  Senators 
did  not  believe  that  they  could  defeat  the  treaty 
outright.  They  were  warned  by  Republican  finan 
ciers,  who  understood  international  economic  con 
ditions,  that  the  safety  and  prosperity  of  the  world 
demanded  ratification,  and  that  the  United  States 
could  not  afford  to  assume  an  attitude  of  isola 
tion  even  if  it  were  possible.  Broad-minded  states 
men  who  were  able  to  dissociate  partisan  emotion 
from  intellectual  judgment,  such  as  ex-President 
Taft,  agreed  that  the  treaty  should  be  ratified  as 
promptly  as  possible.  AH  that  Senator  Lodge  and 
his  associates  really  hoped  for  was  to  incorporate 
reservations  which  would  guarantee  the  independ 
ence  of  American  action  and  incidentally  make  it 
impossible  for  the  President  to  claim  all  the  credit 
for  the  peace. 

Had  the  President  proved  capable  of  cooperating 
with  the  moderate  Republican  Senators  it  would 
probably  have  been  possible  for  him  to  have  saved 
the  fruits  of  his  labor  at  Paris .  An  important  group 
honestly  believed  that  the  language  of  the  covenant 
was  ambiguous  in  certain  respects,  particularly  as 


334   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

regards  the  extent  of  sovereignty  sacrificed  by 
the  national  government  to  the  League,  and  the 
diminution  of  congressional  powers.  This  group 
was  anxious  to  insert  reservations  making  plain 
the  right  of  Congress  alone  to  declare  war,  de 
fining  more  exactly  the  right  of  the  United  States 
to  interpret  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  specifying 
what  was  meant  by  domestic  questions  that  should 
be  exempt  from  the  cognizance  of  the  League. 
Had  Wilson  at  once  combined  with  this  group  and 
agreed  to  the  suggested  reservations,  he  would  in 
all  probability  have  been  able  to  secure  the  two- 
thirds  vote  necessary  to  ratification.  The  country 
would  have  been  satisfied;  the  Republicans  might 
have  contended  that  they  had  "Americanized"  the 
treaty;  and  the  reservations  would  probably  have 
been  accepted  by  the  co-signatories.  It  would  have 
been  humiliating  to  go  back  to  the  Allies  asking 
special  privileges,  but  Europe  needed  American  as 
sistance  too  much  to  fail  to  heed  these  demands. 
After  all  America  had  gained  nothing  in  the  way  of 
territorial  advantage  from  the  war  and  was  asking 
for  nothing  in  the  way  of  reparations. 

It  was  at  this  crucial  moment  that  Wilson's  pe 
culiar  temperamental  faults  asserted  themselves. 
Sorely  he  needed  the  sane  advice  of  Colonel  House, 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   335 

who  would  doubtless  have  found  ways  of  placating 
the  opposition.  But  that  practical  statesman  was 
in  London  and  the  President  lacked  the  capacity  to 
arrange  the  compromise  that  House  approved. 

President  Wilson  alone  either  would  not  or  could 
not  negotiate  successfully  with  the  middle  group  of 
Republicans.  He  went  so  far  as  to  initiate  private 
conferences  with  various  Senators,  a  step  indicat 
ing  his  desire  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  the  dicta 
torship  of  which  he  was  accused;  but  his  attitude 
on  reservations  that  altered  the  meaning  of  any 
portion  of  the  treaty  or  covenant  was  unyielding, 
and  he  even  insisted  that  merely  interpretative  res 
ervations  should  not  be  embodied  in  the  text  of 
the  ratifying  resolution.  The  President  evidently 
hoped  that  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  would 
compel  the  Senate  to  yield  to  the  demand  for  im 
mediate  peace  and  for  guarantees  against  future 
war.  His  appearance  of  rigidity,  however,  played 
into  the  hands  of  the  opponents  of  the  treaty,  who 
dominated  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the 
Senate.  Senator  Lodge,  chairman  of  the  commit 
tee,  adopted  a  stand  which,  to  the  Administration 
at  least,  did  not  seem  to  be  justified  by  anything 
but  a  desire  to  discredit  the  work  of  Wilson.  He 
had,  in  the  previous  year,  warmly  advocated  a 


336  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

League  of  Nations,  but  in  the  spring  of  1919  he 
had  given  the  impression  that  he  would  oppose  any 
League  for  which  Wilson  stood  sponsor.  Thus  he 
had  raised  objections  to  the  preliminary  draft  of 
the  covenant  which  Wilson  brought  from  Paris  in 
February;  but  when  Wilson  persuaded  the  Allies 
to  incorporate  some  of  the  amendments  then  de 
manded  by  Republican  Senators,  he  at  once  found 
new  objections.  He  did  not  dare  attack  the  League 
as  a  principle,  in  view  of  the  uncertainty  of  public 
opinion  on  the  issue;  but  he  obviously  rejoiced  in 
the  President's  inability  to  unite  the  Democrats 
with  the  middle-ground  Republicans,  for  whom 
Senator  McCumber  stood  as  spokesman. 

On  the  19th  of  August  a  conference  was  held  at 
the  White  House,  in  which  the  President  attempted 
to  explain  to  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
doubtful  points  and  to  give  the  reasons  for  various 
aspects  of  the  settlement.  A  careful  study  of  the 
stenographic  report  indicates  that  his  answers  to 
the  questions  of  the  Republican  Senators  were 
frank,  and  that  he  was  endeavoring  to  remove  the 
unfortunate  effects  of  his  former  distant  attitude. 
His  manner,  however,  had  in  it  something  of  the 
schoolmaster,  and  the  conference  was  fruitless. 
Problems  which  had  been  studied  for  months  by 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   337 

experts  of  all  the  Powers,  and  to  the  solution  of 
which  had  been  devoted  long  weeks  of  intelligent 
discussion,  were  now  passed  upon  superficially  by 
men  whose  ignorance  of  foreign  questions  was  only 
too  evident,  and  who  barely  concealed  their  deter 
mination  to  nullify  everything  approved  by  the 
President.  Hence,  when  the  report  of  the  com 
mittee  was  finally  presented  on  the  10th  of  Septem 
ber,  the  Republican  majority  demanded  no  less 
than  thirty-eight  amendments  and  four  reserva 
tions.  A  quarter  of  the  report  was  not  concerned 
at  all  with  the  subject  under  discussion,  but  was 
devoted  to  an  attack  upon  Wilson's  autocratic 
methods  and  his  treatment  of  the  Senate.  As  was 
pointed  out  by  Senator  McCumber,  the  single  Re 
publican  who  dissented  from  the  majority  report, 
"not  one  word  is  said,  not  a  single  allusion  made, 
concerning  either  the  great  purposes  of  the  League 
of  Nations  or  the  methods  by  which  these  pur' 
poses  are  to  be  accomplished.  Irony  and  sarcasm 
have  been  substituted  for  argument  and  position? 
taken  by  the  press  or  individuals  outside  the  Sen' 
ate  seem  to  command  more  attention  than  the 
treaty  itself." 

The  President  did  not  receive  the  popular  sup 
port  which  he  expected,  and  the  burst  of  popular 


338   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

wrath  which  he  believed  would  overwhelm  sena 
torial  opposition  was  not  forthcoming.  In  truth 
public  opinion  was  confused.  America  was  not 
educated  to  understand  the  issues  at  stake.  Wil 
son's  purposes  at  Paris  had  not  been  well  reported 
in  the  press,  and  he  himself  had  failed  to  make  plain 
the  meaning  of  his  policy.  It  was  easy  for  oppo 
nents  of  the  treaty  to  muddy  discussion  and  to 
arouse  emotion  where  reason  was  desirable.  The 
wildest  statements  were  made  as  to  the  effect  of 
the  covenant,  such  as  that  entrance  into  the  League 
would  at  once  involve  the  United  States  in  war, 
and  that  Wilson  was  sacrificing  the  interests  of 
America  to  the  selfish  desires  of  European  states. 
The  same  men  who,  a  year  before,  had  complained 
that  Wilson  was  opposing  England  and  France, 
now  insisted  that  he  had  sold  the  United  States  to 
those  nations.  They  invented  the  catchword  of 
"one  hundred  per  cent  Americanism,"  the  test  of 
which  was  to  be  opposition  to  the  treaty.  They 
found  strange  coadjutors.  The  German- Ameri 
cans,  suppressed  during  the  war,  now  dared  to 
emerge,  hoping  to  save  the  Fatherland  from  the 
effects  of  defeat  by  preventing  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty;  the  politically  active  Irish  found  oppor 
tunity  to  fulminate  against  British  imperialism  and 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   339 

"tyranny"  which  they  declared  had  been  sanc 
tioned  by  the  treaty;  impractical  liberals,  who  were 
disappointed  because  Wilson  had  not  inaugurated 
the  social  millennium,  joined  hands  with  out-and- 
out  reactionaries.  But  the  most  discouraging  aspect 
of  the  situation  was  that  so  many  persons  permit 
ted  their  judgment  to  be  clouded  by  their  dislike 
of  the  President's  personality.  However  much  they 
might  disapprove  the  tactics  of  Senator  Lodge  they 
could  not  but  sympathize  to  some  extent  with  the 
Senate's  desire  to  maintain  its  independence,  which 
they  believed  had  been  assailed  by  Wilson.  Discus 
sions  which  began  with  the  merits  of  the  League  of 
Nations  almost  invariably  culminated  with  vitriolic 
attacks  upon  the  character  of  Wroodrow  Wilson. 

In  the  hope  of  arousing  the  country  to  a  clear  de 
mand  for  immediate  peace  based  upon  the  Paris 
settlement,  Wilson  decided  to  carry  out  the  plan 
formulated  some  weeks  previous  and  deliver  a 
series  of  speeches  from  the  Middle  West  to  the 
Pacific  coast.  He  set  forth  on  the  3d  of  September 
and  made  more  than  thirty  speeches.  He  was 
closely  followed  by  some  of  his  fiercest  opponents. 
Senators  Johnson  and  Borah,  members  of  the  For 
eign  Relations  Committee,  who  might  have  been 
expected  to  remain  in  Washington  to  assist  in  the 


340  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

consideration  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate,  followed 
in  Wilson's  wake,  attempting  to  counteract  the  ef 
fect  of  his  addresses,  and  incidentally  distorting 
many  of  the  treaty's  provisions,  which  it  is  chari 
table  to  assume  they  did  not  comprehend.  The  im 
pression  produced  by  the  President  was  varied,  de 
pending  largely  upon  the  political  character  of  his 
audience.  East  of  the  Mississippi  he  was  received 
with  comparative  coolness,  but  as  he  approached 
the  coast  enthusiasm  became  high,  and  at  Seattle 
and  Los  Angeles  he  received  notable  ovations. 
And  yet  in  these  hours  of  triumph  as  in  the  pre 
vious  moments  of  discouragement,  farther  east,  he 
must  have  felt  that  the  issues  were  not  clear.  The 
struggle  was  no  longer  one  for  a  new  international 
order  that  would  ensure  peace,  so  much  as  a  per 
sonal  conflict  between  Lodge  and  Wilson.  Whether 
the  President  were  applauded  or  anathematized, 
the  personal  note  was  always  present. 

It  was  evident,  during  the  tour,  that  the  nervous 
strain  was  telling  upon  Wilson.  He  had  been  worn 
seriously  by  his  exertions  in  Paris,  where  he  was 
described  by  a  foreign  plenipotentiary  as  the  hard 
est  worker  in  the  Conference.  The  brief  voyage 
home,  which  was  purposely  lengthened  to  give  him 
better  chance  of  recuperation,  proved  insufficient. 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   341 

Forced  to  resume  the  struggle  at  the  moment  when 
he  thought  victory  was  his,  repudiated  where  he 
expected  to  find  appreciation,  the  tour  proved  to 
be  beyond  his  physical  and  nervous  strength.  At 
Pueblo,  Colorado,  on  the  25th  of  September,  he 
broke  down  and  returned  hastily  to  Washington. 
Shortly  afterwards  the  President's  condition  be 
came  so  serious  that  his  physicians  forbade  all  po 
litical  conferences,  insisting  upon  a  period  of  com 
plete  seclusion  and  rest,  which  was  destined  to 
continue  for  many  months. 

Thus  at  the  moment  of  extreme  crisis  in  the  for 
tunes  of  the  treaty  its  chief  protagonist  was  re 
moved  from  the  scene  of  action  and  the  Democratic 
forces  fighting  for  ratification  were  deprived  of  ef 
fective  leadership.  Had  there  been  a  real  leader  in 
the  Senate  who  could  carry  on  the  fight  with  vigor 
and  finesse,  the  treaty  might  even  then  have  been 
saved;  but  Wilson's  system  had  permitted  no 
understudies.  There  was  no  one  to  lead  and  no  one 
to  negotiate  a  compromise.  From  his  sick-room, 
where  his  natural  obstinacy  seemed  to  be  intensi 
fied  by  his  illness,  the  President  still  refused  to 
consider  any  reservations  except  of  a  purely  in 
terpretative  character,  and  the  middle-ground 
Republicans  would  not  vote  to  ratify  without 


342   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

"mild  reservations,"  some  of  which  seemed  to  him 
more  than  interpretative. 

Senatorial  forces  were  roughly  divided  into  four 
groups.  There  were  the  "bitter-enders,"  typifiedby 
Johnson,  Borah,  and  Brandegee,  who  frankly  want 
ed  to  defeat  the  treaty  and  the  League  outright; 
there  were  the  "reservationists,"  most  of  whom, 
like  Lodge,  wanted  the  same  but  did  not  dare  say 
so  openly;  there  were  the  "mild  reservationists," 
most  of  whom  were  Republicans,  who  sincerely  de 
sired  immediate  peace  and  asked  for  no  important 
changes  in  the  treaty;  and  finally  there  were  those 
who  desired  to  ratify  the  treaty  as  it  stood.  The 
last-named  group,  made  up  of  Democrats,  num 
bered  from  forty-one  to  forty-four,  and  obviously 
needed  the  assistance  of  the  "mild  reservation 
ists,"  if  they  were  to  secure  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the 
Senate.  During  October,  all  the  amendments 
which  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  brought 
forward  were  defeated  through  the  combination  of 
the  last  two  groups.  Early  in  November,  however, 
fourteen  reservations  were  adopted,  the  "mild 
reservationists"  voting  with  Senator  Lodge,  for 
lack  of  any  basis  of  compromise  with  the  Demo 
crats.  The  effect  of  these  reservations  would, 
undoubtedly,  have  been  to  release  the  United 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY 

States  from  many  of  the  obligations  assumed  by 
other  members,  while  assuring  to  it  the  benefits  of 
the  League.  The  most  serious  of  the  reservations 
was  that  concerned  with  Article  X  of  the  covenant, 
which  stated  that  the  United  States  would  assume 
no  obligations  to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity 
or  political  independence  of  any  other  country,  or 
to  interfere  in  controversies  between  nations,  unless 
in  any  particular  case  Congress  should  so  provide. 
From  the  moment  when  Wilson  first  developed 
his  policy  of  international  service,  cooperative  in 
terference  in  order  to  prevent  acts  of  aggression 
by  a  strong  against  a  weaker  power  had  been  the 
chief  point  in  his  programme.  It  was  contained  in 
his  early  Pan-American  policy;  it  ran  through  his 
speeches  in  the  campaign  of  1916;  it  was  in  the 
Fourteen  Points.  It  was  his  specific  contribution 
to  the  covenant  in  Paris.  Article  X  was  the  one 
point  in  the  covenant  which  Wilson  would  not 
consent  to  modify  or,  as  he  expressed  it,  see  "nulli 
fied."  Just  because  it  lay  nearest  Wilson's  heart, 
it  was  the  article  against  which  the  most  virulent 
attacks  of  the  "die-hards"  were  directed. 

The  President  denounced  the  reservation  on 
Article  X,  as  a  "knife-thrust  at  the  heart  of  the 
covenant,"  and  its  inclusion  in  the  ratifying 


344   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAE 

resolution  of  the  Senate,  spelled  the  defeat  of  rati 
fication.  On  the  eve  of  voting  he  wrote  to  Senator 
Hitchcock,  leader  of  the  Democratic  forces  in  the 
Senate,  "I  assume  that  the  Senators  only  desire  my 
judgment  upon  the  all-important  question  of  the 
resolution  containing  the  many  reservations  of 
Senator  Lodge.  On  that  I  cannot  hesitate,  for,  in 
my  opinion,  the  resolution  in  that  form  does  not 
provide  for  ratification  but  rather  for  nullification 
of  the  treaty.  I  sincerely  hope  that  the  friends  and 
supporters  of  the  treaty  will  vote  against  the  Lodge 
resolution  of  ratification."  The  "mild  reserva- 
tionists"  led  by  McCumber  voted  with  the  Lodge 
group  for  the  resolution;  but  the  "bitter-end 
ers,"  combining  with  the  supporters  of  the  original 
treaty,  outnumbered  them.  The  vote  stood  thirty- 
nine  in  favor  of  the  resolution  and  fifty -five  against. 
When  a  motion  for  unconditional  ratification  was 
offered  by  Senator  Underwood,  it  was  defeated  by 
a  vote  of  fifty-three  to  thirty-eight. 

The  Republicans  on  the  Foreign  Relations  Com 
mittee  had  succeeded  far  beyond  the  hopes  of  their 
leaders  in  August.  They  had  killed  the  treaty,  but 
in  such  an  indirect  fashion  as  to  confuse  the  public 
and  to  fix  upon  the  President  the  blame  for  delay 
ing  the  peace.  It  was  easy  to  picture  the  obstinacy 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   345 

of  the  President  as  the  root  of  all  the  evil  which  re 
sulted  from  the  political  and  economic  uncertainty 
overhanging  our  European  relations.  So  wide 
spread  was  this  feeling  among  his  natural  oppo 
nents,  that  the  Republican  Senators  began  to  as 
sume  a  far  loftier  tone,  and  to  laugh  at  the  tardy 
efforts  of  the  Democrats  to  arrange  a  compromise. 
When  Senator  Pomerene,  after  consultation  with 
Administration  leaders,  proposed  the  appointment 
of  a  "committee  of  conciliation,"  to  find  a  basis 
of  ratification  that  would  secure  the  necessary 
two-thirds  vote,  the  motion  was  killed  by  forty- 
eight  to  forty-two.  Senator  Lodge  announced 
that  he  would  support  the  resolution  suggested  by 
Knox,  which  would  end  the  war  by  congressional 
resolution  and  thus  compel  Wilson  to  negotiate  a 
separate  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany. 

Intelligent  public  opinion,  however,  was  anxious 
that  the  quarrels  of  the  President  and  the  Senate 
should  not  be  allowed  to  delay  the  settlement.1 

1  A  straw  vote  taken  in  311  colleges  and  including  158,000  stu 
dents  and  professors  showed  an  inclination  to  favor  Wilson  rather 
than  Lodge,  but  the  greatest  number  approved  compromise:  four 
per  cent  favored  a  new  treaty  with  Germany;  eight  per  cent 
favored  killing  the  Versailles  treaty;  only  seventeen  per  cent  ap 
proved  the  Lodge  programme;  thirty  per  cent  approved  ratifica 
tion  of  the  treaty  without  change;  and  thirty-eight  per  cent 
favored  compromise. 


346    WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Rightly  or  wrongly  the  people  felt  that  the  struggle 
was  largely  a  personal  one  between  Lodge  and  Wil 
son,  and  insisted  that  each  must  yield  something 
of  their  contention.  On  the  one  hand,  ex-President 
Taf t  and  others  of  the  more  far-seeing  Republicans 
worked  anxiously  for  compromise,  with  the  assist 
ance  of  such  men  as  Hoover,  who  perceived  the 
necessity  of  a  League,  but  who  were  willing  to 
sacrifice  its  efficiency  to  some  extent,-  if  only  the 
United  States  could  be  brought  in.  On  the  other 
hand,  various  Democrats  who  were  less  directly 
under  Wilson's  influence  wanted  to  meet  these 
friends  of  the  League  half-way.  During  Decem 
ber  and  January  unofficial  conferences  between  the 
senatorial  groups  took  place  and  progress  towards 
a  settlement  seemed  likely.  The  Republicans 
agreed  to  soften  the  language  of  their  minor  reser 
vations,  and  Wilson  even  intimated  that  he  would 
consent  to  a  mild  reservation  on  Article  X,  al 
though  as  he  later  wrote  to  Hitchcock,  he  felt 
strongly  that  any  reservation  or  resolution  stating 
that  the  "United  States  assumes  no  obligation 
under  such  and  such  an  article  unless  or  except, 
would  chill  our  relationship  with  the  nations  with 
whom  we  expect  to  be  associated  in  this  great  en 
terprise  of  maintaining  the  world's  peace."  It  was 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   347 

important  "not  to  create  the  impression  that  we 
are  trying  to  escape  obligations." 

On  the  31st  of  January  the  country  was  startled 
by  the  publication  of  a  letter  written  by  Viscount 
Grey,  who  had  been  appointed  British  Ambassador 
to  the  United  States,  but  who  had  returned  to  Eng 
land  after  a  four  months'  stay,  during  which  he  had 
been  unable  to  secure  an  interview  with  the  sick 
President.  In  this  letter  he  attempted  to  explain 
to  the  British  the  causes  of  American  hesitancy  to 
accept  the  League.  He  then  went  on  to  state  that 
the  success  of  the  League  depended  upon  the  ad 
herence  of  the  United  States,  and  while  admitting 
the  serious  character  of  the  reservations  proposed 
by  Senator  Lodge,  insisted  that  American  coopera 
tion  ought  not  to  be  refused  because  conditions  were 
attached.  His  views  were  unofficial,  but  it  seemed 
clear  that  they  were  approved  by  the  British  Cab 
inet,  and  they  received  a  chorus  of  endorsement 
from  the  French  and  British  press. 

The  publication  of  Grey's  letter  opened  a  path  to 
peace  to  both  Senate  and  President  had  they  been 
willing  to  follow  it.  The  Senate,  by  very  slight 
verbal  softening  of  the  language  of  its  reservations, 
the  President  by  taking  the  British  Ambassador  at 
his  word,  might  have  reached  an  agreement.  The 


348  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Lodge  group,  however,  which  had  shown  some  in 
dications  of  a  desire  for  compromise,  was  threat 
ened  by  the  "die-hards"  who  were  determined  to 
defeat  the  treaty;  fearing  beyond  everything  to 
break  party  unity,  Lodge  finally  refused  to  alter  the 
language  of  the  strong  reservation  on  Article  X, 
which  stated  that  the  United  States  would  assume 
no  obligation  to  preserve  the  independence  of  other 
nations  by  military  force  or  the  use  of  its  resources 
or  any  form  of  economic  discrimination,  unless 
Congress  should  first  so  provide.  Inasmuch  as  the 
economic  outlawry  of  the  offending  state  was  the 
means  which  Wilson  chiefly  counted  upon,  the 
reservation  took  all  practical  significance  from  Ar 
ticle  X,  since  the  delays  resulting  from  congres 
sional  deliberation  would  prevent  effective  action. 
The  President,  possibly  believing  that  imperialist 
elements  abroad  were  not  sorry  to  see  Article  X 
nullified,  refused  to  accept  the  resolution  of  ratifica 
tion  so  long  as  it  contained  this  reservation.  "The 
imperialist,"  he  wrote,  "wants  no  League  of  Na 
tions,  but  if,  in  response  to  the  universal  cry  of 
masses  everywhere,  there  is  to  be  one,  he  is  inter 
ested  to  secure  one  suited  to  his  own  purposes,  one 
that  will  permit  him  to  continue  the  historic  game 
of  pawns  and  peoples  —  the  juggling  of  provinces, 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   349 

the  old  balance  of  power,  and  the  inevitable  wars 
attendant  upon  these  things.  The  reservation  pro 
posed  would  perpetuate  the  old  order.  Does  any 
one  really  want  to  see  the  old  game  played  again? 
Can  any  one  really  venture  to  take  part  in  reviv 
ing  the  old  order?  The  enemies  of  a  League  of  Na 
tions  have  by  every  true  instinct  centered  their 
efforts  against  Article  X,  for  it  is  undoubtedly 
the  foundation  of  the  whole  structure.  It  is  the 
bulwark,  and  the  only  bulwark  of  the  rising  democ 
racy  of  the  world  against  the  forces  of  imperialism 
and  reaction." 

The  deadlock  was  complete,  and  on  March  19, 
1920,  when  the  vote  on  ratification  was  taken,  the 
necessary  two-thirds  were  lacking  by  seven  votes. 
At  the  last  moment  a  number  of  Democrats  joined 
with  the  Republican  reservationists,  making  fifty- 
seven  in  favor  of  ratification.  On  the  other  hand 
the  bitter-end  Republicans  voted  against  it  with 
the  Democrats  who  stood  by  the  President,  thus 
throwing  thirty -seven  votes  against  ratification.  It 
had  taken  the  Peace  Conference  five  months  to 
construct  the  treaty  with  Germany  in  all  its  com 
plexities,  and  secure  the  unanimous  approval  of 
the  delegates  of  thirty-one  states.  The  Senate 
had  consumed  more  than  eight  months  merely 


350   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

in  criticizing  the  treaty  and  had  finally  refused 
to  ratify  it. 

We  are,  perhaps,  too  close  to  the  event  to  at 
tempt  any  apportionment  of  responsibility  for  this 
failure  to  cap  our  military  successes  by  a  peace 
which  —  when  all  has  been  said  —  was  the  nearest 
possible  approach  to  the  ideal  peace.  It  is  clear 
that  the  blame  is  not  entirely  on  one  side.  His 
torians  will  doubtless  level  the  indictment  of  igno 
rance  and  political  obliquity  against  the  Senators 
who  tried,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  defeat 
the  treaty;  they  will  find  much  justification  for 
their  charge,  although  it  will  be  more  difficult  to  de 
termine  the  dividing  line  between  mere  incapacity 
to  appreciate  the  necessities  of  the  world,  and  the  de 
sire  to  discredit,  at  any  cost,  the  work  of  Woodrow 
Wilson.  On  the  other  hand,  the  President  cannot 
escape  blame,  although  the  charge  will  be  merely 
that  of  tactical  incapacity  and  mistaken  judgment. 
His  inability  to  combine  with  the  moderate  Repub 
lican  Senators  first  gave  a  chance  to  those  who 
wanted  to  defeat  the  treaty.  His  obstinate  refusal 
to  accept  reservations  at  the  end,  when  it  was 
clear  that  the  treaty  could  not  be  ratified  without 
them,  showed  a  regard  for  form,  at  the  expense  of 
practical  benefit.  Granted  that  the  reservations 


THE  SENATE  AND  THE  TREATY   351 

altered  the  character  of  the  League  or  the  charac 
ter  of  American  participation  in  it,  some  sort  of  a 
League  was  essential  and  the  sooner  the  United 
States  entered  the  better  it  would  be.  Its  success 
would  not  rest  upon  phrases,  but  upon  the  spirit  of 
the  nations  that  composed  it;  the  building-up  of  a 
new  and  better  international  order  would  not  be 
determined  by  this  reservation  or  that.  Wilson's 
claim  to  high  rank  as  a  statesmen  would  probably 
be  more  clear  if  he  had  accepted  what  was  possible 
at  the  moment,  in  the  hope  that  the  League  would 
be  improved  as  the  country  and  the  world  became 
better  educated. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

CONCLUSION 

BY  the  accident  of  history  the  Presidency  of  Wood- 
row  Wilson,  which  he  designed  to  utilize  for  a  series 
of  social  reforms,  was  characterized  by  the  su 
preme  importance  of  foreign  affairs.  Whatever  the 
significance  of  the  legislative  enactments  of  his  first 
year  of  office,  he  will  be  remembered  as  the  neu 
trality  President,  the  war  President,  and  the  peace 
President.  Each  phase  of  his  administration  rep 
resents  a  distinct  aspect  of  his  policy  and  called 
into  prominence  distinct  aspects  of  his  character. 
It  is  the  third,  however,  which  gives  to  his  admin 
istration  the  place  of  importance  which  it  will  hold 
in  history;  not  merely  because  of  the  stamp  which 
he  attempted  to  place  upon  the  peace,  but  because 
the  two  earlier  phases  are  in  truth  expressive  of  his 
whole-hearted  devotion  to  the  cause  of  peace.  The 
tenacity  with  which  he  held  to  neutrality  in  the 
face  of  intense  provocation  resulted  less  from  his 

352 


CONCLUSION  353 

appreciation  of  the  pacific  sentiments  of  the  nation, 
or  a  desire  to  assure  its  economic  prosperity,  than  it 
did  from  his  instinctive  abhorrence  of  war.  When 
finally  forced  into  war,  he  based  his  action  upon  the 
hope  of  securing  a  new  international  order  which 
would  make  war  in  the  future  impossible  or  less 
frequent.  In  his  mind  the  war  was  always  waged 
in  order  to  ensure  peace. 

Whatever  his  mistakes  or  successes  as  neutrality 
President  or  war  President,  therefore,  it  is  as  peace 
President  that  he  will  be  judged  by  history.  In 
evitably  future  generations  will  study  with  especial 
attention  the  unfolding  of  his  constructive  peace 
policy,  from  his  declaration  of  the  Fourteen  Points 
to  the  Peace  Conference.  In  reality  his  policy  of 
international  service,  to  be  rendered  by  the  strong 
nations  of  the  world  in  behalf  of  peace  and  of  ab 
solute  justice  toward  the  weaker  nations,  was  de 
veloped  all  through  the  year  1916.  It  was  then 
that  he  seized  upon  a  League  of  Nations  as  the  es 
sential  instrument.  But  the  true  significance  of  this 
policy  was  hardly  perceived  before  the  speech  of  the 
Fourteen  Points,  in  January,  1918.  That  speech 
gave  to  Wilson  his  position  in  the  world,  as  preemi 
nent  exponent  of  the  new  ideals  of  international 
relations. 
23 


354   WOODEOW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

What  the  President  demanded  was  nothing  new. 
The  principle  of  justice,  as  the  underlying  basis  of 
intercourse  between  nations,  has  received  wide  sup 
port  at  all  epochs  of  history;  the  cause  of  interna 
tional  peace,  as  an  ultimate  ideal,  has  always  been 
advocated  in  the  abstract;  the  idea  of  a  League  of 
Nations  has  frequently  been  mooted.  But  it  was 
Wilson's  fate  to  be  ruler  of  a  great  nation  at  the 
moment  when  the  need  of  peace,  justice,  and  in 
ternational  organization  was  more  clearly  demon 
strated  than  ever  before  in  the  world's  history. 
Germany's  cynical  disregard  of  Belgian  independ 
ence,  the  horrors  and  waste  of  the  war  for  which 
Germany  was  chiefly  responsible,  the  diplomatic 
disorganization  of  Europe,  which  permitted  this 
world  disaster,  desired  by  merely  a  handful  of  fire 
brands —  all  these  tragic  and  pitiful  facts  had  been 
burned  into  the  mind  of  the  age.  There  was  a 
definite  determination  that  a  recurrence  of  such 
catastrophes  should  not  be  permitted.  The  peri 
od  of  the  war  will  be  regarded  by  future  histo 
rians  as  one  of  transition  from  the  international 
chaos  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  an  organiza 
tion  of  nations,  which,  however  loose,  should 
crystallize  the  conscience  of  the  world,  preserve  its 
peace,  and  translate  into  international  politics  the 


CONCLUSION  355 

standards  of  morality  which  have  been  set  up  for 
the  individual. 

In  this  transition  President  Wilson  played  a  part 
of  the  first  importance.  His  r61e  was  not  so  much 
that  of  the  executive  leader  as  of  the  prophet.  He 
was  not  the  first  to  catch  the  significance  of  the 
transition,  nor  did  he  possess  the  executive  quali 
ties  which  would  enable  him  to  break  down  all  ob 
stacles  and  translate  ideals  into  facts.  But  he  alone 
of  the  notable  statesmen  of  the  world  was  able  to 
express  adequately  the  ill-defined  hopes  of  the 
peoples  of  all  nations.  He  gave  utterance  to  the 
words  which  the  world  had  been  waiting  for,  and 
they  carried  weight  because  of  his  position.  Alone 
of  the  great  powers  the  United  States  had  no  selfish 
designs  to  hide  behind  fair  promises  of  a  better  fu 
ture.  As  President  of  the  United  States,  Woodrow 
Wilson  might  look  for  the  confidence  of  Europe; 
there  was  no  European  Government  which  could 
arouse  similar  trust.  So  long  as  the  war  lasted,  the 
President's  success  as  a  prophet  of  the  ideal  was 
assured,  alike  by  his  ability  to  voice  inarticulate 
hopes  and  by  reason  of  his  position  as  chief  of 
the  most  powerful  and  most  disinterested  nation  of 
the  world. 

But  with  the  end  of  the  war  he  faced  a  new  task 


356   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

and  one  which  was  infinitely  more  difficult.  The 
flush  of  victory  obliterated  from  the  minds  of  many 
in  the  Allied  countries  the  high  ideals  which  they 
had  nourished  during  the  bitterness  of  the  struggle. 
The  moment  had  arrived  when  practical  advantage 
might  be  taken  from  the  defeat  of  the  enemy,  and 
it  seemed  madness  to  surrender  such  advantage 
for  the  sake  of  quixotic  ideals.  The  statesmen  of 
Europe  once  more  viewed  affairs  through  the 
colored  prism  of  national  selfishness.  In  America, 
where  Wilsonian  ideals  had  at  best  been  imper 
fectly  appreciated,  men  were  wearied  by  interna 
tional  problems  and  longed  for  a  return  to  the 
simple  complexity  of  the  business  life  which  they 
understood.  The  President  was  confronted  by  a 
double  problem.  He  must  win  from  Europe  accept 
ance  of  his  programme,  crystallized  in  the  League 
of  Nations;  from  his  fellow  countrymen  he  must  se 
cure  the  support  necessary  if  the  United  States 
were  to  continue  to  play  the  r61e  in  world  affairs 
which  she  had  undertaken  during  the  war,  and 
which  alone  would  make  possible  an  effective 
League  of  Nations.  To  meet  the  difficulties  of  the 
task,  President  Wilson  was  imperfectly  equipped. 
He  lacked  the  dynamic  qualities  of  a  Roose 
velt,  which  might  have  enabled  him  to  carry  his 


CONCLUSION  357 

opponents  off  their  feet  by  an  overwhelming  rush; 
he  was  not  endowed  with  the  tactical  genius  of  a 
skillful  negotiator;  he  was,  above  all,  handicapped 
by  the  personal  hostilities  which  he  had  aroused 
at  home. 

In  Europe  the  President  achieved  at  least  par 
tial  success.  He  proved  unable  to  marshal  the 
forces  of  liberalism  in  such  a  way  as  to  carry  his 
complete  programme  to  victory,  and  the  sacrifices 
which  he  made  to  the  spirit  of  selfish  nationalism 
cost  him  the  support  and  the  confidence  of  many 
progressive  elements,  while  they  did  not  placate 
the  hostility  of  the  reactionaries.  But  he  secured 
the  League  of  Nations,  the  symbol  and  the  instru 
ment  of  the  new  international  organization  which 
he  sought.  Thereby  at  least  a  beginning  was  made 
in  concrete  form,  which  might  later  be  developed, 
when  the  force  of  the  post-bellum  reaction  had 
wasted  itself. 

At  home,  however,  the  forces  of  opposition 
proved  strong  enough  to  rob  the  President  of  what 
might  have  been  a  triumph.  He  lacked  the  ca 
pacity  to  reconcile  his  personal  and  political  op 
ponents,  as  well  as  the  ability  to  compromise  with 
the  elements  that  were  inclined  to  meet  him  half 
way.  In  accordance  with  his  basic  principles  he 


358   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

appealed  from  the  politicians  to  the  people.  But 
here  again  he  failed,  whether  because  of  personal 
unpopularity,  or  because  of  the  poor  publicity 
which  had  been  given  his  efforts  at  Paris,  or  be 
cause  of  the  physical  breakdown  which  shattered 
his  persuasive  powers  and  finally  led  to  his  retire 
ment  from  the  struggle.  The  vindication  which 
he  sought  in  the  presidential  election  of  1920  was 
denied  him.  The  country  was  tired  of  a  Demo 
cratic  Administration  and  gave  to  the  Republican 
candidate  an  overwhelming  plurality.  The  sole 
comfort  that  Wilson  could  take,  in  the  face  of  the 
election  returns,  was  that  both  candidates  had  de 
clared  for  the  principle  of  international  organiza 
tion  and  that  the  most  distinguished  supporters  of 
the  successful  Republican  candidate  had  pledged 
themselves  to  a  League  of  Nations. 

The  months  that  followed  the  President's  re 
turn  from  Paris  until  the  close  of  his  administra 
tion  thus  form  a  period  of  personal  tragedy.  He 
had  achieved  a  broad  measure  of  success  in  Europe, 
where  the  difficulties  appeared  stupendous,  only  to 
have  the  cup  dashed  from  his  lips  at  the  last  mo 
ment  in  his  own  country.  The  bitterness  of  the  ex 
perience  was  intensified  by  his  physical  helpless 
ness.  But  we  should  lack  perspective  if  we  made 


CONCLUSION  359 

the  mistake  of  confusing  personal  tragedy  with 
failure.  His  work  remained  uncrowned,  but  there 
was  much  that  could  never  be  undone.  The  ar 
ticulate  expression  of  the  hopes  of  the  world,  which 
President  Wilson  voiced  during  the  war,  remains 
imperishable  as  a  guide  to  this  and  future  genera 
tions.  The  League  of  Nations,  weakened  by  the 
absence  of  the  United  States  but  actually  organized 
and  in  operation,  was  the  President's  work.  What 
ever  the  fortunes  of  this  particular  League  the 
steps  taken  toward  international  cooperation  by 
its  foundation  can  never  be  completely  retraced. 

WToodrow  Wilson,  however,  is  not  to  be  assessed 
by  his  accomplishment.  It  is  as  prophet  and  not 
as  man  of  action  that  he  will  be  regarded  by  his 
tory.  Like  the  prophets  of  old,  like  Luther  or 
Mazzini,  he  lacked  the  capacity  for  carrying  to 
practical  success  the  ideal  which  he  preached.  But 
to  assume  that  he  must  accordingly  be  adjudged  a 
failure  is  to  ignore  the  significance  of  the  ideals  to 
which  he  awakened  the  world.  Much  there  was 
that  was  unattainable  and  intangible,  but  its  value 
to  mankind  in  the  development  of  international 
relations  may  be  inestimable. 

Not  on  the  vulgar  mass 

Called  "work"  must  sentence  pass, 


360   WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WAR 

Things  done,  that  took  the  eye  and  had  the  price .  .  .  . 
But  all,  the  world's  coarse  thumb 
And  finger  failed  to  plumb, 
So  passed  in  making  up  the  main  account; 
All  instincts  immature, 
All  purposes  unsure, 

That  weighed  not  as  his  work,  yet  swelled  the  man's 
amount. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

THUS  far  no  adequate  biography  of  President  Wilson, 
covering  his  career  through  the  Peace  Conference,  has 
been  published.  The  most  suggestive  is  Henry  Jones 
Ford's  Woodrow  Wilson:  The  Man  and  His  Work 
(1916)  which  stops  with  the  close  of  the  first  term. 
The  author,  a  Princeton  professor,  is  a  warm  personal 
and  political  admirer  of  the  President,  but  he  makes 
a  definite  attempt  at  critical  appreciation.  W.  E. 
Dodd's  Woodrow  Wilson  and  His  Work  (1920)  is  com 
prehensive  and  brings  the  story  to  the  end  of  the  Peace 
Conference,  but  it  is  marred  by  eulogistic  interpreta 
tion  and  anti-capitalistic  bias.  An  interesting  effort  to 
interpret  the  President  to  British  readers  in  the  form  of 
biography  has  been  made  by  H.  W.  Harris  in  President 
Wilson:  His  Problems  and  His  Policy  (1917).  W.  B. 
Hale,  in  The  Story  of  a  Style  (1920),  attempts  to  analyze 
the  motives  by  which  the  President  is  inspired.  But 
the  best  material  to  serve  this  end  is  to  be  found  in  the 
President's  writings,  especially  Congressional  Govern 
ment  (1885),  An  Old  Master  and  Other  Political  Essays 
(1893),  Constitutional  Government  in  the  United  States 
(1908),  The  New  Freedom  (1913),  International  Ideals 
(1919).  The  two  last-named  are  collections  of  ad 
dresses  made  in  explanation  and  advocacy  of  his  plans 
of  domestic  and  international  reform.  The  most 

361 


362  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

convenient  edition  of  the  President's  official  writings 
and  speeches  is  Albert  Shaw's  President  Wilson's 
State  Papers  and  Addresses  (1918),  edited  with  an 
analytical  index. 

For  the  period  of  neutrality  a  storehouse  of  facts  is 
to  be  found  in  The  New  York  Times  Current  History, 
published  monthly.  The  American  Year  Book  con 
tains  a  succinct  narrative  of  the  events  of  each  year, 
which  may  be  supplemented  by  that  in  the  Annual 
Register  which  is  written  from  the  British  point  of  view. 
A  brief  resume  of  Wilson's  first  term  is  contained  in 
F.  A.  Ogg's  National  Progress  (1918).  More  detailed 
is  the  first  volume  of  J.  B.  McMaster's  The  United 
States  in  the  World  War  (1918),  which  is  based  upon 
the  newspapers  and  necessarily  lacks  perspective, 
but  is  comprehensive  and  extremely  useful  for  pur 
poses  of  reference.  The  clearest  outline  of  President 
Wilson's  treatment  of  foreign  affairs  is  to  be  found 
in  E.  E.  Robinson  and  V.  J.  West's  The  Foreign  Pol 
icy  of  President  Wilson,  1913-1917  (1917).  The  nar 
rative  is  brief  but  interpretative  and  is  followed  by 
numerous  excerpts  from  the  President's  speeches  and 
state  papers.  The  tone  of  the  narrative  is  extremely 
favorable  and  President  Wilson  is  credited  with  con 
sistency  rather  than  capacity  for  development,  but  the 
arrangement  is  excellent.  More  comprehensive  is  the 
edition  by  J.  B.  Scott,  entitled  President  Wilson's  For- 
eign  Policy:  Messages,  Addresses,  Papers  (1918). 
Johann  von  Bernstorff's  My  Three  Years  in  America 
(1920)  is  a  well-reasoned  apologia  by  the  German  Am 
bassador,  which  contains  information  of  much  value; 
it  is  not  impossible  for  the  critically  minded  to  distin 
guish  the  true  from  the  false.  The  description  of 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  363 

German  criminal  activities  contained  in  Horst  von  der 
Goltz's  My  Adventures  as  a  German  Secret  Agent  (1917), 
should  be  checked  up  with  the  report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  of  Inquiry  into  the  German  propaganda. 
The  Real  Colonel  House,  by  A.  D.  Howden-Smith 
(1918),  throws  useful  sidelights  on  Wilson  and  contains 
valuable  material  on  the  activities  of  Colonel  House  as 
negotiator  before  the  entrance  into  the  war  of  the 
United  States. 

The  best  general  narrative  of  America's  war  effort  is 
J.  S.  Bassett's  Our  War  with  Germany  (1919);  it  is 
clear  and  succinct,  beginning  with  the  early  effects  of 
the  war  on  the  United  States  in  1914,  and  ending  with 
the  Peace  Conference.  An  interesting,  but  irritating, 
account  is  to  be  found  in  George  Creel's  The  War,  the 
World  and  Wilson  (1920),  which  is  passionate  in  its  de 
fense  of  the  President,  and  blurs  truth  with  inaccuracy 
on  almost  every  page.  F.  F.  Kelly's  What  America 
Did  (1919)  is  a  brief  popular  account  of  the  building  of 
the  army  at  home  and  abroad  and  the  organization  of 
industry:  clear,  inaccurate,  uncritical.  The  most  con 
venient  summary  of  the  organization  of  national  re 
sources  is  F.  L.  Paxson's  "The  American  War  Govern 
ment,"  in  The  American  Historical  Review,  October, 
1920,  which  should  be  supplemented  by  the  Handbook 
of  Economic  Agencies  for  the  War  of  1917,  monograph 
No.  3  of  the  Historical  Branch,  War  Plans  Division, 
General  Staff  (1919).  The  former  contains  many  ref 
erences  in  footnotes,  of  which  the  most  important  are 
the  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (1919)  and  the  Report  of 
the  Provost  Marshal  General  (1919) .  The  published  In 
vestigation  of  the  War  Department,  Hearing  before  the 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  (1918)  is  invaluable. 


364  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  most  complete  information  on  ordnance  is  to  be 
found  in  the  report  of  General  Benedict  Crowell,  Amer 
ica's  Munitions,  1917-1918  (1919);  it  is  an  official  de 
fense  and  should  be  read  critically.  A  graphic  picture 
of  American  accomplishments  is  given  in  L.  P.  Ayres's 
The  War  with  Germany;  A  Statistical  Summary  (1919). 
The  best  account  of  operations  in  France  is  still  Gen 
eral  Pershing's  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  which  is 
printed  in  New  York  Times  Current  History,  January 
and  February,  1920.  It  may  be  supplemented  by 
Shipley  Thomas's  The  History  of  the  A.  E.  F.  (1920). 

The  American  point  of  view  on  the  Peace  Conference 
is  set  forth  authoritatively  in  What  Really  Happened  at 
Paris  (1921),  a  collection  of  lectures  delivered  by  mem 
bers  of  the  American  Peace  Commission  and  edited  by 
Edward  M.  House  and  Charles  Seymour.  Some  Prob 
lems  of  the  Peace  Conference  (1920),  by  C.  H.  Haskins 
and  R.  H.  Lord,  is  an  accurate  and  comprehensive 
analysis  of  the  territorial  questions  settled  at  Paris. 
The  British  point  of  view  and  the  most  important 
documents  are  given  in  A  History  of  the  Peace  Confer 
ence  of  Paris  (1920),  written  chiefly  by  British  dele 
gates  and  edited  by  H.  W.  V.  Temperley.  The  French 
point  of  view  is  admirably  presented  in  Andre  Tar- 
dieu's  The  Truth  about  the  Treaty  (1921).  An  excellent 
picture  of  the  conflict  of  interests  and  the  manner  in 
which  they  were  decided  is  to  be  found  in  C.  T.  Thomp 
son's  The  Peace  Conference  Day  by  Day  (1920).  Rob 
ert  Lansing's  The  Peace  Negotiations  (1921)  is  inter 
esting  as  giving  the  opinions  of  an  American  Com 
missioner  who  disagreed  with  Mr.  Wilson's  methods 
at  Paris.  J.  M.  Keynes's  The  Economic  Consequences 
of  the  Peace  (1920)  contains  an  economic  analysis  which 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  365 

is  more  trustworthy  than  his  brilliant,  but  misleading, 
picture  of  the  Conference.  It  should  not  be  read  ex 
cept  in  company  with  the  authoritative  and  accu 
rate  The  Making  of  the  Reparation  and  Economic 
Clauses  (1920),  by  B.  M.  Baruch.  A  clever  but  super 
ficial  criticism  of  President  Wilson's  peace  policies  is 
to  be  found  in  J.  M.  Beck's  The  Passing  of  the  New 
Freedom  (1920). 


INDEX 


Adams,  J.  Q.,  and  Monroe 
Doctrine,  30 

Adamson  Act,  90 

Adriatic  coast,  Italy's  claims 
on,  311;  see  also  Fiume 

Aircraft  Production  Board, 
140 

Airplanes,  production  for  army, 
134-35,  1S9-42 

Alaska  purchased  from  Russia, 
31 

Albert,  King  of  Belgium,  in 
Paris,  255 

Albert,  Dr.  H.  F.,  and  the 
Wilhelmina,  43;  and  German 
plots,  75;  loses  portfolio, 
76 

Algeciras  Conference  (1906), 
34 

Alien  Property  Custodian, 
179 

Alsace-Lorraine  returned  to 
France,  302,  324 

American  Ambulance  in 
France,  67 

American  Expeditionary  Force, 
no  provision  at  first  for,  121; 
Pershing  sent  to  France, 
122;  plans  for,  124-25;  cen 
tralization  under  Pershing, 
148;  training  in  France, 
200-02;  ports  for,  202-03; 
supply  depots,  203;  distri 
bution  of  supplies,  203-04; 
credit  due,  225-27;  defects, 
226;  see  also  Argonne,  Cha 
teau-Thierry,  St.  Mihiel 

American  Federation  of  Labor, 


delegates  aid  in  formation  of 
war  labor  policy,  182 

American  Protective  League, 
187 

Ancona,  torpedoed  in  Medi 
terranean,  57 

Arabia,  submarine  sinks,  56 

Archibald,  J.  F.  J.,  Dumba 
makes  use  of,  77 

Argentine,  grain  not  available 
for  Europe,  159 

Argonne,  foreign  artillery  used 
in,  134;  plans  for  advance, 
221;  defensive  importance 
for  Germans,  222;  American 
offensive,  222-23;  see  also 
Meuse-  Argonne 

Arizona  offered  by  Germany  as 
bribe  to  Mexico,  106 

Armaments,  Reduction  of, 
guarantees  not  taken  at 
Paris,  323;  League  Cove 
nant  provides,  324 

Armand,  Major,  discusses 
separate  peace  with  Austria, 
231 

Armenian,  submarine  attack, 
56 

Armistice  (Nov.  11,  1918), 
224,  228;  terms,  243 

Army,  General  Staff,  119-20, 
157,  188;  American  Expedi 
tionary  Force,  121,  122,  124 
et  seq.,  148,  200-04,  225-27; 
see  also  Argonne,  Chateau- 
Thierry,  St.  Mihiel;  original 
programme  (1917),  121; 
Roosevelt's  request  to  com- 


367 


368 


INDEX 


^rmy — Continued 
mand  volunteers,  122-23; 
Selective  Service  Act,  122, 
126-27,  133;  National  Army, 
128;  training,  128-29,  130- 
132;  cantonments,  129-30 
(note);  supplies,  129,  132- 
133,  134-43,  152;  democracy 
of,  134;  transportation  of 
troops,  195,  196-97 

Australia,  grain  not  available 
for  Europe,  159 

Austria,  Italy's  offensive 
against,  193;  attempts  for 
separate  peace  with,  231-32; 
treaty,  317,  321-22;  denied 
right  to  incorporate  with 
Germany,  322,  326;  see  also 
Austria-Hungary 

Austria-Hungary,  collapse,  224, 
228;  offers  to  negotiate  on 
basis  of  Fourteen  Points, 
241;  subject  nationalities 
receive  independence,  324; 
see  also  Austria,  Hungary 

Ay  res,  L.  P.,  The  War  with  Ger 
many,  cited,  142  (note) 

Baker,  N.  D.,  Secretary  of 
War,  as  pacifist,  85-86,  117- 
118;  delays  approving  ma 
chine  gun,  137;  and  Wilson, 
153;  and  coal  price  agree 
ment,  166-67 

Baldwin  Locomotive  Works, 
suspected  German  plot  at, 
79 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  Lloyd  George 
and,  13;  in  Council  of  Ten, 
270-71 

Baltimore,  Democratic  con 
vention  (1912),  7-8 

Banat  of  Temesvar,  "The  In 
quiry"  gathers  facts  con 
cerning,  260 

Bapaume,  capture  of,  192 

Bartlett,  C.  L.,  introduces  bill 
in  House  prohibiting  sales  to 
belligerents,  73 


Baruch,  B.  M.,  appointment 
by  Wilson,  15;  on  Council  of 
National  Defense,  155;  chair 
man  of  War  Industries 
Board,  157;  at  Peace  Con 
ference,  259,  276 

Belgium,  American  sympathy 
for,  38,  73,  114;  Wilson's 
answer  to  appeal,  40;  relief, 
67;  effect  in  America  of  de 
portation  of  civilians,  97, 
99;  Germans  rank  United 
States  Army  with  that  of, 
117;  Hoover  in,  160;  com 
plaint  against  treaty,  321; 
treaty  provision  regarding, 
324 

Belleau  Woods,  attack  on,  214, 
225 

Benes,  Edward,  Foreign 
Minister  of  Czecho-Slovak 
Republic,  and  Council  of 
Ten,  274 

Benson,  Admiral  W.  S.,  and 
Daniels,  144 

Bernstorff,  Johann  von,  Ger 
man  Ambassador  in  Wash 
ington,  41-42,  75,  106;  dis 
missed,  108 

Bethlehem  Steel  Company, 
suspected  German  plots  in 
plant  of,  79 

Bethmann-Hollweg  and  sub 
marine  warfare,  106 

"Big  Four,"  see  Council  of 
Four 

Bliss,  General  T.  H.,  on  Su 
preme  Military  Council,  205- 
206;  on  Peace  Commission, 
249 

Blockade,  British  blockade  of 
foodstuffs,  45;  as  justi 
fication  of  submarine  war 
fare,  53;  effect  of  submarine 
warfare  upon  American 
ports,  110 

Bolshevik  revolution,  193 

Borah,  W.  E.,  against  treaty 
and  League  of  Nations,  330- 


! 


INDEX 


369 


Borah,  W.  E.— Continued 
331,      342;      speech-making 
tour,  339-40 

Bordeaux,  port  allotted  Ameri 
can  Expeditionary  Force, 
202,  203 

Bosch  Magneto  Company, 
German  intrigue  and,  75 

Bourgeois,  Leon,  on  committee 
to  draft  plan  for  League  of 
Nations,  289 

Boy-Ed,  Karl,  German  naval 
attache,  75;  and  Mexico,  76; 
dismissed,  78 

Brandegee,  F.  B.,  against 
treaty  and  League  of 
Nations,  342 

Bratiano,  J.  J.  C.,  of  Rumania, 
and  Council  of  Ten,  274 

Brest,  destroyer  base  at,  199; 
port  allotted  American  Ex 
peditionary  Force,  202-03; 
George  Washington  reaches, 
254 

Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  239 

Bridgeport,  German  manu 
facturing  company  at,  75; 
strikes  at,  79 

British  Grand  Fleet,  American 
battleships  join,  199 

Brockdorff-Rantzau,  U.  K.  C., 
graf  von,  German  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  317 

Browning  machine  gun,  137, 138 

Brusilov  attack,  193  ^ 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  leader  in  Demo 
cratic  convention  (1912),  7, 
8;  resigns  as  Secretary  of 
State,  53-54;  pacifist  sug 
gestion,  59;  popular  with 
pacifists,  70 

Bryn  Mawr  College,  Wilson 
professor  at,  3 

Bucharest  treaty,  239 

Bulgaria,  collapse,  224,  228, 
241;  treaty  term  regarding, 
327 

Burleson,  A.  S.,  and  Wilson, 
18;  Postmaster-General.  154 


Byng,  General,  at  Cambrai, 
193 

Caine,  Hall,  quoted,  105 

California  and  election  of  Wil 
son  (1916),  92 

Cambon,  Jules,  276 

Cambrai,  German  lines  broken 
at,  193,  224 

Canada,  Americans  in  forces 
of,  67 

Cantigny,  engagement  at,  211- 
212 

Caporetto,  Italian  collapse  at, 
193;  Foch  commands  French 
forces  in  Italy  after,  207 

Carl,  Emperor  of  Austria, 
desire  for  separate  peace, 
232 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  Wilson 
recognizes,  86;  protests 
American  expedition,  87 

Carrizal,  attack  by  Carranza's 
troops  at,  87 

Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  on  com 
mittee  to  draft  plan  for 
League  of  Nations,  289, 
290 

Chamberlain,  G.  E.,  and  pre 
paredness,  82 

Chateau-Thierry,  212-13,  216, 
225 

Chauchat  automatic  rifles, 
137 

Chemical  Warfare  Service, 
143 

Chemin  des  Dames,  210,  212 

Chicago.  Wilson  speaks  at,  83 

China,  American  policy  to 
ward,  31;  accepts  Japan's 
Shantung  claim,  315;  dele 
gates  refuse  to  sign  treaty, 
321 

Civil  War,  relations  with  Great 
Britain  during,  29 

Clark,  Champ,  candidate  for 
Presidential  nomination 
(1912),  8;  and  conscription, 
126 


370 


INDEX 


Clayton  Act,  90 
Clemenceau,  Georges,  treat 
ment  of  other  French  dele 
gates  at  Paris,  13;  signs  plea 
for  American  troops,  210; 
and  question  of  indemnity, 
281,  300,  301;  opposition  to 
Fourteen  Points,  251,  252; 
in  Council  of  Ten,  264-67; 
languages,  272;  on  Council 
of  Premiers,  277;  helps  for 
mulate  armistice  policy,  278; 
wounded,  278;  and  League 
of  Nations,  286-87,  288,  303; 
ability  to  conduct  plenary 
sessions,  289;  change  in  atti 
tude  toward  Wilson,  295; 
and  Fiume,  313 

Cleveland,  Wilson  speaks  at, 
83 

Coal,  see  Fuel  Administration 

Coffin,  H.  E.,  chairman  Air 
craft  Production  Board,  140; 
on  Council  of  National  De 
fense,  155 

Colleges,  Students'  Army 
Training  Corps,  131;  straw 
vote  on  treaty  in,  345 
(note) 

Colt  machine  gun,  137 

Commerce,  British  Orders  in 
Council  to  control,  42-43; 
see  alsy  Submarine  warfare, 
United  States  Shipping 
Board,  War  Trade  Board 

Committee  on  Engineering  and 
Education,  155-56 

Congress,  Wilson  and,  17,  21, 
191;  Wilson's  appeal  for 
Democratic,  18,  246-47;  and 
arming  of  merchant  vessels, 
58-59,  60,  110-11;  and  note 
to  Germany  (April  19,  1916), 
61;  pacifically- minded,  82; 
preparedness,  85;  Wilson's 
speech  in  Senate  (Jan.  22, 
1917), 103-05;  announcement 
of  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany  to, 


107-08;  Wilson's  speech 
(April  2,  1917),  111-13;  de 
clares  war,  116;  and  the 
army,  119, 133;  and  conscrip 
tion,  126;  appropriation  for 
airplanes,  140;  Overman  Act, 
149,  157,  189,  190;  Lever 
Act,  161,  167;  proposes  con 
trol  of  military  affairs,  188; 
atiacks  on  Wilson's  war  poli 
cies  by  Senate,  188-89;  Sen 
ate  and  the  treaty,  330  et  seq.; 
Foreign  Relations  Committee 
meets  Wilson  at  WThite 
House,  336-37 

Conscientious  objectors,  133 

Conscription,  sec  Draft 

Contraband,  British  interpre 
tation  of,  42 

Council  of  Foreign  Ministers, 
277 

Council  of  Four,  277-80 

Council  of  National  Defense, 
154  et  seq.;  W'ar  Industries 
Board,  156-59;  food  con 
servation,  159-66;  fuel  con 
servation,  166-71;  Labor 
Committee,  181;  publicity, 
186;  influence  lessened,  187 

Council  of  Premiers,  277 

Council  of  Ten,  experts  at 
meetings  of,  261;  organi 
zation  of,  262-64;  Supreme 
Council  called,  264;  meet 
ings,  264,  272-74;  personnel, 
264-72;  and  commissions, 
275;  becomes  unwieldy,  278; 
Wilson  leaves  League  com 
mittee  to  attend,  290 

Crillon,  Hotel,  home  of  Ameri 
can  Commission  at  Paris, 
258 

Crowe,  Sir  Eyre,  on  territorial 
commission,  276 

Crowell,  Benedict,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  quoted, 
135 

Cuba,  interest  of  United  States 
in,  29;  Pershing  in,  123 


INDEX 


371 


Cunliffe,  British  financial  ex 
pert,  300 

Gushing  attacked  by  German 
aeroplane,  49 

Czechoslovakia,  question  of 
autonomy  for  Czechs,  232; 
nationalistic  ambitions 
aroused  by  treaty,  322;  Ger 
mans  and  Magyars  in,  327; 
and  the  League,  328 

Czernin  von  Chudenitz,  Otto- 
kar,  count,  Austrian  Chan 
cellor,  239 

Daniels,  Josephus,  Secretary  of 
Navy,  144 

Danzig,  "The  Inquiry" 
gathers  facts  concerning, 
260;  treaty  provision,  326 

Davis,  Norman,  financial  ad 
visor  to  Peace  Commission, 
259,  276 

"Daylight  saving,"  169 

Democratic  party,  Wilson  and, 
5,  6;  convention  (1912), 
7-8;  Wilson  makes  plea  for 
Democratic  Congress,  18, 
246-47;  foreign  policy,  25- 
26,  35;  Wilson  and  machine 
leaders,  88 

Denman,  William,  chairman  of 
United  States  Shipping 
Board,  175 

Dent,  S.  H.,  and  conscription, 
126 

Dernburg,  Dr.  Bernhard,  and 
German  propaganda,  44,  72 

Dillon,  E.  J.,  on  Wilson,  9-10 

Disarmament,  see  Armaments, 
Reduction  of 

Draft,  Wilson  and,  122,  126; 
Selective  Service  Act,  122, 
127;  National  Army,  128; 
success  of,  133;  General 
Staff  prepares  plans  for, 
148 

Dulles,  J.  F.,  proposes  Repa 
rations  Commission,  306 
(note) 


Dumba,  Dr.  Constantin,  Aus 
trian  Ambassador  at  Wash 
ington,  77;  recall  requested, 
77-78 

Durazzo,  navy  at,  200 

East,    Far,    American    policy 

regarding,    31-32;    see    also 

China,  Japan 
Embargo,  question  of  embargo 

on  munitions,  43-45,  73  ^ 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation, 

175,  176,  178 
Emery,    H.     C.,    on    German 

pessimism    in    June,     1918, 

240 

Enfield  rifles,  139 
Entente,      American     opinion 

favors,    38;    see   also   Allies, 

names  of  countries 
Erzberger,  Matthias,  leader  of 

Reichstag  revolt,  229-30 
Expeditionary        Force,        see 

American         Expeditionary 

Force 

Faisal,  Emir,  Arabian  repre 
sentative  at  Peace  Confer 
ence,  261 

Falaba  sunk  by  submarine, 
49 

Fayolle,  General,  French 
leader,  206;  supports  Foch, 
208 

Fiume,  "The  Inquiry"  gathers 
facts  concerning,  260;  ques 
tion  of  Italian  claim,  261, 
312-14,  315-16 

Foch,  General  Ferdinand,  Per- 
shing  compared  with,  123; 
on  gasoline  conservation, 
170;  and  American  troops, 
196,  227;  made  commander- 
in-chief  of  Allied  armies, 
207;  Chemin  des  Dames, 
210;  launches  counter-offen 
sive  (July  18,  1918),  215- 
216;  political  movements 
supplement  victories  of,  228; 


872 


INDEX 


Foch,  General — Continued 
movement  on  Sedan,  241; 
and  armistice,  244;  at  Peace 
Conference,  261;  and  Council 
of  Ten,  273;  inspects  troops 
on  Rhine,  320 

Food  Administration,  160-66 

Ford,  Henry,  sends  "Peace 
Ship"  to  Europe,  74 

Fore  River  shipyards,  176 

Forster,  Austrian  counselor, 
232 

"Four  Minute  Men,"  186 

Fourteen  Points,  Wilson  intro 
duces,  233-34,  353;  dis 
cussion  of,  234-38;  failure  of, 
238,  280,  322-23;  Austria- 
Hungary  offers  to  negotiate 
on  basis  of,  241;  Germans 
accept  as  basis  of  negoti 
ations,  242;  accepted  by 
Allies,  243,  244.  281;  Wilson 
goes  to  Paris  to  defend,  250; 
Wilson's  concessions,  287; 
territorial  settlements  carry 
out,  323-24 

France,  American  Expedition 
ary  Force,  see  Ameri 
can  Expeditionary  Force; 
French  army  ordered  out  of 
Mexico  by  United  States, 
29;  American  cause  identical 
with  that  of,  37;  messages 
to  Wilson,  40;  and  Wilson's 
note  (Dec.  18,  1916),  102; 
mission  to  United  States, 
122;  French  officers  instruct 
in  American  schools,  131; 
military  disappointment 
(1917),  192;  morale  low, 
193;  problem  of  frontier, 
302-03,  306-07,  325-26; 
complaint  against  treaty, 
321;  Alsace-Lorraine  re 
turned  to,  324 

Franco-British-American  alli 
ance,  310 

Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke  of 
Austria,  assassination,  27 


Freedom  of  the  seas,  one  of 
Fourteen  Points,  234;  not 
discussed  at  Peace  Confer 
ence,  287,  323 

Freya,  German  line  of  defense, 
223 

Fuel  Administration,  167-71, 
186 

Galicia,  "The  Inquiry" 
gathers  facts  concerning. 
260 

Gardner,  A.  P.,  and  prepared 
ness,  82 

Garfield,  H.  A.,  Wilson  and, 
15;  Fuel  Administrator,  167, 
171 

Garrison,  L.  M.,  Secretary  of 
War,  resigns,  85 

Gasoline  savings  effected  by 
gasless  Sundays,  170-71 

General  Medical  Board,  155 

General  Purchasing  Board, 
204 

General  Staff,  119-20,  157, 
188 

George  Washington,  Wilson's 
speech  on,  quoted,  40-41; 
German  boat,  179;  Wilson 
sails  on,  253,  254,  329; 
Wilson  and  experts  on,  260; 
ordered  to  Brest,  304 

Gerard,  J.  W.,  American  Am 
bassador  to  Germany,  re 
called,  108 

German-Americans,  opposi 
tion  to  Wilson,  70;  Wilson 
and,  79-80,  90,  91;  and  the 
treaty,  338 

Germany,  American  sympathy, 
37-38;  Wilson  answer  to 
protest  from,  40;  Wilson  and 
mediation,  41-42,  99;  Great 
Britain  blockades,  42;  tries 
to  prevent  export  of  Ameri 
can  munitions,  43-45;  prop 
aganda  in  America,  44,  65, 
71-74,  186;  submarine  war 
fare,  45-46.  47  et  seq., 


INDEX 


373 


Germany — Continued 

97,  99-100,  106-07,  109-10; 
Wilson's  reply  to  submarine 
threat,  46;  sinks  Lusitania, 
49-50;  Lusitania  notes,  54- 
56;  pledges  not  to  sink  lin 
ers  without  warning,  56-57; 
announcement  regarding 
armed  merchantmen,  57; 
Sussex  torpedoed,  60;  Wil 
son's  note  (April  16,  1916), 
61-63;  opinion  of  United 
States,  70,  117;  secret  in 
trigue  in  United  States,  74- 
80;  appeal  of  ninety- three 
professors,  72;  officials  dis 
missed  from  United  States, 
78;  U-53  off  American  coast, 
97;  proposes  negotiations 
(Dec.  12,  1916).  100-01; 
peace  note  to,  101-03;  warn 
ing  in  Wilson's  speech  (Jan. 
22,  1917),  104;  withdraws 
Sussex  pledge,  106;  diplo 
matic  relations  broken  off, 
107-08;  overt  acts,  109-10; 
publication  of  plans  regard 
ing  Mexico  and  Japan,  111; 
United  States  declares  war 
on,  111-14,  116;  attack 
(March  21,  1918),  206;  drive 
along  Lys,  209;  fourth  and 
last  drive  (July  15,  1918), 
214;  requests  armistice,  224, 
241;  abdication  of  Kaiser, 
229;  Reichstag  revolt  (July, 
1917),  229-30;  negotiations 
with  Russia,  232;  Wilson 
on  disposition  of  colonies, 
284;  delegates  at  Peace 
Conference,  317;  protests 
treaty  terms,  317;  accepts 
treaty,  320;  responsibility 
for  war,  354 

Gibraltar,    destroyer    base   at, 
199 

Godfrey,  Hollis,  on  Council  of 
National  Defense,  155 

Goethals.  General  G.  W..  head 


of  Emergency  Fleet  Cor 
poration,  175 

Goltz,  von  der,  plots  destruc 
tion  of  Welland  Canal,  76 

Gompers,  Samuel,  on  Council 
of  National  Defense,  155; 
at  Peace  Conference,  259 

Gore,  T.  P.,  introduces  Sen 
ate  resolution  regarding 
armed  merchant  vessels,  59 

Goricar,  Dr.  Joseph,  reve 
lations  concerning  Ger 
man  intrigue,  78-79 

Gough,  General,  army  de 
feated,  206 

Gouraud,  General,  supports 
Foch,  208;  and  German 
drive  of  July,  1918,  215 

Grandpre,  battle  around,  223 

Great  Britain,  relations  with 
United  States,  29,  33-34,  38; 
American  cause  identical 
with  that  of,  37;  Orders 
in  Council  for  control  of 
neutral  commerce,  42-43; 
United  States  disputes  ship 
ping  rights  with,  42-43,  65- 
66;  and  Wilson's  note  (Dec. 
18,  1916),  102;  and  Wilson's 
speech  (Jan.  22,  1917),  105; 
mission  to  United  States, 
122;  British  officers  instruct 
in  American  schools,  131; 
provides  transports  for 
troops,  179;  American  battle 
ships  join  British  Grand 
Fleet,  199;  see  also  Allies, 
Lloyd  George 

Greece,  demand  for  territory, 
282;  treaty  term  concerning, 
327 

Gregory,  T.  W.,  Attorney- 
General,  154 

Grey,  Viscount,  British  Am 
bassador  to  United  States, 
letter  concerning  League, 
347 

Gulflight  sunk  by  submarine, 
49 


S74 


INDEX 


Haig,  Sir  Douglas,  quoted,  209 

Hamburg- American  Line,  76 

Harvey,  Colonel  George,  men 
tions  Wilson  as  possible 
President  (1906),  5 

Hertling,  von,  German  Chan 
cellor,  238-39 

Hesperian  sunk  by  Germans, 
57 

Hindenburg,  General  Paul  von, 
retreat  on  Somme  front,  192; 
line  broken,  224 

Hitchcock,  G.  M.,  Wilson 
writes  to,  344,  346 

Hog  Island  shipyards,  176 

Holland,  agents  of  General 
Purchasing  Board  in,  204 

Hoover,  H.  C.,  head  of  Food 
Administration,  160-64;  per 
sonal  characteristics,  160; 
and  morale,  186;  at  Peace 
Conference,  259;  and  League 
of  Nations,  328,  346 

Horn,  Werner,  plans  destruc 
tion  of  bridge  at  Vanceboro 
(Maine),  75 

House,  Colonel  E.  M.,  and 
Wilson,  12,  18,  49,  260,  334- 
335;  sent  to  Europe,  (1914- 
15),  47-49;  personal  char 
acteristics,  47-48;  war  mis 
sion  (1917),  194-95;  and 
appointment  of  a  general 
issimo,  207;  and  separate 
peace  with  Austria,  .231; 
sent  abroad  for  armistice 
plan,  241,  242,  278;  on 
Pea^e  Commission,  249;  at 
Peace  Conference,  258;  and 
"The  Inquiry,"  259-60;  sug 
gests  territorial  commissions, 
275-76;  and  Council  of  Four, 
278-79;  and  League  of  Na 
tions  Covenant,  290;  as  medi 
ator  between  Wilson  and 
Allied  leaders,  304 

Huerta,  Victoriano,  German 
plot  to  restore,  76;  at  Vera 
Cruz.  86 


Hughes,  C.  E.,  Republican 
candidate  for  Presidency 
(1916),  91-92 

Hughes,  W.  M.,  Premier  of 
Australia,  demands  German 
colonies  for  Allies,  288-89 

Hungary,  treaty  and,  322;  and 
League,  328;  see  also 
Austria-Hu  ngary 

Hurley,  E.  N.,  chairman  of 
Shipping  Board,  176;  at 
Peace  Conference,  259 

Hurst,  C.  J.  B.,  legal  expert,  290 

Igel,  von,  German  agent,  80 

Indemnities,  Allies  delay  rais 
ing  issue,  244-45;  question 
of  German,  296-302;  settle 
ment  in  treaty,  304-06;  flaw 
in  treaty  regarding,  322; 
justice  of,  325 

Initiative  and  referendum  in 
Oregon,  15 

"Inquiry,  The,"  Colonel 
House  establishes,  260,  276- 
277 

Interallied  Board  of  Supplies, 
204 

Irish  in  United  States,  29; 
against  Wilson,  59 

Italy,  offensive  against  Austria, 
193;  claims,  310-14;  com 
plaint  against  treaty,  321; 
annexations,  326-27 

Japan,  interest  of  United 
States  in,  31;  Roosevelt  as 
peacemaker  between  Russia 
and,  34;  question  of  immi 
gration  from,  35,  70;  Ger 
man  intrigue  concerning, 
106;  delegates  in  Council  of 
Ten,  271;  claims,  310,  315- 
317;  and  League  Covenant, 
314;  threatens  withdrawal 
from  Conference,  315;  de 
mands  acceded  to,  321 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  policy  of 
non-intervention.  30 


INDEX 


375 


Joffre,  General,  J.  J.  C.,  with 
mission  to  United  States, 
122;  battle  of  the  Marne, 
207 

Johns  Hopkins  University, 
Wilson  at,  3 

Johnson,  Hiram,  Governor  of 
California,  92;  as  Senator 
hostile  to  League  and  treaty, 
330,  339-40,  342 

Jugoslavs,  and  Wilson,  228- 
229;  Austria  counselled  to 
grant  autonomy  to,  232; 
application  of  Treaty  of 
London  against,  311;  na 
tionalistic  ambitions  aroused 
by  treaty,  322;  placed  under 
Italian  rule,  326-27 

Julian  Alps,  Italy's  claim,  311 

Kahn,  Julius,  and  conscription, 

126 
Keynes,    J.    M.,    on    Wilson, 

24 
Kiau-Chau,  Japan's  claim  to, 

315,  321 
Kitchin,     Claude,     leader     of 

House,  and  draft,  126 
Klotz,  French  Finance  Minis 
ter,  and  indemnities,  300 
Knox,  P.  C.,  treaty  resolution, 

345 
Kronprinzessin  Cecilie,  voyage 

of,  28 

Labor,  McAdoo's  concessions, 
174;  and  German  propa 
ganda,  186 

Labor  Department,  reorgani 
zation,  181;  national  war 
labor  policy,  182 

La  Fayette,  Marquis  de,  em 
phasis  of  history  on,  38; 
"La  Fayette,  we  are  here!" 
123 

Lammasch,  Austrian  liberal, 
232 

Lament,  T.  W.,  and  Wilson, 
12;  on  Wilson,  12-13  (note). 


at  Peace  Conference,  259. 
276 

Lane,  F.  K.,  Secretary  of  In 
terior,  153 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  peace  speech 
(1917),  232 

Lansing,  Robert,  Secretary  of 
State,  58,  153-54;  Wilson 
and,  13,  271;  proposes  ceas 
ing  to  arm  merchantmen,  58; 
on  Peace  Commission,  249; 
in  Council  of  Ten,  268,  269 

Latin  America,  United  States' 
relations  with,  35 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  Wil 
son's  speech  before,  95;  Taft 
president  of,  96;  Wilson  and, 
283 

League  of  Nations,  281  et  seq.; 
refusal  to  discuss  (1916), 
102;  Wilson  and,  238,  353; 
Taft  and  Root  pledged  to, 
249;  Wilson  heads  com 
mission  working  on,  275, 
276;  incorporation  in  treaty, 
286,  287-88,  327;  Covenant 
completed,  290;  mechanism, 
290-92;  revised  Covenant 
adopted,  309;  Germany  ex 
cluded  from,  317;  opposition 
to,  330  et  seq.',  reservations 
suggested  by  Senate,  334; 
in  operation,  359 

Lever  Act,  161,  167 

Leviathan,  Vaterland  rechris- 
tened,  179 

Lewis  machine  gun,  137 

Liberty  Bonds,  183,  184- 
186 

Liberty  Motor,  140 

Lloyd  George,  and  Balfour,  13; 
signs  plea  for  American 
troops,  210;  and  separate 
peace  with  Austria,  231;  out 
lines  terms  of  peace  (1917), 
232-33,  236;  and  indemnity, 
244,  281,  300,  301;  and  Wil 
son's  peace  programme,  252; 
at  Peace  Conference,  258; 


376 


INDEX 


Lloyd  George — Continued 
in  Council  of  Ten,  269-70; 
on  Council  of  Premiers,  277; 
on  committee  to  formulate 
armistice  policy,  278;  delays 
opening  of  Peace  Confer 
ence,  285;  and  League  of 
Nations,  287;  and  "manda 
tories,"  289;  change  in  atti 
tude  toward  Wilson,  295; 
opposes  French  annexation 
of  Saar  region,  302;  and 
Fiume,  313;  on  modification 
of  treaty  terms,  318,  319 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  reservation  on 
Article  X  of  League  Cove 
nant,  15;  opposition  to  treaty 
and  League,  330,  333,  335, 

339,  342,  344,  345,  347,  348; 
personal  conflict  with  Wilson, 

340,  346 

Lorraine  front,  Americans  on, 
211 

Loucheur,  financial  expert, 
300 

Louvain  library  burned,  73 

Ludendorff,  General  Erich  von, 
German  leader,  230,  232, 
239,  240 

Lusitania,  Germans  sink,  49; 
effect  on  America,  50-51, 
114;  notes,  53,  54,  56;  Ger 
man  pledge,  56-57;  Ger 
many  does  not  disavow, 
57 

McAdoo,  W.  G.,  Secretary  of 
Treasury,  153;  Director- 
General  of  Railroads,  172; 
concessions  to  labor,  174; 
and  taxation,  183 

McCormick,  Vance,  Wilson 
and,  15;  heads  War  Trade 
Board,  130;  at  Peace  Confer 
ence,  259,  276 

McCumber,  Senator,  spokes 
man  in  Senate  for  middle- 
ground  Republicans  on 
treaty,  336,  337,  344 


McKinley,  William,  and  dec 
laration  of  war  on  Spain, 
51;  begs  for  Republican 
Congress  (1898),  246 

McLemore,  Jeff,  introduces 
House  resolution  concerning 
armed  merchant  vessels,  59 

Magyars,  and  Wilson,  229; 
prevent  separate  peace  with 
Austria,  232 

Maine,  sinking  of  (1898),  51 

"Mandatories,"  288 

Mangin,  General,  supports 
Foch,  208 

Mantoux,  interpreter  for 
Council  of  Ten,  272-73 

Marne,  Foch  at  battle  of  the, 
207;  Germans  reach,  210 

Martin,  F.  H.,  on  Council  of 
National  Defense,  155 

Masaryk,  T.  G.,  President  of 
Czecho-Slovak  Republic,  on 
Wilson,  10 

Max,  Prince,  of  Baden,  Ger 
man  Chancellor,  241 

Merchant  vessels,  submarine 
warfare  against,  45-46,  57- 
58;  British  arm,  57;  question 
of  ceasing  to  arm,  58;  ques 
tion  of  warning  Americans 
from,  59-60;  WTilson  asks 
authority  to  arm,  110 

Meuse-Argonne  drive,  124; 
Browning  machine  guns  used 
in,  138;  see  also  Argonne 

Mexico,  United  States  orders 
French  army  from,  29;  prob 
lem  in  1912,  35;  relations 
(1916),  86;  expedition 
against  Villa,  87-88,  123; 
German  intrigue,  106,  111 

Miller,  D.  H.,  legal  expert, 
290 

Milwaukee,  Wilson  speaks  at, 
83 

Minnesota,  election  (1916), 
92 

Monroe  Doctrine,  30-31,  3% 
103-04.  309,  334 


INDEX 


377 


Monf  Agu,  financial  expert,  300 
Munitions,    Ministry    of,  pro 
posed,  188 
Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  37 

National  Army,  128;  canton- 
meats  built,  129-30  (note) 

Nat  onal  Guard,  189 

National  Industrial  Confer 
ence  Board,  182 

"National  Security  League,  81, 
82 

National  War  Labor  Board, 
182 

Navy,  preparedness,  143-45; 
expansion  of,  145-46 ;  con 
voy  troop  ships,  197;  hunt 
submarines,  197;  Ordnance 
Bureau  manufactures  mines, 
200;  and  mine  barrage,  200 

Nebraskan,  submarine  attack 
on,  56 

Neutrality,  27  et  seq.,  352-53; 
bibliography,  362 

New  Jersey,  Wilson  as  Gover 
nor  of,  5-7,  21 

New  Mexico,  promised  by 
Germany  as  bribe  to  Mexico, 
106 

New  York  (State),  election 
(1916),  92 

New  York  City,  German  press 
bureau  in,  72;  Wilson's 
speech,  294-95 

New  York  Times,  and  election 
(1916),  92 

Nivelle,  General  R.  G.,  plans 
French  offensive,  192-93 

"Non-intervention,"  policy  of, 
30 

North  Sea,  American  battle 
ships  in,  199-200 

Notes,  protest  to  British 
Government,  43;  warning  to 
Germany  of  American  rights 
on  high  seas,  46;  Lusitania 
notes,  53-57,  61;  to  Ger 
many  (April  19.  1916),  61. 
107 


Officers'  training  camp,  130- 
131 

Olney,  Richard,  on  American 
foreign  policy,  33 

Orduna,  submarine  attack  on, 
56 

Oregon,  question  of  initiative 
and  referendum  in,  15 

Orlando,  V.  E.,  signs  plea  for 
American  troops,  210;  in 
Council  of  Ten,  272;  on 
Council  of  Premiers,  277; 
and  Fiume  claim,  312;  retires 
from  Conference,  313;  re 
sumes  place  in  Conference, 
314 

Overman  Act,  149,  157,189, 190 

Pacifists,  Wilson  as  pacifist, 
39-40;  organizations,  73; 
Ford's  "Peace  Ship,"  74l, 
oppose  preparedness,  81; 
and  Liberty  Loans,  187 

Paderewski,  I.  J.,  and  Council 
of  Ten,  274 

Panama  Canal,  question  of 
tolls,  35 

Papen,  Franz  von,  German 
military  attache,  75,  76; 
letter  to  his  wife,  77;  dis 
missed,  78 

Paris,  fears  capture  (1918), 
210;  see  also  Peace  Con 
ference 

Peace  Conference,  254  et  seq.; 
Wilson  at,  23;  American 
Commission,  248-50;  delay 
in  opening,  256-57,  285;  lack 
of  organization,  257;  atmos 
phere,  257-58;  meets  (Jan. 
18,  1919),  261;  commissions, 
275-76;  German  delegates  at, 
317;  bibliography,  364-65 

"Peace  Ship,"  Henry  Ford 
sends  to  Europe,  74 

Pennsylvania,  battleship,  pre 
cedes  George  Washington  out 
of  New  York  harbor,  253 

Peronne,  capture  of,  192 


378 


INDEX 


Pershing,  General  J.  J.,  Mexi 
can  expedition,  87,  88;  com 
mands  American  Expedi 
tionary  Force,  122,  123-24, 
148;  personal  characteristics, 
123;  calls  for  replacements, 
130;  insistant  on  offensive 
spirit,  131;  and  Browning 
guns,  138;  plea  for  troops, 
194,  196;  policy,  205;  policy 
shattered,  208-09;  con 
fidence  in  American  troops, 
211,  222;  on  Americans  at 
Soissons,  216;  and  armistice, 
244;  ready  for  invasion  of 
Germany,  320 

Petain,  General  H.  P.,  Per 
shing  compared  with,  123; 
supports  Foch,  207 

Philippines,  and  American  for 
eign  policy,  32;  problem  in 
1912,  35;  Pershing's  experi 
ence  in,  123 

Pichon,  Stephane,  French  For 
eign  Minister,  Council  of 
Ten  meets  in  study  of,  264; 
in  Council  of  Ten,  267 

Pittsburgh,  Wilson  speaks  at, 
83 

Plattsburg  (N.  Y.),  civilian 
camp  at,  82 

Plebiscites,  326;  see  also  Self- 
determination 

Poland,  Austria  and  Poles, 
232;  claims,  282;  national 
istic  ambitions  aroused  by 
treaty,  322;  independence 
recognized,  324;  outlet  to 
sea,  326;  and  League,  328 

Politics,  insignificant  r61e  in 
Great  War,  226;  see  also 
Democratic  party,  Republi 
can  party 

Pomerene,  Atlee,  proposes 
committee  of  conciliation  for 
treaty,  345 

Portugal,  Germany  ranks 
American  army  with  that  of, 
117 


Preparedness,  71  et  seq.\  Wilson 
and,  15,  58,  117,  118;  Wood 
on,  80-81;  of  army  when 
war  declared,  117 

Princeton  University,  Wilson 
at,  3-5 

Progressive  party,  92 

Propaganda,  German,  44,  65, 
71-74,  186 

Punch,  cartoon  on  Wilson's 
patience,  56 

Quai  d'Orsay,  Peace  Confer 
ence  held  at,  261,  310 

Queenstown,  destroyers  sent 
to,  145,  197,  199 

Raggi,  Salvage,  on  territorial 
commission  of  Peace  Confer 
ence,  276 

Reading,  Lord,  refuses  mission 
for  separate  peace  with  Aus 
tria,  231 

Red  Cross,  American  help  for, 
67 

Reparations  Commission,  305- 
306;  see  also  Indemnities 

Republican  party,  and  Wilson, 
1,  5-6;  and  election  of  1916, 
89-92;  success  (1918),  247 

Revertata,  Austrian  emissary, 
231 

Rheims  cathedral  shelled,  73 

Rintelen,  Franz  von,  German 
agent,  80 

Roebling  wire-rope  shop,  sus 
pected  German  plots  in,  79 

Roosevelt,  F.  D.,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  Navy,  144 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  Wilson 
contrasted  to,  16-17,  18;  as 
peacemaker  between  Rus 
sia  and  Japan,  34;  on 
America's  policy  of  non 
intervention  in  Europe,  39, 
53,  69;  Republicans  refuse 
as  candidate  (1916),  90-91; 
Wilson  refuses  volunteer 
command,  122-23;  attack  on 


INDEX 


379 


,  Theodore— -Jlont'd 
Wilson's  war  policies,    188; 
pies*    for    Republican    Con 
gress     (1898).     246-47;     on 
making  of  the  peace,  251 

Root,  Elihu,  popular  demand 
for  membership  on  Peace 
Commission,  249 

Rosenwald,  Julius,  on  Council 
of  National  Defense,  155 

Rumania,  enters  war,  99;  de 
feat,  100;  demand  for  terri 
tory,  282;  nationalistic  am 
bitions  aroused  by  treaty, 
82.2;  boundaries  extended, 
32\v 

Russia,  Alaska  purchased  from, 
31;  Roosevelt  as  peacemaker 
between  Japan  and,  34; 
in  1916,  100;  wheat  supply 
cut  off  from  Europe,  159; 
Bolshevik  revolution,  193; 
Brusilov  attack,  193;  nego 
tiations  with  Germany,  232; 
Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  239; 
problem  unsettled,  322 

Ruthenians  complain  of  treaty, 
322 

Ryan,  J.  D.,  director  of  aircraft 
production  for  army,  142 

S.  O.  S.,  see  Service  of  Supply 

Saar,  "The  Inquiry"  gathers 
facts  concerning,  260; 
French  claim,  302,  325;  and 
the  League,  328 

St.  Louis,  Wilson  speaks  at, 
83 

St.  Mihiel,  battle,  124,  134, 
211,  218,  219-20 

St.  Nazaire,  port  allotted  to 
American  Expeditionary 
Force,  202 

St.  Quentin,  American  en 
gineering  units  at,  211;  Hin- 
denburg  line  broken  at, 
224 

Scheidemann,  Philipp,  Ger 
man  premier,  317 


Schwab,  C.  M.,  in  charge  of 
Emergency  Fleet  Corpora 
tion,  176,  178 

Selective  Service  Act,  122,  127; 
see  also  Draft 

Self-determination,  principle 
of,  325;  see  also  Plebiscites 

Serbia,  relief,  67;  demand  for 
territory,  282;  treaty  term 
concerning,  327 

Service  of  Supply,  202-05 

Shadowlawn,  Wilson's  speech 
at,  98 

Shantung,  Japan's  claim,  315- 
317;  Chinese  resent  settle 
ment,  321 

Shipping  Board,  see  United 
States  Shipping  Board 

Sims,  Admiral  W.  S.,  com 
mands  destroyer  flotillas, 
145,  197;  personal  char 
acteristics,  198;  inter 
national  reputation,  198-99 

Smith,  James,  Democratic  boss 
of  New  Jersey,  Wilson  and,  6 

Smuts,  General,  mission  to 
Switzerland  in  behalf  of 
peace  with  Austria,  231;  and 
League  of  Nations,  289,  290- 
signs  treaty,  321 

Soissons,  American  troops  at. 
216 

Somme  front,  Hindenburg's 
retreat,  192 

Sonnino,  S.  C.,  Baron,  Italian 
Peace    Commissioner,    251; 
opposed     Wilson's     pro 
gramme,  252;  in  Council  of 
Ten,      271-72;     languages, 
272;  and  Fiume,  312 
Spain,  war  with,  28,  29,  30,  32, 
33,    51;    agent    of    General 
Purchasing  Board  in,  204 
Springfield  rifle,  138 
Stone,    W.    J.,    approves   em 
bargo     on     munitions,     44; 
supports     resolutions     con 
cerning     armed      merchant 
vessels,  59 


880 


INDEX 


Students*  Army  Training 
Corps.  131 

Submarine  warfare,  45,  47  et 
teq.t  105,  106-07.  109-10. 
193 

Sumner,  British  financial  ex 
pert,  300 

Sussex,  torpedoed  without 
warning,  60,  80;  pledge,  62, 
97;  feeling  in  America  re 
garding,  99;  withdrawal  of 
pledge,  106 

Switzerland,  agent  of  General 
Purchasing  Board  in,  204 

Taft,  W.  H..  attitude  toward 
America's  entering  war,  53; 
president  of  League  to  En 
force  Peace,  96;  on  National 
War  Labor  Board,  182;  popu 
lar  demand  for  membership 
on  Peace  Commission,  249; 
for  compromise  on  treaty, 
346 

Tardieu,  Andr6,  in  Council  of 
Ten,  267;  on  territorial  com 
mission,  276;  assists  House  in 
reconciling  Wilson  and 
Allied  leaders,  304 

Tauscher,  Captain  Hans,  and 
German  plots,  76 

Teschen.  "The  Inquiry" 
gathers  facts  concerning 
mines  in,  260 

Texas  promised  by  Germany  as 
bribe  to  Mexico,  106 

Times,  London,  Wilson  sanc 
tions  Britain's  position  *  on 
seas  in,  323 

Treaty,  flaws  in,  321-22;  Sen 
ate  and,  330  et  seq.;  see  also 
League  of  Nations,  Peace 
Conference 

Treaty  of  London,  310-11,  312. 
313.  314 

Tumulty.  J.  P..  Wilson  and, 
18 

Turkey,    collapse,    224.    228 

Tyrol,  Italian  claim  in,  288, 


311;  Italy  granted  territory. 
326 

Underwood,  O.  W.,  mo^ionfof 
ratification  of  treaty,  544 

United  States,  foreign  policy, 
30-36;  material  change  due 
to  war  (1914-16),  66-68; 
blindness  to  war  issues,  68; 
reasons  for  entering  wax, 
114-15 

United  States  Shipping  Board, 


Vanceboro    (Maine),    Ge/*nan 

plot  to  destroy  bridge,  li,  75 

Vaterland   rechristened    Levia 

than,  179 

Venezuelan  crisis,  30 
Venizelos,  Eleutherios.  and 
Council  of  Ten,  273-74: 
member  of  League  of  Na 
tions  commission,  289;  on 
League,  328 

Vera  Cruz,  occupation  of,  86 
Vickers  machine  guns,  137 
Vigilancia  torpedoed,  111 
Villa,     Francisco,     expedition 
against,  87,  123 

War    Industries    Board,    156, 

188 
War    Labor    Policies     Board, 

182 

War  Trade  Board,  179,  259 
Washington,     George,     warns 

against  entangling  alliances, 

28 
Welland  Canal,  German  plot  to 

destroy.  75-76 
Wesleyan    University,    Wilson  (, 

as  professor  at,  3 
White,    Henry,    at    Algeciras 

Conference,    34;    on    Peace 

Commission,  249 
Wilhelmina,  British  seize,  43 
Willard,  Daniel,  on  Council  of 

National  Defense,  155 


INDEX 


381 


Wilson.  Woodrow,  as  an  execu 
tive,  1  et  *eq.\  elected  Presi 
dent,  1,  8;  age,  2;  early  life, 
ft;  personal  characteristics, 
2-3,  8  et  seq.;  Congressional 
Government,  thesis,  3;  Pro- 
fesaor  at  Princeton,  3;  gradu 
ate  work  at  Johns  Hopkins, 
JJ;  President  of  Princeton,  4; 
enters  politics,  5;  Governor 
of  New  Jersey,  5-7;  Presi 
dential  nomination,  7-8; 
Cabinet,  13-14,  153-54;  ap 
pointments,  13-15;  social 
relations,  17;  tactical  mis 
takes,  18,  19-20,  247-48, 
29it\;  speeches,  19;  as  phrase- 
maiier,  19,  51-52;  unpopu 
larity,  19-20,  68-70,  89, 
245-46,  253,  332,  337-38; 
political  principles,  20-23; 
religious  convictions,  23-24; 
and  foreign  affairs,  25-26, 
35;  and  neutrality,  39-41; 
and  mediation,  41-42,  99, 
100;  and  proposed  embargo 
on  munitions,  44;  answer  to 
German  submarine  proc 
lamation,  46;  and  House,  47, 
48;  diplomatic  struggle  with 
Germany,  52-57;  and  right 
of  merchantmen  to  arm  for 
defense,  58-60,  110-11;  Sus 
sex  note  to  Germany,  61-62; 
change  in  foreign  policy,  63- 
65;  on  German- Americans, 
79-80,  90,  91;  and  prepared 
ness,  81,  82,  84-85,  90,  117- 
118, 151;  speech-making  tour 
(1916),  83-84;  and  Mexico, 
86-88;  political  strength,  88- 
89;  reelection  (1916),  88-93, 
99;  development  of  inter 
national  ideal,  94-97;  speech 
at  Omaha,  98;  speech  at 
Shadowlawn,  98;  peace  note 
(Dec.  18,  1916),  100,  101-03; 
demands  definition  of  war 
aims,  101;  speech  in  Senate 


(Jan.  22,  1917),  103-05; 
severs  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany,  107-08; 
speech  in  Congress  (Feb.  3, 
1917),  107-09;  demand  that 
Congress  recognize  state  of 
war  (April  2,  1917),  111-13; 
idealism,  113-14,  115,  280; 
policy  of  centralization,  119- 
120,  147-49,  152-53,  188-91; 
and  Pershing,  122,  226;  and 
Roosevelt,  122-23;  and  draft, 
126;  proclamation  (May  18, 
1917),  150-51;  on  cooper 
ation  of  people,  156;  and 
Hoover,  160,  161;  and  Gar- 
field,  167;  and  revolt  in  Sen- 
ate  against  war  policies,  188- 
189,  190-91;  supports  ap 
pointment  of  generalissimo, 
207;  receives  plea  for  troops 
from  Allies,  210;  distribution 
of  speeches  in  Central  Em 
pires,  228;  Flag  Day  address. 
229;  reply  to  Pope's  peace 
proposals,  230-31;  and  ques 
tion  of  separate  peace  with 
Austria,  231;  formulates 
Fourteen  Points,  233-38; 
appeals  to  peoples  of  Central 
Empire,  239-40;  Germany 
requests  armistice  of,  241; 
negotiations  with  Germany, 
242;  responsibility  for  armi 
stice,  243;  power  in  situation, 
245;  appeal  for  Democratic 
Congress,  246,  247;  appoint 
ment  of  Peace  Commission, 
248-50;  decision  to  go  to 
Paris,  250,  251-53;  Roose 
velt  on,  251;  arrival  in 
Europe,  254;  in  Paris,  254; 
in  England,  255;  in  Italy. 
255;  stands  for  justice,  255- 
256,  282;  popularity  wanes. 
256;  use  of  experts,  260;  in 
Council  of  Ten,  268;  and 
Lloyd  George,  270;  heads 
League  of  Nations  com- 


382 


INDEX 


Wilson,  Woodrow — Continued 
mission,  275,  276;  on  Council 
of  Premiers,  277;  and  Coun 
cil  of  Four,  279,  280;  difficul 
ties  of  task,  281,  284;  and 
indemnities,  281,  296-97; 
and  demands  of  smaller 
nationalities,  281-82;  and 
League  of  Nations,  282-84, 
286.  289-90,  310,  343-44, 
346,  348-49,  353;  on  dis 
position  of  German  colonies, 
284, 288;  original  treaty  plan, 
285;  and  Clemenceau,  286- 
287;  British  delegates  sup 
port,  287,  288;  and  "manda 
tories,"  288;  returns  to 
United  States,  290,  292-95; 
failure  to  convince  America 
of  League's  value,  293-95; 
speech  in  Metropolitan  Opera 
House,  New  York  City,  294- 
295 ;  returns  to  Paris,  295 ;  op 
poses  French  annexation  of 
Saar  region,  302;  French  at 
tacks  on,  303-04;  threatens 
to  leave  Conference,  304; 
compromises,  304-08,  309, 
310;  andFiume,  312-13;  and 
Shantung  claim,  315, 316-17; 
on  modification  of  treaty, 
318-19;  cheered  upon  Ger 
many's  acceptance  of  treaty, 
320;  returns  to  United  States, 


329;  inability  to  negotiate 
with  Senate,  333-35;  con 
ference  at  White  Irlouse, 
336-37;  lack  of  popular  sup 
port,  337-38;  speech-ijnaking 
tour  in  West,  339-40;  'i  break 
down,  341;  and  treaty  .reser 
vations,  341-42,  348;  bfiame 
for  defeat  of  treaty,  350, 
351;  phases  of  adminis 
tration,  852-53;  estimate  of 
achievement,  353-59;  bibl;| 
ography,  361-62 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  en 
unpreparedness  of  army,  80- 
81;  at  Plattsburg,  82;  on 
failure  of  American  airplane 
production,  142 

Works,  J.  D.,  introduces  Sen 
ate  bill  prohibiting  sale  of 
munitions,  73 

World,  New  York,  admits  Wil 
son's  defeat  (1916),  92 

Yarrowdale,  German  cruelty  to 
American  prisoners  on,  111 

Yser,  battle  of  the,  Foch  at, 
207 

Zeebrugge,  naval  work  at, 
200 

Zimmermann,  A.  F.  M.,  Ger 
man  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  106.  114 


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